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Abstract
Maximus the Confessor is increasingly being recognised as a theologian of towering
ecumenical importance. Here I put to him a question which from the origins of Christian
thought until the present constitutes an interpretative crux for catholic Christianity: what is
the nature and function of the material order and, specifically, of the human body, in God's
creative, redemptive, and perfective economies?
The thesis unfolds in five chapters under the rubrics of epistemology, cosmology,
christology, ecclesiology, and spirituality. Each specifies an integral dimension in the
Confessor's theological vision through which I engage his central motif: God the Word
wills always to be embodied in all things. By virtue of their respective teleological
orientation to Christ the incarnate Word, creation, history, and the virtuous life each
functions as a pedagogical strategy by which the transcendent God simultaneously conceals
and reveals himself with the aim of leading all creation, including the body, into deifying
union with himself by grace. Apart from this orientation material diversity possesses a
diffuse, divisive character. The insubordination of the sensible and irrational leads to
personal and cosmic disorder and the eventual dissolution of spiritual well-being. By virtue
of the hypostatic union, the deification of Christ's body and its participation in supernatural
modalities do not simply present the pinnacle of moral perfection, but constitute the
paradigmatic and definitive renewal of fallen creation. The particular bodily events suffered
by Jesus, culminating in his death, form the concrete, causative loci of redemptive,
universally effective divine activity. Ritual and ascetic participation in this activity certainly
entails intellectual abstraction, but only in conjunction with purification from defiling
attachments and ecclesial engagement in the social realisation of divine love.
I conclude that Maximus affirms a constitutive but contingent place for the
corporeal relative to its subordination to the divinely instituted primacy of the intelligible.
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1INTRODUCTION
Caro salutis est cardo. The flesh is the hinge of salvation. By these words with their
recognisably Johannine ring, Tertullian testifies in his De resurrectione mortuorum to a priority
of the corporeal over the spiritual in the Church's primary sacramental acts.' For the
Fathers who followed him, whether Latin or Greek, the corporeal was likewise regarded as
occupying a constitutive place not only in the sacramental realm, but in the whole
soteriological order as well. Alexandrian christology in particular, which in the Third and
Fourth Ecumenical Councils was to achieve normative status for all catholic christendom,
was marked by the soteriological principle that 'that alone is redeemed which is taken by
Christ in the Incarnation',2 a principle extending to the very material dust from which man
was formed in Eden by God. In Christ's very flesh, itself the flesh of God the eternal
Word, lies the world's healing and salvation.
This distinctly incarnational character of Christian faith and life has to a great
extent always been recognised and vigorously defended by adherents of the catholic
tradition as somehow constitutive of Christianity. In recent decades however, perhaps in
view of a resurgence of neo-gnostic and reductionistic trends in the modern period in
general and in contemporary ecdesial life in particular, we are noticing an increasingly
urgent movement that seeks in continuity with mainstream tradition to define and locate
catholic Christianity by external, bodily means. The 'Theologies of the Body' inspired by
the personalist and incamational emphases in the teaching of Pope John Paul II suggest
Tert.Res. 8.2 (CCSL 2, 931.6-7).
2 CCT, volume 1, 366. Cf. Iren.Haer. 2.22.4; 5.14.1-4; Or.Herac. (SC 67, 70.35-37): 'The whole human being
would not have been saved if he [the Saviour and Lord] had not assumed the whole human being';
Greg.Naz.Ep. 101 (SC 208,1.32).
themselves as one example of such a response.' In her book especially dedicated to the
Holy Father entitled Toward a Theology of the Body, Franciscan Mary Timothy Prokes argues
that 'the genuineness and the intrinsic meaning of Christ's embodiment touches each of the
central tenets of faith.'4 She concurs with Cipriano Vagaggini's claim that 'the physical body
of Christ possesses a function that is always active and permanent and even eternal: 5 It follows
that 'when the corporeal reality of Christ's life, death and resurrection is open to vague
interpretations the basic meaning of Christianity disintegrates:6
Prokes' is not a lone voice. Her concerns laudably echo the anti-docetic and anti-
gnostic sentiments of nearly two millenia of Christian thought. Yet it may plausibly be
advanced that there is equally discernible throughout the Church's life what has been called
a 'tradition of inwardness', a fundamental intuition that 'inwardness qualifies the external
dimensions of Christianity:7
 What exactly is this 'inwardness'? Is it the inwardness of a
Friedrich Schleiermacher, who conceived Christian redemption in terms of a subjective,
inward 'feeling of dependence' and a consequent actualisation of God-consciousness?' Is it
the inwardness of an Adolf von Harnack who, like Schleiermacher, idealised adherence to
an inner gospel essence purged from all formal, external, historically conditioned criteria?'
Is it even the inwardness of much of what passes these days for 'mysticism' — perhaps the
kind promulgated by Aldous Huxley in The Perennial Philosophy which suspects sacramental
Christianity of 'an idolatrous preoccupation with events and things in time — events and
3 See Benedict Ashley, Theologies of the Body: Humanist and Christian (Braintree, MA: The Pope John Center,
1985).
4 Toward a Theology of the Body (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 63.
5 Toward a Theology of the Body, 62, quoting Cipriano Vagaggini, The Flesh Instrument of Salvation: A Theology of the
Human Body (Staten Island, NY: Society of St Paul, 1969), 16.
6 Toward a Theology of the Body, 139.
7 Stephen Sykes, The Identib, of Christianity: Theologians and the Essence of Chrictianiy from Schleiermacher to Barth
(London: SPCK, 1984), 35-44.
8 The Christian Faith, trans. H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989).
9 What is Christianity ?, trans. Thomas Bailey Saunders (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1957).
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things regarded not merely as useful means, but as ends, intrinsically sacred and indeed
divine'?' If so, then it is no wonder that those committed to realising the fully-rounded
contours of sacramental Christianity might be wary of any talk of a 'tradition of
inwardness.' With its abstract, idealistic appeals to disincarnate foundations for the spiritual
life, this kind of inwardness is increasingly being identified as symptomatic of a post-
Cartesian dualism that dominates modern Protestant thought. Not surprisingly we are
noticing not a few Protestants themselves issuing a call to return to externals, to
reformulate the very definition of spiritual theology by resurrecting its visible, concrete,
carnate roots. According to Episcopalian Owen Thomas, such a renewal 'will involve an
emphasis on the outer life as the major source of the inner life and, thus, a renewed stress
on the body and communal and public life as well as a renewed focus on participation in
the reign of God as the center of the Christian life, including a renewed emphasis on moral
and liturgical practice in Christian formation.'"
Where does early Christianity feature in this tension or indeed, in this
contemporary cry for the retrieval and concrete realisation in ecclesial life of the
incarnational mystery in its fullness? We saw above that for Tertullian and the normative
christological tradition the reality of God's external enfleshment in Christ, Church and
sacraments determines the very validity of the 'inner' spiritual quest. Yet in the view of
some contemporary thinkers the Fathers cannot be taken as entirely unambiguous
proponents of the full-blooded, somatic Christianity needed in our time. For some the
Fathers appear to exemplify that 'tradition of inwardness' in a way which subverts the
primacy of the external order established by the Incarnation and so threatens the integrity
lo (London: Chatto and Windus, 1946), 63.
3
of bodily life. In an essay originally published in 1939 but only recently translated into
English (1997), no less-devoted a student of the Fathers than Hans Urs von Balthasar, once
described by Henri de Lubac as 'perhaps the most learned man of our tirne,' 12 spoke
critically of what he saw as a movement evident in the Greek Fathers especially that
'proceeds unambiguously away from the material to the spiritual.' In his view a dogma as
basic to incarnational Christianity as the resurrection of the body, while 'formally confessed
and maintained' by the Fathers, sits uneasily within a worldview in which the flesh occupies
at best a liminal plane. 'Spiritualization,' he summarises disapprovingly, 'presented in a
thousand different colorations, is the basic tendency of the patristic epoch.'"
In response we want only to affirm at this stage the fact that in the writings of the
great catholic doctors of the ancient Church and in those Christian spiritual and intellectual
traditions whose springs run as deep, there appears an ordering - equally sensitive to the
perils of docetism or dualism - in which the spiritual does have priority over the material,
and indeed must do so, if theology and with it all reality is to avoid plunging into a nihilistic,
materialist chaos. What should be noted, however, and this might cause us to stop and
revisit at least some of our assumptions, is that the Fathers pose this priority not primarily
in terms of a strict opposition between the spiritual and material per se, but in terms of an
eschatologically oriented order (taxis) in which the external and material dimensions
become charged with efficacious, performative potency precisely and exclusively in their
subordinate relation to the 'internal', spiritual sphere.
11 Owen C. Thomas, 'Interiority and Christian Spirituality,' The Journal of Religion 80 (2000), 60; see also George
Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Posaberal Age (London: SPCK, 1984), 33-41; David S.
Yeago, 'Sacramental Lutheranism at the End of the Modern Age', Lutheran Forum 34:4 (2000), 6-16.
12 Henri de Lubac, Un timoin dans lEglise: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Paradoxe et Misfire de lEglise (Paris, 1967), 186,
quoted by Angelo Scola, Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Theological Style (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 14.
13 Hans Urs von Balthasar, 'The Fathers, the Scholastics, and Ourselves', Communio 24 (1997), 375. Originally
published in Theologie der Zeit 3 (1939), 65-104.
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This brings us to the scope and parameters of this study. It began some years ago in
my mind in the form of a simple question: what happens to the body when it becomes a co-
participant in the divine nature (2 Pet 1:4)? This appears, at first glance, a somewhat naive
query, until one discovers that bound up with it is the whole question as to the status and
function of the material order in God's creative and redemptive economies, and thus the
question as to the status and function of the sacraments, symbols, and structures which
have come definitively to characterise the speech and life of the 'one, holy, catholic and
apostolic Church.' In what follows I bring this question to a learned monk who is
undoubtedly one of the profoundest of Byzantine saints and perhaps the most faithful and
fertile representative of the entire Greek patristic tradition: Maximus the Confessor (580-
662). Contemporary scholarship almost universally recognises the genius and towering
ecumenical significance of this man: he is 'the real father of Byzantine theolo gy;14 'the
leading theologian of his era in the Greek East, probably in the entire church,' 15 'one of the
outstanding thinkers of all time,' 'a defensor fidei, both with a singular intellectual
perspicacity and with an invincible firmness of character,'" whose work 'synthesises and
condenses the essential heart of the spiritual and doctrinal experience of the great patristic
era.' 18 Moreover, Maximus is also acknowledged to have afforded a particularly positive
place for the body and the material world in his theological vision. He demonstrates 'a
14 John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought (New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1987), 131.
15 Jaroslav Pelikan, "Council or Father or Scripture': The Concept of Authority in the Theology of Maximus
Confessor', in David Neiman and Margaret Schatkin (eds.), The Heritage of the EarY Church: Essays in Honor of
the Very Reverend George Vasilievich Florovsky (Orientalia Christiana Analecta 195, Rome: Pont. Instituturn
Studiorurn Orientalium, 1973), 277.
16 Lars Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos: The Vision of St. Maximus the Confessor (New York: St Vladimir's
Seminary Press, 1985), 7.
17 C.J. de Vogel, Platonism and Christianity: A Mere Antagonism or a Profound Common Ground?', VC 39
(1985), 38.
18 I.-H. Dalmais, quoted by Alain Riou, Le Monde et Ltgkse felon Maxime le Confesseur (Paris: Beauchesne,
1973), 33.
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positive evaluation of the empirical man as such', 19 'a healthy appreciation of the nature of
created realities',2° an appreciation which attains its 'culminating point' in his
soteriologically motivated insistence upon the full integrity of Christ's human nature.21
According to Orthodox scholar Panayiotis Nellas, even 'dust' is no longer simply 'matter'
for Maximus, but 'carries in actual fact the "principle" and the "form" of man.' 22 'Beyond a
theology and mysticism which is all too alien to the world,' Maximus' synthesis of the
sensible and spiritual in the human being is said to amount to nothing less than a recovery
of 'the tradition of genuine hellenistic humanism.' 23 These contemporary commendations
could be ratified by even the most cursory evaluation of Maximus' integral influence on the
subsequent Greek theological tradition. It is on the basis of Maximus' dyophysite
christology that John Damascene could point to the physical body of Christ as the concrete
means of bodily participation in God.' It is Maximus whom Gregory Palamas cites with
approval against the intellectualists of his own day when he affirms, 'the body is deified
along with the soul.''
But if Maximus is thought to contribute so unambiguously to the affirmation of the
constitutive status and function of the material order in God's scheme of bringing the
universe to perfection, what are we to make of his equally unambiguous ascetic austerity
and esoteric mysticism in which, in Balthasar's early view, 'he relapses in many respects into
19 Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator. The Theological Anthmpology of Maximus the Confessor (Chicago: Open
Court, 2nd ed. 1995), 95.
20 George C. Berthold (trans.), Maximus Confessor Selected Writings (Classics of Western Spirituality, New York:
Paulist Press, 1985), 98 fn195.
21 See the commentary of Dumitru Staniloae on Amb.Io. 42 in Emmanuel Ponsoye (ed. and trans.), Saint
Maxime k Confesseur. Ambigua (Paris: Les Editions de l'Ancre, 1994), 502.
22 Panayiotis Nellas, Deification in Christ: The Nature of the Human Person, trans. Norman Russell (New York: St
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1987), 65.
23 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie: Dar IVeltbild Maximus' des Bekenners (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag,
2nd ed. 1988), 289.
24 Joh.D.Imag. 1.19; 2.14.
25 Gr.Pal.Tr. 1.iii.37.
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a Monophysite-tinged spiritualism'?' There can be no mistaking the severity of Maximus'
purificatory program in which he calls on his readers to 'subject the flesh to the spirit,
mortifying and enslaving it by every sort of ill-treatment.' 27 The active contempt for visible
phenomena exercised by the true Christian gnostic must extend 'even [to] his own body.'28
The monk must be on vigilant guard against the constant inducement by the passion of
self-love 'to have mercy on his body' (.0n EEiv TO 06[1429 Do not these few examples of
what Polycarp Sherwood once referred to as 'excessive spiritualisation' 3° indicate an
inconsistency regarding the claims made about Maximus, or worse, an inconsistency within
the Confessor's own theological and spiritual vision? Are they not indicative of deep-seated
sympathies with an intellectualist ascetico-theological tradition that in recent years has been
popularly dubbed as `iconodastic'?31
Our answers to these questions will depend largely not only on the evidence we
discover in Maximus' writings themselves, but also on the manner in which we approach
that evidence and the hermeneutical tools we employ to interpret it. It is our purpose from
here on in our introduction to provide the barest prolegomenon that will help us situate
Maximus' thought within its historical, intellectual, and social contexts. Only with these
basic presuppositions in place can we hope to deal fairly and intelligently with what he has
to say about the material order, and so offer any judgement with respect to the claims made
about him and the traditions he so conscientiously struggled to embody.
26 'The Fathers, the Scholastics, and Ourselves', 376.
27 ' YTTOTC(gCallEV Wit) odpxa TG5 TTVEljpaTI, UTTOTTIgOVTEC Kai SouXayopyoiiv-res. 15,« Trd0115
KaKorraOcias-. LA 41 (CCSG 40, 109.927-928). References to critical editions are by volume, page, and line
number.
28 Car. 1.6.
29 Car. 2.60.
38 Polycarp Sherwood, 'Exposition and Use of Scripture in St Maximus as manifest in the Quaeltiones ad
Thalassium', OCP 24 (1958), 207.
31 Elizabeth A. Clark, 'New Perspectives on the Origenist Controversy: Human Embodiment and Ascetic
Strategies', CI-I 59 (1990), 152-154.
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Let us begin by citing Balthasar yet again, who in his acclaimed magnum opus
highlighted the continuity of Christian thought with its cultural context in Late Antiquity,
casting the ancient philosophy of the Greek world in the mould of a 'theological
aesthetic:32 Neoplatonist and Christian stand side by side when they maintain in
contemplating the visible world that, for all its inherent vulnerability and transience, it is
'the epiphany of divine glory:33
 Both recognise in creation a mysterious, divine quality that
precludes any kind of simple, outright rejection of material reality as evil. It should come
as no surprise, then, that there emerged throughout the course of Late Antiquity strong and
certain relations between Christian and pagan accounts of the metaphysical structure of
reality. For it was precisely that which the intellectual traditions of classical culture valued
as vital and lasting and real that contributed to the Church's ability to forge solid
intellectual and philosophical foundations for its lived experience of faith — a faith that sees
the cosmos as the arena of divine salvation. 34 From a purely historical perspective, Plato's
Timaeus and Plotinus' Enneads served as vital a role as Moses' Genesis and Solomon's Wisdom
in the development and reception of the Christian doctrine of creation. Indeed many of the
greatest Christian thinkers, much to the chagrin of and-Christian polemicists like Celsus,
Julian and Porphyry, understood the Christian faith as somehow completing or perfecting
the wisdom of the philosophers. Origen's magisterial apology against Celsus often involves
the Alexandrian doctor in a playful championing of Plato against the would-be Platonist's
32 The Glory of the Lord. A Theological Aesthetics, volume 4: The Realm of Metaphysics in Antiquiry, trans. Brian
McNeil et al, ed. John Riches (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), 323.
33 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, volume 4, 323. Gerhart B. Ladner refers to the common 'experience of a
world pervaded by the divine' in God, Cosmos, and Humankind: The World of Earry Christian Symboirm, trans.
Thomas Dunlap (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1995), 2.
34 See de Vogel, Platonism and Christianity', 1-62; Jaroslav Pelikan, Christianity and Classical Culture: The
Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1993).
35 Or.CeLr. 4.62; 7.42-43.
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Not all modern scholars have proved as confident as Balthasar in championing this
shared belief about the epiphanic character of the cosmos as the fertile ground for the
development of what came definitively to characterise catholic Christianity. For Hamack,
whose influence remains pervasive, the Fathers' readiness to think within the terms and
framework provided by classical culture provides sure evidence that the original evangelical
kerygma had become corrupted and an absolutist, intellectualist system of natural religion
established in its stead.' With reference to what he calls 'Greek Catholicism' for example
he writes:
In its external form as a whole this Church is nothing more than a continuation of the
history of Greek religion under the alien influence of Christianity, parallel to the many
other alien influences which have affected it. We might also describe it as the natural
product of the union between Hellenism, itself already in a state of oriental decay, and
Christian teaching; it is the transformation which history effects in a religion by "natural"
means.... [T]his official ecclesiasticism with its priests and its cult, with all its vessels,
saints, vestments, pictures and amulets, with its ordinances of fasting and its festivals, has
absolutely nothing to do with the religion of Christ.37
Yet the nearly universal Christian self-adaptation to Greek culture was by no means
indiscriminate. Throughout the Church's early life there can be witnessed a broad range of
responses towards non-Christian philosophy, ranging from far-going acceptance to
outright hostility. Nor was such critical tension confined to the first few centuries. In the
sixth and seventh centuries, right at the threshold of the decline in formal education in
36 What is Christianipq, 210-245.
37 What is Christiani0?, 221, 241.
9
classical culture in all but elite circles,' there can still be observed a noticeable discomfort
felt by certain Christian groups — particularly by monastic communities in Syria and
Palestine - towards any kind of proximity between Christian doctrine and non-Christian
('Hellenic') intellectual culture and categories of thought. 39 In the mind of many orthodox
monks and bishops, there were limits to the intellectual and conceptual continuities between
Christian and non-Christian thought. Nor were these sentiments confined to the Greek
east. In the famous utterance of Saint Augustine, the Platonists indeed taught that 'in the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,' but they
said nothing about the fact that this Word 'became flesh and dwelt among us.'40 Plato's
eternity of the soul; Aristotle's necessity of being; the Stoics' dissolution and rebirth of all
things: each involved assumptions and included implications at no uncertain odds with data
reaching back to a tradition predating Plato or Socrates, yet relatively 'new' in form in the
keDgm a of the Church: a creation out of nothing; a God made flesh; a resurrected body.41
At the heart of this tension lay the status of material and temporal reality — whether
cosmic or bodily. Throughout the patristic era the Incarnation, or more specifically, 'the
logos of the cross', retained its character as 'a scandal to Jews and folly to Greeks' (1 Cor
1:18-25). And it was within this tension that, six centuries after Saint Paul, Saint Maximus
himself lived and wrote. And as it was for the Apostle so it was for the Confessor a fruitful,
productive tension. For it is specifically within the context of his works directed to a
bishop directly involved in conflicts arising from this tension that we find the fundamental
38 Peter Brown, The World of Late Antiquity AD 150-750 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971), 172-187;
Averil Cameron, The Language of Images: The Rise of Icons and Christian Representation', in Diana Wood
(ed.), The Church and the Arts (Studies in Church History 28, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 2-3.
39 See Cyril Mango's comments in John Meyendorff, Byzantium as Center of Theological Thought in the
Christian East', in Patrick Henry (ed.), Schools of Thought in the Christian Tradition (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1984), 66.
40 Aug.Conf. 7.9.13.
41 Georges Florovsky, 'Eschatology in the Patristic Age: An Introduction', SP 2 (1957), 235-250.
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elements of his cosmic ontology - elements that allow us to trace in his theology the
constitutive place of the corporeal in God's work of deifying all creation.
Having mentioned his monastic context, we must not overlook the profoundly
material dimensions inherent to the intellectual milieu in which Maximus' moved.
Monasticism was not only nor even primarily a negative movement. Even the early eremitic
movements of the fourth century were as much about embracing a certain social and
spiritual reality as they were about rejecting the false conditions imposed on them by
political and worldly existence. The monks could commit themselves to a life of spiritual
and bodily struggle and impose severe limitations upon their bodies, not because they held
any kind of gnostic contempt for materiality as such, but, as Peter Brown observes,
'because they were convinced that they could sweep the body into a desperate venture.... —
the imagined transfiguration of the few great ascetics, on earth, spoke to them of the
eventual transfiguration of their own bodies on the day of the Resurrection.' 42 Here is
hinted at the forcefully eschatological focus of monasticism: the prophetic orientation of
the whole person — soul and body — toward a perfection only fully realised in another
realm. But as Brown points out, albeit somewhat sceptically, for a rare few this
transfigured, perfect state had already been realised here on earth.' In continuity with the
monasticism of the desert tradition preserved over the centuries in monastic literature and
practice, Maximus looked to the great saints of the past — Abraham, Moses, Elijah, the
Apostles — as prototypical monks who had experienced this transfiguration 'while still in
the flesh.' For those who through divine grace and personal effort become 'another
42 Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Earb, Christianiy (London: Faber
and Faber, 1989), 222.
43 Kallistos Ware provides both ancient and contemporary testimonies of bodily transfiguration in 'The
Transfiguration of the Body', in A.M. Allchin (ed.), Sacrament and Image: Essays in the Christian Understanding of
Man (London: The Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius, 1967), 17-32.
44 Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1124B).
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Abraham' or 'another Moses' there is effective in the soul and the body  the deifying presence
of God. Indeed, through askesis the body becomes an instrumental player and crucial
participator in human redemption - in Brown's words, 'the discreet mentor of the proud
soul.'45 'Seldom, in ancient thought,' he remarks,
had the body been seen as more deeply implicated in the transformation of the soul; and
never was it made to bear so heavy a burden. For the Desert Fathers, the body was not an
irrelevant part of the human person, that could, as it were, be "put in brackets." ... It was,
rather, grippingly present to the monk: he was to speak of it as "this body, that God has
afforded me, as a field to cultivate, where I might work and become rich."46
There is more we could add to fill out the picture. Maximus' life, much more than
ours, would have been affected by the fragile variabilities of day and night, cold and heat,
seasons and harvest, war and peace. How much more then would the steady rhythms of
the monastic ordo — fasting, feasts, vigils, almsgiving, psalmody, prayer, lectio divina — have
penetrated and transformed and given stability to his existential experience of transience
and flux.° For all his heady profundity, here is a man immersed in the earthy conditions of
monastic life with its ascetic discipline, social obligations, sacramental rites, veneration of
icons and the relics of departed saints, hierarchical ecclesiastical government, not to
mention the intiicate and intriguing connections with the world of international politics.
Turning to evaluate Maximus' writings as a whole, we notice that they are
predominantly occasional, such that 'it is the rhythm of spiritual life rather than a logical
45 Brown, The Bo6 and Society, 237.
46 The Body and Society, 236.
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connection of ideas which defines the architectonics of his vision of the world....'" His
works therefore exhibit those literary forms whose roots lie deep in monastic sapiential,
pedagogical, and exegetical tradition: questions and responses, chapters, scriptural and
liturgical commentary, letters, and later, when the need demanded, polemical dogmatic
treatises. These forms do not dictate his thought, but are woven together with pedagogical,
pastoral, and dogmatic concerns within a heuristic approach that never loses sight of its
pragmatic purpose."
All these factors which for the most part must be presumed constitute 'the living
praxis's° from which the Confessor's philosophical theology emerged. They suggest further
• that however deep the level of intellectual speculation Maximus attained, however high his
estimation of intelligible over sensible reality, both his feet, like Socrates', were firmly
planted on the ground.' Yet it is, perhaps, the certain 1iminal01 which Burton-Christie
regards as so characteristic of the monastic life' that best accounts both for Maximus' keen
sense of the simultaneously contingent yet necessary place of the corporeal in the ascent
towards perfection, and so too for our fascination with the material and structural
dimensions of his doctrine of deification that form the subject of this study.
One or two final points may be noted. Our theme provides us with the advantage
of being a unique and relatively accessible angle of approach to Maximus' frequently
47 For a reconstruction of details in the (earlier) monastic office in the east, see Paul F. Bradshaw, Dai# Prayer
in the Earbf Church: A Study of the Origin and Early Development of the Divine Office (London: Alcuin Club/SPCK,
1981), 93-110.
48 Georges Florovsky, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, volume 9: The Byzantine Fathers of the Sixth to
Eighth Centug (Vaduz: Buchervertriebsanstalt, 1987), 213.
49 This fact is demonstrated in Paul M. Blowers' outstanding thesis, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy in Maximus
the Confessor An Investigation of the Quaestiones ad Thalassium (Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity 7, Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991).
5 ° Pierre Hadot, quoted in the Introduction to his Philosophy as a Weg of Life, trans. and ed. Arnold I. Davidson
and Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), 19.
51 Phaedo 61d.
52 Douglas Burton-Christie, 'Into the Body of Another: Eros, Embodiment and Intimacy with the Natural
World', Anglican Theological Review 81 (1999), 22.
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impenetrable theological mind. While the human body has formed the focus of other, more
narrowly anthropological studies in Scripture," Pau1, 54 Athanasius," Gregory of Nyssa,"
the Greek Christian tradition, 57 the Latin Christian tradition,' and in early Christian
theology in general,' never has the deification of the body been the primary focus of any
single study in Mmdmian scholarship, nor the catalyst for a wider consideration of the
epistemological, ontological, christological, liturgical, and ascedcal significance of
corporeality and the material order in Maximus' overall theological vision. Primaily to avoid
introducing issues extrinsic to Maximus' immediate range of thought, I have in this thesis
deliberately omitted discussion of contemporary questions raised about the body in social
anthropology, gender studies, and the new school of 'radical orthodoxy'. It is, nevertheless,
at one and the same time a technical study in historical theology and a spiritual-theological
apology, on the one hand offering detailed contextual and material analysis of relevant texts
and the structure of Maximus' thought, and on the other appealing to the abiding import —
spiritual and intellectual — of the patristic tradition as mediated via one of its most erudite
exponents.
Due simply to the overall coherence of Maximus' thought - his ability to contain
the whole of his immense vision within each of its parts - the five chapters id which this
thesis has been arranged function as mere windows through which we shall attempt to view
discrete themes that he would have considered inseparable from one another. What holds
53 John W. Cooper, Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand
Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000).
54 J.A.T. Robinson, The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology (London: SCM Press, 1952).
55 Alvyn Pettersen, Athanasius and the Human Body (Bristol: Bristol Press, 1990).
56 Reinhard M. Haner, Die Einheit des Leibes Christi bei Gregor von Nyssa: Untersuchungen um Ursprung der
Tlysz:rchen'Erliisungslehre (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974).
57 Kallistos Ware, "My helper and my enemy": the body in Greek Christianity', in Sarah Coakley (ed.), Re h.gion
and the Body (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 90-110.
58 C.W. Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Chrirtianiy, 200-1336 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1995).
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them together will hopefully become most apparent in our chapter on Corporealio and Christ
which, standing at the centre of the entire study, occupies a symbolic place that may well
have pleased the Confessor himself. For it is Christ who, in all his concrete, bodily glory,
stands as the unifying centre of all Maximus' own thought. Indeed, Maximus did not simply
think about Christ, but referring all he experienced and knew to him, regarded him as his
very life, in whom he hoped to come to participate in the concrete reality of the blessings
to come, and whom alone he acknowledged together with the Father and the Holy Spirit to
be glorified by all creation.'
59 Margaret R. Miles, Fullness of Lift: Historical Foundations for a New Asceticism (Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press, 1981).
69 Or.dom (CCSG 23, 73.829-834).
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CHAPTER ONE
Corporeality and Revelation
A man that looks on glass
On it may stay his eye;
Or if he pleaseth, through it pass,
And then the heav'n eipy.1
Towards the evening of his philosophical and literary career, Plato put forward a proposal
in his Timaeus that for many centuries after him came increasingly to possess the force of an
epistemological axiom: 'To discover the maker and father of this universe is indeed a hard
task, and having found him it would be impossible to tell everyone about hitn.' 2 Later
generations of philosophers found encapsulated in these words two vital principles. The
List expressed the fact of God's relative inaccessibility to human modes of rational inquiry.
The second concerned the inadequacy of human modes of discourse to convey knowledge
of God should such knowledge become available. The problem these two principles
present for the 'lover of wisdom' is not simply one of communication. It is rather one of
communion. To know God is not to know about him but to be united to him, and to be
united to him one must be like him. But God is infinite, while humans are evidently finite.
God is immortal; humans are mortal. God is spirit: simple, incorporeal; humans are
corporeal composites: rational souls mingled with the dust of the earth. God is holy and
1 George Herbert, The Elixir, lines 9-12, in John N. Wall (ed.), George Herbert: The Country Parson, The Temple
(New York, Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1981), 311.
2 Timaeus 28c.
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impassible; humans are impure - subject to all kinds of impulses from without and within.
The pursuit of union with God presupposes that the yawning gulf between knower and
known can be bridged. But can it?
In this opening chapter we shall explore further the implications this
epistemological problem suggests for the status and function of the material universe and,
more specifically, for the status and function of the human body. In Platonist philosophies
both these entities, on account of their inherent plurality, share an ambivalent status in the
human quest to know God. Yet in the vision of Saint Maximus the Confessor — whose
theology is rightly regarded as being dominated by the theme of divine revelation' - the
whole intelligible-sensible universe presents itself as the corporeal medium for the self-
manifestation of God. Behind this understanding of cosmic theophany we recognise
several sources: at a distance, Plato's Timaeus — enhanced in Neoplatonism by further
reflection on the idea of a divine world-soul which pervades and supports the universe.
This was an idea present in ancient sapiential literature of both the Oriental and Hellenic
worlds, as we find it expressed for instance in Wisdom 13:1-9 and later explicitly echoed in
Romans 1:20 where Saint Paul claims, 'for since the creation of the world God's invisible
qualities — his eternal power and divine majesty — have been clearly seen, being understood
from what has been made....' The whole universe, in the words of the Psalmist, can
properly be said to 'declare the glory of God.'4 More immediately to hand we detect the
cosmic vision of Dionysius the Areopagite.
Central to Maximus' foundation for such a steadfast conviction is the person of
Christ Jesus, the Son of God made flesh. In him, God the Word has fulfilled in a definitive
3 Florovsky, The Byantine Fathers of the Sixth to Eighth Century, 215-216.
4 Ps 18:2. All OT references are to LXX. Maximus introduces this verse in an exposition of Romans 1:20 in
Q.Thal 13 (CCSG 7, 95.1 —97.41).
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yet mysterious way his will 'always and in all things to effect the mystery of his
embodiment:5 Whether God's revelation in Christ simply parallels what happens in
creation — albeit at a quantitatively greater or even qualitatively different level, or in fact
constitutes or fulfils it, is a question we shall need to pursue in due course. For now we can
affirm that for Maximus what can be known and said of God has itself been given by God
who presents himself for apprehension in the symbolic structures of his pluriform
incarnate economies.
At the same time, Maximus, like his orthodox predecessors, is under no illusions
about the fundamental ontological dissimilarity of this universe to God, and the inadequacy
of rational discourse when it comes to speaking of divine matters. God so far transcends
the created realm that there is nothing in it that approximates to him or can serve as a
fitting analogy by which to approach him. Moreover, on account of its inherent instability,
material creation possesses a potentially deceptive character that blinds the observer to its
true nature — that is, its true purpose. Creation therefore not only reveals God; it also hides
or conceals him. Whatever one can predicate of God by way of analogy and affirmation —
whether intelligence, or goodness, or being itself, is in fact more accurately denied of him.
So we shall find Maximus speaking in a way anticipated by Origen and the Cappadocian
Fathers and shared with Dionysius the Areopagite of a 'double' way of doing theology. It is
the paradoxical, dialectical way of affirmation (kataphasis) and negation (apophasis);
paradoxical, because it is by affirmation that God is concealed, and by negation that he is
revealed; dialectical, because the Christian life involves a continual movement between the
two.
5 Amb.b. 7 (PG 91.1084D).
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What then are we to make of the sensible world, and what are we to do with our
own human senses? While the answers to these questions will only become more patent
towards the end of our whole study, we shall at least offer some preliminary observations
within the bounds of this first chapter. For a start, it may be wiser to ask what God makes
of the sensible world. For Maximus, the shifting, diffuse tendencies of the material universe
serve God's providential and pedagogical economies whereby he condescends to human
weakness and leads the human soul via sensible symbols to penetrate through to the
intelligible realties that lie hidden beneath and beyond — beyond, that is, in the
eschatological sense. The sensible realm must be transcended. Maximus repeats this with
relentless resolve throughout his ascetic writings. In itself it is not evil, for everything God
has created is good. But to stop short with it is idolatry: it is to 'worship and serve created
things rather than the creator' (Rom 1:25). Precisely in rising upon it as on a ladder, one is
able to reclaim it, to reorder it, to recognise its true God-given purpose and worth as an
arena for the display of ineffable divine glory. Consequently the spiritual life is a constant
diabasis — a 'passage' from the sensible to the intelligible, from the flesh to the Spirit, from
the active life to the contemplative, from earthly to heavenly, from temporal to eternal.
Christian askesis involves the elimination from the soul of carnal and idolatrous
attachments, the re-ordering of our sensible, emotional, rational, and intelligible faculties,
and the orientation of the whole person — body, soul, and mind - to God. To characterise
the dualism implied by the categories mentioned such as flesh/spirit . and
sensible/intelligible as 'an endogenous neurosis, an index of intense and widespread guilt-
feelings'' would be to fail utterly to understand not only the spiritual impulse of the entire
catholic patristic tradition, but the eschatological anthropology of Saint Paul. The dualism
6 So E.R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxie: Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius
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proposed in the tradition Maximus receives, lives, and hands on is the dualism of Adam
and Christ, the dualism of the outer man and the inner, the earthly man and the heavenly,
the dualism of the mortal body and the immortal body, the dualism of 'now' and 'not yet':
It is the dualism of the baptismal, deified life, in which one may concur with both Saint
Maximus and the Apostle, 'It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me. The life I
now live in the flesh, I live by faith in the Son of God' (Gal 2:20).
Affirmation and Negation: the two modes of theology
For the Fathers of the Church, Plato's words cited above only echoed Moses' and the
prophets' confession of God's transcendence over against creation. Saint Paul too, faced
with the insurmountable mystery of God's inscrutable acts of judgement and salvation with
Israel, was led to praise him with a doxology inspired by words from the prophet Isaiah:
Oh, the depths of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God!
How unsearchable his judgements, and his paths beyond tracing out!
Who has known the mind of the Lord?
Or who has been his counselor?
Who has ever given to God, that God should repay him?
For from him and through him and to him are all things.
To him be the glory forever! Amen (Rom 11:33-36).
to Constantine (Cambridge University Press, 1965), 35-36.
7 1 Cor 15:35-57; 2 Cot 4:16 — 5:10.
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If anything, in the Fathers' view, Plato had not gone far enough in asserting the
inaccessibility, incomprehensibility, and utter independence of the divine nature. Origen's
treatment of the passage in the Timaeus in his response to the pagan critic of Christianity,
Celsus, is well-known.' Origen's epistemology deserves closer attention since it represents a
very early working out of concerns that were to remain primary in the mainstream
intellectual, exegetical, and ascetic traditions of the Church of the Fathers. According to
Henri Crouzel, the starting point of knowledge in Origen is the symbol.' As the
embodiment of the (divine) mystery they express, symbols bridge the gap between subject
and object and bring about a participation of one in the other." Origen's discussion of the
Timaeus passage cited by Celsus provides a useful example of some of the main points in his
thought. He explains how Celsus had falsely characterised Christians as seeking to know
God through sensual perception alone. Celsus, apparently disgusted at what he considered
to be Christianity's gross materialism and preoccupation with carnal things, argued that if
Jesus' followers truly wanted to be able to see God, they should close the eyes of their flesh
and open instead those of the soul. It is in this context that Celsus had advocated Plato's
dictum about how difficult it is to discover God, and having done so, how impossible it is
to make him known to all. Knowledge of God, in Celsus' book, is evidently a human
enterprise for an intellectual elite, far beyond the powers of the mundane masses.
Origen refutes his opponent on several points. Celsus is of course wrong if he
regards Christians as materialists, for, having come to learn of the invisible and incorporeal
God, their life and purity of worship bear ample witness to their willingness to mortify the
8 Or.Cdr. 7.36-45 (SC 150, 94.29 — 122.34).
9 'The School of Alexandria and Its Fortunes', in Angelo Di Berardino and Basil Studer (eds.), History of
Theology, volume 1: The Patristic Period, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical
Press, 1996), 162.
10 Crouzel, 'The School of Alexandria and Its Fortunes', 162-164.
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flesh. He is wrong too, to think that Christians do not acknowledge the limitations of
sensible means of apprehension. Citing Romans 1:20, Origen affirms that 'though earthly
human beings must begin by applying their senses to sensible objects in order to ascend
(dvaPaivEtv) from them to a knowledge of the nature of intelligible realities, yet their
knowledge must not stop short with objects of sense.'" Thus, while Christians do not claim
that it is impossible to know intelligible realities apart from sense, they might well ask who
is able to know them apart from sense. On yet another point, Origen wryly points out
Christianity's familiarity with the Greeks' idea of two kinds of vision, one bodily and the
other intellectual. It is an idea borrowed from Moses and used by the Saviour who says,
'For judgement I came into this world, that those who do not see might see, and that those
who see might be made blind' On 9:39).
Arriving at last at Celsus' appeal to Plato, Origen decries Celsus' inability to come
to terms adequately with both the transcendence of God and his benevolence. Here Origen
drives home three main points. First, in contrast to Plato's disregard for the lowly
populace, the revelation of God in the Word made flesh is a universal revelation, potentially
accessible to all. Secondly, Plato's language implies (wrongly) that while knowledge of God
is indeed difficult to attain, it is not beyond natural human powers. But 'we maintain',
counters Origen, 'that human nature is in no way able to seek after God, or to attain a pure
knowledge of him without the help of him whom it seeks.' 12 Thirdly, Celsus' application of
the name 'the unspeakable' to God disregards Plato's implicit acknowledgement that, while
it is impossible to make God known to all, he can be made known to some. This last
argument appears somewhat disingenuous until we learn that by it Origen is seeking to
11 Or.Ceir. 7.37 (SC 150, 100.20-25). The 'intelligible realities' are for Origen a subtle assimilation of the
Platonic ideas to prophetic, eschatological realities. Ultimate reality, for him, equates to 'the inheritance of the
eternal life to come' (Or.Lev. 5.1 [SC 286, 206.24-25]).
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uphold an even stricter theological principle and at the same time to introduce a christological
one. God the Father is indeed 'unspeakable', as are many other beings inferior to him. Yet
it is possible to 'see' him on the basis of his own revelation in the Logos. 'He who has seen
me,' says Jesus, 'has seen the Father' On 14:9). To know God is to see him, a possibility
opened up to the pure in heart by the gracious Incarnation of the Word, the only-begotten
Son, the visible image of the invisible God.'
Origen's primary goal in all this is to show that Celsus' and even Plato's arguments
finally rest on nothing more than 'philosophical agnosticism.'" Their claims to know God
were clearly false, for such knowledge had failed to become manifest in their worship and
piety: they still treated man-made idols and creatures as God. True knowledge of God
begins not with human reasoning, but with God, and with what he has presented of
himself to be seen.' From there it leads to the transformation of one's life, to the ascent
from sensible phenomena to intelligible realities, and from there to union with the simple,
incorporeal, invisible God. As Origen concludes,
The disciples of Jesus regard these phenomenal things only that they may use them as steps
to ascend to the perception of the nature of intelligible realities.... And when they have
risen from the created things of this world to the invisible things of God, they do not stay
there; but after they have sufficiently exercised their minds upon these, and have
12 Or.Cefr. 7.42 (SC 150, 114.28-31).
13 Crouzel notes also the connection Origen makes between knowledge and image (The School of Alexandria
and Its Fortunes', 161). Maintaining the rule that only like knows like, 'the pure in heart' is the logikos who,
having recovered by the Spirit the purity of the soul made according to the image of God, is capable of
assimilation to the image of God itself, the Logos.
14 Robert L. Wilken, 'No Other Gods', in idem., Remembering the Christian Past (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 55.
15 Wilken, 'No Other Gods', 55-56.
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understood their nature, they ascend to the eternal power of God: in a word, to his
divinity. 16
Throughout Origen's argument we are able to detect themes constantly reiterated
in the Fathers, and especially the affirmation that the proper way to acknowledge God's
incomprehensibility is not with rational conjecture, nor yet with agnostic skepticism, but
with 'silence' - a transfigured life issuing in humble and holy reverence and praise. Divine
revelation is not a bare demonstration from the divine side, but a dialectical engagement, a
transformative process that starts and ends in God — or more precisely, in God the
Father. 17 It is not difficult to see how advocates of this recognisably trinitarian structure of
revelation and illumination could adapt Neoplatonist categories such as procession and
return, descent and ascent, diffusion and union, all of which imply a descent from simple
unity towards material multiplicity and an ascent back to immaterial union with the One. At
the outermost extension of the movement lie sensible, corporeal phenomena. Knowledge
of God is impossible without the corporeal realm.18
Maximus too is concerned with the transformative character and doxological goal
of the apophatic way to union with God. As he seems keen to demonstrate in his Chapters
on Theology and the Economy,' all true spiritual progress necessarily begins with an
16 Or.Ceir. 7.46 (SC 150, 124.34— 126.42).
17 Herein lies the classic trinitarian structure of epistemology adumbrated by Origen (Or.Princ. 1.3.4-8; Or.Joh.
19.6.33-38 [SC 290, 66-70]) and later enunciated by Basil of Caesarea (Bas.Spfr. [PG 32.153B]). Knowledge of
God is knowledge of God the Father through the Son from the Spirit, by whom are conferred being,
rationality and holiness respectively. In turn the ascending via of theognosis leads from purification through
wisdom/gnosis to the blessed vision of the Father in glory. See further Karen Jo Torjesen, 'Hermeneutics and
Soteriology in Origen's Peni Archon', SP 21 (1989), 338-339; Peter Widdicombe, The Fatherhood of God from
Ongen to Athanasius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 20-21; Vladimir Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God
(New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 15-17.
18 Greg.Naz.Or. 28.12. The question about the status of the sensible in epistemology and revelation remained
alive and well into the 7th and 8th centuries in connection with the iconoclastic controversy. See Cameron,
'The Language of Images', 1-42.
19 Capita theologica et oeconomica [Th.Oec.] (PG 90.1084 — 1173). Hereafter called Chapters on Theology.
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epistemological crisis. Human reason stands before God speechless, for in himself he is
beyond all knowing and speculation. While we may learn from the analogy of created being
that God is (TO eivat), creation itself says nothing about how (-ru3s- ?mat) or what (TO Ti
Avat) he is.' He is neither subject or object, he neither thinks nor is thought, for these are
categories that necessarily involve relating to some extrinsic entity. God, however, is utterly
independent and perfectly self-contained.21
This epistemological impasse - itself the immediate correlate of an ontological fact -
is a fundamental theological presupposition throughout Maximus' thought. Arising as it
does in the distinct unit formed by the opening ten paragraphs of the Chapters on Theology
(1.1-10), it confronts the would-be contemplative with shocking force. In the light of the
likelihood that the century form of the Chapters on Theology, in which is collated a broad
collection of highly condensed spiritual axioms, is especially designed for easy retention and
performative application in the monastic life, 22 such deliberate placement invites our closer
scrutiny. George Berthold has drawn attention to the almost credal form of these
chapters," a form mirrored in the opening paragraph of the second set of centuries as well:
God is one, because there is one divinity; monad, without beginning, simple and beyond
being, without parts and undivided; the same is monad and triad, entirely monad, and
entirely triad; wholly monad in substance, wholly triad in lypostases.24
20 Amb../o. 10 (PG 91.1133C; 1180D).
21 Th.Oec. 2.2.
22 Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, 482-484.
23 The Cappadocian Roots of Maximus the Confessor', in Felix Heinzer and Christoph von SchOnborn
(eds.), Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur. Fribourg 2-5 septembre 1980 (Editions Universitaires Fribourg
Suisse, 1982), 55.
24 Th.Oec. 2.1.
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The conspicuous presence of the alpha privative - the prefix of negation - throughout this
passage and its parallel credal set in the unit formed by 1.1-10 confirms their strongly
apophatic character. But we also notice that these negations are couched in the form of a
confession. Then at the end of 1.1-10, strangely enough, the negations give way to quite a
clear affirmation, or at least, an affirmation interwoven with the doxological utterance we
heard earlier from Saint Paul in Romans 11:36:
God is the beginning, middle, and end of beings as active, but not as passive, like
everything else named by us. For he is beginning as creator, middle as provider, and end as
encompasser, for, as it says, from him and through him and to him are all things.
Has Maximus here abandoned the primacy of the via negativa? Is it in fact possible
to say something of the God of whom nothing can properly even be denied, let alone
affirmed? Let us remember that by this time, the negative theology articulated by Origen
had undergone a noticeable metamorphosis. Before him, Clement of Alexandria - in his
own engagement with Plato's Timaeus dictum - had drawn together central biblical motifs
demonstrating God's ultimate inaccessibility: Moses' entry into the darkness of God's
dwelling place on Sinai; Saint Paul's exclamation from Romans 11:33 on the depths of
divine sop hia and gnosis; and the possibility of knowing the invisible Father through the only-
begotten Word and Son.' After him, and faced with the bold and blasphemous claims of
the Eunomians to be able to describe accurately the true nature of God's essential being
(ouoi a), all three Cappadocians had exercised more urgently both Alexandrians' inclination
25 Clem.Str. 5.12.78-82 (SC 276, 152.1 — 160.19).
26
towards theological apophaticism.' Saint Gregory Nazianzen's rebuttal of Plato's dictum
was even swifter and stronger than Origen's. While the Greek divine had spoken of the
difficulty in perceiving God and the impossibility of expressing him, Gregory agreed on the
impossibility of expressing him but argued for the even greater impossibility of perceiving
him.v Commenting on a passage further on in Gregory's same sermon," Maximus himself
states how the great Cappadocian doctor preferred throughout his teaching 'to speak about
God by privations and negations' in order to preclude any heretical presumption.29
In Saint Gregory of Nyssa's mysticism of darkness especially we are provided with
a clear example of a rigorous apophaticism at work in the spiritual life modeled on Moses'
ascent into the 'gloom' or darkness (Eis TOI) yv6(1)ov) on Mount Sinai's hidden summit:
For leaving behind all visible realities, not only what sense comprehends but also what the
intellect thinks it sees, it keeps on penetrating deeper until, by the intellect's yearning for
understanding, it gains access to the invisible and the incomprehensible, and there it sees
God. This is the true knowledge of what is sought; this is the seeing that consists in not
seeing, because that which is sought transcends all knowledge, being separated on all sides
by incomprehensibility as by a kind of darkness.30
This darkness on Gregory's Mount Sinai, says Jean Danielou, 'is the radical transcendence
of God with respect to all nature and all possibility of intelligibility.' Here even the
intellect (voiis) becomes blind as a new kind of seeing emerges that is by faith.
26 See Pelikan, Christianio and Classical Culture, 40-56.
27 Greg.Naz.Or. 28.4 (SC 250, 106.27 — 108.6).
28 Greg.Naz.Or. 28.9.
29 Amb.lo. 17 (PG 91.1224BC).
3 ° Greg.Nyss.V.Mos. 2.163 (GNO VIII.1, 254.24 — 255.3).
31 Platonisme et theologie Mystique. doctrine spirituelle de saint Gregoire de Nysse (Aubier: Editions Montagne, 1944),
194.
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In the fifth century, such apophadcism became even more strongly underlined by
Dionysius the Areopagite in a powerful crescendo. Dionysius is unequivocal in expressing
the fact that God not only transcends our affirmations, but that he far exceeds our
negations as well. 32 With a liturgico-biblical emphasis reminiscent of Henry Vaughan's line,
'There is in God (some say) / A deep, but dazling darkness', Dionysius refers to the divine
darkness (O Ems- yvotios) as the 'unapproachable light' (1 Tim 6:16) where 'God is said
[by holy Scripture] to dwell.'B Elsewhere in a specifically liturgical context' he speaks of an
immersion into 'the darkness beyond intellect'. 35 More generally, 'to know God' is to know
that he is beyond  all that can be known or perceived. According to Dionysius, this is
precisely what Saint Paul meant in Romans 11:33. 36 And in his famous first Letter he writes:
His transcendent darkness (TO it-ITTEpKElilEVOV airroTi oK6-ros) 37 remains hidden from all
light and concealed from all knowledge. Someone beholding God and understanding what
he saw has not actually seen God himself but rather something belonging to him that has
being and is knowable. For he himself utterly transcends mind and being. He is completely
unknown and non-existent. He exists beyond being and is known beyond the mind.38
Maximus' pedagogical strategy in the Chapters on Theology betrays a close
acquaintance with this entire apophatic tradition in both its theological and liturgico-
32 Myst.theol 1.2 (Corpus Dionysiacum II, 143.5-7).
33 Ep. 5 (Corpus Dionysiacum II, 162.3-4).
34 For the argument that Dionysius' Mystical Theology is to be interpreted with a concrete liturgical context in
mind see Andrew Louth, Deny the Areopagite (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1989), 100-101.
35 ...	 TOv irrrip voiiv	 yv&I)ov. Myst.theol 3 (Corpus Dionysiacum II, 147.9).
36 Fp. 5 (Coypus Dionysiacum II, 162.11 — 163.2).
37 FL-C. Puech suggests that yvOckos. and GKOTOS in Dionysius bear two reciprocally-related meanings. The
former signifies the subjective ignorance of the knowing subject; the latter signifies the objective
inaccessibility of God. See his 'La tenebre mystique chez le Pseudo-Denys l'Areopagite et dans la tradition
patristique', Etudes Carmektaines 23 (1938), 36.
3 8 .4. 1 (Corpus Dionysiacum II, 156.7 — 157.5).
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mystical forms — the former most thoroughly worked out by Gregory Nazianzen, the latter
having deeply Platonic roots and universally realised in the lived spiritual experience of
darkness, deprivation and unknowing in the presence of God." But contained in this
'negative' theology is also an impulse towards affirmation in the form of praise. It is only
after Moses has laid down his will and understanding 'outside' visible phenomena that he
begins to adore God. Only after he has entered the darkness (Eis TOv yvOcpov) - 'the
formless and immaterial place of knowledge' — does he 'remain, performing the most
sacred rites:4° Following the pattern set by the Pauline exclamation in Romans 11, the
experience of negation gives rise to a positive state of hidden nearness to God and mystical
praise. As Berthold puts it,' ... the revelation of God as Trinity is one which both reduces
the human mind to apophatic silence and calls it to a life of divine intimacy:41
The answer then to our question posed earlier surely lies in pointing out that for
Maximus the via negativa is not so much an intellectual theory as a necessary experience,
indeed, the characteristic experience of the Christian life that leads the (un)knowing subject
towards the puoTticn 5,::)()Aoyia, the eschatological and theological' culmination of the
spiritual pilgrimage 'from strength to strength' and 'glory to glory.'" Only when he has fully
denied the possibility of any natural means of access to God — sensual or intellectual — and
actually brought about the sharp awareness of that fact in his readers, is Maximus able to
introduce the possibility of faith which, as a divine gift - a seeing with the spiritual eye of
39 Danielou (Platonisme et Theo!ogle Mystique, 191) traces this tradition back to Philo. Referring to the whole
Greek philosophical tradition Hadot proposes that 'it is mystical experience that founds negative theology,
not the reverse.' Quoted in Davidson and Chase, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 29. For further references
indicating the terminological correspondences between the apophatic expressions in Maximus, Dionysius,
and Gregory of Nyssa, see Walther VOlker, Maximus Confessor au Meister des geistkchen Lebens (Wiesbaden: Franz
Steiner Verlag, 1965), 336-342.
40 Th.Oec. 1.84.
41 'The Cappadocian Roots', 58.
42 In the strict, trinitarian sense of the word.
43 Th.Oec. 2.77-78,
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the intellect, an actual experience of God - gains access to the unknowable God in a way
that far transcends discursive knowledge.'" It is for us no different than it was for Moses,
for whom this drawing near to the hidden God takes place 'by faith alone' (Tria-rEt 1JOvn).45
In another passage, this time in response to a query from the priest Thalassius,
Maximus once again explicitly links the way of negation to this experiential (non)knowledge
of God. 'Knowledge of divine things', he begins, 'is double' (SI -r-njv):
The first kind is relative, since it resides in reason and intellectual ideas alone and possesses
no actual perception through experience of its object. Through this kind of knowledge we
dispose ourselves in the present life. The second, properly true kind of knowledge that
consists in actual experience alone - apart from reason or intellectual ideas — brings about
OC
by participation the complete perception riits object by grace. Through this kind of
knowledge we receive that supernatural deification due in the future, a deification that is
unceasingly effective. They say that the relative way of knowing by reason and intellectual
ideas stirs up desire for actual knowledge by participation, whereas the effective kind of
knowledge that brings about via participation the perception of the object of knowledge
through experience is a deprivation («Imip E T( KTI V) of the other way of knowing residing in
reason and intellectual ideas.46
Again there can be no doubt about Maximus' clear debt to Dionysius, who exalts
experiential knowledge of God over that which is clearried';47 certainly there is no basis to
44 By 'experience' here and elsewhere I have in mind Louis Bouyer's reference to the Fathers' emphasis upon
the objective, actual aspect of experience rather than the modern preoccupation with its subjective, emotive
dimensions. See his discussion in The Christian Mystery: From Pagan Myth to Christian Mysticism, trans. Illtyd
Trethowan (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 278-287.
45 Amblo. 10 (PG 91.1148D); cf. Amb./b. 10 (PG 91.1188AB); Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1057A).
46 ,Q.Thal. 60 (CCSG 22, 77.63-76).
47 Dionysius in De div.nom. 2.9 (Corpus Dionysiacum I, 134.1-2) praises Hierotheus as one who ois pOvov
pcxecfn) dXACc rrak sw T8( Ma.
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speak of any dramatic departure from him." The Areopagite also speaks of a 'double'
(SiTTIjv) tradition of 'the theologians' (that is, the divinely-inspired writers of Scripture):
'the manifest and more evident,' which employs philosophical argument and rational
demonstration, and 'the ineffable and hidden', which, by more experiential and sacramental
means, ushers the subject directly into the presence of God. Both, nevertheless, are
'inextricably entwined.'' The dialectic inherent in this approach finds expression in the
Areopagite's symbolic theology, in which 'unlike' symbols in Scripture, such as rock or
wind or fire, are more fitting for God than like' symbols such as Word' or 'Mind' or
'Being', all of which falsely suggest a real correspondence between themselves and the God
who is beyond being.5°
This dialectic reaches further yet into the strong and ordered distinction which
developed in the fourth century between theologia, knowledge of God in himself, and
economia, knowledge of God as he engages with creation. Describing the dimension of
theologia, Dionysius writes,
Many scripture writers will tell you that the divinity is not only invisible and
incomprehensible, but also unsearchable and inscrutable (Rom 11:33), since there exists no
trace for anyone who would reach through into the hidden depths of this infinity.
48 While I largely concur with Ysabel de Andia's argument that Maximus posits a far more christocentric
relation than Dionysius between negative and affirmative theology, I would argue that her contrasts are drawn
rather too sharply. See her 'Transfiguration et Theologie Negative chez Maxime le Confesseur et Denys
L'Areopagite', in Ysabel de Andia (ed.), Denys l'Ariopagite et sa Posteriti en Orient et en Occident. Actes du Colloque
InterizationaL Paris, 21-24 septembre 1994 (Paris: Institut d'Etudes Augustiniennes), 293-328. For a more
balanced appraisal, see Janet Williams' three studies, 'The Apophatic Theology of Dionysius the Pseudo-
Areopagite I', The Downside Review 408 (1999), 157-172; The Apophatic Theology of Dionysius the Pseudo-
Areopagite II', The Downside Review 409 (1999), 235-250; 'The Incarnational Apophasis of Maximus the
Confessor', SP 37 (2001), 631-635.
49 Ep. 9 (Corpus Dionysiacum II, 197.9-12).
5° De coeLhier. 2.2-3 (Corpus Dionysiacum II, 10.13 — 13.23). In Biblical and Liturgical Symbar within the Pseudo-
Dionysian  Sjnthesis (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1984), 87-90, Paul Rorem observes that
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This is the apophatic way characterised by negation and deprivation of all rational and
intellectual means of knowledge. But having said as much, Dionysius immediately goes on
to speak of the kataphadc way, the way made possible by God's philanthropic, revelatory
economy, the way which itself leads to mystical, experiential union with the triune God:
On the other hand, the Good is not absolutely incommunicable to everything. By itself it
generously reveals a firm, transcendent beam, granting enlightenments proportionate to
each being, and thereby draws sacred minds upward to its permitted contemplation, to
participation and to the state of becoming like it. What happens to those that rightly and
properly make an effort is this: they do not venture towards an impossibly daring sight of
God, one beyond what is duly granted them. Nor do they go tumbling downward where
their own natural inclinations would take them. No. Instead they are raised firmly and
unswervingly upward in the direction of the ray which enlightens them. With a love
matching the illuminations granted them, they take flight, reverently, wisely, in all
holiness.51
It is important to point out that Dionysius' rather abstract-sounding language here
is actually aimed at substantiating a theological method that requires strict adherence to the
boundaries of biblical revelation. To assert the primacy of the apophatic way does not
imply the abandonment of revelation for the sake of some higher, alternative, esoteric
gnosis. Dionysius is no 'mystical iconoclast', as Balthasar so rightly perceived. 0 Rather this
the movement from affirmations to negations is not sequential so much as logical. Affirmation and negation
denote two ordered but contemporaneous epistemological approaches to a single reality.
51 De div.nom. 1.2 (Coipus Dionyiacum I, 110.11 — 111.2).
52 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, volume 2: Studies in Theological Sle: Clerical 41les, trans.
Andrew Louth, Francis McDonagh and Brian McNeil, ed. John Riches (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1984), 179.
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paragraph directs us to conceive of revelation as an interactive dialectic that heads towards the
re-unification of both divine and human subjects. Inherent to this dialectic is the
paradoxical nature of revelation. God reveals himself by hiding himself, and in hiding
himself, makes himself known. In this sense, we can never speak of revelation without also
speaking of concealment.53
The coordination of the apophatic and kataphatic dialectic with that of theologia and
economia is only strengthened in Maximus for whom, as Andrew Louth has suggested, 'pie
movement between apophatic and kataphatic is not a matter of a dialectic between two
kinds of human logic in speaking of God; rather, it is a movement between God's own
hidden life and his engagement with creation...2 54 Denial and affirmation, like theologia and
economia, are antithetical yet complementary registers in which one and the same God gives
himself to be acknowledged to be who he is by the removal of every illusion of what he is
not. 55 To Maximus' mind, the 'double' character of divine revelation and human
apprehension is demonstrated most concretely and paradigmatically in the Transfiguration
of Christ as recorded in the synoptic Gospels. Here the 'vertical' configuration of
Dionysius is woven into a hermeneutic more strongly eschatological and anagogical in
character. It is with specific reference to the Transfiguration as Te( OEOTTpETTTI
SpapaToupriPaTa that we find him referring to 'the two universal modes of theology.'
The hidden (uncreated) and symbolic (created) are united in a paradoxical dialectic: the
Word's concealment in flesh, garments, and cloud is seen to be the very means of his self-
manifestation. Like Gregory Nyssa's Sinai, Tabor is 'the mountain of theology', up to
53 See Dion.Ar. De coelhier. 2.2; Ep. 3; Maximus Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1049A); Amb.b. 10 (PG 91.1129BC).
54 Andrew Louth, `Apophatic Theology and the Liturgy in St. Maximos the Confessor', in idem., Wisdom of the
Byantine Church: Evagrios of Pontos and Maxims the Confessor, 1997 Paine Lectures in Religion, ed. Jill Raitt,
(Columbia, Missouri: Department of Religious Studies, University of Missouri, 1997), 42.
55 Amb.Io. 34 (PG 91.1288C).
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which the Word ascends with Peter, James and John — those who have acquired faith, hope
and love respectively. There 'he is transfigured before them,' which, as Maximus explains,
means that he is 'no longer referred to kataphatically as God and holy and king and suchlike,
but is spoken of apophatically according to the terms beyond-God and beyond-holy and all the
terms of transcendence.' 57 For the disciples, whose bodily and spiritual senses have been
purified, and who have passed over (pET63riaav) from flesh to spirit, it is the moment of
recognition whereby Christ's true identity as the eternally begotten Word of the Father
becomes apparent. His shining face radiates the unapproachable brightness of his divinity,58
'the characteristic hiddenness of his ousia' 59 which he shares with the Father and the Spirit.
In the transfigured Word-made-flesh, Maximus comprehends a miraculous matrix where
theologia and economia, apophasis and kataphasis, unknowing and knowing intersect in a
universal, salvifically effective economy:
For it was necess ° for him without any change in himself to be created like us,
accepting for the sake of his immeasurable love for humankind to become the type and
symbol of himself; and from himself symbolically to represent himself, and through the
manifestation of himself to lead to himself in his complete and secret hiddenness the whole
creation; and while he remains quite unknown in his hidden, secret place beyond all things,
unable to be known or understood by any being in any way whatever, out of his love for
56 Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1165B).
57 QD 191 (CCSG 10, 134.41-46).
58 Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1125D — 1128A).
59 QD 191 CCCSG 10, 134.48).
60 Reading 'ESE i in place of ETSet with Karl-Heinz Uthemann, 'Christ's Image versus Christology: Thoughts
on the Justiniac Era as Threshold of an Epoch', in Pauline Allen and Elizabeth Jeffreys (eds.), The Sixth
Centug: End or Beginning? (Brisbane: Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, 1996), 204.
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humankind he grants to human beings intimations of himself in his manifest divine works
performed in the flesh.61
What we are seeing at work here is a dynamic, paradoxical engagement whereby the
purified and receptive human subject comes to penetrate with the eye of faith the
corporeal, symbolic structures that veil the substance of the Word in order to apprehend
him in the hidden, undisclosed, radiant reality of his pre-incarnate (theological) state. Such
radiance is of course blinding, and as such can only be experienced as darkness. The
movement of the Word from his radiant hiddenness to his veiled manifest form involves
then an act of loving condescension on his part. As the (1)1Xcitv0pckyrros, the Word initially
gives himself to people according to their limited, sense-oriented means of apprehension.
Thus in the Chapters on Theology Maximus says that the 'first encounter' (TTc...ill-I
rrpooPoXij) with the Logos is with his flesh — with his incarnate, veiled form.' The
reference occurs within a series of chapters that meditate on the contrast between the
Lord's presence and absence experienced respectively as 'face to face' vision and vision 'as
in a mirror' (1 Cor 13:12)." Maximus considers these categories in turn in connection with
the progression from the active to the contemplative life.
The Lord is sometimes absent, sometimes present. He is absent in terms of face to face
vision; he is present in terms of vision in a mirror and in enigmas.
To the one engaged in ascetic struggle the Lord is present through the virtues, but
absent from him who takes no account of virtue. And again, to the contemplative he is
61 Amb.lo. 10 (PG 91.1165D — 1168A).
62 Th.Oec. 2.60; also 2.61.
63 Th.Oec. 2.57-61.
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present through the true knowledge of the things that are, but absent to him who
somehow misses it.64
We might also draw attention to the marked tactility of this first, gracious encounter
established by divine initiative. The terms Maximus uses recall the way in which
sacramental initiation is grounded in sense experience. Left to itself, the soul would be
utterly powerless to ascend to God, 'unless God himself; having drawn near to it, touch
(aqua() it by condescension and lead it up to himself; for the human mind has no such
power to ascend, to apprehend any divine illumination as it were, unless God himself draw it
up - as far as it is possible — and himself illumine it with divine brightness.' 65 The resulting
apprehension of the Lord, even by dim reflection, is however conditioned by the spiritual
state and progress of the subject. The manifestation of the Logos is not univocal. It is,
crassly put, personally tailored according to the receptivity of the human person in such a
way as to advance him from knowledge of the Logos' flesh to knowledge of his 'glory'. On
this we shall say more in due course.
In following Maximus' distinctions between various levels or stages in the
revelatory process, we must keep in mind the integrative unity between the two dimensions
of the hidden and symbolic, the apophatic and the kataphatic, a unity Maximus repeatedly
asserts in his insistence on the unity of praxis and theoria over against an unhealthy
preoccupation with one to the exclusion of the other. In Chapters on Theology 2.37-39 for
instance, he makes a point he demonstrates more fully elsewhere" concerning the essential
64 Th.Oec, 2.57-58.
65 Th.Oec. 1.31.
66 Amblo. 10 (PG 91.1145AB); Amb.Io. 57 (PG 91.1380D-1381B); .Q.Thed 3 (CCSG 7, 55.17-22); .Q.Thal 58
(CCSG 22, 31.64-69).
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co-inherence of the ascetic and contemplative dimensions of the spiritual life.° He links
them respectively with our two epistemological categories of kataphasis and apophasis, which
in turn are aspects of the self-manifestation of the Word in the flesh on the one hand, and
the transitus from the Word-made-flesh to the spiritual Word in his pre-incarnate form on
the other:
In the active life, the Word - becoming thick by means of the virtues - becomes flesh.
Whereas in the contemplative life - becoming lean by spiritual thoughts, he becomes what
he was in the beginning. God the Word.
He makes the Word flesh who, by the thicker words and examples, applies the
teaching of the Word the moral practice according to the corresponding potential of the
hearers; and again, he makes the Word spirit who expounds mystical theology through
sublime visions.
He who theologises kataphatically with affirmations makes the Word flesh —
having nothing other than what can be seen or felt in order to know God as cause. But he
who theologises apophatically with negations makes the Word spirit, as in the beginning he
was God and was with God (In 1:1) — working from absolutely nothing of what can be
known, [yet] knowing well the utterly unknowable.
We may conclude this section by adding a number of summary observations. As a
revelatory economy the Incarnation is still a trinitarian event." The Christian ascent from
flesh to spirit, earthly to heavenly is not cosmic or spatial but theological: it is a movement
67 This principle surfaces repeatedly in the Chapters on Theology. See Th.Oec. 1.98; 2.32; 2.37; 2.40; 2.51; 2.64;
2.74; 2.80; 2.87.
68 See also ,Q.ThaL 2 (CCSG 7,51.22-28); 60 (CCSG 22, 79.94-114); Ordom. (CCSG 23, 31.87-97); Amblo. 61
(PG 91.1385D); Opusc. 7 (PG 91.77BC); 20 (PG 91.240C). The Father approves (Eti5oKc;iv) the Incarnation;
the Son personally effects it (airroupyr3v); the Spirit co-operates in it (ouvEpy6.iv). Cf.Greg.Naz.Or. 28.1
(SC 250, 100.13-15).
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from fallen creaturely existence to participation in the mysterious communion of the holy
Trinity. It is therefore the implicitly trinitarian structure of revelation, centred upon the
revelation of the Word in the flesh, that shapes Maximus' understanding of the need to
advance through the flesh of the incarnate Word to lay hold of the 'naked' Word himself.
For the whole Spirit and the whole Father are substantially united with the Word.°
Repeatedly in the Chapters on Theology we come across the phrase 'the Word/the Son of the
Father'.7° The bodily manifestation of the Word-Son has as its ultimate object the revelation of
the Father, who is 'by nature completely inseparable from the whole of his Word.' 71 In
apprehending the Word, a person receives, or better, is received by the complete holy
Trinity. It is not finally the vision of the glory of the Son to which the worthy attain, but
the vision of the glory of the Father — in the Son — through the Spirit.n
This never detracts from Maximus' strongly christocentric and essentially
incarnadonal vision. In fact it strengthens it, for there can be no vision of the hidden Father
except in the visible incarnate Son. But there are different levels of apprehension of the
divine Word that appear to be conditioned by the corresponding level of knowledge of the
inner meaning and salvific purpose of the incarnation. That is why, argues Maximus, the
divine apostle Paul knew only 'in part', whereas the great evangelist John saw the glory of
the only-begotten Son of the Father. 73
 Paul's partial knowledge is the knowledge of the
Word through ascetic activity; John, it seems, pierces through the visible flesh of the Word
69 Th.Oec. 2.71. On the fundamentally trinitarian shape of revelation in Maximus, see further Thunberg, Man
and the Cosmos, 32; Felix Heinzer, 1,'explication trinitaire de L'Economie chez Maxime le Confesseur', in
Heinzer and SchOnborn, Maximus Confessor. Actes du Symposium, 161-164.
7 ° See, for example, Th.Oec. 2.21; 2.25; 2.71.
71 Th.Oec. 2.71. Also Th.Oec. 2.22: 'Just as our human word which proceeds naturally from the mind is the
messenger of the secret movements of the mind, so does the Word of God - who knows the Father in
essence, as Word knows the Mind which has begotten it (since no created being can approach the Father
without him) - reveal the Father whom he knows.'
72 Th.Oec. 2.73.
73 Th.Oec. 2.76.
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and beholds the hidden yet revealed X6yoc and oKorrOs of the Incarnation, that is, its
specifically and inherently salvific (St npas) dimension, viewed teleologically. This
dimension has as its ultimate author and source not the Son, but the Father. It is the
Father's glory which the only-begotten has made known On 1:18). It is God's pEyaAil
PouXij of which the incarnate Word is O dyyaos. In the overall fulfilment of that plan
through the Incarnation lies the accomplishment of our deifying adoption as sons of
God.74
Three Laws and Four Incarnations
We have already indicated the centrality of the Transfiguration in Maximus' theological
vision. In the transfigured body of Christ he recognises an archetypal locus in which the
human union with God by faith and the reciprocal, corresponding universal theophany of
divine glory is proleptically demonstrated. 75 Two accounts in the Gospels (Mt 17:1-8; Lk
9:28-36) occupy his attention in a number of contexts, 76 but nowhere more fully than in the
tenth Ambiguum. 77 Having already seen the importance of the 'double' way of theology, we
must now explore further Maximus' application of this hermeneutic to the synoptic
narrative where Christ's 'garments' and 'flesh' serve as a paradigmatic analogy of how 'God
gives himself to be beheld through visible things.' 78 Each represents one of the two
74 Th.Oec. 2.21-25. The christological titles of Isaiah 9:6 are attributed to the dyyEAos pryciXils. PouAlis of
Isaiah 9:5. Origen had also applied this office to Christ (OrJoh. 1.38 [SC 120, 198.278]). Dionysius links it
with John 15:15 as an aspect of Jesus' revelation of the Father (De coel.bier. 4.4 [Corpus Dionysiacum II, 24.1-4]).
Maximus treats the topic further in Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 28.39— 29.49); 2.Thal 60 (CCSG 22, 73.5 —75.48).
75 On the place of the Transfiguration in the patristic tradition in general, see John A. McGuckin, The
Transfiguration of Christ in Scripture and Tradition (Lewiston/Queenston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 99-143.
76 2D 190-193 (CCSG 10, 131.1 — 136.23); Th.Oec. 1.97; 2.13-16.
77 Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1125D — 1133A; 1156B; 1160C — 1169B).
78 Amb.M. 10 (PG 91.1129A).
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dimensions - visible and invisible, kataphatic and apophatic - by which God conceals and
reveals himself in the economy of creation.
It is in this connection that we find Maximus expounding his understanding of the
'two laws' — the 'natural' and the 'written' (T01) TE OatKOv Kai TOv yparrrOv), each of
which corresponds to the respective incarnate economies of the divine Word in cosmos
and Scripture. While both Origen and Evagrius knew of the cosmos as a vast book, it has
been recognised that the co-ordination of cosmos and Scripture as equally valuable and
equally effective economies represents Maximus' own development .' Both laws are equally
necessary for spiritual advancement, for they are 'of equal honour and teach
(Fa to5s5ovras) the same things as one another!' Indeed, the one is 'the same' (rai1r6v)
as the other." What also becomes especially interesting in Maximus is his co-ordination of
these two incarnate economies with the historic Incarnation in Christ. There are in fact
'three laws': the natural, the written, and the 'spiritual law' or 'law of grace'. While Maximus
recognises their respective integrity as 'different modes of a divine way of life' (To6s
6tackOpous pious. SpOpou KaTa eE6v),82 he also knows them together to constitute a
single law which converges (auvdyETat) in Christ who as creator (5Tiptoupy6s) is the
author of natural law, and as provider and lawgiver orpovor iTils Kai vopoO6Tris) is the
giver of the written law." Or as Balthasar writes, 'the third law, which is ushered in and
embodied in Christ, perfects both the first and the second laws, and unites them for good,
79 'Maximus envisions creation and scripture as objective economies of divine relation that stand in a perfect
analogous relation to the Logos-Revealer.... The written law is thus no longer an intermediate degree
between natural revelation and the revelation of Christ; rather, nature and history are equal poles that
complement one another eschatologically.' Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy, 102; see also Balthasar,
Kosmische Litutgie, 288-300; Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 77-78.
89 Amblo. 10 (PG 91.1128CD).
81 Amb.lo. 10 (PG 91.1152A).
82 .Q.Thal. 64 (CCSG 22, 233.730-731).
83 .Q.Thal. 19 (CCSG 7, 119.7-22); 39 (CCSG 7, 14-17); 64 (CCSG 22, 233.738 — 237.793).
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since at the same time it eliminates their limitations.'" Turning to Maximus' meditation on
the Transfiguration, we find his synthesis of the sensible and intelligible dimensions of
these three economies situated under the rubric of concealment and revelation:
For just as, when calling the words of holy Scripture the garments of the Word, and
interpreting its intelligible realities (rd voripa-ra) as his flesh, we conceal him in the first
case and reveal him in the second, so too when calling the external forms and visible
shapes of created beings garments, and interpreting the hidden principles (ros Àc;yous)
in accordance with which these forms and shapes have been created as flesh, we likewise
conceal in the first case, and reveal in the second. For the Word, who is the creator of the
universe and the lawgiver and by nature invisible, in appearing conceals himself, and in
concealing himself is made manifest. 85
Judging by the emphasis upon interpretative actions — 'we conceal.., we reveal' -
Maximus' seems to be making his point on the interpretative, existential plane, though it is
based on an economic reality. Just as the garments which veil the Lord become in the
eschatological moment of sight transparent to the flesh concealed beneath, so do the words
of Scripture and the corporeal forms of the ordered universe become translucent to 'the
intelligible realities' and 'hidden principles' embedded in them. The entire scheme including
the economy of Christ can be represented diagramatically as follows overleaf:
84 Kosmische Lit:ogle, 289.
85 Amb.lo. 10 (PG 91.1129B).
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Three Economies 'We conceal' 'We reveal'
Christ
Written law
(Scripture)
Natural law
(created beings)
Garments
(ip«-rta)
Words
(Ta iSiripa-ra)
Forms and shapes
(-1-« eysq TE Kai oxripaTa)
Flesh
(ocipKas)86
Intelligible realities
(ra voirjpaTa)
Hidden principles
(oi Xciyot)
Perhaps what is most striking about the above schema is that the 'fleshes' of Christ
is ordered together with invisible, intelligible realities. While the visible dimensions constitute
indispensable elements in each economy, Christ's transfigured flesh is seen already to take
part in another order again, that is, the theological order. The relation between the sensible
and the intelligible dimensions is best understood, as I.-H Dalrnais has observed, as one
controlled by the dialectic of preparation-realisation rather than by an antithesis between
figure and reality. 87 Nor do these two dimensions merely sit side by side. On the contrary,
Balthasar has referred to a mutual perichoresis — a reciprocal interpenetration - that takes
86 'The use of the plural is somewhat mysterious. One proposal, suggested to me by Andrew Louth, is that the
plural designates flesh that is to be consumed as food. We find precisely that use in Clem.Str. 5.10.66.2 (SC
276, 134.6-10) where, having spoken of 'milk' for infants as catechesis and 'meat' for the perfect as mystic
contemplation, he refers to both as 'the fleshes and blood of the Word (oapas. airrai Kat dtpa TOU
Xoyou), that is, the apprehension of divine power and essence.' Could it be that Maximus, in contemplating
the transfigured body of Christ, is led to equate it with his eucharistic flesh?
87 I.-H. Dalmais, 'La Manifestation du Logos dans l'Homme et dans L'Eglise: Typologie anthropologique et
typologic ecclesiale d'apres .Qu.Thal 60 et la Mystagogie', in Heinzer and SchOnborn, Maximus Confessor Actes du
Symposium, 21.
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place between them on account of their mutually shared 'universal principle' (yEviKOs
A6yos)." Despite their natural ontological differences, both sensible and intelligible share
the fact of having been created out of nothing, and therefore the capacity of being united
as a single, dynamic medium of divine glory. 89 Nevertheless, only the intelligible realities
share with God an intelligible nature, and thus the visible, sensible elements clearly remain
subordinate to them, just as kataphasis is subordinate to apophasis, economia to theologia,
concealment to revelation, praxis to theoria.
Our next question must be to ask further about the relation between these three
incarnate economies. We have seen that Maximus stresses the equalio of the natural and
written laws — what Blowers refers to as their 'fundamental reciprocity' on account of a
common underlying symbolic structure, and thus 'their common access to the intelligible
mystery of the incarnate Logos.'" Indeed, Maximus applies to all three economies a
metaphor originally used by Gregory Nazianzen in a sublime sermon preached for the
festival of Theophany (Epiphany) with explicit reference to the enfleshment in Christ of
the incorporeal Word." In each economy, the visible, sensible, symbolic dimensions
designate the realm in which the Word, who is 'subtle' (AErr-rOs) by nature,92 has 'thickened
himself' (Traxu06v-ra). 93 In Ambiguum 33 Maximus is called upon to deal with Gregory's
statement that 'the Word became thick'. 94 Perhaps it was thought to sound suspiciously
Origenist, for Evagrius in his Kephalaia Gnostica had accounted for the 'thickness' attaching
88 Kosmische Liturgic, 170-171, 231; see also Amb.Io. 17 (PG 91.1228C); Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 29.
89 .Q.Thal. 2 (CCSG 7, 51.15-30); see further Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 398-401; Blowers, Exegesis and
Spiritual Pedagogy, 98-99.
9° Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy, 106.
91 Greg.Naz.Or. 38.2 (SC 358, 106.16-20).
92 Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1129C).
93 Aruba 10 (PG 91.1129D).
94 Amblo. 33 (PG 91.1285C — 1288A).
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to pre-existent intellects by referring to their fall and subsequent punitive embodiment's
Yet following the most natural meaning of the phrase in its context in Gregory, Maximus
first supplies a christological interpretation:
The Word is said to be 'thickened by the inspired teacher... because the Word, who is
simple and incorporeal and feeds spiritually all the divine powers in heaven in succession,
deemed it worthy also to thicken himself through his incarnate coming from us, for us, and
like us yet without sin, and fittingly to expound to us through words and patterns a
teaching concerning the ineffable which far transcends the power of all rational discourse.
For it is said that everything has been taught through parables, and that nothing is
explained without a parable (cf. Mt 13:34). For so it pleases teachers to use parables
whenever their pupils do not understand things spoken in archetypal form
(rrpayro-n_irrcos) 96 and to lead them on to true perception of the things said.97
The transition Maximus records here from theologia to economia is exactly as one finds it in
Gregory. The eternal and transcendent Word becomes a true flesh-and-blood human being
in order to draw humanity in himself up to God. Especially notable in Maximus' exposition
is the phrase 'through his incarnate coining from us, for us, and like us' (6,6(
ivadpKou a I/ TOIJ rrapouoias E igic3v 5i' ipas Ka0' isipas), by which he emphasises
the mutual interdependence of the soteriological and realistic dimensions of the Word's
enfleshed presence. We may note also the parallel he draws between the Incarnation and
Jesus' use of parables. As the true pedagogue, the Word presents himself symbolically in
order to lead us to a true perception (auva ioeflat v) of the archetype.
95 Evag.Keph. 4.6.
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Next Maximus follows with two alternative interpretations of Gregory's phrase
regarding the Word's 'thickening' himself. The first represents the Word's cosmic
economy:
Or [it could be said that the Word 'becomes thick' in the sense that], having ineffably
hidden himself in the defining sub-structures (T615 X6yots) of created beings for our
sake, he indicates himself by analogy through each visible being, as through certain letters,
wholly present in his utter fullness in the whole universe and at the same time wholly
present in individual things. He is wholly present and undiminished. Remaining, as always,
without difference, he is present in different things; simple and uncompounded, he is in the
compounded; without beginning, he is in things that have a beginning; invisible, he is in
visible things; intangible, he is in tangible things.98
Finally Maximus presents the Word's scriptural economy:
Or [it could be said that the Word 'becomes thick' in the sense that], for our sake who are
dense in disposition, he consented to embody himself for us and to be represented through
letters and syllables and sounds so that, with us following him little by little from these
things, he might lead us to himself, joined by the Spirit, and make us ascend into subtle and
non-relative understanding of him who contracted us for his sake into his own union to
the same extent that he expanded himself for our sake by the principle of condescension.99
96 Blowers (Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy, 120) I think tends to obscure the full import of this adverb by
translating TOis Trpo..yro-rurrwc Xeyopsvot as 'what they originally said'.
97 Amb.Io. 33 (PG 91.1285C).
98 Amb.Io. 33 (PG 91.1285D).
99 Amb.Io. 33 (PG 91.1288A). The Greek of the final phrase is especially difficult to render: TOGO.UTOV .6pas.
Si iawrOv TTOOS" 'gVCOGIV iaUTOIJ OUGTED\a5, ocrov au-ros 61 riu&s- EaUTOV aurcaTaPcicncos. XoycA?
St ga-rstXsv. Stephen Gersh has: 'he brings us for his own sake into union with himself by contraction to the
same extent that he has for our sake expanded himself according to the principle of condescension' (Fmm
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Much could be said about the cosmic and scriptural dispensations in which the
Word 'thickens' himself, but in view of Maximus' strongly cosmological ontology which we
shall be examining in greater detail in the next chapter, we shall here concentrate primarily
on his understanding of the written law, that is, the Word's incarnate economy in Scripture.
How are the 'scriptural and christological economies related? We recall our discussion
above about Maximus' symbolic identification of Christ's 'garments' with the 'words' of
Scripture and his 'flesh' with their intelligible contents or meaning. Through his historic
Incarnation as Christ, the divine Word — who 'remains quite unknown in his hidden, secret
place beyond all things, unable to be known or understood by any being in any way
whatsoever' - lovingly condescends to become 'a type and symbol of himself' thereby
granting human beings 'intimations of himself in the manifest divine works performed in
the flesh.'' In like manner we find Maximus positioning the scriptural economy in a
marked dialectic with theological inaccessibility, explaining that 'it is customary for
Scripture to represent unspeakable and hidden intentions of God in corporeal terms
(aco1aTIKc35), so that we may be able to perceive divine realities through the words and
Iamblichus to Diugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian  Tradition [Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1978], 255). But the Greek does not speak of a 'union with himself' but of 'his own union/unity' Cifpos
ivcoatv Eatrroi,), indicating either the union of the divine and human natures in Christ or the theological
unity of the divine Word. Blowers renders it a little differently again: 'Thus the more he drew us together into
union with him for himself, the more for our sake he would expand himself by reason of his condescension'
(Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy, 120). This unfortunately fails to render accurately the meaning of the tantum-
quantum formula. Both scholars recognise the importance of bringing out the Neoplatonic dialectic of
expansion and contraction (5i a a-roXii —aua-roAri), which Thunberg (Microcosm and Mediator, 60-61) identifies
as a metaphysical law describing the movement from unity into differentiation (Siaa-roAri) and back to unity
(cruarokri). He rightly concludes 'that in Maximus' view the movement of SiacyroAri, of differentiation, as
the movement of God's condescension in creation, comes very close to the incarnation, and the movement
of (Nal-0701 consequently, comes close to deification.'
100 Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1165D — 1168A).
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sounds that are comformable to our nature, since God is unknowable Mind and ineffable
Word and inaccessible Spint.... )101
It is apparent then that the scriptural and the christological economies share as a
whole the same structure and purpose. In what way then, we may ask, are they distinct? Is
there any qualitative difference between them?' Once again it will be useful to look back to
Origen as the spiritual father of the anagogical herrneneutical tradition which Maximus
inherits. Origen knows no division between Christ and the divine Word who is the true but
hidden content of Scripture — its mind (voi:15) or spirit (TryEiipa). For him 'Christ and
Scripture are identified, the latter being already an incarnation of the Word in writing,
which is analogous to flesh; nor is it another and different incarnation, since it is
completely related to the one incarnation....
identification: Christ is Scripture's sole object. He is, in de Lubac's splendid phrase, its
'whole exegesis.' Anagogy is the integration of the reader via the material symbol of the
text into its divine content.' Scripture's purpose has been fulfilled when through askesis
the believer himself becomes Scripture - a living symbol of Christ."
Nevertheless, for Maximus as for Origen, holy Scripture contains its own intra-
structural dimensions that are to be distinguished and not confused. The first of these, as
we have mentioned, is the distinction between the letter and the spirit .' Parallel to this is
101 
.Q.Thal 28 (CCSG 7, 205.42-46).
102 Blowers pursues this question at some length, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy, 117-130. See also Thunberg,
Microcosm and Mediator, 73-79.
103 Crouzel, 'The School of Alexandria and Its Fortunes', 166-167.
104 Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis. The Four Senses of Scripture, volume 1, trans. Mark Sebanc (Edinburgh:
T&T Clark, 1998), 237.
105 See further Karen Torjesen, Hermeneutical Procedure and Theokgical Method in Origen's Exegesis (Patristische
Texte und Studien 28, Berlin, 1986), 124-138.
106 On this distinctive feature of monastic exegesis, see Douglas Burton-Christie, "Practice makes Perfect":
Interpretation of Scripture in the Apophthegmata Patrum', SP 20 (1989), 213-218.
107 Th.Oec. 1.91; Q.ThaL 32 (CCSG 7, 225.17-33).
'103 Anagogical exegesis presupposes this
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the distraction between the Old Testament and the New, the Law and the Gospe1. 108 The
New Testament inheres and is mysteriously hidden in the letter of the Old. In turn the Law
is the shadow of the Gospel, and the Gospel the image of the good things to come. And
the Old Testament is again divided into the Law and the Prophets, the former a shadow
and the latter an image of the divine and spiritual benefits contained in the Gospel. Still
another tripartite scheme in holy Scripture becomes evident in its partial or progressive
revelation (ill Kc(ni pg pos 4)av6pcoots) of the trinitarian mystery, in that it moves from a
confession of the Father to the Son to the Holy Spirit.' Each 'component' possesses a
carefully schematised, irreducible function in the overall scriptural and historical
dispensation. The fact that Moses and Elijah, representing the Law and the Prophets,
appear with Christ on the mountain of Transfiguration is highly significant in this regard.
In themselves the written media of the old covenant are 'dead' - destined to pass away like
the body. But co-ordinated with Christ, they are able to fulfil a saving, revelatory,
pedagogical function, which is no less than their true (teleological) 'mind' or purpose. That
true purpose is to testify to the 'law of grace', to the Gospel - to the Christ who 'unfolds
eschatologically" their intelligible contents. In a kind of reversal of its own progressive
trinitarian order, Scripture's true purpose is to lead us in the Spirit from its multiple 'words'
to the singular Word' in whom we come finally to the Father.'" So Maximus can say:
108 Th.Oec. 1.89-93; Myst. 6.
109 Antb.Io. 23 (PG 91.1261A). The passage bears strong echoes of the ancient doctrine of three orders or eras
in which God progressively reveals himself as Father (Israel/OT), Son (Christ/NT), and Holy Spirit
(Church). Maximus probably drew it directly from Greg.Naz.Or. 31.26. This tripartite arrangement arises also
in Anb.Io. 21 (PG 91.1241D — 1256C). Just as the Old Testament was a 'forerunner' of the Gospel, so too is
the written Gospel, like the proclamation that takes place in the words and deeds of the saints, a 'forerunner'
of the Word's final, 'more perfect' revelation in the eschatological consummation. The entire scheme of
salvation is thus arranged in an unfolding prophetic triad (PG 91.1253C): shadow (Old Covenant and its
worship), image (New Covenant and its worship), truth (the coming age).
110 Blowers, Exeseszlr and Sphitual Pedagogy, 124.
48
Whenever the Word of God becomes bright and shining in us, and his face becomes
dazzling like the sun, then also are his clothes more radiant, that is, the words of the holy
Scripture of the Gospels are clear and distinct and contain nothing hidden. Moreover, both
Moses and Elijah stand beside him, that is, the more spiritual meanings of the Law and the
Prophets.112
Returning now to Anthiguum 33, we may offer some final remarks on the
relationship between the 'three laws'. The syntactical structure of the whole passage
undergirds Maximus' regard for the structural and effective equality of all three economies.
Each is introduced as a valid alternative 	 OTI... OTI) with an equally effective
soteriological thrust (Si
	 St	 St ;was). In the summary sentence
enclosing Maximus' classic tantum-quantum (TOGOTJTOV... 000V) formulation,' again with
t
an explicit soteriological marker (St npas-), we are given a glimpse of his overarching
incarnational, revelatory metaphysics. The 'thickening' or 'expansion' of the Word is
simultaneously the 'thinning' or 'contraction' of the 'density' of human nature — its opacity
to divine things. The movement is not temporally sequential, nor does it imply the
dematerialisation of human nature. It is rather a two-dimensional description of the Word's
self-expansion into and penetration of the universe and the reciprocal, simultaneous
transfiguration of and contraction of the universe into him. In this respect Blowers'
comments are instructive: 'The natural law and the written law, creation and scripture, are
grounded in the preexistent and transcendent Logos. In Maximus' thought, however, the
111 Th.Oec. 2.20-22.
112 Th.Oec. 2.14.
113 See Balthasar, Kosmirche Litupgie, 277-278; Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 31-32; Jean-Claude Larchet, La
dioinisation de l'homme se/on saint Maxime le Confesseur (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1996), 376-382.
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transcendent Logos is never conceptually separate from the historically incarnate Christ:11'
And turning to Thunberg we also find a fitting analysis:
The cosmological (ontological), the providential and the historical Logos are not separate
elements in Maximus' theology, but consciously depicted as one and the same: Christ, the
Son of God the Father, and the Lord of the Church. He is the centre of the universe in the
same manner as he is the centre of the economy of salvation.... [T]he Logos, on account
of his general will to incarnate himself, holds together not only the X6yot of creation but
also the three aspects of creation, revelation (illumination) and salvation.115
By his Incarnation the eternal Word establishes in time a single, universal, theophanous
economy by which the natural and written economies which we experience as distinct are
constituted as effective revelatory and saving dispensations. Only on this basis can
Maximus posit the equal revelatory efficacy of the two laws. In other words, they have no
independent metaphysical or salutary status apart from the Word who is none other than
the crucified and risen incarnate Saviour Jesus Christ:
The mystery of the Word's incarnation contains the force of all the hidden meanings and
types in Scripture, and the understanding of visible and intelligible creatures. The one who
knows the mystery of the cross and tomb knows the true nature (TOUS Xciyous.) of these
aforementioned things. And the one who has been initiated into the ineffable power of the
resurrection knows the purpose for which God originally made all things.116
114 Exegetic and Spiritual Pedagogy, 118.
115 Microcosm and Mediator, 77.
116 Th.Oec. 1.66.
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On the other hand, as Blowers has demonstrated, the two laws cannot be reduced or
collapsed into one as though their specific functions in the progressive, revelatory
enactment of the eternal divine plan were of no account."'
Alongside these three economies in which the Word is said to become thick,
Maximus hints at yet a fourth, equally important economy - one we have already
encountered with Gregory Nazianzen's 'thickening' metaphor in the Chapters in Theology. It
is, namely, the life of the virtues: 'In the active life, the Word — becoming thick by means of
the virtues — becomes flesh?"' As the caption heading this section suggests, Maximus
envisages the life of the virtues as an incarnation of the Word no less real and effective
than his three incarnate economies in cosmos, Scripture, and Christ. The texts we could
adduce are many, and will come up for closer analysis later during the course of our whole
study. Here we shall simply try to focus upon the revelatog character of this incarnation with
a view to discerning its impact upon the body.
Behind Maximus' thinking on this point there lies his fully developed
understanding of the direct and mutual reciprocity between divine incarnation and human
deification. In the traditions represented by Saints Irenaeus, Athanasius, and Augustine this
reciprocity was expressed in the well-known phrase, 'God became man that we might
become God.'" With Gregory Nazianzen we notice a shift related to his soteriological
principle quod non est assumptum non est sanatum — what is not assumed is not healed.' He
introduces to the traditional phrase the tantum-quantum formula which we met above in
Maximus. United to God in Christ, human nature became one with God, 'so that I might
117 Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy, 118-119.
118 Ev 1_16 TTpaKTIK63, TOIS TC3V ClpETc3V TpOTTOIS TraxuvOuEvos A6yos. (Th.Oec. 2.37).
119 Iren.Haer. 3.19.1; Ath./ne. 54; Aug.Serm. 192.1.1.
129 `What is not assumed is not healed' (TO yap clirpOoXTITTTov, deEpdireuTov). Greg.Naz.Ep. 101 (SC 208,
1.32).
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be made God so far as he is made man' Civa yg vcopat Tocoirrov eE65 , Ociov i6vos-
dvepcorros). 121 Man's deification is not only reciprocally related, but directly and
quantifiably proportionate to the extent of God's humanisation, and dependent upon it.
Maximus however takes this proportionate dependence of human deification upon God's
incarnation one step further by asserting the dependence of God's incarnation upon
human deification. God takes bodily form in man to the extent that man deifies himself through
the cultivation of virtue. The widely acknowledged locus classicus for this doctrine is found in
Ambiguum 10:
For [the Fathers] say that God and man are paradigms of one another: God is humanised
to man through love for humankind to the extent that man, enabled through love, deifies
himself to God; and man is caught up spiritually by God to what is unknown to the extent
that he manifests God, who is invisible by nature, through the virtues.122
What Maximus is depicting here is less 'another' incarnation distinct from Christ so
much as the progressive and proleptic incorporation of the Christian into the revelatory
and deifying dynamic of the Word's one glorious Incarnation. The same dynamic is
apparent when we consider another crucial passage in Ambiguum 7 where omitting the
T000UTOV-8001) formula Maximus describes the three-fold result of having actively
'engraved and formed' (iVTUTruioas TE Kai pop#Lioas) God alone in oneself entirely:
121 Greg.Naz.Or. 29.19 (SC 250, 218.9-10). Catherine Osborne also detects in Origen the presence of an
'inverse symmetry' between human assimilation to God through love and God's love for humankind. See her
important study Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God ofLove (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 182.
122 Amb.ro. 10 (PG 91.1113BC). I follow Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his
Refutation of Origenirm (Studia Anselmiana 36, Rome: Herder, 1955), 144 fn35, in reading TO dyvcoorTov in
place of TO yvo3o-rov.
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The result is that he too is and is called 'God' by grace, that God by condescension is and
is called man for his sake, and that the power of this exchanged condition is demonstrated
in him. This is the power that deifies man to God on account of love for God, and
humanises God to man on account of God's love for humankind, and which, according to
this wonderful exchange, makes God man by the deification of man, and makes man God
by the humanisation of God.123
A number of repeated features are worthy of note. First is the foundation of this
transformative reciprocity in divine love for man (4)17n avepurrria) and human love for
God (dyeing, (1)0n60Eov). Love fills out or 'gives body' at the level of actuality to the
union potentially realised in faith. Secondly, correlative to the reciprocal effects of
deification and incarnation, expressed by the adoption of Gregory's 'wonderful exchange'
(Ka XT) dwriaTpoclyrb
subject. In the words that follow the first passage from Ambiguum 10, Maximus makes
passing reference to the impact of the reciprocal exchange upon 'the nature of the body'.
IA]ccording to this philosophy,' he writes, 'the nature of the body is necessarily ennobled
(EUyE V I CETa ) ' 125- that is, it becomes subject to and endowed with reason.' The person
'caught up' in the process of deification becomes in the ordered totality of his corporeal
123 Amb.lo. 7 (PG 91.1084C).
124 Greg.Naz.Or. 38.4. The phrase occurs in Gregory's appeal to keep the Feast of the Theophany replete with
baptismal imagery: 'This is our present Festival; it is this which we are celebrating today, the coming of God
to man, that we may go forth, or rather (for this is the proper expression) that we may go back to God — that
putting off the old man, we may put on the New; and that as we died in Adam, so we may live in Christ,
being born with Christ and crucified with him and buried with him and rising with him. For I must undergo
the wonderful exchange (-rt=jv KaXtjv chrrtcr-rpoOlv), and as the painful succeeded the more blissful, so must
the more blissful come out of the painful. For where sin abounded, grace abounded much more yet; and if a
taste condemned us, how much more does the passion of Christ justify us? Therefore let us keep the
Feast....' On the development of the idea of the admirabile commercium in the Fathers, see Hans Urs von
Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theog, volume 4: The Action, trans. Graham Harrison (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 246-254.
125 Ambio. 10 (PG 91.1113C).
126 Amb.M. 10 (PG 91.1116D).
,124 we observe the bodily manifestation of divine power in the deified
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human nature — a composite unity of intellect (v6.15), reason (X6y05), and sense
(caaenais), an agent of divine manifestation. And because God's deifying presence in his
body is incarnate as love, it is sacramentally effective: capable of binding both himself and
other human beings to God. In other words, the deified subject himself, as God by grace,
becomes a means of deifying others. Thus it is speaking of love experienced through another
person that Maximus says that 'nothing is more truly Godlike than divine love, nothing more
mysterious, nothing more apt to raise up human beings to deificadon.'127
Now at last we may be in a better position to understand Maximus' co-ordination
of ourselves, the cosmos and Scripture as 'three human beings'. 1 ' In their common and
essential bipartite structure (sensible-intelligible) all three possess a potentially divisive
character, contingent upon their orientation to the 'greater and more mystical economy' of
the universal consummation. Insofar as cosmos and Scripture are a human being, through
the reciprocal deification of man and incarnation of God this future 'more hidden
economy' (inaTIKG..yrg pa o(Kovopia) 129 becomes already concretely manifest in space
(cosmos) and time (Scripture). Only in deified humanity do cosmos and Scripture attain
their proper status and goal. Through the deified person's life of virtue, that is, through
faith active in love, both cosmos and Scripture lose their obscuring and concealing and
divisive character, and instead their intelligible and divine qualities become manifest. This is
what Maximus means when he speaks of a time when 'the body will become like the soul
and sensible things like intelligible things in dignity and glory, when the unique divine
power will manifest itself in all things in a vivid and active presence proportioned to each
127 Ep. 2 (PG 91.393B); see also Myst. 24: 'nothing is either so fitting for justification or so apt for deification
and nearness to God, if I may speak thus, than mercy offered with pleasure and joy from the soul to those
who stand in need' (Sotiropoulos 236.22-25).
128 Myst. 7 (Sotiropoulos 188.10-12).
129 Myt. 7 (Sotiropoulos 186.25).
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one. ,130 We shall encounter even more explicit statements to the same end towards the
...
latter stages of this chapter.
Revelation as Symbolic Pedagogy
In several places we have mentioned the specifically pedagogical function of sensible
symbolic media as they occur in the three incarnate economies of God the Word. Cosmos,
Scripture, and Christ are carefully schematised and symbolic pedagogies through which the
divine Word, employing a whole range of pedagogical skills — from teaching to training,
concealment to correction - brings about deifying illumination. Werner Jaeger has
demonstrated that for the dominant tradition of spiritual anthropology to which Maximus
was heir — that of Gregory of Nyssa -paideia was primarily understood in terms of morphosis
or formation."' Gregory's 'constant repetition of this basic image, which implies the
essential identity of all educational activity and the work of the creative artist, painter, and
sculptor, reveals the plastic nature of his conception of Greek paideia.'132
This is a significant detail for our discussion, for it brings to the fore the positive
view of materiality this metaphor assumes. Interestingly it is an aspect of paideia that is
common to Christian and Neoplatonist alike. In the first book of the Enneads, Plotinus
provides the famous illustration of this 'plastic' dimension of paideia at work in the sculptor
whose basic task is to model his own statue:
130 Myst. 7 (Sotiropoulos 188.5-8).
131 Ear# Christianiy and Greek Paidela (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1961), 86-87.
132 EarA ChristianiD, and Greek Paideia, 87.
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Just as someone making a statue which has to be beautiful cuts away here and polishes
there and makes one part smooth and clears another till he has given his statue a beautiful
face, so you too must cut away excess and straighten the crooked and clear the dark and
make it bright, and never stop 'working on your statue' till the divine glory of virtue shines
out on you, till you see 'self-mastery enthroned upon its holy seat.'133
Maximus, familiar with this very 'plastic' image of formation from both Gregory of
Nyssa 134
 and Dionysius,"5
 also adopts and develops it in a number of contexts. In some
instances it serves as a metaphor of the critical first stage in the pursuit of Christian
perfection. In the purgative process of human ascent to God, one must disengage the body
from its association with defiling practices and passionate attachments, cutting away from
the soul the vices and passions that bind it to transient materiality:
Some of the passions are of the body, some of the soul. Those of the body take their origin
in the body; those of the soul from exterior things. Love and self-control cut away both of
them, the former those of the soul, the latter those of the body.136
In another passage, Maximus' use of the image recalls Plotinus' idea of the discernment of
an inner beauty of the soul. Paideia leads to clearer vision of the beauty of the divine image.
For Maximus, however, that beauty is constituted by the presence of Christ in the heart by
baptismal faith:
133 Enneads 1.6.9.
134 In inscn:ptiones Psalniorum 2.11 (GNO V, 115.22— 116.26).
135 De myst.theoL 2 (Cotpus Dionysisacum II, 145.3-7).
136 Car. 1.64. See also Th.Oec. 2.17 where the process of cutting away material attachments is explicitly linked
as a first stage to progress towards the beatific vision.
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If according to the Apostle, Christ dwells in our hearts bi faith (Eph 3:7), and all the treasures of
wisdom and knowledge are hidden in him (Col 2:3), then all the treasures of wisdom and
knowledge are hidden in our hearts....
This is why the Saviour says, Blessed are the pure in heart, for thg shall see God (Mt 5:8),
because he is hidden in the heart of those who believe in him. They will see him and the
treasures in him when they purify themselves by love and self-control, and the more
intensely they strive the fuller their vision will be.137
Developing further the plastic dimension of the image of moiphosis, Jaeger goes on
to speak of the analogy with physical development implied by Gregory's understanding of
paideia. Spiritual development mirrors physical growth, but differs from it in that the former
is not spontaneous, but requires constant care and nurture."' If anything, left to itself the
soul tends towards change and fragmentation. It is this decline that divine paideia corrects
and transforms."'
Again we find this analogy between physical and spiritual nourishment developed
by Maximus in his answer to a query as to whether the perfect human state is static or
involves change.' His answer leads us to recognise that while physical food cannot give
spiritual nourishment, spiritual food nourishes both soul and body. Paideia does not
eliminate the body. It transfigures it by giving it a form befitting union with God. The
remarkable final stage of the discussion bears close resemblance to passages discussed
above in which we observed the reciprocal correspondence between human deification,
divine incarnation, and the attendant corporeal revelatory implications:
137 Car. 4.70, 72.
138 Jaeger, Early Christiani and Greek Paideia, 87.
139 See, for instance, Greg.Nyss.V.Mor. 2.1-3.
140 Th.Oec. 2.88.
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When [the soul] receives through this food the eternal well-being inherent to it, it becomes
God by participation in divine grace, having ceased all activities of mind and sense, and
having given rest together with itself to the natural activity of the body joined to the soul
by virtue of the body's own commensurate participation in deification. The result is that
God alone is made manifest through the soul and the body, their natural characteristics
having been overwhelmed by the excess of glory.141
So far we have presented examples of paideia as an ascetically applied purificatory
process that leads towards giving form to the sensible so that it may function as a
transparent vehicle of divine theophany. But in the light of our analysis of God's incarnate
economies as the fulfilment of his will 'always and in all things to effect the mystery of his
embodiment', an understanding of divine revelation as a symbolic pedagogy leads us to
consider further Gregory of Nyssa's conception of paideia 'in metaphysical terms that
project its continuation into cosmic dimensions: 142 Andrew Louth has drawn out the
implications of such a view. By including paideia within his treatment of the 'tacit' nature of
tradition, Louth shows how, on the basis of the fact that `paideia involves taking seriously
the nature of man as a social being', gnostic Christian traditions rejected paideia as
fundamentally opposed to their individualist, anti-material view of human nature and the
world.' The function of paideia as the formative operation of the Holy Spirit on human
nature and as the cementing force in Christian society carries with it a positive evaluation
141 Th.Oec. 2.88. The 'natural characteristics' primarily refer to the features of empirical life bordered by
mortality and penetrated by corruption: sexual reproduction, passionate attachment, corruption and death
(Myst. 24 [Sotiropoulos 226.6]; Ordom. [CCSG 23, 50.401; 66.697]). But they also refer to the natural, bodily
and material characteristics of creation insofar as they are the locus of these corruptive influences and thus
bear a divisive character that obscures their true nature and purpose.
142 Jaeger, Ear# Christianiy and Greek Paideia, 89.
143 Discerning the Mystery: An Essay on the Nature of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 76.
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of material, social, historical existence — an 'underlying vision of the healthy and thoroughly
profitable diversity of material symbols....' 144 These contingent material and historical
elements - cosmos, Scripture, Church, liturgy, and ascetic praxis - constitute the basic
symbolic tools God uses in the pedagogic formation of human nature.
This view is confirmed in the last of Maximus' Ambigua to John of Cyzicus in which
he treats a passage from one of Gregory Nazianzen's poems that invites an interpretation
of the cosmos as the arena of divine paideia:
For the high Word plays (rraist) in every kind of form,
Mixing, as he wills, with his world here and there.145
Carlos Steel has noted how John of Cyzicus must have been startled by Gregory's
ascription of 'play' to the divine Word, since Gregory usually confines the term to the
activity of the devi1. 146
 While Maximus provisionally proffers four interpretations of
Gregory's poem, it is possible to discern a common thread: play characterises the
pedagogical interaction of the transcendent God in his cosmic and incarnate economies
with what is inherently weak, transient, and unstable. Initially Maximus' focus is more
apparently christological. Citing 'the great and fearful mystery of the divine descent of God
the Word to the human level accomplished through the flesh', Maximus equates Gregory's
sense of the word 'play' (Tra(yviov) to Saint Paul's talk of God's 'foolishness' and
144 So Blowers concludes with more specific reference to Maximus' exegetical method, Exegeth and Spiritual
Pedagogy, 254.
145 Amb.Io. 71 (PG 91.1408C — 1416D). The poetic passage is from Greg.Naz.Praec. (PG 37.624A — 625A).
Text-critical questions related to this passage are treated by Carlos Steel, `Le Jeu du Verbe. a propos de
Maxirne, Amb. ad lob. LXVII', in A. Schoors and P. van Deun (eds.), Pbilohistrin Miscellanea in Honor= Carok
Laga Septuagenarii (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 60, Leuven, 1994), 281-282. I have followed his amended
text which reads: TTaiEl yap A6yos ai TT1215 EV s'iSsai Trav-ro5arrOicn / Ktpvas. , c.çieixEl, Kciapov iav
gvea Kai uea.
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'weakness' in 1 Corinthians 1:25. By predicating of this mystery what in human terms are
privations — play, foolishness, and weakness — both theologians are actually affirming
God's possession of transcendent prudence, wisdom, and power."'
In his more difficult second conjecture Maximus however seems to move beyond
an exclusively christological interpretation. By 'play' he suggests Gregory means 'the
distance or kind of equidistant projection of mediating beings from the extremes' Crnv
Tc3v pLro3v TuxOv upoPokriv, KaTa TO Toot) cin-O Tdiv eiKpcov gxoucsav
(in-Oa-mo(v). 148 The 'mediating beings' refer to visible, transient phenomena; the
'extremes' to the invisible realities at the beginning and end of human existence. 'Play' then
refers to the bridging of the gap, the uniting of opposites which, as Maximus suggests, is
precisely what occurs in the Incarnation where the ontological gulf between the divine and
human realms is bridged.' But quoting Dionysius Maximus also depicts it as a cosmic reality
brought about by God's loving and ecstatic 'going-out-of-himself' to be present
providentially in all creation, the object of his love.' The whole 'historical nature' of
visible creation, then, is the means by which the transcendent Word stoops playfully like a
parent to our limited, childish level of understanding with a view to lead us on to
understand reality sub specie aeternitatis.' In comparison with divine reality, empirical
existence is indeed 'play' — or even folly. Only by recognising its inherently phantasmic,
unstable character are we made wise to transfer our confidence to what is permanent,
stable, and real.'
146 'Le Jeu du Verbe', 282-283.
147 Amb.Io. 71 (PG 91.1409A - 1409C).
148 Amb.Io. 71 (PG 91.1412B).
149 .Amb.M. 71 (PG 91.1413A).
150 Amb.Io. 71 (PG 91.1413AB). Cf. Dion.Ar.De div.nom. 4.13.
151 Ambio. 71 (PG 91.1413B - 1413D).
152 Amb.Io. 71 (PG 91.1416A - 1416D).
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As can be observed throughout our chapter so far, divine revelation is not simply a
one-sided divine display but God's adaptive and progressive engagement with the believing
subject in an effective paideia leading to union with himself. In this respect it is appropriate
to speak of Maximus' notion of proportionate revelation, one he shares with a tradition found
in Clement of Alexandria and mediated through Origen in which there is provided an
account of 'the economic variability'' of the Word in Scripture and cosmos.' Origen
repeatedly refers to the fact that the incarnate Word is perceived under a variety of forms,
without any alteration in himself, according to the varying measure of spiritual capacity
found among perceiving subjects. Some look at Christ and see only a man 'without form or
beauty'. Others, whose perception has been purified and transformed, look at Christ and
see his higher nature — the eternal Word and Son of God the Father.' It would be
nearsighted to evaluate this principle of proportionate, restricted access to divine
knowledge as an expression of some kind of elitist esotericism. On the contrary, it is
essentially soteriological: the Logos empties himself so that, becoming 'all things to all, he
may save all' (1 Cor 9:22). 1 ' Origen, who like Saint Paul and Clement of Alexandria knew
knowledge to be dangerous, 157 recognised in the Lord a wise pedagogue who sometimes
deliberately veiled his teaching, 'so that seeing they may not see and hearing they may not
understand' (Lk 8:10), and who praised his Father for hiding divine things from the wise
and learned and revealing them instead to children (Mt 11:25).
153 John A. McGuckin, 'The Changing Forms of Jesus', in Lothar Lies (ed.), Otigeniana Quarta: Die Referate des
4. Internationalen Oteneskongresses Innsbruck, 2. - 6. September 1985 (Innsbruck-Wien: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1987), 215-
222.
154 On the differences between Clement and Origen, see Karen Jo Torjesen, Pedagogical Soteriology from
Clement to Origen', in Lies, Oteniana Quarta, 370-378.
155 Or.Matt. 12.37; Or.Cdr. 2.72; 4.15-17; 6.67-68; 7.42-44 et aL
156 See OrJob. 1.31 (SC 120, 166.217); Maximus .Q.Thai 47 (CCSG 7,325.211-227); Th.Oec. 2.27.
157 1 Cor 8:7; Clem.Str. 1.9.45; 1.12.55; 4.25.160; 6.15.124; Clem.Paed 3.12.97. Cf. Ecc 1:18.
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Even so, in addition to the need to regulate the disclosure of sacred truth in order
to guard it from desecrationl" Dionysius poses as a reason for proportionate, symbolic
revelation our own incapacity to perceive divine things directly. 15° Once again the dual
ability of symbols to reveal and conceal is seen to serve a pedagogical purpose. The
dizzying multiplicity in the cosmic order and salvation-history which confronts the
contemplative constitutes in fact a soteriological function of the Word's symbolic pedagogy
in which, by assuming different forms, he reveals himself proportionately and incrementally
in a measure commensurate to a person's spiritual state.' This doctrine of course
presumes the reciprocal and progressive engagement of the knower with the known, the
pupil with the pedagogue via these symbolic media.
Maximus draws these ideas together by means of a number of varying metaphors
used mainly in the context of forming in his monastic readership a sensitivity to the
multivalence inherent to the world of Scripture. m Looking upon Scripture's various verbal
forms, themselves analogously related to the multiple aspects of the logoi in creation,' 'the
masses' (oi TroAXoi) see there only 'flesh' and not its singular Logos. Its true 'mind' or
inner meaning (O voiis Trc rpacpijs), which is actually contrary to appearance 6-rEpov
Trap« TO SoKO*, eludes them." And even among believers there are differing levels of
spiritual maturity, and therefore of revelation. As the bread of life, the Word nourishes all
158 The biblical text customarily cited in this connection is Matthew 7:6.
159 De coahier. 2.2 (Coqms Dionysiacum II, 11.11-20).
160 See Or.Matt. 12.36-38; OrJoh. 1.20; Or.Gen. 1.7; Or.Lev. 1.1; Or.Cdr. 1.55; 2.65; 4.16-18; 6.68; 6.77.
161 See Paul M. Blowers' detailed treatment in 'The Anagogical Imagination: Maximus the Confessor and the
Legacy of Origenian Hermeneutics', in G. Dorival and A. le Boulluec (eds.), On:geniana Se,cta. Oligine et la Bible.
Aetes du Colloquium Otenianum Sextum, Chanti4, 30 add — 3 sotembre 1993 (Bibliotheca Ephemeridum
Theologicarum Lovansensium 137, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995), 639-654.
162 Again we refer to another of Blower's fine studies, this time 'The Analogy of Scripture and Cosmos in
Maximus the Confessor', SP 28 (1993), 145-149.
163 Th.Oec. 2.60.
62
who ask, but not all in the same way. 164
 Maximus distinguishes between 'two forms' of the
Word's manifestation: a 'common and more public' appearance and one 'more hidden' and
accessible only to a few. Those who encounter him according to the first represent the
'initiates' or 'beginners' (oi EicrayOpEvol, oi vri rriot), while those who encounter him
according to the second are 'the perfect' (0'1 TEXEIG)OEVT01, Oi TEXE(01). It is a distinction
he sees as mirroring the scriptural distinction between those who see Jesus 'in the form of a
servant' and those who ascend the mountain of Transfiguration and see him in his
transcendent divine glory. 165 The two groups are determined not so much by categories
suggesting the relative inferiority or superiority of one to the other than by their respective
and subjective orientation to the final eschatological mystery. The infants' are evidently still
being led towards 'the age of perfection', whereas 'the perfect' are living prophetic types in
whom the Word already — though at a hidden level (Kp4i635) - 'is delineating in advance
(TrpoStaypdckov) as in a picture the features of his future coming. )166
As we shall see more clearly in the next and final section of this chapter, the
movement from initiation and spiritual infancy to perfection lies within the power of the
believing subject who must devote himself to the imitation of Christ in an ascending
program of askesis, contemplation, and finally adoration of the holy Trinity. Followers of
Christ are not simply neutral or passive recipients of a proportionate revelation tailored to
their spiritual or intellectual capacities. In Balthasar's memorable phrase: 'Revelation is a
batdefield.' 167 The divine gift — whether it be spoken of as faith, vision, grace, adoption —
164 Th.Oec. 2.56. The metaphor is widely used in Origen.
165 Th.Oec. 1.97; 2.13; 2.28. Cf. Eph 4:13-14.
166 Th.Oec. 2.28.
167 Theo-Drama, volume 4, 12.
63
must be engaged, acted upon, put to work, exercised, guarded, and invested, 168 Continual
and progressive passage from flesh to spirit, from kataphasis to apophasis, from praxis to
theoria is both a moral and theological imperative in response to and in co-operation with
the divine initiative:
Therefore, the need for further understanding is such that we must first pass through the
veils of the letters that surround the Word, and thereby with a naked intellect behold the
pure Word himself as he exists in himself — as the one who clearly shows forth the Father
in himself— as far as humanly possible. It is necessary for him who piously seeks after God
not to hold fast to the letter, lest he unwittingly take words about God in place of God,
that is, in place of the Word — precariously being content with the words of Scripture, while
the Word escapes the mind through its holding fast to the garments, all the while thinking it
has the incorporeal Word, like the Egyptian woman who took hold not of Joseph, but of
his clothes, and also like those men of old who, remaining only in the beauty of visible
phenomena, unwittingly worshiped the creation instead of the creator.169
In conclusion then, what has been said of Origen's hermeneutical pedagogy is
equally applicable to Maximus' reading of both the cosmic and scriptural worlds: the
relationship between the sacred text and its reader is viewed 'not statically, as the passive
apprehension of something given, but dynamically as an effort by the exegete to penetrate
ever more deeply into the inexhaustible depths of God's Word, according to his own skill
168 This does not imply that revelation is simply what the knowing subject makes of it. On this point I do not
concur with Marguerite Harl's otherwise magnificent thesis in Otine et la Fonction Révilatrthe du Verbe Incarni
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1958), 342-343, when she suggests that the notion of proportionate revelation
renders the incarnate Word little more than a 'une aide, une aide peut-etre decisive' which merely enables the
striving subject to acquire divine knowledge himself in such a way that ultimately 'cc n'est pas le Verbe
incarne qui donne lui-meme
169 Th.Oec. 2.73. The incident from Genesis 39:12 is utilised in the same way in the context of Maximus'
exposition of the Transfiguration in Amb./.o. 10 (PG 91.1129A — 1133A).
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and capacity." 7° It is on account of both Scripture's divine content and the necessary
development of the Christian's spiritual capacity that scriptural interpretation and natural
contemplation are never finally definitive but involve recognising the symbolic plasticity of
the economic orders: their 'somehow expansive signification, which stretches along with
the understanding of the reader.'171
Sensual taxis and Intellectual diabasis
As one ascends the progressive steps of the spiritual life one moves from dependence upon
material symbols to a more direct apprehension of the subject they disclose. Indeed, 'the
saints' represent the highest way of apprehending divine knowledge when it is said of them
that 'they do not acquire the blessed knowledge of God only by sense and appearances and
forms, using letters and syllables, which lead to mistakes and bafflement over the
discernment of the truth, but solely by the mind, rendered most pure and released from all
material mists.' 172 The words 'solely by the mind' (v4 p6vc.9) may suggest to our way of
thinking that Maximus is advocating an entirely disincarnate, intellectualist form of gnostic
speculation. Yet we must remind ourselves that underlying his epistemology is a vast and
intricate metaphysical network that connects and at the same time preserves as
fundamentally integral the absolute transcendence of the divine nature, the threefold
incarnate economies of the second person of the Trinity, and the natural (created)
composition of the corporeal human being. On this score Maximus' thinking is on par with
1" Manlio Simonetti, Biblical Intetpretation in the Ear# Church: An Historical Introduction to Patristic Exegesis, trans.
John A. Hughes, eds. Anders Berquist and Markus Bockmuehl (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 43.
171 From the description of biblical symbol in the work of 19 th century French bishop Olymphe-Philippe
Gerbet, Esquisse de Rome Chritienne, quoted by Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture,
volume 2, trans. E.M. Macierowski (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 204.
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that of the Cappadocians, whose worldview, as Jaroslav Pelikan once prudently pointed
out,
should not be characterized as some sort of doctrine of absolute idealism that rejected the
testimony of the senses in the name of the supremacy of spirit. They were critical of a
philosophical theology that claimed to be able to "overleap" the data provided by the
senses. For the testimony of the senses was, within its appropriate sphere, both trustworthy
and necessary, and it was proper for the human mind to rely on sense experience. It was by
the senses, and by the experience of "the actual world" through the senses, that valid if
limited knowledge of that actual world could be acquired.173
As we have argued, for Maximus the 'actual world' - with all its complex variagation and
continual flux — presents to those with 'eyes' to see a vast book depicting the harmonious
web of the whole created economy.' By virtue of the natural integrity of the dual
sensible/intelligible composition of the universe, he can testify to the material order as
bearing in itself 'traces' (dinixiipaTa) of divine majesty 'infused' (iyKa-ral_gat) into its
very sensible contours.' These traces, radiating the magnificence of the highest goodness,
are 'capable of conveying directly to God the human intellect which, having held itself
above them, comes to transcend all visible phenomena: 17' What is needed is three-fold: a
recognition of the created and ordered harmony of the sensible/intelligible universe, the re-
ordering and the preservation of the created order (taxis) of one's own natural faculties, and
172 Amb.b. 10 (PG 91.1160B).
173 ChristianiO and Classical Culture, 109.
174 Amble. 10 (PG 91.1128D— 1129A).
175 2. ThaL 51 (CCSG 7,395.22-24).
176 2. Thai 51 (CCSG 7, 395.24-27).
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the proper exercise of those faculties upon the data of revelation in a progressive passage
through all created beings — sensible and intelligible — and beyond them to God himself.
Maximus' basis then for viewing the path of revelation as a two-way, divine/human
dialectical and pedagogical process is seen to be as much ontological as it is moral. He
knows that it is impossible for a person to acquire any kind of divine gift — whether
wisdom, knowledge, or faith — by means of natural ability alone. Their conferral is by
divine power.' On the other hand 'it is obvious too', he says, 'that the grace of the Holy
Spirit in no way leaves the natural faculty unengaged, but rather — since it has been left
unengaged by behaviour contrary to nature — grace begins to make the natural faculty
active again, leading it via the use of modes harmonious with nature towards the
comprehension of divine things!' He adduces two illustrative proofs. The first is
chris tological:
For just as the Word did not perform (in a way appropriate to his divinity) activities natural
to flesh apart from his intelligently animated flesh, neither does the Holy Spirit effect in the
saints the knowledge of the mysteries apart from the faculty which naturally seeks and
searches after knowledge.179
The second is natural:
For just as the eye does not apprehend sensible phenomena without sunlight, so the
human mind could never receive spiritual vision without spiritual light. For the one
177 Q. Thal 59 (CCSG 22, 47.61-64).
178 2 Thal 59 (CCSG 22, 51.95-99).
179 „Q.ThaL 59 (CCSG 22, 51.104-109).
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illumines natural sense enabling it to apprehend bodies, while the other illumines the mind
for contemplation, bringing it to comprehend realities beyond sense.180
According to their natural, created state, human faculties in their psycho-somatic
totality are receptive to divine revelation since they are naturally ordered to respond to the
symbolic revelatory data available to them in the sensible and intelligible world. Maximus
elaborates upon the structural details of these faculties in Ambiguum 21. The five senses are
fitted for application to sensible phenomena, though on their own lack the ability to
discern the true nature of the things they sense.' Conversely, the soul also has five
faculties, each corresponding to its visible image in the senses. 182 But since the soul is
rational, it is capable of discerning the true nature of the things it apprehends through the
bodily senses. One's interaction with particular visible things then is to be governed not by
one's sensual experience of them but by the soul's divinely-illumined rational account of
their true universal nature and function - their logar.
If the soul uses the senses properly, discerning by means of its own faculties the manifold
inner principles (XOyous) of created beings, and if it succeeds in wisely transmitting to
itself the whole visible universe in which God is hidden and proclaimed in silence, then by
use of its own free choice it creates a world of spiritual beauty within the understanding.183
180 ,Q. Thai 59 (CCSG 22, 51.116-122).
181 Amb 21 (PG 91.1248A).
182 Eye=mind; ear=reason; nose=irascible faculty (Guu65); tongue=concupiscible faculty (irri Oupic);
touch=life.
183 Amble). 21 (PG 91.1248C).
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By using the senses in this way, the soul actually is said to endow them with reason as
'intelligent vehicles of its own faculties.' 184 When it joins this transformed sensual operation
on the one hand with the practice of virtue on the other, the whole soul/body composite
becomes an agent of divine theophany.'"
This is of course the way it should be. But Maximus never underestimates the
radically perverse state of fallen, empirical human existence. Through Adam's fall all these
natural faculties have become disordered. Instead of the mind (voils) acting as the leading
(iyEpov1K65) influence in a descending taxis of mind, reason, and sense, there has come
about instead through the soul's abandonment of the natural course and its deliberate
sensual inclination towards matter 'a complete absorption of the intellectual power in sense
and in sense knowledge.' 186
 Maximus' whole epistemology and doctrine of divine revelation
is therefore articulated within a context in which the Christian must necessarily and
continually be engaged in an ascetic struggle to reorder his own chaotic state. The key to
achieving divine knowledge is found in a middle course between two tempting extremes:
accession to the sensual and bodily realm on the one hand, and outright hatred for it on the
other.'"
To that end, and drawing upon the distilled wisdom of the patristic monastic
traditions, Maximus praises a partnership (a4uyia) between soul and flesh modelled
variously on the relationships between master and servant, husband and wife, and Christ
and the Church. The body with its senses is to be the soul's tool or instrument (Opyavov)
for comprehending the magnificence of visible things. It is to be the means of manifesting
184 Amb../o. 21 (PG 91.1249BC).
185 Amb.Io. 21 (PG 91.1249C).
186 Sherwood (trans. and notes), St. Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic .14e, the Four Centuries on Charity (Ancient
Christian Writers 21, New York, NY/Ramsey, NJ: Newman Press, 1955), 64.
187 Car. 1.6-8; 3.8-9.
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externally through practical deeds the invisible glory of the virtuous soul. It is to be active
in 'symbolically engraving the hidden nature of intelligible things on the external contours
of visible things: 188 fir
This is indeed Maximus' assumption in Ambiguum 10 which is nothing less than an
involved, elaborate apology on the necessity of practical ascetic struggle (7-rp4is) in the
Christian diabasis through the sensible and intelligible worlds to God.' Extending the
insights of Vittorio Croce on Maximus' theological method,' Blowers has convincingly
argued that the notion of diabasis constitutes 'an integrating leitmotif of Maximus' entire
hermeneutics!' He shows that while the Confessor uses a whole range of compounds of
the verb . PaivEtv (dva—, &a—, pETa—, irrava—) to express the dynamism inherent to
spiritual progress, the ,Quaestiones ad Thalassium feature a more concentrated and consistent
use of the compound Sia rBaivEtv—&aPaal . Blowers conjectures that the reason for this
lies in the fact that the latter pair
convey for him both a sense of transcendence — in keeping with the need to "pass over," or to
"ascend beyond," sensible objects and the passions which they can spark — and yet also a
crucial sense of continuity, namely, the necessity of first "passing through" or "penetrating"
sensible objects en route to the intelligible and spiritual truth that inheres, by grace, in
those sensible things.192
188 p. Thai prol (CCSG 7, 17.1-18).
189 Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua, 33-34.
190 Tradi;a:one e ricerca. II metodo teologico di San Massimo il Confessore (Milan, 1974), summarised by Aidan Nichols
in Byzantine GoJpek Maximus the Confessor in Modern Scholarship (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 24-63.
191 Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy, 100.
192 Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy, 97.
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Maximus explicitly bases the need for diabasis not on some kind of anti-material worldview
but on the Word's Incarnation and subsequent ascension in the flesh to the right hand of
the Father. The human passage through the created order to God is a participation in
Christ's own exodus and passage through the same. In Chapters on Theology 2.18, a paragraph
noted for its roots in Origen, 193
 Maximus presents a summary of this spiritual anabasis to
God in which we see set together the whole range of verbal prefixes just mentioned.
Taking as his starting point the scriptural phrases 'from strength to strength' (Ps 83:8) and
'from glory to glory' (2 Cor 3:18), Maximus likens the necessity of lifting one's soul and
mind in prayer from human to divine realities to the necessity of continual progress
(TTpOKOTTTi) in the practice of the virtues, advancement (ETTavci(3acris) in the spiritual
knowledge of contemplation, and transferral (pE-rciPaals) from the letter of Scripture to the
spirit. 'In this way,' he says,
the mind will be able to follow him who passed through the heavens, Jesus the Son of God (Heb
4:14), who is everywhere and who has passed through (SiEÄrjAueciTi) all things in the
economy on our behalf, so that following him, we also may pass through (Saec.opEv) all
things with him, and may come to be with him (1rpOs airrOv) 2 1 94 if that is, we perceive
him not according to the limitations of his economic condescension, but according to the
majestic splendour of his natural infinitude.195
Returning to Ambiguum 10, in which Maximus' terminology appears somewhat
more fluid, the question had obviously been raised in connection with the passage from
193 Balthasar, Kosmirche LituTie, 561. ,
194 The use of the preposition Trpos by the Fathers — notably Origen and Maximus — reflects its very
deliberate use in John's Gospel where it signifies the unique theological proximity of the Word/Son with
God the Father.
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Gregory Nazianzen's panegyric on Saint Athanasius m whether it was possible, given
Gregory's omission of any mention of TTpaKTIKli, to 'pass over' the 'cloud or veil' of
matter and the fleshly realm by reason and contemplation alone without ascetic struggle.m
In part of his response Maximus reiterates the saints' teaching that ascetic struggle in itself
cannot create virtue. It does nevertheless manifest it,'" and it is to this revelatory character of
praxis as a necessary, visible effect of the soul's participation in God that Maximus
repeatedly returns in his elucidations on the question. The saints, for example, know that
forbidden pleasure is sensually aroused. The solution to its eradication is not, as one given
to pure intellectualism might have it, the total elimination of sense. Rather,
when therefore they perceived that the soul, when moved contrary to nature through the
mediation of flesh towards matter, is clothed with the earthly form (1 Cot 15:45-49), the
saints were disposed to appropriate the flesh in a seemly way to God through the
mediation rather of the soul moved naturally towards God, adorning the flesh as far as
possible with divine splendours through the ascetic pursuit of virtue.199
Many scholars have observed the close relation between the practical and
contemplative dimensions in Maximus' ascetic theology and its background in the
renowned hermit Evagrius Ponticus (d. 399). 20' In Evagrius, ascetic struggle (Trp4is,
Trparrocrj) represents the first phase in an ascending triad of spiritual development that
195 Th.Oec. 2.18.
196 Greg.Naz.Or. 21.
197 Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1105C — 1108A).
198 Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1109B).
1 99,4.mb./o. 10 (PG 91.1112CD).
200 M. Viller, 'Aux sources de la spiritualite de S. Maxime. Les oeuvres d'Evagre le Pontique', RAM 11 (1930),
156-84, 239-268, 331-336; Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, 330-38; VOlker, Maximus Confessor a/c Meister des
gerstlicben Lebens, 236-248; Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 355-76; Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy,
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progresses through contemplation (0Ecopia, yve301s (l)ucrucrj) to mystical knowledge of
the trinity (0EoAoyia). 201 The three stages reflect the fundamental revelatory and
epistemological structure — one we have already outlined and seen as common to the
patristic mystical tradition: purification from defiling attachments, engagement with the
world of God's economy, and finally doxological participation in the mysterious
communion of the holy Trinity. Whether or not Evagrius advocated the eventual
abandonment of the preliminary stages as one ascends the spiritual ladder remains a bone
of scholarly contention. 2' It is clear, however, that Maximus — who likewise articulates a
three-stage spiritual advancement that begins with praxis, moves to themia, and is
consummated in theologiam - espouses the full and mutual co-inherence of praxis and theolia.
The vita practica is not simply preparatory. One does not leave behind commandment-
keeping and ascetic discipline and the practice of suffering love for one's enemies as
though such inherently corporeal and social factors per se get in the way of the true business
of the Christian life. Rather it is the case, as Larchet asserts, that praxis forms 'le
complement indispensable et permanent' of theort•a. 204 Or as Maximus himself puts it, 'he
who seeks the Lord through contemplation without ascetic struggle <opIc Trpd Ec.os)
shall not find him.'205 To be sure, the one leads to, implies, and qualifies the other, so that
he can speak in a single breath of yvc3crts- gprparros- and irpgts gym:405,20* or else
133-136; Larchet, La divinisation de Phomme, 451-57; Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor (The Early Church
Fathers, London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 35-38.
201 Evag.Prak. 1 (SC 171, 498.1-2).
202 See the arguments dealt with by Gabriel Bunge, Origenismus-Gnostizismus: Zum geistesgeschichtlichen
Standort des Evagrios Pontikos', VC 40 (1986), 24-54; idem., 'The "Spiritual Prayer": On the Trinitarian
Mysticism of Evagrius of Pontus', Monastic Studies 17 (1987), 191-208.
203 Car. 1.86; 1.94; 4.47; Th.Oec. 1.37-39; 1.51-57; My!. 4; et al See further Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator,
332-368; Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy, 133-145.
204 La divinisation de Phomme, 453.
205 2Thal 48 (CCSG 7, 339.151-153).
206 Amb.Th. prol (PG 91.1032A).
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define praxis as ElEcopia ivEpy0up6vI1 and theoria as Trpiits pucr-raycoyoup6vfl. 207 In
another passage he is unequivocal:
In my view, ascetic practice (Trp4ts) and contemplation (0E(..opia) mutually cohere
(ctuvExopAms) in one another, and the one is never separated from the other. On the
contrary, ascetic practice shows forth through conduct the knowledge derived from
contemplation, while contemplation no less displays rational virtue fortified by practice.208
The implications of this conviction for both one's bodily senses and the entire sensible
world become more apparent a little further on in the same treatise:
It is impossible for the mind to cross over (Staf3iivat) to intelligible realities, despite their
connatural relation, without contemplating intermediary sensible things, but it is also
absolutely impossible for contemplation to take place without sense (which is naturally akin
to sensible things) being joined with the mind.209
Before we end this first chapter, we ought finally to point out that the mutual co-
inherence of praxis and theoria in no way upsets the necessary hierarchical taxis or gradation
between them that corresponds to the ontological, epistemological, and eschatological
priority of intelligible over sensible, apophasis over kataphasis, soul over body, spirit over
letter. In the progressive ascent of the spiritual life, these corporeal entities 'are not to be
eliminated as impure, but to be transcended as insufficient.'' One 'must first be lifted up
207 ThaL 63 (CCSG 22, 171.392-393).
208 Q
.Tha158 (CCSG 22, 31.64-69).
209 P. Thai 58 (CCSG 22, 33.111-115).
210 Vittorio Croce, quoted in Nichols, Byzantine Gospel, 38.
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to God' and only then, once the soul's whole desire has been extended to him alone,
'descend to look into created beings and regard each one in terms of its own nature, and,
through them, again be drawn up by contemplative knowledge to their creator.' 2" Only
thus can material realities be emptied of their obscurative, divisive character and
reintegrated as the transparent vehicles of God's transcendent glory. We could do no better
than to conclude by affirming with Blowers that for Maximus the path to 'authentic
revelation' involves 'a process not of extreme spiritualization but of a transfiguration in which
material realities disclose their created fullness Ka TO( xptaT6v.'212
211 ,2D 64 (CCSG 10, 50.16-22).
212 Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy, 255.
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CHAPTER TWO
Corporeality and the Cosmos
'What of vile dust?' the preacher said.
Methought the whole world woke,
The dead stone lived beneath my foot,
And my whole body Jpoke.1
Why did God create the universe? How can it be, and not be God, who alone 'is'? How can
its material order possess any 'being' at all, when its existence is marked by perpetual
movement and flux, its continual becoming something that it wasn't before? These
questions lead us into a study of the status and function Maximus accords corporeality in
the cosmic order. We shall undertake it primarily by way of an examination of his great
anti-Origenist treatise, the seventh of the earlier Ambigua ad Ioannem.
While scholars have rightly recognised its importance as a cosmological treatise, we
shall see that Ambiguum 7 is first of all a treatise about the human body. The drawing of an
analogous correspondence between the ordered universe and the human body was a
commonplace throughout Greek antiquity. In the fourth century Athanasius cites 'the
Greek philosophers' who, following Plato's speculation about the mythical construction of
the universe by means of the embodiment of a living creature endowed with soul and
reason,2 speak of the cosmos as 'a great body' (ac.4« p gya).3 In the Platonic philosophical
1 G.K. Chesterton, The Praise of Dust, in idem., Stories, Esserys, and Poems (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1935),
311.
2 Timaeus 30b.
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tradition, 'the relation between body and soul was a microcosm of the vexed problem of
the relation between God and the universe: 4 Like the cosmos, the human being 'is all
symmetry: 5 In adopting this same analogy, Maximus stands within a long tradition
common to East and West in which to think of the human body 'is to think of something
that is ... a key to understanding the cosmos itself:6
Concurrently, Maximus - like Athanasius - differs from Plato in his discernment
that the 'mystery' of bodily existence is inextricably linked to the 'mystery' of Christ, God
the incarnate Word. The divine Word's assumption in time of human flesh endowed with a
rational soul constitutes for the Confessor a unique paradigm of cosmic proportions, and
therefore, as we have already seen in chapter one, he is able to view sub specie aeternitatis the
entire cosmos — a composite unity of intelligible and sensible reality, as the incarnate,
theophanic fulfilment of God the Word's will 'always and in all things to effect the mystery
of his embodiment:7
We may well ask before we begin whether this notion of God's embodiment in the
cosmos is so conceptually and structurally distinct from certain forms of pantheism and
Neoplatonic imrnanentism. At least one of the charges brought against Origenism, then
and now, is its eventual disparagement of the material and historical order as evil and
God's own subjection to some kind of external necessity (dvoircr). Does Maximus, in his
refutation of Origenism, go to the other extreme and posit a form of anti-dualist cosmic
monism? Is the universe simply God's material self-extension? These are important
questions, and so in preparation for our analysis it will be helpful to conduct a brief survey
3 Ath./nc. 41.
4 Brown, The World of Late Antiquity, 74.
5 George Herbert, Man, lines 13-14; in Wall, George Herbert: The Country Parson, The Temple, 210.
°Andrew Louth, 'The body in Western Catholic Christianity', in Coakley, Religion and the Bo6,, 112.
7 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1084D).
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of sixth century Origenism. There it will become clear that in at least some quarters, the
derogatory label `Origenise implied, in the opinion of the labelling party, a too-uncritical
reception of certain aspects of non-Christian Greek philosophy that were thought to
compromise the ontological distinction between God and creation, the integrity of the
material order, and the wise practice of the ascetic life. From the evidence at hand in
Maximus' works it is not entirely unreasonable to conjecture that whatever the so-called
`Origenism' was that he confronted, it shared with earlier tendencies an over-rigorous
intellectualism that marginalised the body and the material world, an intellectualism that for
Maximus' own monastic readership 'was still inducing the monks to pin their hopes for
true spiritual stability on a future intellectual union with God in a state completely
disconnected from time and matter: 8 While we have concurred in our introduction with
Balthasar that the great themes which passed from the likes of Plato and Plotinus into
Christianity were on the whole 'world-affirming', it appears that Origenism, precisely on
account of its retention of an insufficiently-modified Platonic cosmology, was perceived
equally by Maximus and his forebears to threaten the great Christian doctrines of creation,
incarnation, and resurrection.
Origenism, Metaphysics and the Body
We begin tracing the metaphysical structure of the cosmos in Maximus' theological vision
by providing a cursory sketch of the sixth century Origenist movement. A full account
would entail a formidable essay in its own right, and indeed has been the subject of a
Paul Blowers, 'Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of "Perpetual Progress', VC
46 (1992), 158.
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number of detailed studies.' It will suffice here simply to index a few lines of thought that
will allow us better to appreciate Maximus' own engagement with what appears to be a
problematic monastic trend of his time, and to see it not simply as an intellectualist debate,
but a concern — at once philosophical and theological - impinging upon significant aspects
of monastic, and thus Christian practice.
In an essay' anticipating her novel reconstruction of the Origenist debate,"
Elizabeth Clark, drawing to a large extent on research findings of Antoine Guillaumont''
and Jon Dechow, 13 argued that in the Origenist controversy of the late fourth and early
fifth centuries, the true concerns of anti-Origenist polemic were less theological than they
were anthropological. The real nub of Origenism, she says, was not Origen's
subordinationism, but Evagrius' 'anti-iconic theology. '14 Hand in hand with this
anthropological 'iconoclasm', Clark argues, goes the 'ascetic assault on the human body.''s
The major line of Epiphanius' denunciation of Origen, like those of Theophilus of
Alexandria and Jerome, 'pertains to issues of materiality as they manifest themselves in
discussions of the body and of allegorical exegesis.' 16 None of this is without implication
for `Origenism' in the sixth century, since Justinian makes judicious use of florilegia,
9 Antoine Guillaumont, Les Kephalaia Gnostica l dtvagre le Pontzgue et Phirtoire de Porzge'nisme chez les grecs et chez les
griens (Patristica Sorbonensia 5, Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1962); Clark, 'New Perspectives on the Origenist
Controversy', 145-162; Brian E. Daley, `What did "Origenism" mean in the Sixth Century?', in Dorival and
Boulluec, Origeniana Sexta, 627-638.
1 ° Clark, 'New Perspectives on the Origenist Controversy', 145-162.
" The Orzgenist Controverry: The Cultural Construction of an Earry Christian Debate (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1992). Clark's thesis is not without difficulties, not the least of which include her sweeping appraisals of
Evagrius' spiritual anthropology (esp. 43-84) and her apparent hermeneutical failure to read 'with' his own
agenda as a practitioner of pastoral diagnostics.
12 Les Kephalaia Gnostical.
13 'Dogma and Mysticism in Early Christianity: Epiphanius of Cyprus and the Legacy of Origen' (PhD thesis,
University of Pennsylvania, 1975).
14 'New Perspectives on the Origenist Controversy', 149. See also Georges Florovsky, `Origen, Eusebius, and
the Iconoclastic Controversy', CH 19 (1950), 77-96, who in this connection raises the question of Maximus'
own relation to Origen's christological ambivalence.
13 'New Perspectives on the Origenist Controversy', 154.
16 Ibid., 155.
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circulating by the second quarter of the sixth century,17 composed of anti-Origenian
material from Epiphanius, Theophilus and Jerome.18
More recently Brian Daley has argued that while the fourth century crisis may well
have concerned issues of bodility and corporeality, 'our sources for the sixth-century
controversy suggest that the center of debate had significantly shifted: what was really at
stake in the struggle seems to have been Christology — the unity and symmetry of the
person of Christ as an intelligent, embodied human creature and as "one of the Holy
Trinity"....' 19 Interestingly, however, Daley makes this claim within the context of his
conviction, in which he concurs with Manlio Sirnonetti, 2° that sixth-century Origenism
'signified more a style of religious thinking, and perhaps a set of priorities in living the
monastic life, than it did adherence to a body of doctrine which could find its inspiration in
the works of Origen.'21 In this respect, both Daley and Clark share the view that whatever
`Origenism' was, it was not confined to the ivory towers of ecclesiastical politics, but
spelled pastoral crisis at the very grass-roots of monastic life.
These scholarly suggestions may be illuminated by an extract from monastic
biographer Cyril of Scythopolis' Lives of the Monks of Palestine, penned around 560.22
Alongside the more rhetorically charged comments of Barsanuphius (d. ca. 540), 2 Cyril's
work remains one of the main sources for gauging reactions to Origenism' in Palestine in
17 CCT, 2.2, 386.
18 CCT, 2.2, 400.
19 'What did "Origenism" mean in the Sixth Century?', 629.
20 `Origenism was above all a way of living the Christian religion, in which great faith was joined with an
equally great freedom of thought, and an ardent mystical impulse constantly came down to earth in terms
characteristic of a Platonically stamped intellectualism.' From `La controversia origeniana: caratteri e
significato', Augustinian= 26 (1986), 29, quoted by Daley, 'What did "Origenism" mean in the Sixth
Century?', 637.
21 'What did "Origenism" mean in the Sixth Century?', 628.
22 English translation by RM. Price and John Binns, Cyil of Sgthopolis: Lives of the Monks of Palestine (CS 114,
Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1991).
23 Ep. 600 in Francois Neyt and Paula de Angelis-Noah (eds.), Barsanuphe et Jean de Gaza. CorreJpontiance,
volume II (SC 451, Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 2001), 804-810.
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the first half of the sixth century. 24 In the exchange between Cyril and Abba Cyriacus of the
Laura of Souka we learn about the appeal to Gregory Nazianzen's commendation of
philosophical enquiry25 by monks apparently taken by the doctrines of the pre-existence of
the soul and a universal apokatastasis.' It is worth relating the exchange at length. We begin
where the younger Cyril asks Cyriacus about a group of monks who had only recently (ca.
514) been expelled from the New Laura:
'Father, what are the views they advocate? They themselves affirm that the
doctrines of pre-existence and restoration are indifferent and without danger, citing the
words of St Gregory, "Philosophize about the world, matter, the soul, the good and evil
rational natures, the Resurrection and the Passion of Christ, for in these matters hitting on
the truth is not without profit and error is without danger."
The elder replied in the following words: 'The doctrines of pre-existence and
restoration are not indifferent and without danger, but dangerous, harmful, and
blasphemous. In order to convince you, I shall try to expose their multifarious impiety in a
few words. They deny that Christ is one of the Trinity. They say that our resurrection
bodies pass to total destruction, and Christ's first of all. They say that the Holy Trinity did
not create the world and that at the restoration all rational beings, even demons, will be
able to create aeons. They say that our bodies will be raised ethereal and spherical at the
resurrection, and they assert that even the body of the Lord was raised in this form. They
say that we shall be equal to Christ at the restoration.
What hell blurted out these doctrines? They have not learned from the God who
spoke through the prophets and apostles — perish the thought — but they have revived
24 Joseph Patrich, Sabas, Leader of Palestinian Monasticism: A Comparative Study in Eastern Monasticism, Fourth to
Seventh Centuries (Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1995), 333.
25 The infamous passage is from Greg.Naz.Or. 27.10 (SC 250, 96.17 — 98.22).
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these abominable and impious doctrines from Pythagoras and Plato, from Origen,
Evagrius, and Didymus. I am amazed what vain and futile labours they have expended on
such harmful and laborious vanities, and how in this way they have armed their tongues
against piety. Should they not rather have praised and glorified brotherly love, hospitality,
virginity, care of the poor, psalmody, all-night vigils, and tears of compunction? Should
they not be disciplining the body by fasts, ascending to God in prayer, making this life a
rehearsal for death, rather than mediating such sophistries.'27
Given its hostility, it is difficult to know how reliable such an exchange is for
historical reconstruction. For included among those expelled from the Laura as `Origenise
leaders was the monk Leontius of Byzantium, whose doctrine has been demonstrated to
bear little resemblance with that explicitly condemned here.' Nevertheless, it shows that at
least one of the main concerns with monks reckoned Origenist was intellectualism — a
preoccupation with speculative philosophy and the apparent neglect of the practice of
prayer, humility, and brotherly charity. Joseph Patrich has suggested that likely candidates
for such a 'movement' may have included oi Xoyi nj -repot — 'the more educated', and that
the dissidents referred to above by Cyril as oi yEvvoi5E5 - 'the distinguished ones' - had
probably received classical education on account of their higher socio-economic status.'
Regarding the charge of intellectualism, a monk like Leondus could easily have been
vulnerable since as a champion of strict Chalcedonianism he operated within a field of
rational and analytical philosophical discourse in which, as Daley writes, 'the common tools
of debate had become far more technical and academic than they had been for Athanasius
26 It is not the biblical idea of an enTOKaTdCITaCrIS TIC(VTC.OV per se that was thought to be troublesome (cf.
Ac 3:21), but the inclusion in it of (finally restored) demons and Satan himself.
27 Price and Binns, Cyril of Sgthopolis, 252-254.
28 See Brian Daley, The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium', JTS NS 27 (1976), 333-369.
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and his contemporaries:30
 In other words the very doing of what in our day might be called
'philosophical theology' was reckoned by some to be an Origenise pursuit. Moreover, we
note also the association of Origen, Evagrius, and Didymus with the earlier non-Christian
Greek philosophers — an association that had already been made explicit by Justinian in
543.31
It is to Justinian's edicts of 543 and 553 that we now turn. Once again, while we
cannot deduce from them any definitive and lasting categories as to what did or did not
constitute Origenism in other contexts, they do serve to illustrate that certain heretical
tenets of the mid-sixth century arising from speculative theories of Greek philosophy were
reckoned wrong on account of their incompatibility with the Christian doctrines of
creation, incarnation, and resurrection. In comparing the edicts from the two occasions,
Grillrneier speculates that those of 553 reflect an even more focused attention on issues of
corporeality and christology. 32 Among the nine canons of 543 we find rejected the
doctrines of the pre-existence of souls, their surfeit and banishment into bodies, the
differentiation between Christ (as a pre-existent soul) and the Logos, the spherical form of
resurrected bodies, and the eventual restoration of all things, including demons. These are
again included in the fifteen canons of 553, but with a few notable additions." First, in the
second anathema, there is the mention of the doctrine of a henad:
If anyone says that the origin of all rational beings was incorporeal and immaterial
intelligences without any number or names, so that they formed a henad on account of the
29 Patrich, Sabas, 333.
30 Brian Daley, "A Richer Union': Leontius of Byzantium and the Relationship of Human and Divine in
Christ', SP 24 (1993), 244.
31 CCT, 2.2, 391.
32 CCT, 2.2, 407.
33 Straub, ACO IV.1, 248-9.
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sameness of essence (ousia), of power (dynamis) and of activity (enogeia) and on account of
their union with the God-Logos and knowledge; that they became sated with the divine
vision (KOpov Si a6ToUs A«Pi(l/ TI1S Oeias eecopias) and turned to what was worse,
each corresponding to its inclination to it, and assumed lighter or denser bodies and were
labelled with names with respect to the fact that the difference of names exists, like bodies
and powers too, from above; and that for this reason some became the cherubim, others
seraphim, and again others principalities, powers, dominions, thrones, angels and all the
other heavenly orders which exist and were so named, let him be anathema.
This rejection of the henad is important for us since it is precisely the problem under fire
from Maximus in Ambiguum 7. Canons 10, 11 and 14 are also of interest for us:
If anyone says that the Lord's resurrected body is an ethereal and spherical body, that the
other resurrected bodies too will be like this, that moreover the Lord will put off his own
body first and in a similar way the nature of all the bodies will return to nothing, let him be
anathema.
If anyone says that the coming judgement means the annihilation of all bodies, and at the
end of the fable immaterial nature stays and in the future nothing of matter will continue to
exist, but only the pure nous, let him be anathema.
If anyone says that there will be a single henad of all rational beings (Tr«vmw Tc)U
Aoyixc:w ivas p(a) through the annulment of IVostases and numbers with the bodies, and
that the end of the worlds and the laying aside of bodies and the abolition of names follow
the knowledge relating to the rational beings, and that there will be sameness of knowledge
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as of hypostases and that in the fabricated apokatastasis there will be only pure intelligences, as
they exist in their foolishly invented pre-existence, let him be anathema.
These paragraphs make evident how closely woven christological and
anthropological concerns are with a cosmology in which the world is considered not simply
in static metaphysical terms, but protologically and teleologically as well. One wonders
whether the characteristically Justinian soteriological emphasis on the flesh of Christ who is
'one of the Trinity' is simply a political gambit to unite the Empire in the Chalcedonian
horos, or whether in fact it represents a studied response on the basis of his insight into the
implications of `Origenise cosmology. What can or cannot be said of Christ as a true,
bodily human being and has immediate import both for what can or cannot be said of our
bodies and the whole material order. The doctrine of a fall from an original henad - a
primeval unity of rational, incorporeal beings, and with it the implicit understanding that
the telos of all beings is constituted as a return and restoration to that pristine, incorporeal
state, can be seen to impinge upon the doctrine of the Incarnation and especially of the
resurrection — of Christ's body in particular and of human bodies in general. Yet bodies are
not just corpses, but persons, or at least identifiably linked to created, subjective, human
individuality. The swallowing up of all individuality and differentiation, when understood as
the annihilation of hypostases, numbers, and bodies, condemned in Canon 14, was seen to
amount to a defective doctrine of creation and, concurrently, a defective doctrine of the
Incarnation.
Our point in this summary overview has not been to defend or implicate either
Origen or Evagrius with respect to the errors that came to be associated with their names.
Henri Crouzel has pointed out the noticeable 'gap' separating Origen of the third century
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and the Origenism of the sixth, and more recently Gabriel Bunge has shown that
Guillaumont's characterisation of sixth century Origenism as `Evagrian' is far from
certain. 34 Our intention rather at this stage has been to observe what in the mid-sixth
century were the doctrines considered actual and imminent threats to the confession of the
Church, its worship and, in specific connection to Maximus' milieu, to the faithful living of
the monastic vocation. The Origenism Maximus takes to task cannot be identified from
these sixth century sources. Its precise nature will only become more apparent as we
examine his refutation of its metaphysical structure and false philosophical suppositions.
This he does not by coming at it in a head to head negation, but by revisiting and
reconstructing the Origenist world-view at a deep, sub-structural level. We have already
seen in chapter one that Maximus is a monk-theologian who fully understands and wills to
retain the essential and beneficial elements in the great Alexandrian's exegetical approach.'
He is rightly named a 'definite insider' to the Origenian hermeneutical tradition.' Here
above all we shall see how the doctrine of creatio ex nibilo, radically and consistently applied,
emerges as the fundamental solution to the faulty Origenist metaphysic. But this will be no
battle of 'theology' against 'philosophy'. Maximus' doctrine of creation is itself a creative,
enduring synthesis of patristic theology and the Neoplatonic, and especially Proclean,
34 There has already been a considerable amount of study directed to this end. On Origen, see Henri Crouzel,
Ongen (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), 169-179; M.J. Edwards, `Origen no Gnostic; or, On the Corporeality of
Man and Body and Soul', JTS NS 43 (1992), 23-37. On Evagrius, especially in response to claims that he
espouses an intellectualist, iconoclastic, or non-affective ascetic theology, see Gabriel Bunge, 'The "Spiritual
Prayer": On the Trinitarian Mysticism of Evagrius of Pontus', Monastic Studies 17 (1987), 191-208; idem.,
Paternite .ohituelle: La Gnose chritienne chez .8vagre k Pontique (Spiritualite Orientale 61, Abbaye de Bellefontaine,
1994); Bouyer, The Christian Mysteg, 216-221; also Elizabeth A. Clark, `Melania the Elder and the Origenist
Controversy: The Status of the Body in a Late-Ancient Debate', in John Petruccione (ed.), Nova et vetera:
Patristic Studies in Honor of Thomas Patrick Halton (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press,
1998), 117-127.
35 Sherwood, 'An Annotated Date-List', 3.
36 Paul Blowers, 'The Anagogical Imagination: Maximus the Confessor and the Legacy of Origenianian
Hermeneutics', in Dorival and Boulluec, On:geniana Sexta, 649.
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doctrine of participation, mediated to him via Dionysius the Areopagite. 37 Given what has
been said about the integrity of the material order in Neoplatonism and Origenism, it will
be interesting to see how the body fares in Maximus' refutation.
Ambiguum ad Ioannern 7: A Dynamic Ontology
Ambiguum 7 arguably ranks among the most important treatises of Maximus' early
philosophical theology. Alongside Ambiguum 15, it spells out in detail the main themes in
his refutation of Origenism and provides the foundation for elements that were to become
central in the later christological debates. Halfway through the whole treatise comes the
phrase that dominates our study of the place of the body in Maximus' total theological
vision: Tor the Word of God and God wills always and in all things to effect the mystery
of his embodiment.' This sentence suggests that the mystery of divine incarnation, enacted
constitutively in Christ, is in fact the paradigmatic foundation of a far-reaching cosmic
mystery. 'In all things' (iv niiatv) signals the utterly universal scope of God's ultimate aim
to be embodied in his creation. Yet the treatise begins with a question from Gregory
Nazianzen regarding the mysterious quality of human bodily existence. How does Maximus
achieve this shift from an anthropological conundrum to a universal cosmology?
37 In an unpublished doctoral thesis, Eric D. Perl has striven to account for Maximus' doctrine of deification
by recourse to eventually non-Christian philosophical sources alone. While I believe his depiction of the
structure of Maximus' metaphysics to be accurate enough, I suspect that he misses somewhat the spirit of
Maximus' thought and its rootedness in the theological tradition, and so ventures to ally Maximus with a view
that far too baldly states the identification of God and creation. See his Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, and
Deification in Saint Maximus the Confessor' (PhD thesis, Yale University, 1991); and more briefly,
'Metaphysics and Christology in Maximus Confessor and Eriugena', in Bernard McGinn and Willemein Otto
(eds.), EnUgena: East and West. Papers for the Eighth International Colloquium of the Sociqy for the Promotion of
EnUgenean Studies, Chicago and Notre Dame 18-20 October 1991 (Notre Dame, London: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1994), 253-270.
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It would have been easy for him simply to repristinate the traditional repudiations
of the principal Origenist doctrines on the homogeneity of end and beginning, the pre-
existence of souls, the punitive and unstable nature of material creation, the endless cycle
of being, and universal apokatastasis. Indeed, one could say that the refutation of Origenism
in the sixth century, epitomised by Justinian's condemnations of 543 and 553, had largely
been negative, rather than constructive. But, as Sherwood in his seminal study on
Ambiguum 7 has pointed out, for Maximus simply to follow suit would have been
'ineffective, because superficial.' 38 In the first place, part of the problem was not simply the
content of the Origenists' doctrines, but their use of Fathers revered for their authority as
justification for their position. As we saw from the extract from Cyril of Scythopolis above,
and learn also from the letters of Barsanuphius and John in Gaza, 39 Origenist monks had
long been appealing to the authority of divines in the calibre of Gregory Nazianzen to
bolster their doctrine of the pre-existence of souls. Maximus views his task in part
controlled by the need to vindicate the Fathers associated. 4° Secondly, Maximus himself
would have been sympathetic to the Origenist monks' genuine intellectual concern to
articulate a coherent explanation of this material universe in relation to the one God, and
of its final meaning and destiny in him. Perhaps Origenism's greatest danger was the very
factor that made it so attractive: 'it offered a thoroughgoing philosophical foundation and
adjudication for the contemplative life of the monks.'" So we can surely agree with
38 The Eark'er Ambigua, 91.
39 Ep. 604 in Barsanuphe et Jean de Gaza. Come.spondance (SC 451, 815-824). Brian Daley provides a useful
summary of the relevant exchanges in 'The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium', 366-368.
4o Amb./o. 7 (PG 91.1089C).
41 Blowers, 'The Logology of Maximus the Confessor in His Criticism of Origenism', in Robert J. Daly (ed.),
Origeniana .Quinta: Papers of the 5th International Origen Congress Boston College, 14-18 August, 1989 (Leuven
University Press, 1992), 570.
88
Sherwood that '[t]here was then necessary not merely a dialectical non sequitur, but a real
ontological explanation of man's nature in regard to the end.... )42
Yet it is also true to say that Maximus would have shared the experience of the
Origenist monks of this universe as 'a place where we discover our fallen state and learn to
love God.'43 Here we discover Maximus concerned to show how it is precisely within the
material structure and temporal contingencies of the cosmos that there can be discerned
the providential and gracious presence of a good God. Ontologically speaking, visible and
sensible creation is inherently unstable, fluid, and liable to dissolution." But, hidden
(mystically!) beneath it in the form of intelligible reality, there is available to it from outside
itself an ontological stability — being — that comes, graciously, from the free divine will. The
solution to personal and cosmic mutability consists in a vision of reality in which created
nature finds its true stability by participating in an ontological and eschatological order that
ultimately is both realised and anticipated in the union of created and uncreate in the
Incarnation. True (final) existence — both personal and cosmic, spiritual and corporeal - is
achieved only through participation in Christ, the incarnate God.
So it is that Maximus does not merely negate what are only the external symptoms
of the problems in Origenist doctrine. Instead, as a theologian-philosopher entirely
adequate to the task, he revisits and revises Origenism's internal logical structure,
strengthening its philosophical coherence and at the same time deepening its theological
integrity. What emerges is a remarkably coherent and fundamentally christocentric vision of
the mysterious union of all intelligible and sensible reality with God.
42 Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua, 91
43 Louth, Maximus the Confessor, 67.
44 Amb../o. 15 (PG 91.1217A).
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The difficult text before Maximus is from the Nazianzen's 14 th Oration, On .Love for
the Poor,45 a primary text for Gregory's anthropology. Here it follows in the relevant context:
... this wretched and low and faithless body: how I have been yoked together with it I do
not know, nor how I am an image of God yet blended with clay. It makes war when
healthy yet is vexed when warred upon. As a fellow servant I love it, and as an enemy I
spurn it. As a fetter I flee it, and as a joint heir I am ashamed of it. I strive to weaken it, and
have nothing else to use as a co-worker to attain the best - knowing for what I was made
and that I must ascend to God through my actions.
NI I spare it as a co-worker, then I have no way to flee its insurrection, or to avoid falling from
God, weighed down bi its fetters which draw me down or hold me to the ground." It is a gracious
enemy and a treacherous friend. 0 what union and estrangement! What I am afraid of I
treat with respect, and what I love, I have feared. Before I make war [on it] I reconcile
myself [to it], and before I make peace [with it] I set myself apart [from it]. What is the
wisdom that concerns me? What is this great mysteg? Is it that God wills that we who are a portion of
God and slipped down from above — in our struggle and battle with the body — that we should ever look to
him, and that the weakness joined [to us] should serve to train our dignig, lest exalted and lifted up on
account of our high status we despise the Creator 47 - that we should know that we are at the same
time both the greatest and the lowest, earthly and heavenly, transitory and immortal,
inheritors of light and fire - or of darkness, whichever way we incline? Such is our mixture
and this is its reason, as it appears to me at least: that when we exalt ourselves because of
the image, we may be humbled because of the dust. Hence let him who wishes
45 Greg.Naz.Or. 14.7 (PG 35.865C).
46 Maximus treats this sentence in Amb.Io. 6.
47 This is the passage treated in Amb.Io. 7. Note how the question posed by Gregory continues.
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contemplate these matters, and we shall join him for spiritual exercises at a more
opportune t1me.48
Throughout this passage we hear expressed an ambivalence towards the body and
bodily conditions — one that was widely felt in philosophical and Christian ascetic and
theological traditions, both Eastern and Western.' Its essential features combine both
Platonic and Pauline themes, echoing on the one hand Socrates' cool stance towards 'the
foolishness of the body', 5° and on the other the Apostle's impassioned cry, 'who will rescue
me from this body of death?'51
Baffled by the paradox of human sublimity and humility, Gregory is wondering
why, if he was created for a heavenly life of union with God, man was given a body. 52 His
own answer is that the body keeps man humble, guarding him from pride and presumption
on account of his kinship with the divine. Only in this lowly condition is man capable of
recognising his true identity and so of achieving his heavenly destiny. To that end, one can
take Gregory's rhetorical question, 'What is this mystery?', one he poses in suggestive
contexts elsewhere, 53
 and see in it the construction of a bridge between material creation
and its deification.
48 PG 35.865A - 865D.
49 See D.S. Wallace-Hadrill, The Greek Patristic View of Nature (Manchester University Press/ New York:
Barnes and Noble, 1968), 66-79; John M. Dillon, 'Rejecting the Body, Refining the Body: Some Remarks on
the Development of Platonist Asceticism', in Vincent L. Wimbush and Richard Valantasis (eds.), Asceticism
(New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 80-87; Ware, 'My Helper and My Enemy', 90-110;
Louth, The body in Western Catholic Christianity', 111-129.
5° Plato Phaedo 67a.
51 Romans 7:24.
52 Anna-Stina Ellverson, The Dual Nature of Man: A Stue# in the Theological Anthropology of Gregog of Nazianzus
(Studia Doctrinae Christianae Upsaliensia 21, Uppsala, 1981), 41.
53 Greg.Naz.Or 2.17; 7.23; 38.13; 39.13; 45.9.
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Because the text in question, as Sherwood has observed, 'not only is patient of an
Origenist interpretation, but positively invites it,' 54 we might also ask what are the concrete
signs in monastic life such an interpretation could entail. I have highlighted the social
conditions of the setting from which this difficulty emerges, since it ties our interpretation
of Maximus' cosmic ontology to the concrete context of the audience — John the Bishop of
Cyzicus and the monks of the monastery there - to whom he directs his anti-Origenist
confutation. They supposedly would have been especially acquainted with conditions in
which, confronted by their own and others' corporeality through ascetic struggle,
exasperation with bodily life could become all the more acute. They would have known the
temptation common to all ascetic and mystical traditions to leave behind practical
asceticism in order to attain the traditional monastic ideal: a pure, undistracted form of
intellectual contemplation. Yet the collective wisdom accumulated over the centuries in
orthodox Christian ascetic traditions suggests that both the practical and spiritual goals of
ascetic life demand that the monk neither pamper nor denigrate his body, but train it as a
disciplined instrument and co-worker of the soul. In his popular monastic masterpiece
Maximus gives voice to precisely this conviction when, appealing to the words of Saint
Paul, he writes,
No one, says the Apostle, hates his own flesh (Eph 5:29), of course, but mortifies it and makes it
his slave (1 Cor 9:27), allowing it no more than food and clothing (1 Tim 6:8) and these only as
they are necessary for life. So in this way one loves it without passion, rears it as an
associate in divine things and takes care of it only with those things that satisfy its needs.55
54 The Earker A_mbigua, 73.
55 Car. 3.9.
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The evidence adduced earlier suggests that Origenism manifested itself at the social level as
an intellectual elitism, a presumptious preoccupation with speculative spirituality at the
expense of lived assimilation to God through rigorous askesis. The dangers inherent in such
a one-sided existence include intellectual overload and stagnation. Monastic sapiential
literature abounds with diagnostic remedies to cope with the danger of akedia — listlessness,
despondency or boredom. 56 In addition, then, to the theoretical problems inherent in the
Origenist position, there remained in Maximus' context the 'immediate and practical threat
of "satiety", namely, the kind of spiritual surfeit, the "peaking out" as it were, that the
monks were prone to experience in their daily ascetic struggle.'57
Having said that, what was the Origenist interpretation of Gregory's passage, and
what in turn its proper meaning? We shall not here analyse the whole of Maximus' lengthy
argument in thematic, synthetic detail. Sherwood has already done so admirably in his
unrivalled analysis of Ambiguum 7•58 Instead we shall strive to preserve the flow of
Maximus' argument, along the way isolating primary sub-structures that underlie and give
shape to his vision of corporeality in the cosmos.
The two phrases at the heart of the difficulty are those where Gregory says that we
are 'a portion of God' (p6tpav ®Eoii) and 'slipped down from above' (dvco0Ev
psUaav-ras). Taken bare, both ideas sit comfortably enough with Origen's understanding
of the corporeal cosmos as the result of a primordial fall of souls, occasioned by 'satiety'
and a 'cooling' in attention, from a pristine state of divine perfection and preoccupation
56 See the studies by Pierre Miguel, `Akedia', in Lexique du Desert: Etude de quelques mots-clis du vocabulaire
monastique ,grec ancien, (Spiritualite Orientale 44, Abbaye de Bellefontaine, 1986), 19-35; and Gabriel Bunge,
Aka/a. la doctrine spirituelle Èvagre le Pontique cur Paddle (Spiritualite Orientale 52, Abbaye de Bellefontaine,
1991).
57 Blowers, 'Perpetual Progress', 155.
58 See also Riou, Le Monde et Ltglise, 45-71.
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with the good. 59 As such one could say that they contribute to what Ugo Bianchi calls the
conceptual and objective connection drawn by Origen between the soul's fall and its
'terrestrial incorporation.' 60 Maximus opens the seventh Ambiguum with a brief run-down of
the false ideas drawn from 'pagan teachings':
According to their opinion there was once a henad of rational beings, by virtue of which we
were connatural to God and had our dwelling (cf. Jn 14:2) and foundation in him. Then they
add that when motion (ki nest* s) came about - as a result of which these rational beings were
dispersed in varying degrees, God envisaged the generation (genesis) of this corporeal world
for the sake of binding them in bodies as a punishment for their former sins. This is what
they propose the teacher61 is suggesting in the words above.
As Maximus has it, the Origenist schema places genesis as the third ontological
'moment' in a series that begins in monadic unity, disperses through motion (kinesis), and
eventuates punitively in corporeal generation. The nature of motion, diversity and their
cause had long been the object of philosophical scrutiny. It is a problem directly related to
the question about the origin of evil, for when considered 'from below', motion, mutability,
differentiation and evil go hand in hand. 62
 It was a question that in the fourth century had
been addressed by Athanasius when he asserted the inherent goodness of creation and
59 Or.Princ. 2.6.3; 2.8.3; 2.9.2.
60 Ugo Bianchi, 'Some Reflections on the Ontological Implications of Man's Terrestrial Corporeity according
to Origen', in Richard Hanson and Henri Crouzel (eds.), Oteniana Tenia: The Third International Colloquium for
On:gen Studies, University of Manchester September 7th — 11 16, 1981 (Rome: Edizioni Dell'Ateneo, 1985), 157.
Crouzel has opposed Bianchi on this point in Oten, 215.
61 Ie. Gregory Nazianzen.
62 Some sought to resolve this issue by recourse to dualism — the positing of two sources of the cosmos, one
good and the other evil. Interestingly Justinian had accused Origenism of precisely such dualism when he
ascribed to Origen Manichaean errors: Tor he [Origen] was educated in the mythologies of the Hellenes and
was interested in spreading them; he pretended to explain the divine scriptures, but in this manner mixed his
own pernicuous teaching in the documents of the holy sciptures; he introduced the pagan and Manichaean
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denied of evil any positive or substantial status. The recurrence of strongly dualistic
heresies throughout the patristic period and beyond necessitated frequent recourse to this
basic orthodox affirmation.' The problem remained, however, of how to account for evil
without subsuming created diversity into God himself (monism), or giving it a positive
source outside of God (dualism).
Only later in Ambiguum 42 does Maximus — on christological grounds - outrightly
reject the punitive character of corporeal generation inherent in the Origenist position as
`Manichaean'." Nothing created is evil. Here however he first concentrates on the structure
rather than on the substance of the henad doctrine in which the negative motion of fall
follows after a state of non-motion - after a state of perfect participation in God. While this
appears to be the order that best fits the biblical story, it contradicts Neoplatonic logic. In
classic Neoplatonist metaphysics, within the context of seeking to resolve the age-old
problem of the relation between the one and the many, the basic structure of motion (and
thus of all intelligible reality) is conceived of as an ontological cycle of remaining (mone),
procession (proodos) and return (epistrophe). In proceeding from its cause - an ontological, not a
temporal or spatial movement — an effect at the same time continues to remain in its cause.
This remaining constitutes a thing's identity between itself and its cause; procession constitutes
its difference. The overcoming of difference is achieved by its return to the cause, a move
entirely natural and innate. Procession and return are in fact the same motion viewed
respectively from the aspect of the cause and from the aspect of the effect." The whole
error and the Arian madness, so that he could give to them what the holy scriptures could not understand
precisely' (Ed.c.Ongen 73.4-8, quoted in CCT, 2.2, 393-394).
63 Amblo. 42 (PG 91.1332A): 'The being (TO eival) of evil is marked by non-existence' (cf. PG 91.1328A).
See further Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, volume 2: The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700)
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 216-226.
64 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1328A; 1332A — 1333A).
65 'Procession and reversion together constitute a single movement, the diastole-systole which is the life of the
universe.' E.R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 219.
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process is summarised by Proclus in his Elements of Theology with the triadic formula: 'every
effect remains in its cause, proceeds from it, and returns to it.'"
As noted above, Eric Pen has demonstrated Maximus' familiarity with Proclus'
metaphysical framework through his thorough acquaintance with the work of Dionysius.
Since neither procession nor return entails a break with remaining (pow)), but in fact
,
presupposes continuation in it, then in Maximus' estimation, pow must constitute a state
of perfectionyet to be attained by fallen creation. The essence of Maximus' refutation of the
Origenist henad then, as Peni. concludes,
is that it is metaphysically impossible for the creature to begin in its deified condition, in
perfect participation in God.... [I]f it did, then, contrary to Origenism, it would be
impossible for the creature to fall, since it would already possess the Good, that which
alone is desirable in itself.°
The problem with the Origenist schema of peection, fall, and (material) creation is that it
contradicts a logic according to which perfection is actually perfect: inviolable, immutable.
But if this is a false sequence, if there is no such thing as an historically actual prelapsarian
perfect state, what for Maximus is the ontological status of this material universe in its
present, fallen, historical condition? Did God create a flawed world? What is the relation
between the rational creature's natural procession from God into being (creation) and its
unnatural movement towards non-being (fall)?
For Maximus, preserving the distinction between creation as procession from non-
being into being on the one hand, and fall from being into non-being on the other hand, is
66 .. . 'limy tray iv TO cd -rio.? Kai trpoiival dm' ain-oil Kai i1TIap84niv trpOs airrO (prop. 35, in Dodds,
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paramount. Yet the two are contemporaneous. At the very moment (pa) of its coming-
into-being, creation falls from its cause.' What to the modern reader may appear as a
certain pessimism on Maximus' part here must be acknowledged to be at the same time
both theologically realistic, true to his traditional sources, and consistent with his
Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. By means of Adam's fall human nature has failed to
attain the fullness of its natural, created condition in which it would be simultaneously
united with and distinct from its creator. As a result, material, historical existence is
experienced by fallen humanity as fragmented and distant from its creator, and so in some
way as less than created. It does indeed seem that in his doctrine of providence and
judgement, in which Maximus distinguishes between the ontological and the moral spheres,
the operation of judgement as punishment and correction is restricted to the moral
sphere.° Nevertheless his understanding of a double creation — in which he is continuous
with a tradition reaching back to the two Gregories,7° Evagrius,' Origen,72 Clement,'
Philo:4 and perhaps Plato him.self,75 allows him also to think of Adam's fully-sensual
Proclus: The Elements of Theology, 38).
67 See Pen, `Methexis', 226.
68 .Q.ThaL 59 (CCSG 22, 61.262); eQ. Thai 61 (CCSG 22, 85.10-15).
69 At the ontological level, Maximus rules out the punitive character of judgement, as in this crucial passage
from Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1133D): `The providence of Mind, I say, is not convertive, or as it were the
dispensation that turns things from what is not necessary to what is necessary, but constitutes the universe
and preserves the hgoi according to which the universe was established. And judgement is not pedagogic or as
it were punitive of sinners, but the salutary and determinative distribution of beings, in accordance with
which each of the things that has come to be, in connection with the logoi in accordance with which it exists,
has an inviolable and unalterable constitution in its natural identity....' `Yet,' he goes on, and here he is
speaking of the moral realm, `providence and judgement are also spoken in connection with our implanted
chosen impulses, averting us in many ways from what is wicked, and drawing us wisely back to what is
good....' For further discussion, see Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 66-72, who underscores the anti-
Origenist and anti-Evagrian character of this passage.
70 Greg.Nyss.Opif 16 (PG 44.185B); Greg.Naz.Or. 6.22; 38.11.
71 Evag.Keph. 1.51; 3.24-26; 6.36.
72 Or. Gen. 1.13.
73 Clem.Str. 5.3.16.
74 Legum allegoria 1.12. Here, commenting on Genesis 2:7, Philo writes: `There are two kinds of humanity: one
is heavenly, the other earthly. The heavenly man, being made in the image of God, is completely without a
share in corruptible and terrestrial substance. But the earthly man was constructed out of diverse matter,
which [Moses] calls dust. That is why he says that the heavenly man has not been moulded, but has been
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material incorporation simultaneously as a punitive and assisdve divine act. Adam's
creation as a composite being formed from the dust of the earth and the breath of God
(Gen 2:7) and his fall are simultaneous, so much so that for Maximus any actual, empirical
prelapsarian existence is excluded. No sooner is man given being out of non-being than he
transgresses the divine command, declining from the good. His natural passage from non-
being into perfection or well-being is short-circuited by sin.
Returning to Maximus' objection to the Origenist henad, we can now be more
attuned to the subtleties both of the Origenist position and the Maximian refutation. The
subtleties of the Origenist position are threefold. First, a henad implies a pre-temporal,
eternal creaturely coexistence with God. On the basis of the biblical title pantocrator for
God, Origen had understood the eternality of the world ( ra Trciv-ra) to be correlative to
the eternality of God's sovereignty. 76 Athanasius had clarified and corrected Origen by
subordinating the secondary, contingent (economic) relation of creator-creation to the
primary, eternal (theological) relation of Father-Son. 7 By positing the actual pre-existence
of rational creatures, the doctrine of a henad reduces the act of creation to the addition of
individual accidents, rather than seeing it as the creation of actual essences. This Maximus
states and rejects with clarity elsewhere:
stamped with the image of God (006 Trin2\th:rem, KT 7 EiK6va Si TETUTTWCJeal 0E0.)), whereas the earthly
man is a moulded figure (TrAciapa) of the Artificer, but not his offspring.' Trans. F.H. Colson and G.H.
Whitaker, Philo I (LCL, London: William Heinemann / NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), 166. See also Philo
De Officio munch 46.
75 Timaeus 69bc.
76 'As no one can be a father without having a son, nor a master without possessing a servant, so even God
cannot be called omnipotent unless there exist those over whom he may exercise his power; and therefore,
that God may be shown to be almighty, it is necessary that all things should exist' (Or.Princ. 1.2.10). This
holds for the intelligible world, yet Origen did not hold the material universe to be eternal, for several times
he clearly asserts that it was made by God out of nothing (eg. Or.Princ. 2.1.4; 4.4.6-7).
77 Tor creatures not to exist does not lessen the maker; for he has the power of framing them whenever he
wills. But for the offspring not to be always with the Father does lessen the perfection of the Father's
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Some say that created things eternally coexist with God, which is impossible. For how can
what is utterly limited eternally coexist with the wholly infinite? Or how are they really
creatures if they are co-eternal with the creator? But this is the theory of the Greeks, who
in no way admit God as the creator of the essences, but only of qualities (TrotoTTITcov).
But we who know God as the Almighty (rOv TrairroSOvapov) affirm that he is the creator
not of qualities but of essences endowed with qualities. And if this is true, creatures do not
eternally coexist with God.78
Secondly, the doctrine of a henad implies that God brought the material world into
being not freely, but by necesszry. If creation is the necessary result of a fall from a state of
unitary simplicity, that is, a necessary consequence of evil, then it cannot be the free and
good creative act of God. Once again we turn elsewhere to find Maximus' assertion to the
contrary:
In no way do we assert that souls pre-exist bodies, or that bodies were introduced as an
addition to souls as a punishment for the evil committed beforehand by incorporeal beings.
We do not suppose that evil alone is likely to have been the cause of the pre-eminent
miracle of visible phenomena through which God, heralded in silence, can be known.79
Thirdly, the doctrine of a fall from an already existing state of perfection, a fall
occasioned by 'satiety,' implies a never-ending cycle of instability in which creation's
ontological status is necessarily susceptible to corruption and dissolution. For if
essence. Thus his works were framed when he willed, through his Word; but the Son is ever the proper
offspring of the Father's essence' (Ath.Ar. 1.29).
78 Car. 4.6; also 3.28; 4.1-5.
79 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1328A); also Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1329C-1332B); and DP (PG 91.293BC), where Maximus
rejects any thought of God being creator by necessity of his goodness.
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embodiment and material diversity are the result of opposition — an opposition that arose
even within a state of mane' and perfect union with God, then creation remains
ontologically and fundamentally flawed. Gregory of Nyssa, to whom Maximus is so
indebted in this treatise and in his anthropology in general, had been sensitive to precisely
this problem in Origen's doctrine in the fourth century, and against it pitted his doctrine of
'perpetual progress' — the never-ending progression in the good."
Maximus begins his refutation of the existence of a henad by what is initially
recognisable as an exercise in Aristotelian logic. The custom of determining the end by
reference to the beginning or cause was ancient and well-established.' Yet because of the
fall, direct access to the beginning is impossible. The fall has ruled out the Platonic ideal of
recollecting or returning directly to one's origins. Instead, one must learn one's beginning
by turning to the end." Asserting what will become an oft-repeated dictum, 'nothing
moving has [yet] come to rest' (ov KtvotipEvov goTr)),84 Maximus directs his attention
not to the origin, but to the goal (telos) of motion, the 'ultimate object of desire' (To
,gaxaTOV OpEKTOV):
Now if the divine is immovable (emiuriTov) (since it fills all), and everything that has being
from non-being is movable (Kt vq-r6v) (since it is continually impelled towards some cause),
and nothing moving has come to rest, since it has not yet found rest for its capacity for
80 While the word stasis, a synonym of mone, is not used in its technical sense in Amb.Io. 7 (Sherwood, Earlier
Ambigua, 93 fn44; 95), its meaning is implied in the long list of scriptural citations in PG 91.1072D — 1073A.
Its first appearance as a technical term within the triad genesis-kine.ris-stasis only occurs in Amb.Io. 15 (PG
91.1217D — 1221B).
81 See Ronald E. Heine, PeOction in the Virtuous Life: A Stut# in the Relationship Between Edification and Polemical
Theology in Gregory of Nyssa's De Vita Moysis (Patristic Monograph Series 2, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1975).
82 Epistle of Barnabas 6.13; Or.Princ. 1.6.2; 3.6.1-3; Bas.Hex. 11.7 (SC 160, 242).
83 'No longer, after the transgression, is the end revealed from the beginning, but the beginning from the end.'
Q.ThaL 59 (CCSG 22, 63.280-281).
84 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1069B).
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appetitive motion in the ultimate object of its desire, (for nothing else is apt to stop what is
naturally impelled except the appearance of that object of desire), then nothing in motion
has come to rest.85
The main argument against the primordial existence of a henad lies in the fact that
perfect stability - the attainment of the ultimate object of desire - remains an as-yet
unrealised reality.' Here Maximus begins to lay down the parameters of what we have
called his 'dynamic ontology.' For Aristotle, a proper analysis of a given reality involves
asking about its four basic causes: the final cause - the telos 'for the sake of which' (TO o(,
tg vEKa) a thing exists; the formal cause — the logos of being (O A6yos- -6-15 oVaias) which
characterises the course on which a thing travels; the material cause — the parts from which
a thing is made; and the motive cause — the principle (apXri) of motion, the cause which
sets a thing on its course." Maximus makes partial use of these categories as part and parcel
of a scientific analysis of reality. Just as in Aristotle's teleological view of nature one can
only account for reality by knowing 'that for the sake of which' it exists, u so with Maximus
the cosmos is viewed not as a static, metaphysical unit, but in terms of its goal (telos) or
purpose (skapos)," which for the Confessor is christologically determined. The beginning
and end of creation are identical insofar as all creation comes 'from God' and is naturally
oriented towards him as its goal. But the beginning is also unlike the end, in that the goal of
85 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1069B).
86 See Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1072C — 1073A) where Maximus draws upon a series of scriptural proofs to show
that 'rest' is a future reality.
87 Aristode De generatione animalium I, 715a.
88 Maximus uses this formula as the definition of telos here in Arnb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1072C) and also in Q.Thal 60
(CCSG 22, 75.36-37), ascribing it anonymously to an 'outsider' (cAX6Tpioc). Sherwood in Earlier Ambigua,
100 conjectures that the outsider is Evagrius, though it is not at all implausible that Maximus is referring to
Aristotle himself.
89 The term skopos, usually translated as 'purpose', 'plan', or 'goal', is of great importance in Maximus as
providing the specific terms by which God brings creation to its telos. The word can also mean 'plot' or
creation is deification. At least in his early years, Origen viewed beginning and end as
unitive: 'when the end has been restored to the beginning, and the termination of things
compared with their commencement, that condition of things will be re-established in
which rational nature was placed.'" Within such a worldview, not only is all motion and
difference problematic; the Incarnation cannot accomplish anything new, nor achieve any
real goal, other than help towards the restoration of equilibrium. But for Maximus, created
human nature - and with it, the whole cosmos - is defined by a dynamic trajectory
considered equally from ontological, eschatological, and moral perspectives. This trajectory
has its beginning (dpvi) in God its sole cause (ai-ria), who, as we shall see, brings it into
'being' from non-being and sets it upon the path that leads via 'well-being' towards its goal
in 'eternal well-being', that is, in union with himself, the 'ultimate object of desire.'
Maximus hereby combines what we have seen as the traditional Neoplatonic cycle of
procession and return — one he often expresses with the Dionysian image of the spokes of
a wheel proceeding from and converging upon a central point" — with what could be
considered a more historical, horizontal, developmental understanding of motion as the
passage of the soul from genesis to stasis in God.' Procession coincides with the creature's
emergence by the will of God from non-being into being. Being as return is stretched out
into a movement at once caused by God and self-caused, since it is fundamental to the
nature of the soul to be self-moved and autonomously oriented towards God. Its freedom,
which at the same time constitutes its distinction from and relation to God, is entirely
natural. Yet creaturely dependence is not denied when the human soul is designated
'theme', as among later Neoplatonist commentators it was customary to assign at the outset a single skopos to
each philosophical work in the effort to unify that work and harmonise varying philosophical sources.
99 Or.Princ. 3.6.3.
91 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1081C); Myst. 1 (Sotiropoulos 154.3-7); Th.Oec. 2.4; cf. Dion.Ar.De div.nom. 2.5; 5.6.
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aUeurrocr-ra-roc — `self-constituted.' Since procession and return indicate ontologically,
not chronologically distinct movements, the procession of the soul into being is, if not
immediately interrupted by fall, identical with its return to its cause. It is thus the function
of the triads genesis, kinesis, stasis and being, well-being, eternal-well-being to offset the equilibrium
inherent in the procession-return cycle by introducing a linear, developmental movement.
Consequently the need for a reappraisal of the Origenist metaphysic is at once
moral and ontological. If rational beings once had a secure 'foundation' and 'abode'," yet
subsequently fell from that stable state, then given the same circumstances, Maximus
concludes, they will 'necessarily ( dvdyKris) experience the same alterations in position
ad infinitum.' That necessary ontological instability cannot but trigger a moral angst: 'what
could be more pitiable than that rational beings should be impelled in this way and neither
possess nor hope for an immutable foundation @dots) whereby they may be anchored in
the good?'" Here Maximus adumbrates what he will say later by identifying the Origenist
problem as a dilemma about freedom. For Origen, freewill involves an act of rational
power by which one moves oneself towards one of two opposites: good or evil?' In order
for the choice of the good to be considered free, one must also be able to choose its
opposite, namely evi1. 98 Despite Origen's abhorrence of determinism and his true concern
to preserve both God's transcendence and human freedom, by confusing ontological with
moral stability both God and the cosmos get stuck between the dialectical vicissitudes of
92 Paul Plass has studied this modification as it relates to Maximus' conception of time in 'Transcendent Time
in Maximus the Confessor', The Thomist 44 (1980), 259-277, and 'Moving Rest in Maximus the Confessor',
Classica et mediaevalia 35 (1984), 177-190.
93 Amb.lo. 42 (PG 91.1345D); Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1052AB); Ep. 7 (PG 91.436D — 437B). That the soul is self-
constituted is axiomatic in Proclus' theological metaphysics (prop. 189, Dodds, Proclus: Elements of Theology,
164).
94 These terms are frequently paired: '15pucrts. andpoini.
95 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1069C).
95 Amb.b. 7 (PG 91.1069C).
97 See Or.Plinc. 3.1.1-22 which is preserved in Greek.
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good and evil. On the one hand, evil becomes itself the necessary cause of this present
world. On the other hand, the good ends up being desired not for its own sake, but on
account of the experience of evi1. 99 Maximus will show how, paradoxically, creaturely
freedom is maintained precisely by the soul's being naturally determined by God.
Having set the problem in perspective with this focus upon the final cause, the
Confessor continues his argument by addressing the relation between genesis and kinesis. His
argument progresses as a kind of consistent application of the Christian doctrine of
creation ex nihilo. Genesis must be the ontological precondition of kinesis in both intelligible
and sensible beings, w° because at the most fundamental level there are only two basic
realms: the uncreated, and the created 101
 - and entities of the latter only have being by
means of genesis. Over and against the essential continuum between the one and the many
advanced in pagan Neoplatonism, Maximus presses this ontological divide with force. God
as 'self-caused' (airraiT(os) is 'unmade, without beginning, and immovable: 1 ' 'To be telos,
perfection and impassibility belongs to God alone, for he alone is immutable, complete,
and impassible.' 1' He is that telos 'for the sake of which (Oil EVEKEV) all things exist, but
98 See Or.Princ. 2.8.3.
99 This dialectical notion of freewill later becomes a subject of contention in the Monotheletist controversy, in
which Maximus calls false the assumption that choice involves plurality, and that plurality necessarily involves
opposition. Only acts of willing that correspond to the seat of will in nature are truly free. Florovsky in The
Byzantine Fathers of the Sixth to Eighth Centug, 234-235, I believe, says as much when he comments on freewill
in Maximus: 'Freedom of choice not merely does not belong to the perfection of freedom. On the contrary, it
is a diminishing and distortion of freedom. Genuine freedom is an undivided, unshakable, integral striving
and attraction of the soul to Goodness. It is an integral impulse of reverence and love. "Choice" is by no
means an obligatory condition of freedom. God wills and acts in perfect freedom, but he does not waver and
he does not choose. Choice — Trpoa tpEais — which is properly "preference,"... presupposes bifurcation and
vagueness — the incompleteness and unsteadiness of the will. Only a sinful and feeble will wavers and
chooses.'
100 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1072A).
101 Amb.lo. 41 (PG 91.1304D).
102 Amb.10. 7 (PG 91.1072C).
103 Amb.lo. 7 (PG 91.1073B).
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itself is for the sake of nothing: 10' On the other hand, all created beings are subject to
motion - interpreted not as a general state of random flux (which would be contrary to
nature), but as a movement directed toward a goal. Thus, perhaps citing the Aristotelian
commentators, Maximus says 'they call this motion a 'natural capacity' (Stivapiv (1)uotrriv)
that hastens towards its proper goal, or 'passibility' (Rai0o 5) which, as motion from one
thing to another, has impassibility as its goal, or else 'effective activity' (EvEpyEtav
Spacr-rocriv) whose goal is self-perfection?' Nothing created is its own telos, or is self-
perfect, or impassible.' 'It belongs to creatures to be moved towards the-end-without-
beginning, and to cease their activity in just such a perfect end, and to be acted upon
(Traeilv): 107 This inherent passibility, Maximus explains, is not the passibility associated
with deviance (Tporrii) or the corruption of capacity, but the natural and fundamental
condition of creatures which have been brought into being from non-being.108
Motion then, is proper to the nature of rational beings, not because they have
fallen, but because they have been created by God.' The mystery of creation places the
world at a fundamental ontological distance from God, such that 'the interval (TO p4crov)
between uncreate and creatures is total, and as infinite as the difference." Yet it also
places the world in an ontological relation to him — not as an extension of his own ineffable
104 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1072C). We find this formula also in Q.Tbal. 60 (CCSG 22, 75.36-37). For its possible
origin in Evagrius, see Sherwood, Barbi,- Ambigua, 34.
105 Amb.M. 7 (PG 91.1072B).
106 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1072C).
107 Allib.10. 7 (PG 91.1073B).
108 Arnb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1073B).
109 'The source (cipxtj) of every natural motion is the genesis of things that are moved. And the source of the
genesis of things that are moved is God, since he is the creator of nature (yEvecrioupyog)' Amb.b. 15 (PG
91.1217C). According to Balthasar kinesis constitutes a basic `ontologischer Ausdruck des Geschaffenseins'
(Kosmische Lituizie, 136). Origen also says as much, at least in Rufinus' translation: But since those rational
creatures, which we have said above were made in the beginning, were created when they did not previously
exist, in consequence of this very fact — that they were not (non eran) and then came to be (esse coeperuni) - they
are necessarily changeable and mutable (necessario conuertibiles et mutabiles substiterun); since whatever power was
in their substance was not in it by nature, but was the result of the goodness of the Maker.' Or.Princ. 2.9.2 (SC
1, 354.31-36). See also Or.Ptinc. 4.4.8.
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being, but fundamentally derivative of and dependent upon it. Maximus uses terminology
clearly reflecting Proclus' doctrine of participation when he speaks of creation as issuing
'from God' (EK emiJ) ,111 no 'imparts himself (iatrrOv... peTaSoisival) to beings in the
form of being itself.' Dionysius the Areopagite had spoken of this when he referred to
God as 'the being of beings.' m In Maximus' construal of the vision, God is creation's source
of being, its means of being, and its goal of being: its 'beginning (dpXil), middle (pEGOTris),
and end (TEX05)2 114 But mere 'being' is not creation's goal, but 'eternal well-being': union
with God — deification. Maximus links the now-reformed metaphysical triad genesis, kinesis,
and telos to its counterpart being, well-being, and eternal well-being.
Since, therefore, rational beings are created, they are always moving. They have been
moving naturally from the beginning by virtue of being (E; GpXT-15 KaTa (1)001V St« 1-6
Elva°, and move voluntarily towards their goal by virtue of well-being (upOs Taos )arre(
yvck;priv Stec TO si5 siva°. For the end of motion for those being moved consists in eternal
well-being (iv TO? EI E) ELMO, just as the beginning (cipx6) is being itself, which is God,
who is the giver of being and the gracious giver of well-being — since he is beginning and
end. For the simple fact of our motion derives from him as the beginning, and the nature
of of our motion is defined by him as the goal.115
110 Ansb.b. 7 (PG 91.1077A).
111 Amb.b. 7 (PG 91.1072A; 1080AB); 10 (PG 91.1180A; 1188B); 15 (PG 91.1217D); 41 (PG 91.1312B). Cf.
Romans 11:36.
112 Amb.Io. 35 (PG 91.1289A).
T113 al/TOS EGT1 TO eivat T015 OUGI... Kai «UT° TO jwat TC3v OvT6:w .... De div.nom. 5.4 (Corpus
Dionysiacum I, 183.8-9).
114 Th.Oec. 1.10.
115 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1073C). Cf. .Q.Thal 60 (CCSG 22, 79.117-120): Tor it was necessary for the one who is
truly creator by nature of the mid of created beings also to become the author by grace of the deification of
the beings he has created, so that the giver of well-being might appear also as the gracious giver of eternal
well-being.'
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The involvement of the human creature in this process is far from mechanical. It
leads him in an escalating series of ecstatic experiences through which all perception —
intelligible and sensible - becomes completely overwhelmed by the embrace of God, his
true goa1,116 'like darkness illuminated by light, or iron completely penetrated by fire.''"7
Perhaps because Origen's cosmology derived to a large extent from his meditations on the
eschatological vision portrayed in 1 Corinthians 15:24-28, n8 Maximus too119reconsiders
2human destiny as ecstasy under the rubric of 'subjection' 0) tirro-rayto. 120
 Just as the
Saviour subjected himself to the Father in Gethsemane with his prayer 'not as I will, but as
you will' (Mt 26:39), and as Saint Paul, disowning himself, could say that It is no longer I
who live, but Christ who lives in me' (Gal 2:20), so freewill (TO co:ITE,P oijcilov) will become
'freely and completely surrendered to God, submitting to a state of being ruled by
refraining from that which wills anything contrary to what God wills.' 121 Far from entailing
the abolition of freewill however, there is instead established a solid ontological foundation
116 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1073CD).
117 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1076A).
118 See, for example, Or.Princ. 3.6.1-6.
119 Sherwood (Earlier Ambigua, 89) notes that at two points in Ambiguum 7 'Maximus introduces and uses in an
opposite sense those very texts which had served Origen, and after him of course the Origenists, as
substantiation of their error.' This represents the second.
120 This meditation reflects clear indebtedness to Dionysius' discussion of ecstasy in De div.nom. 4.13, where,
reflecting on Saint Paul's words in Galatians 2:20 and 2 Corinthians 5:13, he writes: 'This divine yearning
brings ecstasy so that the lover belongs not to self but to the beloved. This is shown in the providence
lavished by the superior on the subordinate. It is shown in the regard for one another demonstrated by those
of equal status. And it is shown by the subordinates in their divine return toward what is higher. This is why
the great Paul, swept along by his yearning for God and seized of its ecstatic power, had this inspired word to
say: it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me (Gal 2:20). Paul was truly a lover and, as he says, he was
beside himself for God (2 Cor 5:13), possessing not his own life but the life of the One for whom he yearned,
as exceptionally beloved.' In connection with this very passage, Andrew Louth has asserted that for
Dionysius, ecstasy 'is not primarily some kind of overpowering experience, it is a matter of letting one's life
be ruled by another.' See his 'St. Denys the Areopagite and St. Maximus the Confessor: a Question of
Influence', SP 28 (1993), 171. On the basis of the Maximian text under observation here, we can plausibly
argue that quite the same applies for Maximus.
121 Amb.b. 7 (PG 91.1076B).
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for freedom, so that, 'whence being comes to us, thence also we may desire to be
moved.' 122 It will be the case, says Maximus, that
like an imprint conforming to its original seal, 'the image will ascend to the archetype,'123
and will have neither the desire nor the ability to move elsewhere. Or to put it more
forthrightly, it will not be able to will otherwise, since it will have taken hold of the divine
activity, or rather have become God by deification, utterly delighted to the full in being
outside (Tb EKOTCX0E1) those things that are and are perceived to be naturally its own. This
is due to the abundant and overwhelming grace of the Spirit that shows God alone to be
active, so that there is in all only one activity of God and the worthy, 124 or rather of God
alone, inasmuch as he, in a way entirely befitting his goodness, interpenetrates entirely
those worthy of God.123
In the same stroke Maximus excludes the possibility of 'satiety' or any deviation in the final,
perfect state. All reality — intelligible and sensible — will be 'enveloped in God by his
ineffable appearance and presence?'
Here ends Maximus' initial refutation of the henad, after which he begins a positive
interpretation of the two phrases from Gregory — 'a portion of God' and 'slipped down
from above.' The two phrases, used in their original context as a probable hendiadys, are
taken by Maximus as conveying two quite different meanings. 'Slipped down from above'
consistently indicates a fall from the divinely intended and natural course of created human
nature. It is applicable to us 'because we have not moved in accordance with the principle
122 Amb.lo. 7 (PG 91.1076B).
123 The phrase is from Greg.Naz.Or 28.18.
124 Fifteen years later during the Monothelete controversy, Maximus had to clarify his meaning on this and
other occasions where he spoke of one will or energy. See Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 33.114); Opusc. 1 (PG 91.33A).
125 Amb../o. 7 (PG 91.1076C).
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(logos) preexisting in God according to which we were made.' 127 Further on he explains in
more detail the ontological ramifications of this moral failure:
He is rightly said to have 'slipped down from above' who did not move towards his own
beginning and cause according to which (Kae' ?)v), by which (i4; II), and for which (151' tilv)
he was made. He is thus in an unstable gyration and fearful disorder of soul and body. And
even though his cause remains fixed, he brings about his own defection by his voluntary
inclination towards what is worse.... He has willingly exchanged what is better for what is
worse: being for non-being.128
Any deviation (-Tome from the trajectory from being via well-being to eternal well-
being constitutes a progressive fall into non-being. Coinciding with the creature's good
creation by God out of nothing, 'the fall' amounts to the creature's immediate failure to
attain that created state of being, a failure visibly marked and limited by its union with a
corruptible, mortal body. The fall towards non-being in the form of material dissolution,
then, is not the natural creaturely state of the soul. On the contrary, in its natural state the
human soul is compelled towards being.13°
The claim that we are 'a portion of God', however, tells quite a different story: it is
that ontological norm from which we have noticeably 'slipped' in our empirical existence.
126 Amid,. 7 (PG 91.1077A).
127 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1081C).
in Amb.b.
 7 (PG 91.1084D — 1085A).
129 There are two levels at which Maximus speaks of Tpomj: one (pejoratively) as a moral failure, and the
other (neutrally) as an innate capacity - related to our composite condition - to suffer change. In the first case:
'Deviance (i1 Tporrrj) is a movement contrary to nature suggesting the failure to obtain the cause. For
deviance, in my estimation, is nothing other than a decline in and a falling from our natural activities.' Ep. 6
(PG 91.432AB). In the second: 'Every creature is a composite of essence (oucrias) and accident
(oupPE(3rk6T05) and in constant need of divine providence since it is not free from mutability (rporms).'
Car. 4.9. Also Arnb.Io. 15 (PG 91.1220C); Sherwood, Ear&er Ambigua, 193-196.
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Maximus' lengthy analysis of the phrase provides the setting for him to introduce the
doctrine of the logoi, a 'complex, polysemantic, and rich concept which goes back to the
early theology of the Apologists...." In Maximus' cosmology the logoi are hidden unifying,
ordering, and defining principles deeply imbedded in the very substructures of creation. A
thing's being — what it is - is determined by its logos, by what God intends it to be. As
constitutive of relation and definition, the logoi define the essential qualities and purpose of
creaturely being and at the same time disclose the divine Word and Wisdom operative
within the cosmic economy. Quoting the Areopagite, Maximus calls them
`predeterminations' (Trpooptopoi) or 'divine intentions' (eila eEkripaTa) according to
which God has created and knows the things that are.' Together with Maximus' use of
the Neoplatonist philosophical logic of union and distinction, the doctrine of the logoi
demonstrates how created nature can at the same time participate in God at the level of
being, well-being, and eternal being without there ever being a confusion of essences
between God and creation, or between different species of creatures.
The next section of An/big/von 7 presents a crucial argument for us at this point, for
it relates directly to the structure of deification, and carries over into Maximus' remarks on
the nature and function of the body in relation to the soul. He begins with a syntactically
awkward passage in which he says that while one must acknowledge the difference between
individual logoi on the one hand, and the difference between all the logoi and God the Logos
on the other, they are one in an indivisible and unconfused way because the logoi have their
130 Maximus says this much with specific reference to the human nature of Christ in DP (PG 91.297A —
300A).
131 Florovsky, The Byzantine Fathers of the Sixth to Eighth Century, 223.
132 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1085AB). Cf. Dion.Ar.De div.nom. 5.8 (Corpus Dionysiacum I, 188.6-10): We say that the
pre-existent logoi are paradigms.... Theology calls them predeterminations, divine and good intentions that are
determinative and creative for beings. According to them the transcendent one predetermined everything that
is and brought it into being.'
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source of existence in the Logos, and thus, ultimately, also their teleological consummation
in him. The strongly biblical provenance of Maximus' thinking is striking:
Who - knowing that God by his Word and Wisdom brought into being from non-being
the things that are (Wis 9:1-2), if he should wisely direct the contemplative faculty of the
soul to the infinite difference and diversity of natural beings, and by rational enquiry
distinguish conceptually the principle (logos) according to which they were created — who [,
I say,] will not see that the one Word (logos), while being distinguished from created things
by an indivisible difference on account of their unconfused particularity with themselves
and one another (61e(TTjV al1TWV 711305 dÄXT1À0( TE Kai iain-a clatiyxu-rov 15(6-up-a),
is [in fact] many logoi? And again, [who will not see that] the many logoi are one Word, who
by referring all things to himself (Tb TrpOs a l'JTOV TrdnVTCOV d(vackopCx) exists for
himself without confusion, and who is essentially and actually God the Word of God the
Father, the beginning and cause of the universe, Ig whom all things were created in heaven and on
earth, whether visible or invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers — all things have
been created from him and through him and for him?133
The doctrine of the logoi articulates the double reality of the simultaneous
distinction and relation between God the Logos and the manifold created beings. For every
species or category of created being — whether visible or invisible, angel or human — there
is a corresponding logos or divine rationale that determines its nature - determines and
qualifies, that is, 'what' that thing is.' Maximus states repeatedly that creation takes place
'in accordance with them' (Kocr' airroUs). 135 As both ontologically and chronologically
133 An/b.b. 7 (PG 91.1077C — 1080A). The biblical passage is a conflation of Colossians 1:16 and Romans
11:36.
134 And thus, we could add, 'for what' a thing is, since the logos of a thing encloses both nature and function.
135 Eg. Amb.lo. 7 (PG 91.1080A).
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prior, they 'pre-exist in God' — not as subsistent realities, but as ideas or principles of God's
design and intent. All created beings, therefore, participate in God insofar as they have
being from him. More specifically it can be said, though, that 'every intellectual and rational
being, angel or human, by means of the very logos according to which it was created - which
is in God and with God, is called and is a portion of God, because its logos pre-exists in
God.' 136 'Surely then' Maximus affirms, `if it moves in accordance with its logos and comes
to be in God, ... and if it wills and yearns to attain nothing else in preference to its own
origin, then it will not fall away from God, but rather, in straining towards him, actually
becomes God and is fittingly said to be a portion of God by its participation (Tr71-.,.. put-6)(u v) in
God.'"7
This argument represents deft work, since by it Maximus does not simply negate
the Origenist doctrine of pre-existence, but reworks it, giving sense and scope to material
diversity, and situating the ground and goal of creaturely being firmly and immutably in
God's eternal purpose. Maximus' logology builds upon the orthodox discernment of
difference and relation between God and creation: God's eternity lies at the level of
actuality. Creation's eternity, guaranteed by the logoi, exists only at the level of potential.
Only when God freely creates something from non-being is that potential realised in the
form of being (ETvat). 138 While the logos of human nature does not suffer change or
136 Amb.io. 7 (PG 91.1080B).
137 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1080C).
138 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1081AB); also Amb.b. 42 (PG 91.1329C): 'And with respect to those beings whose
generation is in harmony with the divine purpose, their essential existence remains — unable to pass from
being into non-being. And with respect to those beings whose actual essential existence is unable to pass
from being after generation, their logoi are permanent and stable, having as their beginning the sole skill of
being, from which and for which they exist, and Ig which they possess the potential to propel themselves stab# towards
being.'
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alteration itself, it determines for human nature a dynamic course whose terminus (rr6pas)
lies in God. He is its ultimate Sabbath or 'place' of rest,'"
Every rational being (Xoyt K65), therefore, is 'a portion of God' by virtue of having
its logos in God. But this is only half of the argument. There is 'another way' of conceiving
Gregory's phrase - structurally identical, yet more explicitly christocentric. m Since the
Word of God, 'our Lord Jesus Christ, is the substance of all the virtues' — for the virtues
are his not attributively as with us, but absolutely — 'every person who participates in virtue
by a consistent conduct (Kae' 4tv Trayiav) unquestionably participates in God: 1 ' This
observation leads Maximus into a profound discussion arguably forming the heart of
Ambiguum 7 in which he outlines the shape of the Christian life in terms of the reciprocal
relation between God's incarnation and human nature's deification. In view of the
significance of this section with respect to the overall focus of our study, it will be worth
attending to in detail.
Image, Likeness and the Embodiment of God
We have already encountered the reworked metaphysical triad — about to re-emerge here in
verb form as yivErat — Kivt -rat —Ciri — connecting the dynamically-conceived, divinely-
purposed course of the logos of human nature to the triad being, well-being, and eternal being.
But now the connection is further nuanced with an important and central distinction in
139 'When someone comes to be in God, he will no longer move away from that place, since it is a state
surrounded by stillness and calm. Hence God himself is the 'place' of such blessedness for all the worthy, as it
is written, be for me God my protector, a strong place to save me (Ps 70:3).' Amb.b. 7 (PG 91.1080D — 1081A). Cf.
.Q.TbaL 61 (CCSG 22, 103.320-325), where the same text is quoted: Tor while God is not 'somewhere,' but in
an absolute sense is beyond every 'where', the foundation (n i5pucrts) of all those being saved will be in him,
as it is written, be for me God my protector, a strong place to save me (Ps 70:3).' See also Th.Oec. 2.32.
14° Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1081C).
141 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1081D).
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Maximus, suggested by the subtle difference between Genesis 1:26 and Genesis 1:27,
between image and likeness. 142 Having described the movement of the participant in virtue
from beginning to end as 'the praiseworthy course' (T01) TTa I vETOv SpOpov), he writes:
By virtue of this course he becomes God, receiving his 'being God' (TO esOs Eivat) from
God, having deliberately (TrpoatpoEt) added to the natural goodness of the image the
likeness through the virtues — through the natural ascent to and conformity with his own
beginning. From this point on there is also fulfilled in him the apostolic word which says,
for in him we live and move and have our being (Ac 17:28). For he 'comes to be in God' (yiviTal
iv T65 Oic-9. ) through diligence, having preserved uncorrupt the logos pre-existing in God of
being. And being activated through the virtues he 'moves in God' (Kivii-rat iv Tc7? eid5)
according to the logos pre-existing in God of well-being. And he 'lives in God' (Cu iv Tri)
Oic) according to the logos pre-existing in God of eternal being.143
By weaving into this course the added distinction between image and likeness,
Maximus weds ontological considerations to the course of the spiritual life, and, almost
incidentally, draws the conversation more deeply towards a treatment of the constitutive
place of bodily life in the process of deification. It may not be wrong to suggest that this
distinction, which holds a prominent place in select lines of the tradidon," 4 plays
142 Thunberg quotes Disdier, 'Les fondements dogmatiques de la spiritualite de S. Maxime le Confesseur',
Èchos d'Orient 29 (1930), 296-313, to the effect that this distinction lies at the heart of all Maximus' spirituality
(Microcosm and Mediator, 113). See also Wilke; Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens, 47-68, 88-101;
Larchet, La divinisation de l'homme, 151-164.
143 Amblo. 7 (PG 91.1084AB).
144 This interpretation of Genesis 1:26-27 can be found in Iren.Haer. 5.6.1; Clem.Str. 2.22; Or.Princ. 3.6.1:
'Man received the dignity of God's image at his first creation; but the perfection of his likeness has been
reserved for the consummation, namely, that he might acquire it for himself by the exercise of his own
diligence in the imitation of God, the possibility of attaining to perfection being granted him at the beginning
through the dignity of the divine image, and the perfect realisation of the divine likeness being reached in the
end by the fulfilment of works'; Diad.Cap. 89; Evag.MeL 12.484-485: 'That which is natural to man, is that
man was created in the image of God; what is supernatural is that we come to be in his likeness, according to
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immediately to Maximus' benefit in his concern to address the peculiarly practical problems
surrounding Origenist speculative philosophy. His appreciation and development of the
distinction between image and likeness is distinctive. As we observed in chapter one there
exists in Neoplatonic spirituality a concern to restore the beauty of the image of God in the
soul so that the soul may be likened to him.' The Fathers generally follow Origen in
pointing out that only Christ the incarnate Logos is the EiK.....r 4v TOU 0E66 (Col 1:15),
whereas rational beings (AorKoi) are created 'according to the image of God' - Ka-C E Kov a
eE(56. While for some writers image and likeness appear to be synonymous expressions
denoting rational beings' close kinship to God, there is another tradition reaching back to
Philo that draws a clear distinction between the two terms. So in Irenaeus we find
expressed at one point the thought that only the perfect (TAE los) human being, a tripartite
unity of body, soul, and (divine) spirit, is truly 'in the image and likeness of God.' Carnal
man, though retaining the image of God in the 'plasma' — the composite of body and soul -
remains imperfect until he receives likeness through the sanctifying work of the Holy
Spirit. Clement of Alexandria, perhaps with Irenaeus in mind, refers to 'some of our own
[teachers]' who divide image and likeness into divine gifts conferred in two stages. What is
according to the image is given at creation, and what is according to the likeness is given at
the future perfection.' And writing in the mid-fifth century, Diadochus of Photike
the word, "I have come that they may have life and that they may have it in abundance" [John 10:101....'
Trans. from the Syriac by M. Parmentier, Evagrius of Pontus"`Letter to Melania" I', in Everett Ferguson
(ed.), Forms of Devotion: Conversion, Worship, Spitituaky, and Asceticism (New York and London: Garland
Publishing, 1999), 289. The distinction is evaluated by Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 120-132.
145 Plotinus Enneads 1.2.1-7; 1.6.1-9. Plato (Theaetetus 176ab) equates the ideal of flight (()uyri) with a process
of 'likening [oneself] to God as far as possible' (opoicoats. GEG? KaTa TO (5uva-rOv).
146 Iren.Haer. 5.6.1; see further Adelin Rousseau, 'Appendix II', in his edition of Irinie de Lyon. Demonstration de
la Predication Apostolique (SC 406, 365-371).
147 Clem.Str. 2.22 (SC 38, 133.6-9).
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acknowledges that while all human beings are according to the image of God, only those
are according to his likeness who subject their freedom to him through love.'
Maximus inherits elements from all these traditions, but we find his conception of
the distinction between image and likeness to be all the more developed. This is amply
demonstrated in a response from the .„Quaestiones et Dubia, where the biblical topos presents a
specific occasion for comment:
Why does it say, Let us make man in the image and likeness of God (Gen 1:26), but then a little
further on it says, so God created man, in the image of God he created him (Gen 1:27), omitting the
according to his likeness?
To which Maximus replies:
Since God's primary purpose was to make man according to his image and likeness, and 'image'
means incorruption, immortality, and invisibility — all of which image the divine, he has
appointed these for the soul's possession, having also given it with them the self-governing
and freewilling faculty, all of which are images of the essence of God. But 'likeness is
impassibility, gentleness, patience and all the other characteristics of the goodness of God
which are indicative of the activity of God.
Thus those things belonging to his essence which display the fact that we are in his
image, he has given naturally to the soul. But the other things belonging to the activity of
God which indicate likeness to him, these he has left to our self-determining will (63
ijpeTpoc ocUTEoucric) yvc.i.'41ti) while he awaits the perfection of man — if man should
somehow make himself like God through the imitation of the divinely fitting characteristics
148 Diad.Cap. 4 (SC 5, 86.10-16).
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of virtue. That is why, therefore, the divine Scripture omits in the words following these
the mention of clikeness'.149
All rational creatures are made in God's image, since they participate in God's essence
(ousia). For Maximus, this is made evident in the soul's natural qualities: incorruption,
invisibility, and immortality. But the attainment of likening to God, humanity's goal, is
contingent upon participation in his goodness, which is indicative of his activity (enegeia).
This vocation necessarily involves the whole person - mind, soul, and body - in the
practical and social virtues: imperturbability, gentleness, patience and so on. Thunberg has
rightly recognised this holism when he points out that likeness to God in Maximus is
'consistently related to the life of virtues and the vita .practica.' 15° That humanity is created in
God's image is natural — it belongs to 'being'. But the acquisition of likeness to God
through ascetic struggle, correlated to the attainment of 'well-being', is a gift of grace
alone. 151 This goal of perfection (likeness, well-being) attained by grace and by the life of
virtue presupposes an incorporeal ontological foundation (image, being) by nature.
Maximus' thinking on this subject bears some affinity with another passage in Diadochus,
in which baptism is said to achieve 'two goods': the first restores a person immediately to
the image of God in which he was made; the second, which presupposes yet 'infinitely
surpasses' the first, anticipates the eschatologically perfected conformity to God's likeness
149 .0 III, 1 (CCSG 10, 170.1-20).
150 Microcosm and Mediator, 128.
151 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1345D): 'In the beginning man was made in the image of God for the indisputable
purpose of being born by the Spirit through free choice, and that he may acquire the likeness which is added
to it through the keeping of the divine commandment, so that man himself might be on the one hand a
creature of God by nature, and on the other hand a son of God and a god through the Spirit by grace.' Here
Maximus does not oppose nature and grace, as he makes clear in a passage in Amb.Io. 10 where the first and
third elements in the triad, being and eternal being, are correlated to the operation of 'God alone', whereas
the middle element, well-being, is said to depend on 'our will and movement'. It is well-being that holds the
other two together and makes them what they are (PG 91.1116B).
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through love — 'the fulfiment of the law.' 152 Much more could be said. For now we must
leave this topic until we treat baptism further in chapter five.
Returning then to Arnbiguum 7, we can appreciate now the significance of Maximus'
insistence on the cruciality of the practical life in the fulfilment of humanity's divinely given
vocation. Moreover, the attainment of likeness through active participation in the virtues
collapses the distance between this world and the next, between time and eternity.
Elsewhere Maximus says the same thing of human nature when, by grace, it is united to its
logos. Ultimately this only occurs at 'the advent of infinite rest,' when creatures come to be
'in God.' At that point, all motion related to temporal worldly existence ceases — or rather —
reaches its proper goal in `evermoving rest?' But here, such a person is said to have already
(195n) achieved immobility in God. Already  he is 'identical to himself [ie. to his own logos] by
virtue of the most imperturbable habit.' Such a person is 'a portion of God: he exists, by
virtue of his logos of being in God; he is good by virtue of his logos of well-being in God. He is
God by virtue of his logos of eternal being in God.' 155 Nothing distinctively different from
God remains visible in him, for 'he has placed himself completely in God alone, having
fashioned and formed God alone in himself entirely.' In Gregory Nazianzen's phrase, a
'wonderful exchange' has taken place in which as we have seen three distinct elements are
discernible: man has become God, God has become man, and God's deifying power has
become bodily manifest and accessible in the deified person himself. It is worth quoting the
passage again, this time in full:
152 Diad.CaP. 89 (SC 5, 149.1 — 150.17).
153 See further .Q.ThaL 65 (CCSG 22, 283.522 — 285.541).
154 Ambit). 7 (PG 91.1084B).
155 Amb.b. 7 (PG 91.1084B).
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The result is that he too is and is called 'God' by grace, that God is and is called man
because of him by condescension, and that the power of this exchanged condition is
displayed in him. This is the power that deifies (eEoiiGav) man to God on account of his
love for God, humanises God to man on account of his love for humankind, and which,
according to this 'wonderful exchange', makes man God on account of the deification of
man, and makes God man on account of the humanisation of God. For the Word of God
and God wills always and in all things to effect the mystery of his embodiment.156
What Maximus is here describing, it should be recalled, is not that historical
incarnation of the Word which took place in Christ. That proleptic event in time is
certainly presupposed. Rather what is being described here is an existential, bodily
theophany in the creature in whom has been realised the reciprocally proportionate and
simultaneous dynamic of deification and incarnation. The demonstrative, theophanic
character of this reciprocity is deeply significant, for it confirms for Maximus' monastic
readers that that most contingent and mutable object of creation — the human body - when
ennobled by deification, has been selected by God in his own good counsel as the primary
means of his self-demonstration in the cosmos, and thus the high point of creation's access
to him.
Reminding ourselves about the context of the discussion, we can see how it is that
Maximus interprets Gregory's affirmation that we are 'a portion of God.' What it cannot
mean is that we are divine by nature: God and creation are essentially different. Nor does it
imply that bodily incorporation involves a necessary fall from kinship to God. Yet it is clear
156 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1084CD). Other passages that express the reciprocity between divine incarnation and
human deification can be found in Amblo. 3 (PG 91.1040D); 10 (PG 91.1113BC); 33 (PG 91.1288A); 60 (PG
91.1385B); .Q.ThaZ 22 (CCSG 7, 139.34 — 139.48); 61 (CCSG 22, 101.285-296); 64 (CCSG 22, 237.780-791);
Ep. 2 (PG 91.401B; 91.408B); Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 32.97 — 33.106).
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on the other hand that material creation, being inherently mutable and transient, cannot of
itself possess any ontological stability. On its own it is less than real being. But that is the
point. Its ontological stability rests in God's will and purpose for it, and thus in its ordered
relation to that will. Kinship to God, expressed by the ontological fact that human beings
are created in his image, is fulfilled only through the attainment of likeness to God at the
moral level within the corporeal structures and limitations of human existence. These must
be transcended, but they are simultaneously the means of transcendence. The impermanence
of this universe drives us on to discern the proper purpose and goal of things determined
by their logoi whose diversity converges metaphysically and teleologically in the unity of the
Logos himself. Then, says Maximus, we shall 'no longer cling out of ignorance to the
movement that envelops things, because we shall surrender our mind and reason and Jpirit to
the great Mind and Word and Spirit, indeed, ourselves entirely to God entire, as image to
archetype.'' Far from motion corrupting the divine vocation of human beings, the divine
logoi are 'on account of their motion naturally adapted by the creator to help them reach the
goal.'m
 Commenting on Gregory's statement where he speaks of the welcome the worthy
will receive 'by the ineffable light' when they come to contemplate 'the holy and majestic
Trinity' that 'unites itself entirely to the entire mind,'' Maximus adds that such rational
beings have remained undiverted in their course, 'knowing that they are and will become
instruments (Opyava) of the divine nature.' 16° This instrumental function of human nature
in the divine plan is aptly illustrated by the instrumentality of the body in the life and
activity of the soul. Given the profundity of this passage, I quote it in full:
157 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1088A). This triadic structure of the human being (nous, logos, pneuma) in the image of its
Trinitarian archetype, which is found in Greg.Naz.Or. 23.11, also appears in Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1196A) and
,QD 101 (CCSG 10, 79.1 — 80.26).
158 i4mb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1088B).
159 Greg.Naz.Or. 16.9 (PG 35.945C).
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It is God entire who, in the way of a soul [with a body], has wholly embraced them so that
they become like limbs of a body adapted and useful to their master. He directs them
towards what he thinks fit and fills them with his own glory and blessedness, graciously
giving them unending and ineffable life — a life completely free from every specific
accompanying mark of this present life contracted through corruption - not a life
consisting in the breathing of air, or in veins coursing with blood, but God entire being
participated in by all: God entire becoming to the soul — and through the mediation of the
soul, to the body — what the soul is to the body, as he himself knows how, so that the soul
receives immutability (cirrpoiav) and the body immortality (fieavaGlav). Thus the whole
human being, as the object of divine action (13EoupyoUpEvo
the God who became a human being. He remains wholly human in both soul and body by
nature, yet becomes wholly God in soul and body by grace and by the divine radiance of
the blessed glory, a radiance appropriate to him, besides which nothing more radiant and
exalted can be imagined. 162
The repeated occurrence of the word OAos demands our attention. The 'whole'
human - soul and body — is 'wholly' subject to the activity of God 'entire' and so
experiences transformation to incorruptible life. Body, to be sure, is at the lower rung of an
ordered hierarchy which rises through soul and intellect to God. But maintained in this
proper taxis, it too is accessible to God as an instrument via the mediation of the soul. Here
16° Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1088AB).
161 This distinctly Dionysian word carries overtones from the liturgical sphere where it designates God's
efficacious activity through sacramental ritual acts. See further Andrew Louth, 'Pagan Theurgy and Christian
Sacramentalism', JTS NS 37 (1986), 432-438; Paul Rorem, Biblical and Liturgical Symbolr within the Pseudo-
Dionysian Synthesis (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute, 1984), 104-111. Also more recently Gregory Shaw,
Neoplatonic Theurgy and Dionysius the Areopagite', JECS 7 (1999), 573-600, who, while rightly arguing
against drawing a strict division between pagan and Christian theurgy, wrongly characterises post-Dionysian
Christian sacramentalism as purely anthropocentric.
S),161 is deified by the grace of
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we find Maximus expressing his commitment to the integrity of the body in union with the
soul which he holds in continuity with Leontius of Byzantium, the two Gregories, and the
fourth century physician-come-Christian philosopher, Nemesius of Ernesa. That this
markedly cosmological treatise should give rise to such a metaphor is not unreasonable,
for, as we mentioned earlier, among Christian writers the fundamental unity of the cosmos
was best expressed by the adoption of the classical understanding of the human being as a
cosmos-in-miniature (limpOs- KOopos). This observation provides us with an appropriate
moment to investigate further aspects of Maximus' anthropology - in particular his
conception of the soul-body relationship, since it is inescapably bound up with his
understanding of the hypostatic union, the Church, and consequently his whole vision of
reality.
Soul, Body and the Mystery of the Human Vocation
Among the Fathers, actual anthropological dualism, as it was perceived to exist in extreme
Gnostic circles,m
 was a rarity - even in the more rigorous ascetic systems. The Platonic
doctrine of the soul's pre-existence, however, which enjoyed sporadic Christian sympathy
throughout Late Antiquity, constantly held out the potential threat of a real dualistic view
of the universe. With some exceptions, the Fathers largely resisted this tendency. As we
noted above, Irenaeus envisaged O TEXEios avepcorros not as a purified soul, but as a
composite union of body, soul, and spirit created in the image and perfected in the likeness
of God.'" For Clement, the body is the soul's 'consort and ally' with which it is honoured
ioz Amu-0. 7 (PG 91.1088BC).
163 Such as the school of Basilides, described in Iren.Haer. 1.24.5.
164 Iren.Haer. 5.6.1.
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and sanctified by the indwelling Holy Spirit. 165 Unlike Clement, Origen maintained the pre-
existence of the soul, and while he could see the necessity of the body in God's restorative
economy, he does not find it constitutive of what it means to be hurnan.166
It is only with Nemesius in the fourth century however that we find a more
concerted effort to provide a rational and philosophically attractive account of the relation
of the soul to the body and the precise nature of the soul's superiority. Here we find for the
first time in a Christian author a clearer picture of the dual nature of the human being who
unites (alma in-OpEvos) in himself two distinct orders of cosmic reality: intelligible and
sensible, rational and irrational. In Nemesius' words, since man's being lies on the border
pEeopiot 5) between intelligible and phenomenal, it provides
the best proof that the whole universe is the creature of the one God.... God created both
an intelligible and a phenomenal order, and required some one creature to link these two
together in such a way that the entire universe should form one agreeable unity, unbroken
by internal incoherences.167
Nemesius' contemporaries Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa, who like him were
indebted to Origen for their spiritual anthropology, made much of this dual nature and
mediatorial function of human creatures. The Nyssene knew of humanity as 'a kind of
165 Clem.Pad 1.13.
166 Or.Cds. 4.65-66; 7.38. Yet Or.Cdr. 3.41 also has this to say against Celsus' disdain for Jesus' bodily birth:
We affirm that his mortal body and the human soul in him received the greatest elevation not only by
communion but by union and intermingling, so that by sharing in his divinity he was transformed into God.'
And on the necessity of (present) corporeality, Or.Princ. 4.4.8: 'Now there will always be rational creatures
that need a corporeal garment, and so there will always be a corporeal nature, the garments of which rational
creatures must use — unless someone supposes he can show by any proofs that a rational nature can live apart
from a body of any kind.'
167 Nemes.Nathom 1 (Morani, 3.5; 5.1-6).
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microcosm, enclosing in itself those very elements which make up the universe."68
 For the
Nazianzen, this understanding was wedded with his conception of two creations and the
tripartite structure of the human composite (mind-soul-body), clearly demonstrated in a
passage Maximus quotes in our present treatise, where he proposes it as the divine doctor's
clear explanation of the origins of humanity's genesis.
Mind (voi)e), then, and sense (aToerioic), thus distinguished from one another, remained
within their own boundaries, and bore in themselves the magnificence of the Creator-
Word, silent praisers and thrilling heralds of his mighty work (cf. Ps 18:2). But there was
not yet any mingling of both, nor any mixing of these opposites — a mark of a greater
wisdom and extravagance [that would be demonstrated in the creation of] natures. Nor, as
yet, were the whole riches of goodness known.
But then the Architect-Word, when he had determined to demonstrate this and to
produce a single living being from both invisible and visible nature, created man. He took a
body from already existing matter and breathed into it life from himself, which the Word
knows to be an intellectual soul and image of God. He placed this man upon the earth — a
sort of second great cosmos in miniature, another angel, a mixed worshipper.
The human being's mediatorial function as a miniature cosmos is expressed even
more forthrightly - though with even greater subtlety and insight - by Maximus himself in
the seventh chapter of his Mystagogia and most notably in the famous Ambiguum 41. In the
former, Maximus draws a direct parallel between the bipartite structures of the cosmos and
the human being. Just as the intelligible and sensible realms make up one cosmos, so soul
and body make up one human being, and 'by virtue of the law of the one who bound
168 Greg.NyssAnim. et res. (PG 46.28B).
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them,' neither of these elements, bound together in inseparable unity, denies or displaces
the other.' In the latter, he speaks of five divisions (St a ip g cnis) of reality: uncreated and
created, intelligible and sensible, heaven and earth, paradise and the inhabited world, male
and female. 171 'Humanity,' he writes,
clearly has the power of naturally uniting at the mean point of each division since it is
related to the extremities of each division in its own parts.... For this very reason the
human being was introduced last (goxaTos) among beings as a kind of natural bond
(citiv5Ecip85 Tic (immiKCis) mediating between the extremities of universals through their
proper parts, and leading into unity (Cis' in itself those things that are naturally set apart
from one another by a great interval.172
As these passages suggest, the human being's mediatorial vocation rests upon his
mediatorial structure. Specifically, soul itself operates as the mediating element between God
and matter, since it possesses faculties that unite it with both: a rational faculty to link it
with God through the intellect and an irrational faculty to link it with matter through the
senses.' Let us examine this 'internal' structure more closely.
Nemesius as we saw discerned the primary function of the human being as one of
holding in his psychosomatic unity the two realms of being together in unconfused union.
Neither the body nor soul, therefore, can entertain independent existence: 'the body is not
a living creature by itself, nor is the soul, but soul and body together: 1 ' Their union is not
169 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1093D); Greg.Naz.Or. 38.11.
170 Myst. 7 (Sotiropoulos 186.13-15).
171 Amb Jo. 41 (PG 91.1304D — 1305A).
172 Amb.Io. 41 (PG 91.1305BC).
173 Amb Jo. 10 (PG 91.1193D).
174 Nemes.Nat.hom.33 (Morani, 101.6-7).
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one of juxtaposition (Ka-ra Trapci0Eatv, TrapaKiio0a0 - like two dancers, nor of mixture
()Tams-, KEKpaaeat) - like wine and water.' Instead, citing the authority of Ammonius
Saccas,' Nemesius proposes a union without confusion (douyx6Tcos) resulting in a
single living subject, 177 with the soul remaining distinct as the intelligent principle of life,
activity, and movement. It modifies and masters the body, not the other way around. It
pervades the body without diminution, and is bound and present to the body in the kind of
relationship (cASs iV OXEGE t) by which God is said to be present with us — not spatially, but
relationally (065E TO1TIKC-15, «Axe( Ka-ra oxict(v). 178 Nemesius goes on to invoke the
union of the divine Word with his human nature as analogous to the sours union with the
body:
While God the Word suffers no alteration from his fellowship with the body and soul, nor
participates in their infirmity when sharing with them his own divinity, he becomes one
with them, remaining one just as he was before the union. This mode of mingling or union
is utterly new, for he mixes with them throughout yet remains unmixed, unconfused,
uncorrupted, unchanged, not sharing their passivity but only their activity.179
Nemesius' language came to achieve great prominence in the christological
controversies of the subsequent centuries — except rather than christology serving to
illuminate anthropology, as in Nemesius, the union of soul and body was used as a
consciously imperfect analogy of the union of two natures in Christ. Leontius of
Byzantium in the sixth century could be said to provide the most exacting, scientific
178 Nemes.Nat.hom. 3 (Moroni, 38.12 — 39.12).
176 The Alexandrian Neoplatonist — and, according to Eus.H.e. 6.19, teacher of Plotinus and Origen.
177 NemesNathom. 3 (Moroni, 40.10-12).
178 NemesNathom. 3 (Moroni, 41.15-19).
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application of this analogy. According to a fine study by Brian Daley - in which he
demonstrates Leontius' clear dependence upon Nemesius - Leondus' conception of the
union of natures in Christ and the union of soul and body in man 'rests at heart on a subtle
,
and elaborate conception of the dialectical 'relationships' (oxEcTE Is) that comprise and
coordinate the generic and individual levels of reality.' Critical terms such as physis and
hypostasis are, for Leontius, 'essentially ways of recognizing the underlying and ontologically
fundamental communality and distinctiveness of things?"' In other words, orthodox
christology's precise grammatical and conceptual designations serve to articulate the
mystery of identity and difference, a mystery particularised and demonstratively enacted in
the Incarnation.
As an heir to this intellectual tradition, Maximus freely draws upon both orthodox
christological insights as well as the dialectical logic of the sixth century Aristotelian
commentators to articulate his spiritual anthropology. In many cases it occurs specifically in
the context of his refutation of the pre-existence of souls through his insistence upon the
simultaneous coming-into-being (genesis) of soul and body as a single, complete human
subject. Soul and body are clearly of different substance (ousia) and definition (logos). Soul is
immortal, invisible, incorporeal; body is mortal, visible, and corporeal. Through his reading
of Genesis 2, Maximus is able to trace this difference in being back to two different sources
of being. Soul is constituted immediately from the divine and life-giving insufflation; body,
however, is made by God mediately from the objective matter of the body from which it
comes (dust, mother's blood). 181 Given these natural differences, two questions present
themselves for enquiry. First, how can two substances of opposing qualities be joined to
178 Nemes.Nat.hom. 3 (Morani, 42.13-19).
188 'A Richer Union', 252.
181 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1321C).
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make up (cirtoTEXiiv) a single, complete, unified species? Secondly, given their union, what
is the nature of their relation with one another?
At the forefront of Maximus' development of these issues lies the Aristotelian
'principle of relation' (O	 rrpOs T1 X0y05) ,182 which he explains applies to parts of a
whole that come into existence simultaneously to constitute a single species.'" The
insistence on simultaneous (pa, Opou) genesis thus becomes all-important, since if one
were to pre-exist the other, their gnthesis to form a particular instance of a generic species
(aepoyrros) would either involve a necessary alteration in substance or else imply the
endless perpetuation of reincarnation or reanimation. Both these (im)possibilides, which
dissolve the principle of relation, are rejected outright.' Maximus argues instead for the
composite nature of human being: the soul or body of a particular person, each as a part of a
whole, can only be considered in relation to that whole person:
For the soul is not said to be a 'mere soul' after the death of the body, but the soul of a
human being, indeed, the soul of a particular human being. Even after the body, it retains
by relation the whole as its own species ( gxe I ()c el505 allTiis TO OX0V Ka T(
OXEOlv), since the [whole] human being is predicated of an individual part. Likewise,— the
body is not said to be a 'mere body' after its separation from the soul, even if it is
corruptible and naturally returns to the elements from which it is constituted. Like the soul,
it too retains by relation the whole as its own species, since the [whole] human being is
predicated of an individual part.
182 Cf.Aristotle Categosiae IV.
183 Amb.b. 7 (PG 91.1100C); Amb.b. 42 (PG 91.1324A) et aL
184 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1324AB); Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1100D). Owing to an unfortunate misunderstanding of the
text, Thunberg (Microcosm and Mediator, 104) wrongly takes Maximus' rejection of the doctrine of
metempsychosis in this passage as a (positive) assertion of a perichoretic-like relation between body and soul.
185 Amb.Io. (PG 91.1101B). The language here is clearly related to Porphyry's tree of being (yivos — ii505
_ 6104)opa - i5lov – oup3EPTIK65): 'The higher is always predicated of the lower.... Thus, the individual is
185
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The inviolability of this relation (oxicrts) between soul and body in no way compromises
their substantial, natural difference from one another.1"
Since the critical point in this relation of parts — that which assures their ontological
permanence and indissolubility of relation - is directly related to their simultaneous genesis as
a complete species, the virginal conception of Christ and his bodily ascension into heaven
both serve as the archetypal examples!" On the basis of the virginal conception, at which
moment the divine Word unites to himself the whole human nature at the exact moment
the latter comes into actual being, the simultaneous union-genesis of soul and body as an
individual hypostasis is said to be brought about entirely by the will of God. 1" In other
words, there is no potential naturally inherent in either soul or body capable of effecting
and maintaining the union. Their simultaneous genesis and gnthesis is the free and sovereign
act of God. With Christ's bodily ascension and session, Maximus finds the foundation for
the assertion of the permanence of the soul-body relationship. Since Christ's body forever
remains a constitutive component of the human nature hypostatically united with the Word
in heaven at the right hand of the Father, Maximus deems it arrogant to infer that, 'with
respect to the advancement of rational beings towards perfection,... bodies will at some
time dissolve into non-being.' Who can think this, he adds, and 'believe also that the Lord
himself and God of the universe is with a body now and forever, and renders to others the
contained by the species and the species by the genus, for the genus is a kind of whole, the individual a part.
The species is both a whole and a part, a part of another and a whole, not of another but in others. The
whole is in the parts.' Porphyry Isagoge 7.13 — 8.2; trans. by Edward W. Warren, Potpry the Phoenician: Isagoge
(Ontario: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1975), 41. Thus species (as whole) is ontologically prior to
individual (as part).
188 Amb.M. 7 (PG 91.1101C).
187 The situation with Christ remains, however, still utterly unique, for the divine nature already exists from
eternity as the hypostath of the second Person of the Trinity, whereas the assumed human nature only comes
into being at the very moment of union. Obviously much here spills over into Maximus' christology,
something we shall be treating in more detail in chapter three.
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power to be able to advance, and who, as the author of universal salvation, ushers and
beckons all towards his own glory, as far as possible, by the power of the Incarnation, and
who cleanses the stains of all?" 89
 The Confessor is simply being faithful to the dogmatic
tradition which asserts that what is united to God is also saved. To be sure, the very reason
the Word became flesh was that he might 'save the image' and 'render the flesh immortal.'
'How then,' Maximus retorts in words that underscore the permanence of the soul-body
union, 'can what is saved be lost, and what is rendered immortal ciie?'"°
Soul and body, then, are necessarily and permanently related to one another by
virtue of their simultaneous coming-into-being as a particular human being — as parts of a
whole instance of a composite species. Even at death when they are temporarily separated,
each can only be spoken of in relation to the whole person whose body or soul it is. Their
union is established and maintained, as we noted, by the will and purpose of God.
Nevertheless, their natural differences remain, a fact implying that their relation to one
another will not be one of equals. The corporeal body, utterly incapable of self-sufficiency
per se, remains the instrument of the intelligent soul, for
the whole soul, permeating (xcopoiioa) the whole body, gives to it both life and
movement, since the soul by nature is simple and incorporeal. [The soul does this] in the
whole body and in each of its members without being divided or split up by the body, since
it is natural for the body to admit the soul according to the body's natural underlying
capacity to receive the soul's activity. Present throughout, the whole soul binds together
188 Amble. 42 (PG 91.1324C — 1325B). Also Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 98-99.
l89 Amblo. 7 (PG 91.1332C — 1333A).
190 Amb../o. 42 (PG 91.1336A). See also Q. Thal 54 (CCSG 7, 459.277-279).
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the members variously capable of receiving it in a manner commensurate with its
preservation as one body.191
In exploring this further, we are led back into the complex flow of Maximus'
explanation in Ambiguum 7 as to what Gregory means when he says we are 'a portion of
God.' By these words Gregory intended, suggests Maximus, not to explain the cause of
human genesis, but the reason for the bodily affliction attending empirical human
existence."' We recall from the context of Gregory's passage that that reason was related to
God's providential and pedagogical economy. The inherent weakness and contingency of
bodily life keeps us rational beings humble, 'lest exalted and lifted up from our high status
we despise the creator.' But keeping in mind Maximus' distinction between image and
likeness, it is also the means of our being likened to God. The rational and intellectual soul,
made in God's image, is capable precisely in its union with the body  of receiving likeness to
God. By the soul's 'intelligent provision for the lower part' (Ka Ta Si Till) imoTripovticnv
TrpOs TO Ucketp6vov TrpOvotav) — that is, by fulfilling the commandment to love
neighbour as self and its 'prudent care for the body' (ipckpOvcos Toi, oc.3paTos
dv-rixop yriv), and through its mediating to the body the indwelling maker and his gift of
immortality, it endues the body with reason through the virtues and appropriates it to God
, ,	 ..
VDIKE I CA)0a 1 eEcji) in such a way that the body becomes its fellow-servant (Op6SouXov).193
The result, he continues, in terms clearly echoing Nemesius' conviction that the unity of
man demonstrates one creator,
191 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1100AB).
192 Amb Jo. 7 (PG 91.1089D).
193 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1092B).
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is that 'what God is to the soul, the soul becomes to the body,'194 and there is manifested
the one creator of all who resides proportionately in all beings through humanity, and our
manifold and natural diversities converge into one. Then God himself will be all in all (1
Cor 15:28). He will have encompassed and given independent existence to all things in
himself, by the fact that no being will continue to possess motion that is aimless and
deprived of his presence. It is with respect to this presence and by our reference to the goal
of the divine plan that we are and are called gods On 10:35) and children (In 1:12) and body
(Eph 1:23) and members (Eph 5:30) and 'a portion' of God.195
Saint Paul's expression 'all in all' (Trdv-ra iv Tram) forms a natural focal point for
meditation, since it presents in exact wording what became the 'golden rule' of
Neoplatonism that accounts for the presence of causes in their effects: 'everything in
everything but in a way appropriate to each.' 196 Dionysius' way of expressing this notion,
reckoned by Perl to be his 'ultimate conclusion of the theory of pardcipation'197epitomises
the mystery of God's relation to and difference from creation: 'He is all things in all things
(iv Tram Trciv-ra icrri) and he is nothing in anything, and he is known to all from all, and
to none from any.'198 Nevertheless, it is important to understand Dionysius' words as an
answer to his preceding question, 'how do we know God?' That God is said to be 'all
things in all things' is primarily an epistemological assertion, or, more correctly, an exclamation
of praise. Indeed, the sentence that follows it more clearly states Dionysius' meaning: 'he is
194 The phrase is a direct quote from Greg.Naz.Or. 2.17 (SC 247, 112.14-15): 'iv' On-Ep icrri (DEO5
TOVJTO *uxri otopa-rt yEvrgat.
195 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1092C).
196 TTdv-ra iv Traatv, OIKE mac Si iv iKdaTc9; Proclus, prop. 103 (Dodds, Proclus: Elements of Theoky, 92.13).
In his commentary (254), Dodds mentions the possible Pythagorean roots of this formula, adding that later
Neoplatonism 'saw in it a convenient means of covering all the gaps left by Plotinus in his derivation of the
world of experience, and thus assuring the unity of the system: it bridged oppositions without destroying
them.' Note also the context of Dionysius' use of 1 Corinthians 15:28 in De div.nom. 1.7.
197 Perl, `Methexis', 75.
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known to all from all things and to no one from anything.' The fact that 'he is all things in
all things' is immediately qualified by 'and he is nothing in anything' reminds us of
Dionysius' overarching apophaticism in which any positive assertion of God and creation's
ontological identity is excluded, since any such possibility remains hidden in the inscrutable
depths of the divine Wisdom. So when in Ambiguum 22 Maximus refers to the ontological
fact of God's being 'all in all' — 'wholly in all beings in general and indivisibly in each
particular' — it falls within a rhetorical question in which the matter is regarded as an
impenetrable mystery.'" And speaking of the same presence as an ecclesially fulfilled reality
in Mystagogia 1, God's immanence 'all in all' is said to be a fact 'that will become apparent
only to the pure in disposition (povaiTaros TOis Kaeapcits -rip; Stdvotav
Opaeijourat).'
With Maximus' citations from Ephesians then we are reminded that all that he has
been saying about the relation of soul to body and parts to the whole — while steeped in the
theological and technical vocabulary of Neoplatonist metaphysics and Aristotelian logic -
stems ultimately from his reflections on the scriptural witness to the Church as the body of
Christ. It is as he develops this meditation further that we encounter yet another
interpretation of the phrase 'a portion of God.' The soul-body relation sits alongside
previously mentioned images of light-air and fire-iron, 201a11 three of which 'illustrate the
same metaphysical phenomenon.'' Each image exemplifies God's own theophanic
embodiment in Christ, creation, deification, and Church. The metaphysical structure —
determined by the union of uncreated and created in the one person who is the incarnate
198 De div.nom. 7.3.
199 Amb.lo. 22 (PG 91.1257AB).
zoo Myst. 1 (Sotiropoulos 152.4-5).
201 Ambio. 7 (PG 91.1076A; 10881)).
202 Pen, `Metheztis', 134.
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Word - is the same in each case. In each case too the illustrative interpenetration of soul
with body, light with air, fire with iron is mutual, but not symmetrical. Just as the natures of
body, air, and iron are wholly qualified by the properties of the more active natures of soul,
light, and fire, without any nature losing its distinctive properties, so too is creation wholly
penetrated by God the Word, who 'wills always and in all things to effect the mystery of his
embodiment. '2°3
Hereby Maximus affords us a glimpse into what is a deeply ecclesiocenttic cosmic
ontology. True cosmic being is fulfilled in the Church, the body of Christ, 'the fullness of
him who is filled all in all' (Eph 1:23). Christians are 'members' or limbs of this body, who
together, to use Irenaeus' favourite christological image ecclesiologically, are being
'summed up' (Eph 1:10) according to the Father's wonderful plan — hidden in him before
the ages (Eph 3:9) but now revealed through the Incarnation. The Incarnation proleptically
'maps out,' as it were, and actually performs in corporeal contours God's plan for the
creation and perfection of human nature by uniting the extremities of the cosmos in
Christ.' Using a cognate of the verb recalling his assertion of the fudty of our ontological
foundation in God (irriyvupt), Maximus describes how the Son of God, in uniting to
himself our nature, 'fixed us firmly to himself (iau -rc;?' crupmiap gvou) through his
intelligibly and rationally animated holy flesh taken from us, as through a first-fruit (65 Si'
ci -rrapxijs),' and 'in the way of a soul with a body, knitted and adapted us to himself by
203 See further Pen, `Methexis', 196.
204 See Amb.Io. 41 (PG 91.1308C — 1312B); and Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1333CD), where the incarnate Word, as
the author and perfector of our salvation, is said to have provided himself 'as a type and blueprint' (Ttirrov
Kat upoypappa) with respect to the attainment of virtue (cf. Greg.Naz.Or. 7.23). If there was to be a final
annihilation of the body in the scheme of perfection, it would have been effected beforehand in his own
economy.
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the Spirit.' 205 In Ambiguutn 31, Maximus expounds further his very Johannine
understanding of Saint Paul's ascription of the name 'firstfruits' to Christ (1 Cor 15:20, 23):
If, then, Christ as man is the 'firstfruits' of our nature with God the Father, and as it were
the leaven of the whole lump, and as the Word who is never displaced from his
permanence in the Father is with God the Father according to the designation of his
humanity, let us not doubt that in accordance with his petition with the Father On 17:20-
26) we shall be where he is as the firstfruits of our race. For just as having loosed the laws
of nature supernaturally he was made low for us without change — a human being as we
are, sin alone excepted, so also will we consequently come to be above because of him —
gods as he is by the mystery of grace — altering nothing at all of our nature. Thus again, as
the wise teacher says, 'the upper world is filled' - the members of the body being united to
the head according to their worth, each member clearly by its proximity in virtue
harmoniously receiving the position (e gatv) proper to it through the orchestration of the
Spirit and filling up the body which Pic all and is filled from all — the body of him who is
filled Ig all in every :Peg (Eph 1:23).206
Has this redemptive dispensation fulfilled in the Church always been part of God's
original plan and intent for creation? The affirmative answer to this question belongs to
Maximus' refutation of the Origenist cyclical schema in which the end of all things involves
a restoration to their pristine former state. Yet the monk has no love for simplistic
solutions that fad adequately to discern the inherently mysterious quality of God's eternal
will, let alone ones that ignore the great weight of biblical and traditional consensus. We are
not to understand his ecclesiological vision of participation in the body of Christ as
205 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1097B).
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something entirely other than, or additional to, his ontology of creation, where all creatures
participate in the being of God. It is rather its fulfilment. His articulation of the difficulty
here as elsewhere207 is achieved by the subtle employment of careful distinctions. And here
he makes explicit for the first time in this treatise a distinction that will in the next chapter
become crucial for our understanding of his christology: that between logos and tropos.
God's wonderful plan (Trav-r«yaeos aKorrcis) has never received anything new as far as
its original principle is concerned (Ka-rd TOv ov AOyov), but having reached its time for
fulfilment, che clearly introduced it by means of another, newer mode' (SI .320\ou
Katvo-r4Dou TpOuou).208
 The explanation that follows in which can be observed the
classical Maximian delineation of divine plan, human fall, followed by the newness of
divine restoration must be heard in full:
For God created us [to be] like unto himself by possessing through participation the exact
characteristics of his goodness, and gave us the means (tropos) which, through the use of
our natural powers, leads to this blessed end. But humankind voluntarily (iKouclicac)
rejected this mode by the abuse of its natural powers. Therefore, lest alienated humankind
move still further from God, another means had to be introduced in its place, one more
divine and paradoxical than the former to the extent that what is beyond nature is higher
than what is natural. And this, as we all believe, is the mystery of the most-mystical
dwelling of God with human beings (cf. Rev 21:3). For, says the divine Apostle, had the first
covenant remained blameless, no place would have been sought for a second (Heb 8:7). And it is clear to
all that the mystery that has come to pass in Christ at the end of the age is the
206 Amb..To. 31 (PG 91.1280C — 1281B).
207 Amblo. 42 (PG 91.1328AB).
208 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1097C).
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unambiguous demonstration and fulfilment of that which at the beginning of the age was
committed to the charge of our forefather.209
On this note we draw to a close a lengthy excursus through one of Maximus' greatest
expositions on the ontological foundations of bodily human and cosmic being. A brief
summary will bring together our final thoughts.
Having sketched out the principal tenets of sixth century Origenism, we noted that
the springboard for Maximus' refutation of problematic trends among his monastic
readership lies in a request for him to comment on a passage in Gregory of Nazianzen
which, given that human beings are 'a portion of God', the meaning of bodily life is
questioned as a 'mystery'. We were reminded that in considering the place of the corporeal
in Maximus' theological vision we are guided by the distinctly practical circumstances
towards which his philosophical articulation is directed.
Secondly, we found there to be two levels at which motion or change in the
cosmos must be considered. On the one hand, all created beings are moved since they have
been brought by God into being from non-being. Motion that is natural to created beings
leads them from non-being into being, and then on a path that leads via well-being to
eternal being in union with God. This is the structure of deification, creation's proper goal.
But on the other hand, empirical existence possesses a kind of negative instability as the
result of the human creature's abandonment of his beginning and source of being from the
very moment of his coming-into-being. Adam's material incorporation and his
transgression of the divine command are simultaneous. Hence the original mode (tropos) by
which humanity was to realise its divinely given pattern (logos) was interrupted and
209 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1097CD). See also Amb.Io. 31 (PG 91.1276B); 41 (PG 91.1308CD) et al.
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corrupted. The entry of evil in the form of deviation from one's natural course and the
experience of death is the complex result of devilish deception, the abuse of freedom,
deliberate choice, and the righteous judgement of God. The fall, through which human
beings 'have actualised non-being in themselves „210 is simultaneously moral and
ontological, but in that order, for it involves the irrational choice of non-being over being,
the love of dust instead of love for God. 2” Its ramifications are necessarily cosmological,
for fallen humanity lacks the means to fulfil its mediatorial vocation as the microcosm in
whom the disparate realms of the universe are reconciled and united. Left alone in such a
predicament, all material reality — the human body especially — can only be experienced as
the exacerbation of dispersal, disharmony, and dissolution. As Maximus summarises the
situation in Ambiguum 15:
All beings according to the principle by which they subsist and are, are stable and
unmoved. But by the principle of the things observed around them, according to which
[principle] the economy of this universe plainly is constituted and disposed, it is obvious
that all things are moved and are unstable.212
But thirdly, in spite of the fallen condition, history and creation remain the arena in
which is fulfilled God the Word's will 'always and in all things to effect the mystery of his
embodiment.' What is ultimately stable and real in the universe is determined by its relation
to what is assumed by the incarnate Word, for in Christ a radically new existence has
become manifest and accessible by which embodied humanity — and in it, all creation - can
attain its proper end and beginning. In view of Christ, human corporeality in itself cannot
210 Amb.k). 20 (PG 91.1237BC).
211 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1092C — 1093A).
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be a hindrance but is rather, in its rightful order, a constitutive, signal means of achieving
the creaturely goal of likeness to God, since in bodily humanity the divine glory finds the
organ for its manifestation and active presence throughout the whole cosmos. The
incarnation of God has as its reciprocal correlate the deification of man - a cosmically
sanctifying event and process achieved and perfected in the Church, the body of Christ,
whose members are parts and portions of God. Thus human participation in God as 'a
portion of God', a reality true of every created rational being, is fully realised only by
participation in the Word, the substance of the virtues.
This whole vision is expressed by Maximus by means of precise Neoplatonic
metaphysical conceptual terminology, shaped on the one hand by Aristotle's (horizontal)
analysis of nature in terms of its telos and function, and on the other by Proclus' (vertical)
theory of participation, both of which serve to transform the Origenist schema. The final
state cannot simply consist of a return to a former henad, since perfect participation in God
— 'who is by nature limitless and honourable, and naturally stretches to infinity the appetite
of those who enjoy him through participation'2" — precludes any possibility of satiation,
and infinitely transcends all temporal and spatial limitation. Deification is as endless and
infinite as its source. Yet it does not involve a universal assimilation of individuals into the
divine essence — the obliteration of essential difference and hypostatic identity — but the
utter transparence of all individnglity and human actuation in the light of divine activity.
This, according to Maximus, is the heart of Saint Paul's daim that God ultimately will be
'all in all' (1 Cor 15:28), a totality encompassing both intelligible and sensible reality. Precisely
how such a universal, trans-temporal cosmic vision can be regarded by Maximus to have
212 Amb.io. 15 (PG 91.1217AB).
213 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1089B).
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been achieved definitively through something as precarious as the particular, historical, bodily
life of Christ will form the subject of our next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
Corporeality and Christ
Christ bath took in this piece of ground,
And made a garden there for those
Who want herbs for their wound.1
We have seen in the foregoing chapters how manifestly Maximus' thinking on the place of
the corporeal in the structure of creation and revelation is dominated by the mystery of the
enfleshed Word of God. But if in doing so we failed to discern a marked, qualitative
difference between the Word's incarnate economies in Scripture and cosmos on the one
hand, and his incarnate sojourn on earth in the person and work of Jesus Christ on the
other, we shall find it to be otherwise when in this chapter we investigate more closely the
constitutive soteriological function of Christ's corporeality. It is an investigation that seeks
to understand to what extent divine passion features as the Incarnation's primary mystery,
and thus will necessarily lead us to ask what Maximus considers an acceptable, or indeed the
definitive form of orthodox theopaschism. For with the stark fact of the decidedly
contingent and material dimensions of Christ's corporeal life in time and space, Maximus -
along with his Christian forebears - comes face to face with the mystery of divine
passibility, a mystery that raises sharply the difficult question about the relation between the
utter impassibility of the divine nature — universally acknowledged as a theological axiom,
1 George Herbert, Sunday, 40-42; in Wall, George Herbert: The Country Parson, The Temple, 193.
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and the confessed reality of the divine Son's conception and birth, suffering and death 'for
us and for our salvation.'
Maximus is well known for his openness to overtly theopaschite language, even
though he lived in an ecclesiastical climate where the formal, grammatical relation between
orthodox and heterodox theopaschitism was still strained and unclear. Perhaps one of the
most striking examples occurs towards the end of his Mystagogia when he likens God to 'the
poor man' (Mt 25:40; Jam 2:1-13) on account of his salvific solidarity with the poverty of
the human condition. God's suffering is clearly not limited to his humble life in Palestine.
Taking into himself the suffering of each person in due proportion, God suffers until 'the
perfection of this age', and is said to be 'always suffering mystically out of goodness.'2 Yet
as this chapter unfolds it will become clear how even this profound appreciation of the
paschal contours of God's general economic activity is deepened still further in Maximus'
more specifically christological reflections in which he extends to economia the theological
distinction between logos and tropos, contemplates the perichoresis of divine and human
natures in Christ at the modal, hypostatic level, and emphasises in notably Cyrilline fashion
the all-encompassing, deifying power of Christ's 'holy flesh'. In the concrete bodily
sufferings and death of Christ Maximus encounters 'truly a passible God', the God who
precisely in his fleshly, passible kenosis has graciously demonstrated and wholly wrought the
deification of passible, bodily human nature.
There are other good reasons to pursue this particular line of enquiry with regard to
Maximus' christology. The greater deal of contemporary theologising, especially since the
systematic genocide of the Second World War, continues to be scandalised by the Fathers'
universal acceptance as a theological norm of what is largely disdained as an abstract and
2 Myst. 24 (Sotiropoulos, 238.4-8).
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largely irrelevant metaphysical principle of Greek philosophy, namely, the impassibility of
God. In the view of one especially influential theologian of the past half-century, Jiirgen
Moltmann, patristic christology and, as a result, all traditional soteriology, is corrupt almost
from the start by the Fathers' assertion of divine apatheia.3 As the argument goes, a God
who cannot suffer cannot love — nor can he save those who suffer without violating or
overriding the natural human condition. Moltmann's convictions run parallel to a whole
trend in modern theology (unconsciously?) indebted to process philosophy in which God
ends up necessarily subject to the evolutionary vicissitudes (and ultimately, the dark
nihilism) of the universe.4
Our scope here is not to engage directly with contemporary critical scholarship, nor
to negate that most poignant and critical difficulty raised for Christian theology by the vast,
immeasurable burden of human suffering, whose silent plea continues to rise to heaven like
the age-old cry of Abel's blood from the ground and Israel's lament 'How long?', and
whose full depths God himself demonstrates to have experienced definitively and
vicariously in the prayer of Golgotha, 'My God, my God, why....?' Dietrich Bonhoeffer
was far from capitulating to modernist sympathies when, whilst awaiting execution at the
hands of the Nazis, he penned the famous line, 'only a suffering God will do.' Rather our
goal is to show that for Maximus the theological problem presented by the hypostatic union
in Christ of divine and human, of incorporeal and corporeal, of impassible and passible is
subsumed under the status of that union as the dynamic crucible of human salvation, as the
historically actual fact that deifies the universe. God's real suffering as Christ, precisely
because it really is God the Word's own suffering, bears redemptive, recreative power.
3 The Crucified God, trans. R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1974), 227-235; The Trinity and
the Kingdom of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1981), 23-24.
4 See the literature adduced by Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 1-25.
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Thus Maximus calls the sufferings of Christ 'wonderful sufferings' because by virtue of the
hypostatic union their destructive character, in fact the whole 'use' (xpatc) of death, the
ultimate pathos, has been reversed. What his suffering and death take away from him — life,
honour, glory - are precisely by that very suffering and death given to us. 5 In and through
his particular sufferings, all human suffering — an ontological and theological more than a
•
psychological reality - is given potentially redemptive significance, in such a way 'that our
salvation resides in the death of the only-begotten Son of God.'6
We shall begin then by presenting a brief overview of theopaschism in the centuries
prior to our period, all the time highlighting its correlation to the dual question regarding
the integrity of Christ's corporeality and the integrity of salvation in his flesh. Then we shall
move on to examine Maximus' christology primarily as it is expressed in his Ambigua ad
Thomam, in which the question of divine (im)passibility figures as a prominent, even
overarching theme, and in which Maximus ventures upon a refined and increasingly rich
commentary upon difficult christological passages in Gregory Nazianzen and Dionysius the
Areopagite. Finally we shall turn our attention towards the two expressions from which the
title of this study is derived - 'holy flesh' and 'wholly deified' — by which Maximus
expresses his most mature christological and soteriological convictions in the context of the
Monotheledst controversy.
Divine Impassibility and the Corporeality of Christ
It has been argued, not implausibly, that the christological debates of the fifth century were
from at least one perspective a struggle over deep-seated efforts to defend and preserve
5 ,,QD 1.12 (CCSG 10, 143.1-6).
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undefiled the dogma of God's impassibility.' Throughout the patristic epoch, as G.L.
Prestige once rightly observed, it was 'invariably assumed and repeatedly stated that
impassibility is one of the divine attributes. Human nature, on the other hand, is passible,
because in men the rational mind is dependent on a fleshly instrument, and consciousness
is mediated through physical senses.' s Passibility, it was discerned, is specifically and strictly
linked to corporeality. And so while passibility must properly be denied of God on account
of his incorporeal nature, it is also bound somehow to feature in any realist account of the
Incarnation.
And indeed, theopaschite language with reference to the Incarnation was part and
parcel of accepted Christian nomenclature right from apostolic times. If it was true that the
Word who 'became flesh' and `tabernacled among us' was the same Word who in the
beginning was 'with God' and who 'was God' On 1:1-14), then surely it was not improper
to speak with Ignatius of Antioch of 'God's passion' (TO TRZeos Toii GEOV) or of 'the
impassible one who suffered for us': or of 'the living God who suffered', as we find with
Clement of Alexandria. 10 Yet this liberty in attributing passibility to God was by and large
explicitly limited to the dimensions of his saving economy 'for us' and did not extend to
the Father or to the transcendent divine nature in general. The same Tertullian who could
employ such theopathic language as 'God's sufferings' or 'God's blood' n - or even more
pointedly, 'God crucified' and 'God dead' — was to combat the Patripassianism of Sabellius
6 Ep. 12 (PG 91.468D).
7 John J. O'Keefe, 'Impassible Suffering? Divine Passion and Fifth-Century Christology', TS 58 (1997), 39-60;
also with specific reference to the Nestorian/Monophysite dispute, see Henry Chadwick, 'Eucharist and
Christology in the Nestorian Controversy', JTS NS 2 (1951), 158-162.
8 G.L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: SPCK, 2nd ed. 1952), 6.
9 Ign.Rom. 6.3; Ign.Pobv. 3.2.
io Clem.Prot. 10.106.4.
11 Cf. Acts 20:28.
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and Praxeas with devastating ire.' Origen too, while equally able to speak of divine
suffering, regarded it strictly as an economic, provisional reality, acknowledging with the
philosophers God's ultimate moral and ontological apatheia.13
In the earlier centuries one could afford to make theopathic expressions in a less
guarded manner, but later on in the face of Arianism when it became necessary to affirm
Christ's constitution as consubstantial both with the Father and with creaturely humanity,
and not much later again in the face of Apollinarianism and Nestorianism when it became
necessary to clarify the locus and identity of the acting subject in Christ, such overtly
theopaschite language was increasingly regarded as possessing questionable legitimacy, or at
least in need of careful qualification. At the same time, Docetism loomed as a continual
threat with dire soteriological consequences. Such tensions were undoubtedly felt by
Athanasius, for example, whom we draw upon here in two instances for what in the
ensuing centuries were to become representative issues in the christological debates. In the
first passage the relationship between the Word's assumed corporeality and passibility is
especially clear. It arises in his letter to Epictetus (ca. 372) at a point where Athanasius
opposes the view that the Word in himself was changed into flesh and bones. Rather,
[the Word] appropriated to himself what belonged to the body, as belonging to himself, the
incorporeal Word.... For the Word was present with the human body, and what it suffered
he referred to himself so that we might be able to partake of the Godhead of the Word. It
was a marvel that he was the one suffering, yet not suffering suffering in so far as the body
12 Tert.Prax. 1.5; 16.
13 See Thomas Weinandy, `Origen and the Suffering of God', SP 36 (2001), 456-460; Ronald E. Heine (ed.),
Origen: Commentary on the Gospel according to John, Books 13-32 (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America
Press, 1993), 29-32.
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which was his very own suffered, yet not suffering in so far as the Word, being God by
nature, is impassible.14
It does not follow, however, that one should reduce the respective actions of Christ —
miracles or sufferings - to either his divine or his bodily nature. Thus in our second passage
we find Athanasius writing to Serapion:
[Christ's acts] did not occur in dissociation, along lines governed by the particular quality of
the various acts — as though the actions pertaining to the body took place apart from the
divinity, or the acts pertaining to the divinity took place apart from the body. Rather they
all occurred interconnectedly, and it was one Lord who did them all paradoxically by his
own grace.15
In the wake of Nestorianism, Athanasius' emphasis upon the 'one Lord' who is
both impassible and passible and whose actions occur `interconnectedly' was reaffirmed in
Cyril of Alexandria's third letter to Nestorius read at the Council of Ephesus (431) when it
decreed that one should attribute 'all the expressions in the Gospels to the single person,
the one incarnate hypostasis of the Word.' 16 While the `Antiochene' conception (as it has
been dubbed, somewhat injudiciously) of two coincidental subjects which together make
up 'Christ' had the advantage of clarity, as well as of preserving intact the impassibility of
the divine nature, Cyril's characteristic emphasis upon the singular subject — 'the one
incarnate nature of God the Word' oiia Alr i'JC7 I s TO1J ®eo, AOyou cncrapKcop g vn) — held
14 Epirtula ad Epictetum 6; trans. John A. McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Contmverry, Its
History, Theology and Texts (Leiden/New York/Cologne: E.J. Brill, 1994), 384.
15 Epirtola ad Serapionem 4.14 (PG 26.657A).
16 Schwartz, ACO 1.1.1, 38.21-22.
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more closely to both the biblical witness and the creed of Nicaea, at the same time
possessing greater accessibility and pastoral depth. In general the Cappadocians were
careful in their use of theopaschite language, 17 though in a more rhetorical flourish Gregory
Nazianzen could speak pointedly of our need for 'a God made flesh and put to death', and
went so far as to use an expression — in vogue today since Luther — also found in a fifth
century apocryphal source: 'crucified God' (iuraupOpEvos 0E65).18
Despite Nestorian accusations to the contrary, Cyril was far from wanting to teach
NorraEicx, that is, from ascribing real passibility to the divine nature. 19 'The Godhead is
impassible', he wrote in his second letter to Nestorius, 'because it is incorporeal.'
Nevertheless, acknowledgement of the real suffering of the incarnate Word — whether
'impassibly', 'economically', 'by appropriation', or 'in the nature of his flesh''' — as a
necessary corollary of his corporeal and fully human existence, became through Cyril's
influence a primary touchstone of orthodox christology, as the famous twelfth anathema at
the very end of his provocative third letter to Nestorius makes abundantly clear:
17 For a brief analysis of Cappadocian christology, see CCT, 1, 367-377.
18 Acta Philippi 6.7 (CCSA 11, 189.14-15). On Gregory, see John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought
(New York: St Vladirnir's Seminary press, 1987), 71.
19 'The Antiochenes believed that Cyril allowed the human pathos of Jesus to touch the godhead and thereby
to compromise God's impassible nature.' O'Keefe, 'Impassible Suffering?', 50. Cyril counters such
accusations to Succensus: 'They do not understand the economy and make wicked attempts to displace the
sufferings to the man on his own, foolishly seeking a piety that does them harm. They try to avoid confessing
that the Word of God is the Saviour who gave his own blood for us, and say instead that it was the man Jesus
understood as separate and distinct who can be said to have achieved this. To think like this shakes the whole
rationale of the fleshly economy, and quite clearly turns our divine mystery into a matter of man-
worshiping.' From Second Letter to Succensus, 4 (McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria, 362).
20 arraeEs yap TO ()Cloy, (ST( Kai aa(opaTov (Schwartz, ACO I.1.i, 27.16).
21 McGuckin, St. Cyril of Akxandria, 202.
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If anyone does not confess that the Word of God suffered in the flesh, was crucified in the
flesh, and tasted death in the flesh, becoming the first-born from the dead, although as
God he is life and life-giving, let him be anathema.22
Just as the soul, which is inherently impassible, appropriates as its own the pain of the body
with which it is united, so too can it be said that the enfleshed Word 'suffered impassibly'
(g -rra0Ev eara6635) the weaknesses inherent to the human condition. It was precisely this
form of theopaschism that formed the 'key element' of his 'basic soteriological intuition.'24
Cyril's insistence upon the paradoxical and mysterious character of the coexistence
of impassible and passible in one Christ secured his place as the christological champion of
both the Greek orthodox and Monophysite traditions. Still, the very real ecclesiastical
divisions aroused in the fifth century christological debates involving the question of divine
passibility were not healed when more than five hundred bishops met together in the
basilica of Saint Euphemia to decide the matter at the Fourth Ecumenical Council in
Chalcedon (451). In actual fact they were exacerbated. For a great number of especially
Palestinian bishops, Pope Leo's formulation, officially ratified during the Council,
represented a move away from Cyril and the Nicene creed and a capitulation to the evils of
Nestorianism:
For each form, in communion with the other, performs the acts which are proper to it: the
Word, that is, performing what belongs to the Word, and the flesh carrying out what
22 McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria, 275. It is worth noting that on account of its wariness of theopaschite
language, Chalcedon gave synodical status to Cyril's second letter to Nestorius but not this his third
containing the twelfth anathema. It had to wait until the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553 to receive sanction.
23 Scholium 8 (McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria, 300-301).
24 Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, 70.
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belongs to the flesh. The one [form] shines out in miracles, the other succumbs to
injuries.25
At first glance, what Leo is saying is just what Cyril, following Athanasius, had excluded:
the strict reduction of Christ's actions reported in the Gospels to one or the other nature.
The crucial, redeeming phrase is his qualification cmn communion with the other', a phrase
whose hidden but abiding influence came to especially clear light with Maximus himself
and his understanding of perichoresis. It was not enough, however, to convince many Eastern
bishops who considered Leo's letter to Flavian, and eventually with it, the whole thrust of
the Synod, to be far from the more direct theopaschism of Cyril and the previous conciliar
tradition. In the ensuing controversy between Chalcedonian and non-Chalcedonian
factions, both parties attached importance to the identity of the subject of various
theopaschite formulae, the adverbial qualifications appending them, and the ascription of
both divine and human actions (miracles and sufferings) to a single acting subject. Despite
the initial wariness displayed by strict Chalcedonians to overtly theopaschite language,
theopaschism increasingly came to figure as the corollary of the realist incarnationalism
they themselves were seeking to uphold. For example, the monk Leontius of Byzantium,
whose christology is often characterised as somewhat dry, abstract, formal and scholastic,
and who has suffered both in ecclesial and intellectual history through his having been
labelled with the incriminatory title `Origenist',26 found it necessary to invoke the fact that
25 Leo.Tom. 4 (Schwartz, ACO II.2.i, 28.12-14): Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium est..
Verbo scilicet operante quod Verbi est, et came exsequente quod carnis est. Unum ,horum coruscat miraculis, akird succumbit
The Greek translation (Schwartz, AGO II.1.i, 14.27 — 15.1) runs: Evepyei ,yap sKa-rspa popclni uiTa
ea-rspou Koivcovias OTTE0 Y510V gq;11KEV, TOU iv Aoyou KaTspyaousvou -roue orrip , E0T11/ TOU
A0yOU, TOVJ Si auipaTos. EKTEAOIJVTOC amp i0TIV TOil maim-roc, Kai TO usv carrcZy StaAauTrit TOls.
eaupaattr, TO Si Tdis. UPpECJIV UTTOTT6TTTCOKEV.
26 See the evaluation of Daley, 'The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium', 333-369. Also CCT, 2.2, 185-229.
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the incarnate Word 'can never be considered apart from his body'." To his mind, they are
'atheists' who assert the impassibility of the Word 'against Christ' (Ka-re( TO6 XptoTO1);28
they fail to appreciate what the Fathers mean when the latter speak of 'God's blood, cross,
suffering, and death....'29 And Leontius of Jerusalem, by emphasising the Chalcedonian
distinction between physis and hypostasis, was able more successfully than his Byzantinian
namesake to locate the ego of Christ, to whose divine nature has been united a 'passible
essence' (otioiav rraOri Trjv) with all its fully human idiomata, at the hypostatic leve1.30
It was in connection with the Church's lex orandi in particular that marked efforts
took place in an attempt to secure ecclesial unity under the rubric of faithfulness to the
Cyrilline-Chalcedonian tradition. Three phases can be identified. The first revolved around
the addition of the phrase 'who was crucified for us' to the Trisagion hymn of the liturgy
by Peter the Fuller of Antioch in the 470s, so that it was sung, 'Holy God, holy and mighty,
holy and immortal, thou who ;vast crucified for us, have mercy on us.' Interpreted
christologically, the hymn could be regarded as entirely orthodox, as Severus of Antioch
argued in the last of his 125 cathedral homilies. But when in 510 visiting Antiochene
monks introduced the addition to Constantinople where the hymn was customarily
addressed not to the Son but to the holy Trinity, it was suspected as Monophysite and
subsequently (by 518) rejected.31
The second phase revolved around the formula 'one of the Trinity... was
incarnate.' In an expression of genuine diplomatic concession Emperor Zeno used this
formula in his Henotikon (482) to win the Monophysites over to an acceptance of
27 Contra Nestorianos et Eubichianos (PG 86.1281A).
28 Dialogos contra Aphthardocetas (PG 86.1321CD).
29 Dorehensio et triumphus super Nestorianos 41 (PG 86.1380A).
30 Quoted by Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, 77-79; CCT, 2.2, 271-312.
31 See CCT, 2.2, 254-259.
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Chalcedon. In it both 'the miracles and the sufferings' are ascribed to 'the one person.'32
But not only did this 'instrument of unity' fail to reconcile the Monophysites; it precipitated
schism with Rome, for, among other things, it presented a formula esteemed highly by
such vehement anti-Chalcedonians and anti-Leonines as Severus of Antioch?'
The third phase revolved around forms of what is more strictly regarded as the true
theopaschite formula, 'one of the Trinity suffered/was crucifled/died.' m Promoted in the
capital from 519 by the so-called Scythian monks and their leader John Maxentius as a
confession to unite divided Chalcedonians and to consolidate Chalcedon in an anti-
Nestorian direction, the formula eventually won the support of Emperor Justin I's nephew
Justinian. Attempts to gain approval of the formula from Pope Hormisdas (514-523)
during Justin's reign proved unsuccessful, but in 533 Rome finally gave it sanction.
Justinian's enthusiasm for the theopaschite formula was so great that from the time he
became sole Emperor (527), no official christological document omitted its confession?'
Its establishment as an integral confession in the Constantinopolitan liturgy in 535 with the
qualifying word aapKi ('in the flesh') was strengthened in 553 by the strongly Cyrilline
tenth canon of the Fifth Ecumenical Council:
If anyone does not confess that our Lord Jesus Christ who was crucified in the flesh is true
God and Lord of glory and one of the holy Trinity, let him be anathema.
32 A detailed study of the Henotikon and its significance, with an English translation, can be found in CCT, 2.1,
247-317.
33 Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, volume 1, 274-275.
34 For historical background and a translation of the text, see John A. McGuckin, 'The "Theopaschite
Confession" (Text and Historical Context): A Study in the Cyrilline Reinterpretation of Chalcedon', JEH 35
(1984), 239-255.
35 CCT, 2.2, 338. For the affairs of the Scythian monks, see CCT, 2.2, 320-343.
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Justinian likewise underscored the singularity of subject in Christ when he insisted
that 'the wonderworker' and 'the sufferer' are not different subjects, but 'one and the same,
our Lord Jesus Christ, the enfleshed Word of God made man.' m By his influence the
ascription of both the miracles and the sufferings to 'one person', which we observed
above in Zeno's Henotikon, was confirmed by the Fifth Council's third canon.
Justinian's genius in trying to secure a theological basis for ecclesial unity can only
be considered remarkable, for both the recognition that 'one of the Trinity suffered (in the
fleshy and that 'both the miracles and sufferings are of the one person' were insights which
could be affirmed by Severans and Chalcedonians alike. Yet it could also be argued that it
was precisely this common commitment to a generic Cyrilline theopaschism that obscured
still-unresolved questions regarding the relationship between the divine subject, God the
Word, and his human activity, manifest chiefly under the form of passivity. Whence did
this activity-as-passivity spring? Was it a soteriological necessity, an essential facet in the
whole divine economy in the flesh? Or was it incidental — a metaphysical accident, a
temporary concession purely limited to the phenomenological, pedagogical plane? Did the
theopaschite formula sufficiently preserve the essential dogmatic structure in which the
mystery of Christ is comprehended only within a trinitarian, theological framework in such
a way that the permanently theological character of christology, canonised in the creed, was
safeguarded? Or did it risk blurring the distinction between theologia and economia, or even
collapsing both into soteriology? Let us turn now to Maximus and see if we cannot suggest
some answers to these perplexing questions.
36 justri.Conf: (PG 86.995CD).
153
Passible God against sin, or: Truly a Suffering God
The Ambigua ad Thomam present themselves as an especially rich and important source of
material with which to explore the place of the corporeal in Maximus' christology. Written
as they were about mid-career in his life (tnid-630s),' they provide clear indications of
Maximus' emerging opposition to Monenergism, and represent mature reflections on the
normative christological traditions — subsequent to his careful elaboration of an anti-
Origenist philosophical theology (Ambigua ad Ioannem 6-71), yet before his full-scale
engagement in the Monotheletist controversy sparked by the promulgation of the imperial
Ekthesis in late 638. 38 Their insertion as a kind of shorter prologue to the much longer
earlier Ambigua, an ordering possibly appropriated by Maximus himself,' suggests that the
Confessor accorded them a theological priority over the whole of the Ambigua, thereby
underlining their interpretive function in the light of the earlier, larger set. By situating such
an explicit theological and christological group of chapters at the head of a work more
37 Following Sherwood, Annotated Date-List, 39.
38 We recall that around 634 Maximus had indicated that an orthodox interpretation of 'one enegeicl , one of
the two phrases outlawed by Sergius in the P.aphos drawn up in response to the Alexandrian Pact of Union and
the protests of Sophronius (633), was possible in a qualified way (Ep. 19 [PG 91.592BC]; Opusc. 9 [PG
91.132C]). For Maximus, Pope Honorius' response to Sergius - in which the pontiff speaks of 'one will in our
Lord Jesus Christ', is ambivalent about the legitimacy of formulae isolating either one or two activities, and
sanctions strongly theopaschite language - is likewise capable of an orthodox reading. But only with the
promulgation of the Ekthesis in October 638, a document drafted by Patriarch Sergius and signed by Emperor
Heraclius, does Maximus begin openly to oppose Monotheletism. For Maximus, the Ekthesir' rejection of two
wills and two activities in Christ indicates a clear departure from Chalcedon's confession of one Christ 'from'
and 'in' two natures. Interestingly, however, in continuity with the Cyrilline-Chalcedonian tradition the
Ekthesis affirms in an explicitly anti-Nestorian polemic the passibility of the one, incarnate divine subject, to
whom the miracles and the sufferings both belong.
39 This is at least Sherwood's contention, based on a reference in Opusc. 1 (PG 91.33A), where there is a
reference to the second of the earlier Ambigua ad Ioannem (Amb.Io. 7) as 'the seventh chapter.'
154
generally conjectural in character,' Maximus makes it clear where his confessional
sympathies lie.
And such a clarification may well have been necessary. For in his earlier refutation
of Origenism, Maximus was himself prone to think and write in such a way as to risk his
own reception as Origenise at another level.' As we saw in chapter one in material cited
from the Chapters on Theology especially, Maximus operates with an epistemology patently
rooted in Origen, in which, simply put, the anabasis of the intellect from the material to the
spiritual constitutes the dominant structural metaphor. It would be wrong to write this
epistemological structure off as hopelessly intellectualist or esoteric, for it was a complex
amalgamation of Pauline and Platonic strands which, over the course of several centuries,
had become recognisable as mainstream, as is evident for instance in the fundamental
themes of Alexandrian exegesis, Cappadocian spirituality, and Desert monasticism. It is an
epistemology marked not only by a wise acknowledgement of the potentially deceptive
character of empirical knowledge and the ultimate transcendence of divine realities, but
also a keen sense of the unity, order and purposefulness of the visible cosmos, and a deep
intuition for its capacity to disclose, albeit in shadows, invisible realities beyond itself.
Nevertheless, while there is nothing heterodox per se about this approach, it lends
itself to an interpretation of the Incarnation that, in the hands of those 'less well grounded
4° See Maximus' own qualifications about the conjectural (a-roxao-riKc35) status of his thoughts in Arnb.Io.
10 (PG 91.1193BC); 19 (PG 91.1236C); 21 (PG 91.1244B); 41 (PG 91.1316A); 42 (PG 91.1349A); 71 (PG
91.1412AB).
41 There are a number of polemical sources that associate Maximus with Origenism. One is the caustic Syriac
biography edited by Sebastian Brock, 'An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor', Analecta Bollandiana 91
(1973), 315, reprinted in Sebastian Brock, Syriac Peripectives on Late Antiquiy (Aldershot: Variorum, 1984).
Another, a Syrian Monophysite tract called The Herey of the Maximiennes by Simeon of Kennesrin and
translated by Guillaumont, Les 7Cephalaia Gnostica', 176-180, aligns Maximus with Origen, Theodore of
Mopsuestia, and Nestorius. A third source is evident in the record of Maximus' trial (R114 [CCSG 39, 29.225-
227]), where he is accused of 'enticing everyone to follow the doctrines of Origen.'
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in the essentials',42 threatens its integrity precisely at its primary point of significance. Any
unqualified emphasis upon a permanent transition in human apprehension from the flesh
of the incarnate Logos to his 'naked' (yu1Jv65) pre-incarnate form contains in itself the
potential to reladvise the whole of the economy of God's condescension and turn it into
yet another parable of God's universal immanence — a theophany perhaps quantitatively
greater than, but qualitatively no different from God's self-manifestation in the economies of
creation and history.'
One further implication of such potential reladvisadon is the debasing of
materiality and the denial of its inherent redeemability, a problem we discovered in the
previous chapter to be not at all incidental in the Origenist debates of the 6 th century. This
problem becomes all the more acute when we see the peculiar prominence in Maximus'
earlier thought of a Pauline text to which Origen took frequent recourse: 'If we once knew
Christ according to the flesh, we do so no longer' (2 Cor 5:16). For the great Alexandrian
this sentence virtually constituted a formal epistemological principle. As far we can observe
by examining his use of it — often in the context of commenting upon the Transfiguration
— it is clear he regards knowledge of Christ Ka-r« a«pica as an inferior 'first stage'
compared to a higher form of knowledge of him as he was before his sojourn in the flesh,
that is, as he was 'with God' in the beginning. He likens the former kind of knowledge to
Saint Paul's knowledge of nothing except 'Jesus Christ, and him crucified' (1 Cor 2:2),
whereas the latter is exemplified in certain biblical prophets and, above all, in Saint John
42 Sherwood, 'Exposition and Use of Scripture in St Maximus', 207.
43 Grillmeier suspects Evagrian christology of this problem by its being subsumed within an intellectualist,
non-empirical epistemology, in which the eternal (and ontological) significance of Jesus' humanity is
minimised. See CCT, 1, 377-384.
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the Evangelist." As we have seen in the first chapter of this study, the distinction is capable
of an orthodox interpretation when it is seen to mark the return from economia to theologia,
that is, when it is seen as a subjective shift in perception commensurate to the Word's own
pedagogical programme. One ceases to know Christ Ka're( adpKa when one perceives in
Christ the eternally existing Word without being blinded or scandglised by his bodily
condition. Gregory of Nyssa apparently understands the Pauline text in much the same
way,45 and Gregory Nazianzen can cite it in a passage with no uncertain incarnational
com.mitments." But John Chrysostom seems to have been aware of the potential pitfalls
posed by the text to intellectualist interpreters. He emphasises the fact that 'not according
to the flesh' means not that Christ is without the true flesh of his human nature, which
abides with him in glory, but that he is no longer subject to the affections of bodily nature,
such as thirst, hunger, weariness and the like. 47 So when Maximus in his earlier works cites
the text in apparent sympathy with Origen's interpretation, 48 it is no small wonder that
certain aspects of his epistemological method, viewed in isolation from his entire
chiistological vision, might be regarded with suspicion by those not even as maliciously
disposed as his Monophysite opponents.
We shall confine ourselves in the present context to suggesting that in the climate
of the impending christological debate Maximus may well have been conscious that his
epistemology required at the very least some critical qualification. 49 With the foundational
44 Or.Joh. 2.2-4 (SC 120, 224.28-29); Or-Matt. 12.37 (GCS 10, 152-155); OrJer. 15.6 (GCS 3, 130);
Or.Cantproi; Or.Cdr. 6.68; 7.39.
45 Greg.Nyss. 'Vbs. 2.2 (SC 119, 268.18-25).
46 Greg.Naz.Or. 30.14.
Homi# 11 in 2 Cor. (Philip Schaff [ed.], NPNF, volume 12, 332).
48 ,QD 29 (CCSG 10, 25.39-40); Th.Oec. 2.18 (cf. Or.Princ. 2.11.6); 2:61 (cf. Or.Ceir. 6.68).
49 We are far from reviving Balthasar's early thesis - which anyway he proposed `nur als eine Vermutung'
(Kosmische Litu,sie, 12-13) - of an Origenist crisis' in Maximus' career. To that we can bring Sherwood's
refutation based on his findings in The Earlier Ambigua, amply summarised by Thunberg (Microcosm and
Mediator, 10-11): 'It is [Maximus] terminology which is later more clearly defined and not his theology....
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christological narratives at stake, Origenist epistemology could only be admitted within an
interpretive context in which the fundamental dogmas of the Church — most specifically its
conviction regarding the mutually corrective function of christology and soteriology — form
the backdrop for an account of subjective human engagement with God as he wills to
make himself known.
So it is that we can plausibly conjecture that Maximus situates the later Ambigua
before the longer earlier Ambigua, since it sets down with dogmatic precision the lex credendi
whose primary historical form and locus had found expression in the theopaschite
shibboleth, unus ex trinitate passus est. Herein lies the definitive mark of all orthodox
theologising. It is in relation to this article of faith, in whose formal structure is compressed
the credal shift from tbeologia to economia, that everything Maximus has to say about
Origenism, monastic practice, and scriptural exegesis is to be understood. And more than
what Maximus has to say, for, as the Confessor himself would have it, it is the key to a
proper reading of the Fathers, who are bound to be misunderstood and abused unless the
realities of the Incarnation of the second person of the Trinity, as received in and
confessed by the orthodox, catholic Church, are taken into full account equally at the
metaphysical, soteriological, and moral levels.
Be that as it may, the shorter corpus bears features that signal its own literary and
theological integrity. It is for a start addressed to a certain Thomas, whom Maximus regards
M here is a very considerable degree of consistency in Maximus' theology from the first ascetic writings
onwards....' Next to this, and closer to our point, we may place the important insight made by Florovsky
many decades ago: 'St. Maximus to some extent repeats Origen.... But the Logos doctrine has now been
entirely freed from the ancient ambiguity, an ambiguity which was unavoidable before a precise definition of
the Trinitarian mystery.... [A]ll the originality and power of St. Maximus' new Logos doctrine lies in the fact
that his conception of Revelation is developed within Christological perspectives. St. Maximus is coming from Origen, as it
were, but overcomes Origen and Origenism. It is not that Christology is included in the doctrine of
Revelation, but that the mystery of Revelation is discernible in Christology.' Florovsky, The Bytantine Fathers of
the Sixth to Eighth Century, 216.
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as his 'spiritual father and teacher.'5° Thomas seems to have been a prominent figure
(Abbot?) in the Philippist monastery in Chrysopolis, and some years later (ca. 640)
Maximus addressed him a second letter in which he answered Thomas' invitation to clarify
some his responses given in the first set of difficulties. 51 Both the Ambigua ad Thomam and
the follow-up letter share with almost Maximus' entire auvre the character of occasional
works — responses to specific requests to elucidate difficult passages in the traditional
material.
The difficult passages in question are from the renowned Theological Orations of
Gregory Nazianzen (treated in Ambigua 1-4), and from the fourth letter of Dionysius the
Areopagite to the monk Gaius (treated in Ambiguum 5).52 On the surface, it may appear that
the first difficulty,D which is 'altogether free from allusion to Christology', 54 bears nothing
more than a formal relation to the difficulties that follow. In it the concern has been raised
over Gregory's use in two of his sermons of the verb milt) in connection with the divine
monad. How can it be said that there is any 'movement' in God? Movement implies three
things: first, passibility, that is, the fact of being a passive object, susceptible to the action
or causation of another. Secondly, mutability, since movement implies change or diffusion.
And thirdly, plurality, and for Gregory plurality involves opposition and corporeality.55
5° Amb.Th. proi (PG 91.1032A).
51 Epirtula secunda ad Thomam. The critical edition by Bart Janssens (CCSG 48) was not available in time for me
to consult in detail for this study. My analysis and references are based upon the introduction and text in P.
Canart, 'La deuxieme lettre a Thomas de S. Maxime le Confesseur', Byantion 34 (1964), 415-445.
52 It is noteworthy that Maximus himself accords both authors an equal status. Both are among those 'holy,
venerable and blessed men' who have received every outpouring of wisdom accessible to the saints' (Amb.Th.
proL [PG 91.1032B]). The teaching we receive from them we receive from Christ himself, 'who by grace
exchanged himself for them' (PG 91.1033A).
53 PG 91.1033D — 1036C.
54 Louth, Maximus the Confessor, 48.
55 Greg.Naz.Or. 28.7 (SC 250, 114.11-15): Tor every compound is a starting point for strife, and strife of
separation, and separation of dissolution. But dissolution is altogether foreign to God and to the primary
nature. Therefore there can be no separation, that there may be no dissolution, and no strife that there may
be no separation, and composition that there may be no strife. Thus also there must be no body, that there
may be no composition....'
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How can any of these exist in God who is 'without beginning, incorporeal, and
undisturbed'?"
In dealing with this difficulty, Maximus is preparing the ground for what he will say
in the four following chapters that treat the passibility of God in the person of the
incarnate Word. It cannot be incidental that a stricdy theological difficulty should be dealt
with first, before moving into christology. The application of trinitarian terms and formulae
to christology was considered by Maximus a key to apprehending the mystery of the
hypostatic union and the communicatio idiomatum. 57 Theologia here functions as an essential
prolegomenon to christology — and all the more so because the subsequent christological
difficulties involve the question of divine passibility.
Hence before Maximus addresses the immediate question at hand, he embarks
upon an elaborate but typical confession of the holy Trinity, clearly distinguishing between
the terms otiaia and UTTOOTaCTIC and their cognates." God is Trinity at the level of the
particular - hypostasis, and Unity at the level of the common - ousia. Neither fact is a
separate, self-evident reality, but is spoken of in relation to the other. Thus, 'the Trinity is
truly a monad, because this is the way it is (0T1 oi irrcos icr-ri), and the Unity is truly a triad,
because this is the way it exists CeiT1 OUTCOS 1:14)E0-111KEV), since the one Godhead is
monadically, and exists triaclically.'"
The Confessor goes on to relate this distinction to that between logos and tropos.
Logos has to do with 'what' a thing is at the level of being (ousia). Tropos has to do with 'how'
a thing is at the level of hypostasis — its actual state of existence. This distinction between
56 Amb.Th. 1 (PG 91.1036B).
87 In his dispute with Pyrrhus Maximus found it necessary to defend his application of trinitarian terms to
Christ (PG 91.348CD).
58 In Opusc. 13 (PG 91.145A — 149D) Maximus argues that the misconstrual of this basic distinction is at the
root of all the major errors in trinitarian and christological doctrine.
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'being' and 'existence' is not a distinction between abstract and actual reality, but a
grammatical, logical distinction between the universal, structural makeup of a certain nature
and its existential mode at the level of the particular and concrete. They are theoretical
terms expressing two distinct dimensions of a single entity. In this case, since the logos in
question is associated with the unknowable divine ousia, it is better understood as indicating
the 'fact' of being. Maximus goes on to use this distinction in the second step of his answer
that deals with how it is that there is said to be 'movement' in God:
But if when you heard the word 'movement' you wondered how the super-infinite
Godhead moves, [know that] the passivity belongs to us, not to it. For first we are
illumined about the fact of its being (TOV TOIJ ivat Xciyov airriis). Then we are
enlightened about the mode of how it exists (1-01.0 TOT./ 1T0)5 aUTTIV TpOTTOV), since
[knowing] that something is, is always conceptually prior to [knowing] how it mdsts.60
So while we cannot ascribe any passive 'being moved' to the triune God, we can speak of
movement in relation to the subjective acquisition and order of theological knowledge. The
movement of which Gregory is speaking, argues Maximus, refers to an epistemological
shift within us, itself specifically occasioned 'through revelation' (5t' boh,dvaEcos),' and
which leads us eventually to confess God as simultaneously one and three.'
59 Amb.Th. 1 (PG 91.1036C).
60 Amb.Th. 1 (PG 91.1036C). The rationale bears striking resemblance to Greg.Nyss.Tres dn. (GNO
56.17 — 57.7): We must first believe that something exists, and then scrutinise the manner of existence of the
object of our belief. Thus the question of existence is one, and that of the mode of existence is another.'
61 Amb.Th. 1 (PG 91.1036C).
62 The question of movement in God is also addressed by Maximus in the chronologically anterior work,
Amb.Io. 23. There it is clear that the first step in theological knowledge is 'the principle of unity', from which
one moves by illumination to knowledge of the mode in which such unity exists. Maximus follows another
line of thought in Greg.Naz.Or. 31.26, but going back to Irenaeus and Tertullian, in which there is outlined a
progressive order of revelation corresponding to the three eras of salvation history: the time of the Old
Testament in which God reveals himself openly as Father; the time of the New Testament in which was
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It is by divine illumination, consequently, that we move from the level of unity,
which in the order of theologia is denoted by logos, to the level of differentiation, which is
denoted by tropos. In the order of economia, however, the pattern is reversed. Unity in Christ
occurs at the level of tropos or hypostasis, whereas differentiation occurs at the level of logos
(ousia, physis). Epistemologically, the latter is arrived at by encounter with the former. The
reversal is of profound significance, for if hypostasis is 'the concrete, spatially and temporally
limited form in which the mind encounters intelligible or formal reality', 63 and therefore has
priority over universal or generic reality in the order of knowing, then christology will
always be first and foremost a markedly empirical science. It also means that whatever is
contingent in Christ — his corporeality, his suffering, his very particularity as a human being
with a name and a face and a history — is charged with revelatory, and thus soteriological
power.
If this dynamic lies in the back of Maximus' mind, how does it unfold in the
following three difficulties (Ambigua 2-4) in which he demonstrates a very real concern to
read Gregory's comments in relation to their textual and theological context? It was
precisely the more contingent, corporeal aspects of Christ's history that presented Gregory
and his audience with a theological dilemma. So with reference to the humbler actions
described of our Lord in Scripture, Gregory advised that his hearers
manifested the Son; and the time of the Church in which the divinity of the Holy Spirit is more firmly
established. In this way, says Maximus, the Godhead can be said to be moved 'by the gradual nature of
revelation' (Amb.Io. 23 [PG 91.1261A]).
63 As Daley defines it with respect to Leontius in 'A Richer Union', 248.
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ascribe the exalted things to the Godhead and to the nature that is greater than passions
and the body, and the more lowly things to the composite one who for you emptied
himself and was incarnate, or it is no worse to say, who became a human being.64
At first blush Gregory seems to be suggesting a capitulation to that reductionism
which in the preceding section we saw Athanasius before him and the tradition following
him had recognised as insufficiently nuanced to depict faithfully the mysterium Christi. Yet
for Maximus it is unthinkable that the divinely-inspired 'Theologian' could have been
straying toward the more `Antiochene' conception of Christ as a coincidence of two quite
independent subjects. To be sure, the distinction Gregory is drawing between 'the
Godhead' and the divine nature on the one hand, and 'the composite one' on the other, is
not the Nestorian division of Christ into a divine subject and a composite human subject
made up of body, soul, and mind. It is rather the distinction between the orders of theologia
and economia, between the Word as he is in his transcendent divine nature and the Word as
he is in the Incarnation — a 'composite' (ativerros) but single subject at once fully divine
and fully human.
Maximus, conscious of the need to read Gregory in context, proceeds by
paraphrasing the Cappadocian in terms of clear Chalcedonian logic and Cyril's kenosis
christology:
While the whole Word of God is complete ousia, since he is God, and while the whole
[Word of God] is hypostasis without defect, since he is Son, when he emptied himself he
became the seed of his own flesh, and having rendered himself composite by the ineffable
64 Greg.Naz.Or. 29.18; Amb.Th. 2 (PG 91.1036D — 1037A).
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conception he became the IDpostasis of that same assumed flesh. So by this novel mystery65
the whole Word without change truly became a human being. The same Word was a
hypostasis of two natures - uncreate and created, impassible and passible, admitting without
defect all the natural definitions [of the natures] of which he was a lypostasis.66
Composition, then, is built into the very reality which is the incarnate Word. But at what
level? And to what end? It is at this point that Maximus draws in a striking phrase from
Gregory's fourth Theological Oration — 'passible God against sin' 67 — by which the status and
function of Christ's suffering in the economy are given direction and meaning:
But if the Word admitted substantially all the natural definitions of the natures of which he
was a hypostasis, then, lest the sufferings of his own flesh be thought of as merely [human
sufferings], the teacher most wisely attributed them to him who became composite at the
level of hypostasis by the assumption of the flesh, and, since the flesh was his, to him who
according to it (KaT' co:rriiv) is truly 'passible God against sin.'68
Most importantly, what Gregory is doing is not dividing the single hypostasis who is Christ
the incarnate Word, but, according to Maximus, 'demonstrating the difference between
ousia, with respect to which even having become incarnate the Word remains simple, and
hypostasis, with respect to which he assumed flesh, became composite, and went about as
passible God in the economy.' 69 Because the hypostasis who is the incarnate Word is
identical to the hypostasis who is the eternal Word and second person of the Trinity, it is
65 While he resolutely affirms the consubstantiality of Christ's human nature with ours, Maximus concedes
the novelty and utter uniqueness of the mode of the Incarnation (Amb.Io. 7 [PG 91.1097C]).
66 Amb.Th. 2 (PG 91.1037A).
ee6s. TraOrir6s. Ka-ra -rijs cipap-riac (Greg.Naz.Or 30.1). See also Maximus Opusc. 9 (PG 91.120A).
68 Amb.Th. 2 (PG 91.1037AB).
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necessary to identify it in the economy as a 'composite hypostasis' — a term with a history
going back to the first half of the sixth century 70- not in order to indicate any change in the
divine ousia, which remains simple and unaltered, but to show that it is in very fact also the
hypostasis of the human ousia, which has no particular existence, no separate subsistence or
hypostasis of its own. The term 'composite hypostasis', along with 'God, passible against sin',
accounts for the incarnate God's passibility without falling into the errors of either
Docetism or idolatry, that is, worshipping a naturally passible, and therefore creaturely
God.
It remains for Maximus to qualify what he means, or rather, what Gregory means by
ousia. Here he is conscious of the Arian and Apollinarian errors, which 'both cut short the
integrity of the human nature of the Word, and make him to be passible divinity by
nature.' 71 Yet the problem is not only metaphysical, but soteriological. On it depends the
efficacy of the salvation wrought by the only-begotten God who has 'become a true human
being in every respect, sin alone excluded.., yet not excluding natural activity.' n It is the
principle of this natural activity (Iimicrucli ivg pye t a) that constitutes the definition of ousia:
it is 'that which is predicated of things as common and generic.' m Whatever can be
predicated as common and generic to human nature — passibili0 included, must also be
capable of predication to the ousia of Christ's human nature. Yet, taking Chalcedon in a
Cyrilline direction, we are to predicate these properties not simply of his human nature (his
69 Amb.Th. 2 (PG 91.1037B).
79 Daley in The Origenism of Leontius', 361, fn2, traces the term back to John the Grammarian (d. 520).
While Grillmeier (CCT, 2.2, 336-338) discovers it in the Chalcedonian Abbot Euthymius (377-473), teacher of
the great Palestinian monastic leader, Sabas, our sources for this evidence are late (post-550). According to
Grillmeier the term was actually rejected by Leontius of Jerusalem (CCT, 2.2, 295; pace Nicholas Madden,
'Composite Hypostasis in Maximus Confessor', SP 28 [1993], 186-187), but revived under Justinian.
71 Amb.Th. 2 (PG 91.1037C).
72 Amb.Th. 2 (PG 91.1037C).
73 Amb.Th. 2 (PG 91.1037C).
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'what'), but of him (his 'who') who is a composite hypostasis of both the divine and human
natures: the one incarnate Word.
So far we have witnessed Maximus' attempt to apply the formal logic of what
David Yeago has dubbed the 'grammar of sameness and otherness' 74 to a difficult passage
in Gregory's third Theological Oration. It is a logic Maximus develops in detail elsewhere:5
and most notably in a letter written, perhaps at a slighdy earlier date, to Cosmas, a deacon
in Alexandria. 76 There in a classic passage he explains how it is possible to speak of unity or
distinction, first at the level of ousia:
Things united according to one and the same ousia or nature... are always the same as one
another in ousia and different in hjpostasis. They are the same in ousia by the principle of the
common equality of essence observed indistinguishably in them in their natural identity. By
virtue of this principle, one thing is not more what it is or is called than another thing, but
all admit one the same definition and description Opov TE Kai A6yov) of ousia.
But they are different in lypostasis by the principle of the particular difference that
distinguishes them. By virtue of this principle each is distinguished from the other, and
they do not coincide with one another by their characteristic properties at the level of
IVostaris. Instead, each one in the sum total of its properties brings a totally individual
description of what is proper to it at the level of hypostasis. 77
Then at the level of hypostasis:
74 'Jesus of Nazareth and Cosmic Redemption: The Relevance of St. Maximus the Confessor', in Modern
Theology 12 (1996), 170.
75 ()prem. 13 (PG 91.145B).
76 Ep. 15 (PG 91.544-576). Sherwood, Annotated Date-list, 40.
77 Ep. 15 (PG 91.552BC).
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Things united according to one and the same h postasis or person (n-pciacorrov), that is,
things constitutive of one and the same lypostaris by virtue of their union, are the same as
one another in hypostasis and different in ousia. They are the same in lypostasir by the
principle of the indivisible particular (TrpocrumtKiis) unity that is constituted from them by
virtue of their union. By virtue of this principle the properties differentiating each from
what is common to it by ousia are, by virtue of their simultaneous coming together with one
another in a state of being, rendered characteristics of the one lypostasis constituted from
them. They are observed to be identical with one another at the level of hypostasis, admitting
no difference whatsoever, as is the case with a human soul and body....
But they are different in ousia by the principle of their natural difference from one
another. By virtue of this principle, they in no way admit the definitions and descriptions of
one another at the level of ousia. Instead, each yields a description of its own ousia that does
not coincide with that of the other.78
Those things that share the same ousia are different in hypostasis. Human beings are
the prime example, since they share a common human nature, yet differ in their respective
hypostases — their particular existences as one or another person, such as Peter or Paul or
Mary. But those things that share the same hypostasis are different in ousia. One example
Maximus is fond of employing in this respect - an example used in the same way by
Leontius of Byzantium79 - is of a particular human person, a composite of body and soul.
Body and soul are different in ousia: their properties are different and distinct. Yet each has
no concrete, independent existence in itself, but only as a complete (composite) hypostasis —
as a particular human being. Maximus explains:
78 Ep. 15 (PG 91.552D — 553A).
79 V. Grumel,	 hypostatique et la comparaison de l'Ime et du corps chez Leonce de Byzance et saint
Maxime le Confesseur', Echos d'Orient 25 (1926), 393-406; Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 101-104.
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For the properties (-1-« iswipa-ra) that mark off someone's body from the bodies of
others and someone's soul from the souls of others, concurring by virtue of their union,
characterise and at the same time mark off from other human beings the bjpostasis
constituted from them. Take for example [the IDpostasis] of Peter, or of Paul. Yet [those
properties do not mark off] the soul of Peter from his own body, nor the soul of Paul from
his own body. For both, soul and body, are identical with one another by the principle of
the one hypostasis constituted from them by virtue of their union, because neither exists on
its own owe' a6-reo in separation from the other before their composition by which the
species comes about (Els' ygveotv ETSous). For the production, the composition, and the
constitution of the species from them according to their composition, are all
simultaneous.8°
Thus, while at the level of ousia the properties of a particular person's body are
different from the properties of that person's soul, the properties of each are predicated of
that whole particular person, since he or she is that body or soul's hypostasis: its particular
mode of existence as one instance of the human species. Their difference is at the level of
'what' they are (ousia); their identity is at the level of 'whose' they are (postasis).
By placing this logic from Letter 15 alongside our discussion on the christology of
the later Ambigua, we do not wish to imply that Maximus thinks that the union of body and
soul in a particular human being is anything more than an imperfect analogy of the union
of the two natures as a composite hypostasis in Christ. 81 In this respect Maximus is far more
80 Ep. 15 (PG 91.552D).
81 While Thunberg's summary of the analogy at work in Opusc. 13 and Ep. 15 is accurate (Microcosm and
Mediator, 101-104), and one may plausibly interpret the relationship of soul to body with the idea ofperichorefir,
his main justification for the theory is based upon an unfortunate mistranslation of Ambiguum 7 (PG
91.1100D). According to Thunberg (104), Maximus 'not only makes an anti-Origenist use of the terms of
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reserved than Cyril, whose liberal application of the analogy the Confessor would probably
have considered excessive in his own milieu. For Maximus, the parallels between the union
of body and soul and the union of natures in Christ are primarily logical and linguistic.,82
indeed, he can also speak of a particular dog as a hypostasis. Yeago's comments are
instructive when he rightly asserts,
The example does not illumine the phusiologia of Christ directly but rather the grammar of
the ways in which we use the concepts of identity and difference in the interplay of the
registers of ousia and hupostasis. Maximus is not providing a "model" for incarnation, but
suggesting that clarity about the grammar of these concepts will enable us to talk
coherently about identity and difference in the inexpressible mystery of Christ.83
We are now in a position to trace Maximus' development of this language in his
treatment of difficulties from Gregory in Ambigua 3 and 4. It is a language that allows him
to juxtapose a series of paradoxical claims about Christ which, held together in inseparable,
unconfused unity, form a picture that discloses the essentially salvific character of the
economy. This use of paradoxes and the concurrent refusal to minimise the tension
inherent in the authentic bodily and human life of the divine Word is reminiscent of the
approach of Cyril, who 'loved to press the force of this economy by the use of strong
paradoxes.'" The increase in occurrences of soteriological formulae Orrip GE, 7va
transmigration in fact but understands by them, on the human level, what he means by pericboresis on the
Christological level.' But Maximus does nothing of the sort. Rather he reduces to the point of ridicule the
doctrine of the transmigration of souls or bodies in connection with his refutation of the soul's pre-existence.
82 This should not be taken to mean that Maximus regards the union of natures in Christ in terms of a purely
`vammaticar orthodoxy. On the contrary, he repeatedly insists on the fact of the union rrpaypa-ri Kai
aXrjEletcx, not simply KXTICIEl name'); Ep. 15 (PG 91.573A); 17 (PG 91.581C); 18 (PG 91.585BC). The
references are from VOlker, Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens, 72 fn5.
83 Yeago, 'Cosmic Redemption', 170.
84 McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria, 185.
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OCki01:1..., 51CX TO...), familiar to us from New Testament kerygmadc formulae and
Christian homiletical literature, and here used in connection with the Incarnation and
actions of Christ, indicate Maximus' narrowing focus on the implications of this
metaphysical christo-logic. In Ambiguum 3, he comments on a passage from Gregory's
second sermon on the Son, in which Gregory had defended the sobriety of a realist
interpretation of John 1:14: that the uncomposed became composed. In his apology,
Gregory advanced the soteriological 'cause' (aiTia) of the Incarnation upon his recalcitrant
hearers with evocative force:
That cause was to save you who are insolent, who despise the Godhead for this reason:
that having become man, that is, the lower God (e) KdTC.0 eE6s), he admitted your
thickness. He engaged flesh through the mediation of mind, since that flesh was mingled
with God and has become one, the stronger prevailing, so that I might become God as far
as God has become man.85
Gregory's words, 'he engaged flesh through the mediation of mind', indicate a
structure familiar to Maximus as mediated through the legacies of Evagrian, Nemesian, and
Neoplatonic anthropology. The intellect (voisis) is the leading principle (hegemonikon) of the
human being, and as the primary organ of the spiritual subject constitutes the connecting
point to the (divine) intelligent domain, whereas the body connects the human being to the
(created) sensible domain, the human soul mediating between both!' According to
Gregory, the assumption of a sensible body by the divine Word takes place via the mind
and the soul.
85 Amb.Th. 3 (PG 91.1040A). Greg.Naz.Or. 29.19.
86 Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1193D — 1196A); Myst. 5, 7.
170
Nevertheless, it is not on the basis of the composition of human nature as body,
soul, and mind, but on the basis of the union of the two natures that Maximus here argues
that the condition which the Logos has become is composite at the hypostatic level:
composite, strangely enough, at the point where union is to be located." Before his incarnate
state, the Word was simple (ciTrÀciis) with respect to both nature (1)ticris) and hypostasis.
Maximus summarises this simple state in terms of incorporeality, affirming that as God, the
Word was 'devoid of a body and bodily conditions' (yupv6s . auipa-roc Kai Tc3v 60a
ouipa-ros). 88 But 'now' (vim)), in order to save, `by the assumption of flesh with an
intelligent soul, he has become that which he was not with respect to the composite hypostasis
(T1jV UTTOOTaCIFIV ativeuroc), and remained what he was with respect to the simple nature
(rilv (Haw di-r2olis).'89 It is by the assumption of human nature in its full reality —flesh
endowed with an intelligible, rational soul - that the hypostasis who is the Word is rendered
composite. The whole event is disposed of in such a way as to ensure both continuity and
discontinuity: continuity at the level of nature, in that the divine nature is preserved simple
and entirely 'without change'; discontinuity at the level of hypostasis, not in that the Word
ceased to be the second hypostasis of the Trinity, but in that by the assumption of human
nature, a composite of body and soul, the hypostasis who is the Word freely becomes
receptive to certain conditions basic to a creaturely state. Maximus' way of describing this
outcome is deliberately paradoxical, for we might expect there to be discontinuity at the
level of nature — in that the simple divine nature is united to a composite human nature,
87 Maximus reasserts this point strongly in his follow-up letter to Thomas. Christ is not a composite nature, as
Severus taught, or else he would be a tertium quid consubstantial with neither his Father nor his Mother. Text
in Canart, 'La Deuideme Lettre I. Thomas' [Canart], 433.85 — 437.134.
88 Amb.Th. 3 (PG 91.1040B).
89 .4mb. Th. 3 (PG 91.1040B).
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and continuity at the level of hypostasis — in that the divine subject who is the second person
of the Trinity is identical to the subject who is Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God.
This fundamentally paradoxical way of conceiving the Incarnation is increasingly
seen to be inextricably and necessarily bound to discerning its soteriological function. In a
sentence loaded with soteriological formulae, Maximus seeks to articulate this new reality in
a kind of running midrash on Gregory's text:
For he had no other reason to be born carnally than to save that nature whose passibility
he experienced as a kind of thickness. He 'engaged with flesh through the mediation of
mind', 'having become man, that is, the lower God', and on behalf of all became all that we
are, excluding sin: body, soul, mind (through which comes death) — a human being, a
community of these - God become visible for the sake of the intelligible.90
It is this real subjectivity to what Maximus calls 'natural sensation' (ti ITO Tilt) 4)thattcnv
akreflatv)" that can, or indeed, must be predicated of the Word who has become flesh.
The effects of the union are repeatedly spoken of through metaphors of revelation,
visibility, and manifestation, terminology that will feature even more prominently in the
next two Ambigua. 'Through naturally passible flesh he rendered visible his super-infinite
power,' and in clothing himself with flesh he 'fittingly deified it by the hypostatic
identity.'n Deification is not simply human assimilation to God, but the salvifically
effective, bodily enactment of divine theophany. The 'prevailing' of which Gregory speaks,
90 Amb.Th. 3 (PG 91.1040B).
91 Amb.Th. 3 (PG 91.1040BC).
92 Amb.Th. 3 (PG 91.1040C).
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as Maximus was to clarify later, does not entail the absorption or negation of the human
ousia by the divine. On the contrary, it occurs entirely at the hypostatic, modal level."
The extent of the deification of human beings, then, in terms that have become
familiar to us, is conditional upon and proportional to the extent of God's Incarnation. Just
as in the hypostatic union the Word who 'is his natures' has become voluntarily receptive
to the creaturely conditions of human nature, so too in 'the deification of those being saved
by grace' - a deification that is given 'in corresponding measure to his emptying,' human
nature becomes what it was created to become: 'wholly deiform... receptive \ANcoprynKc3v)
to God entire and God alone.' 94 The finite is capable of the infinite. By means of this
profound insight - which we would expect from one committed to a Cyrilline
interpretation of Chalcedonian dogma, God's passibility in Christ, while still presenting a
paradox that defies rational explanation, is understood ultimately as a dynamic reality
bound to the attainment of human perfection.
In the first half of his fourth Theological Oration, Gregory took up Scripture passages
adduced by his opponents one by one, which they appear to have used to support a
thorough-going subordinationism. At one point, he treated a series of texts that suggested
the Son's subjection to the Father, including the prayer from the cross, 'My God, my God,
why have you forsaken me?'" When we come to the difficulty Maximus deals with in
Ambiguum 4, the Scripture text Gregory was explaining is Hebrews 5:8, 'Although he was a
Son, he learned obedience from what he suffered.' Gregory argued that neither obedience
nor disobedience can properly be predicated of the Logos qua Logos. Yet in his 'alien
form', the Word 'honours obedience by action' and 'experiences it by what he suffers.' In
93 Canart, 433.85— 435.119.
94 14mb. Th. 3 (PG 91.1040D). This line is an exact quote from Greg.Naz.Or. 30.6 (SC 250, 238.38-39).
95 Psalm 21:1; also 1 Corinthians 15:45. Greg.Naz.Or. 30.5.
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an act of total and gracious solidarity, the incarnate Word experiences suffering and so
fulfils the obedience that properly belongs to human nature."
Maximus takes the opportunity to reiterate Gregory in a way that fills out the
notion of Christ's obedience and subordination within a fully-fledged schema of orthodox
theopaschitism, at the same time weaving into his reading immediate concerns raised by the
Monenergist agenda. The fact that he can do so without contrivance may well indicate the
perceived subtlety of the threat posed to orthodox theopaschidsm by Monenergism — both
through what in Maximus' eyes is its minimalist portrayal of the humanity of Christ, and
consequently through its implicit denial of the reality of the sufferings of the incarnate
Word. The way out of this crisis was to propose, through the characteristically Cyrilline
adoption of a series of adverbially qualified paradoxical actions, a doctrine of the true
passibility of God in his saving economy.
The foundation of such a doctrine lies in a full appreciation of the precise character
of the human condition assumed by the Word. It may be appropriate here to explore this
appreciation further. In his writings, Maximus generally distinguishes between two kinds of
passibility (Trcieos) in relation to human nature. The first is inherent. By virtue of its being
brought into being from non-being, human nature shares with all creation a creaturely
passivity. 97 The second is added, a liability introduced on account of Adam's deviation from
the good." In a punitive act of benevolent foresight, God added this passibility, associated
with man's corporeality as a composite nature and his capacity for sense, as a means of his
eventual restoration. Yet both passibilities are called 'natural'. Both correspond to
Maximus' complex conception of human nature as the product of two creations,
96 Amb.M. 4 (PG 91.1041A); Greg.Naz.Or. 30.6.
97 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1073B).
98 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1093C); 42 (PG 91.1316C— 1317B).
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ontologically though not chronologically distinct, a &Nifty which we have seen is suggested
by the two Genesis accounts (1:27; 2:7). The added passibility, while punitive and
restorative in function, is blameless (ciStoi13X7ros): it is the result or consequence of sin,
but it is not in itself sinful."
We have already seen that the Word assumes human nature in its composite
sensible and intellectual entirety: mind, soul, and body. But how closely does this human
nature assumed by the Word correspond to our own fallen, mutable human condition? If
sin — upon which follows corruption and death, is explicitly excluded from the nature
assumed by him, how can one speak meaningfully of his participation in our suffering?
Maximus realises the need to address this problem carefully, for on it hinges the
whole question of human salvation. It is a problem he dearly thought long and hard about,
and in a number of treatises he offers a detailed treatment. m Here it is enough for him to
assert that the human nature assumed by the Word is the entire, natural, passible nature
common to all:
On the one hand, as being be nature God, the Word is entirely free by nature of obedience
and disobedience.... For the law of command and its fulfilment or transgression apply to
those who by nature are movable, not to him who by nature is immobile being.
But on the other hand, in the form of a slave, that is, having become by nature a
human being, the Word condescended to fellow-servants and slaves, and assumed an alien
form, adopting together with our nature the passibility of that nature that is ours. For alien
99 2.Tbal 21 (CCSG 7, 127.5 — 129.62); .Q.ThaL 42 (CCSG 7, 285.7 — 289.90); Amb.lo. 42 (PG 91.1316D -
1317A); Opurc. 20 (PG 91.237AB).
100 Eg..Q.Thal21, 42, 61; Amb.Io. 42.
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indeed is the penalty of the sinner to the one who is sinless by nature. And that pena4 is the
passibiliy given in judgement to the whole of nature on account of the transgression.101
Part of the solution Maximus here touches upon lies in the dual aspect of the
movement involved in the Incarnation. In a delightful parallelism he describes this dual
aspect under the distinct rubrics of emptying (K gvcoots) and condescension
,(ourca-rai3aats.), the latter of which seems to indicate a successively 'lower' dimension
than the former:
Yet, since he emptied himself in the form of a skive, that is, as a human being, and since he
condescended to assume an alien form, that is, he became by nature a passible human being, then in
his emptying and condescension he is seen to be both good and a lover of humankind, the
emptying showing that he has truly become a human being, the condescension showing that he is
truly a passible human being. 102
As he is wont to do, Maximus takes what for Gregory are probably synonyms, namely, 'the
form of a slave' and 'an alien form', and with them creates a technical distinction that
corresponds to the dual level at which human nature exists. By his emptying, the Word truly
becomes a human being. By this he enters into the first kind of creaturely passibility. By his
condescension, he truly becomes a passible human being. By this he enters into the second kind
of punitive passibility.103
WI Amb.Th. 4 (PG 91.1041BC).
102 Amb.Th. 4 (PG 91.1041CD).
103 The significance of this corresponding distinction should not be pressed. Indeed we find the scheme in the
reverse order at the beginning of Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1316D) in which Maximus links typologically the
distinction between Christ's generation (y6vEcts) and birth (y4vvr)cris) to the dual levels of the Incarnation
as condescension and emptying: 'For he who accepted to become a human being by generation (genesis) on
behalf of the first Adam, and did not deem it unworthy to be born on account his transgression,
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What are we to make then of the biblical assertion of Christ's sinlessness (Heb
4:15), a fact Maximus repeats tirelessly? And how are we to understand the Word's
assumption of a nature bordered by corruption and death, if he is free of the sin upon
which they follow?
Here we must introduce the other distinction which Maximus only hints at here,
and that is between 'blameless' (dSte(PÄTIT05) and 'blameworthy' (61;516(3Xn-ros)
passibility. 104 He had already made this distinction between 'blameless' and 'blameworthy'
passibility in human nature in Quaestiones ad Tbalassium 21 and in Ambiguum 42, both of
which will be studied in more detail in the final chapter. The sufferings borne by the Word,
while clearly present in 'the entire human nature' as a result of judgement, are said to be
'blameless' (dOt c(Parra). 105 In another place, Quaestiones ad Tbalassium 42, he makes the
same distinction within a specifically christological frame of reference in connection with
Saint Paul's statement in 2 Corinthians 5:21 that God 'made him who knew no sin to be sin
for us.'
After the faculty of choice belonging to Adam's natural reason was corrupted, it in turn
corrupted together with itself the nature which had abandoned the grace of impassibility.
And so sin has come about. The first sin, which is blameworthy (E6S(ciPArrros), is the
deliberate fall from good to evil; the second, which is a result of the first, and is blameless
(d5tdPXri-roc), is the alteration (peTaTroinats) of nature from incorruptibility to
demonstrated through his coming-to-be (genesis) his condescension to him who had fallen (TrpOs -rOv
TrEcrou-ra,), and through his birth (gennesis) his voluntary self-emptying for him who had been condemned
(rrpos TOV KainSESIKacrustrov).'
104 2.Thal 21 (CCSG 7, 127.5 — 129.62); Q.Thal 42 (CCSG 7, 285.7 — 289.90); Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1316D-
1317A); Opusc. 20 (PG 91.237AB).
105 Amb.Th. 4 (PG 91.1044A). See further Larchet, 'Ancestral Guilt according to St Maximus the Confessor: a
Bridge between Eastern and Western Conceptions', Sobornost 20:1 (1998), 36-38.
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corruptibility. These two sins have come about through the forefather by the transgression
of the divine command. The first is blameworthy. The second is blameless....
Therefore the alteration of nature towards passibility and corruption and mortality
is judgement for Adam's deliberate sin.... The Lord took [upon himself] this judgement for
my deliberate sin — I mean nature's passibility and corruption and mortality, and so became
sin for me according to passibility and corruption and mortality.106
What we have in this brief paragraph is a whole series of paired terms that give
formal symmetry to the complexities involved in the Incarnation with a view to
demonstrate more amply its essentially soteriological thrust. Not many years later (ca. 640)
Maximus would make a similar distinction in a different connection in a remarkable
passage in Opuscula 20. Instead of using TrpcioArOns, the normal term for the Word's
'assumption' of human nature, he uses oiKEicacrts. — 'appropriation', in this case with
regard not to human nature in general but to the 'dishonourable sufferings' associated with
it. The verb form of this word had featured in the Council of Ephesus when, in Cyril's
third letter to Nestorius, it was said that 'in the crucified body,' the only-begotten God
'impassibly appropriated [made his own] the suffering of his own flesh.'' In the sentence
before our passage, Maximus describes how, in the way of a doctor with a sick patient, it is
'by appropriation alone' out of compassion, that the incarnate God 'expends and destroys
the sufferings by the power of his embodiment, until he liberates us from them, yet spares
us.' 1 ' At this point, he draws the important distinction:
106 2 Mai 42 (CCSG 7,285.7-15; 288.58 —289.67).
107 Ta TflS Was oapxO5 drraEls oikeloievoc TrciOri (Schwartz, ACO 1.1.i, 37.11-12).
108 Opusa 20 (PG 91.237AB).
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For the principle of suffering (6 Trepi Tra0c2)v Xciyos) is twofold. The first is associated
with honour (6 pit) Tijs. Lu(Ttpias.). The second is associated with dishonour (6 öi
ci-rtpias). The first characterises ()(aparrripiCcov) our nature. The second debases
(TrapaxapdTTcov) it completely. Hence the first he admitted substantially (otiotcoOc25
Ka-reS6a-ro) as a human being, willing so for us, simultaneously securing nature and
dissolving the condemnation against us. And he disposed himself to appropriate
(01KovopiKC)5 ck)KetcAioa-ro) the second which can be recognized in us and in our
insubordinate ways. His purpose was that, having utterly consumed all that is ours as fire
does wax and the sun low-lying mist, he might give us a share in the things that are his,"
and that he might render us henceforth not only impassible, but also incorruptible
according to the promise.n°
As is also evident in this passage just quoted, the upshot of the dual-descent traced
by Maximus in Ambiguum 4 is seen to be twofold. On the one hand, there is a negative
movement, described in terms of what is removed from human nature: badness is
'exhausted'; the penalty of disobedience is 'dissolved.' Both of these are damaging
accretions arising from the inclinations of the 'unnatural deliberative mindset.' 111 On the
other hand, there is a positive movement, described in language inspired by 2 Peter 1:3-4 as
the gift of participation 'in his divine power, a power that activates the immovability of the
soul and the incorruptibility of the body by the identity of the will around what is good by
nature.' 112 The beneficial effects of the Incarnation extend to the corruptible body, since
the extent to which the Word assumed human nature includes, under the rubric of
109 This sentence, with its fire/wax, sun/mist analogies, is from Greg.Naz.Or. 30.6, which same passage heads
Anth.Th. 4.
110 Opurc. 20 (PG 91.237AB).
Ill Anth.Th. 4 (PG 91.1044A).
112 Amb.Th. 4 (PG 91.1044A).
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condescension, its bodily corruption. The positive and negative movements are aspects of
the Word's active and passive fulfilment of obedience, which he 'honours by action' and
'proves by suffering.' 113 This is entirely consistent with a conclusion Maximus draws
elsewhere, namely that 'the suffering the incarnate Word underwent was not a penalty
(irrtai 5), as it is with us, but an emptying (K4vcaois) on our behalf.'114
Throughout the fourth Ambiguum one can detect the spelling out of the Son's
saving works in what may be described as corporeally demonstrative terms. It is here in
particular that Maximus moves a step beyond his predecessors to give expression to divine
suffering in Christ in a way that amplifies its soteriological implications and at the same
time excludes heterodox christologies that lay claim to orthodox theopaschism. For the
previous tradition, it was enough to assert that Christ did divine things 'divinely' (0E1K(.35),
and human things humanly or 'bodily' (ccopartKc.:is). 1 " Even Cyril, who said that 'Christ
acted divinely and bodily at the same rime,' 116 still insisted on maintaining with respect to
the one true Son both 'the absence of suffering divinely' and 'the attribution to him of
suffering humanly?'" Severus too spoke of the one subject doing miracles 'divinely' and
suffering 'humanly.' 118 With Dionysius the Areopagite, however, we detect the first signs of
the inversion of these traditional ideas. In his fourth letter, as a prelude to his articulation
of the famous tbeandric character of Christ's activity, Dionysius denies that Jesus did his
divine works KaTa 0E0V and his human works Kara avOpcorrov. 119
 Maximus takes the
Dionysian vision and, on the basis of the pericboresis of Christ's natural activities and within
113 Amb.Th. 4 (PG 91.1044B).
114 Opusc. 9 (PG 91.120AB).
115 See the references given in Lampe, PGL, 618.
116 Cyr.Luc. 5.12 (PG 72.556B).
117 The reference is from the Second Letter to Succensus (text in Lionel R. Wickham [ed.], Cyril of Alexandria: Select
Letters Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983], 90.14-16): E(Sel yap avayKaicas apOTEpa auiECIOal TC,;) EVI Kai
KaTa Oujeetav uic"0:, Kai TO ifl TraaxElv OiiKi35 Kai TO AEyecreat Traeilv aVepcJITIVO3S.
118 Pelikan, The Chrirtian Tradition, volume 1, 273.
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the parameters prescribed by Chalcedonian orthodoxy, re-casts it positively by means of an
inverted formula: the incarnate Word performs the human or fleshly works divinely, and the
divine works humanly.
His remained Lord by nature, and became a slave for me — a slave by nature, in order to
make me master over the one who had obtained tyrannical control through deceit. That is
why, on the one hand, accomplishing the works of a slave in a lordly fashion, that is, the
fleshly works divinely, he went about displaying (i1Ts.580'<vu-ro) his natural and impassible
power and asserting his lordship by fleshly means. Through passibility this power erases
corruption, and through death creates indestructible life. And on the other hand,
performing the lordly works in the manner of a slave, that is, the divine works carnally, he
went about declaring (ive6siKvIrro) his ineffable emptying. Through passible flesh this
emptying deifies (OsoupyOkav) the entire race bound to earth by corruption.12°
We shall see the Confessor develop this line of thought even further in the latter
sections of this chapter. By the salutary and death-destroying actions performed in
paradoxical congruity with the two natures, Christ manifests the 'substantial energies' of
those natures of which he is a 1.postasis. 121 By 'paradoxical congruity' I mean to suggest that
for Maximus it is not possible simply to isolate certain actions in the narrative history of
Christ by labelling them as either 'divine' or 'human'. At the modal, empirical level, divine
acts are seen to be performed in a human manner, human acts in a divine manner. That
means that Christ's human actions, such as suffering and subjection and even death, are
not incidental or superficial to the saving economy, but belong constitutively to it, since
119 Dion.Ar.Ep. 4 (Cotpus Dio*siacum II, 161.8-9).
12° Anth.Th. 4 (PG 91.1044CD).
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they function on the one hand as the means of disclosing the divine action of the Logos,
and on the other, as we shall see in due course, as the precise means of reversing their
potentially negative power. The integrity of neither nature is compromised, yet by virtue of
the fact that natural activity, or, more narrowly, that 'the constitutive power of nature' On
Ka're( (kiatv OUCITaTIKTI Otivapts) is the demonstration (eciroSEits) of ousia — a point
asserted with formulaic clarity only in the next Ambiguum,122 and that what has been
effected in the union is a real 'exchange' (irraXXay), 123 the activity of each nature can
only be comprehended under the form of 'works' accomplished 'in united fashion'
(povaStK6s) and 'with integral form' (ivoEt5c3s) by the single subject. To put it in
another way, the Incarnation — and, by extension, deification - is a human act as well as a
divine act. And this human activity, most recognisable in the active passivity of Christ's
flesh, is not merely incidental, but a constitutive 'component', if you will, of the saving
economy. It is now as he takes up a difficult passage in Dionysius that the full scope of this
elaboration upon the paradoxical exchange in the Incarnation is unveiled.
Suffering Wonders, Wonderful Sufferings
The fifth Ambiguum has attracted its fair share of scholarly attention. Part of the reason is
that it presents a matrix for analysing Maximus' role as an interpreter of Dionysius the
Areopagite, evident in Pelikan's characterisation of it as the 'orthodox restatement and
reinterpretation of the Dionysian structure....
121 Amb.Th. 4 (PG 91.1044D).
122 Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1048A).
123 Amb.Th. 4 (PG 91.1044D).
124 'The Place of Maximus Confessor in the History of Christian Thought', in Heinzer and SchOnborn,
Maximus Confessor. Actes du Symposium sur Maxime k Confesseur, 395; see also Enzo Bellini, `Maxime interprete de
'124 Another reason is that the difficulty in
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question arises from one of the letters by Dionysius containing a phrase sounding
suspiciously Monenergist which, whether in an original or manipulated form, had occupied
the centre of a long and divisive christological debate. The phrase is, of course, 'one
theandric activity'; or, in the textual tradition reckoned authentic by Maximus and modern
editors alike, 'a certain new theandric activity.'125
Dionysius' letter is actually the fourth in a pseudo-series to Gaius, a monk under
his episcopal jurisdiction. In chapter one we already discovered the decidedly apophatic
tone of Dionysius' Letters 1 and 2: knowledge of God involves an entry into a
transcendent darkness, for God 'is completely unknown and non-existent. He exists
beyond being and he is known beyond the mind? Then in Letters 3 and 4 it appears that
our Bishop of Athens specifically seeks to apply this via negativa to certain scriptural
affirmations regarded as bearing christological significance. In contrast to our contemporary
christological climate in which people readily assume Jesus' humanity but remain skeptical
concerning his divinity, the prevailing mood in the sixth century accepted Jesus' divine
status — for was he not worshipped as God? — but struggled with the reality of his
humanity. And so it is that Letter 4 responds to the biblical ascription of the name
divepciarros 127 to Jesus — possibly in Philippians 2:8 or 1 Timothy 2:5 — an ascription that
forms a sticking point in Gaius' understanding of God. Dionysius writes:
How is it, you ask, that Jesus, who is beyond all, has been ranked together with all human
beings at the level of being? For here (iv8O(50 128 he is not called the cause (aiTia) of
Pseudo-Denys l'Areopagite', in Heinzer and SchOnborn, Maximus Confessor. Actes du S.ymposium fur Maxime k
Confesseur, 37-49.
125 See further, in brief, Louth, Maximus the Confessor, 54-56.
126 El,. 1 (Corpus Dionysiarum II, 157.3-5).
127 Ep. 4 (Corpus Dionysiacum II, 160.3).
us It is this reference that causes me to suspect that Dionysius has some definite Scriptural passage in mind.
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humanity, but is himself, in the whole of his being (Ka-C oUolav OXI-M, truly a human
being.129
This is the portion of the letter before Maximus as he begins his explanation of what he
believes Dionysius is up to:
According to his simple interpretation of Holy Scripture, the monk Gaius apparently thinks
that because God is designated as the cause of all with all the names of those things that
have come from him, so also after the Incarnation he is again named 'man' in this manner
only. Hence the great Dionysius in these words corrects him by teaching that the God of
all, as incarnate, is not simply called a human being, but that he is 'himself truly and
essentially a whole human being'.130
From here on, Maximus' expository method of dealing with this difficulty indicates
his sensitivity to the spirit and structure of Dionysian logic at work here. For the
Areopagite as for the Cappadocians, who encountered the Eunomian heresy first-hand,
none of the names or categories that apply to created beings are properly applicable to
God. Even to say that 'God is' is not strictly accurate. In an apophatic schema it is more
accurate to say that 'God is not' - to deny that 'God is.'131 In some ways Maximus has
followed the same route in the preceding Ambigua when he began by asserting the
transcendence of the Trinity, and then moved into an engagement with the mystery of
God's suffering in the order of the economy. Yet as it has become evident his goal is not
simply to unlock the metaphysical complexities of the Incarnation, but to enable his readers
129 Now from Maximus Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1045C).
130 Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1048A).
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to discern therein the salutary revelation of the transcendent Logos, and so have him take
incarnate form in them."2
At first he simply re-states what has already been said in the previous difficulties:
'God incarnate is to be denied nothing at all of what is ours, apart from sin.' 133
 Any quasi-
docetic interpretation of the Word's humanity is expressly rejected. But then in a shift to
what can only be called apophatic terminology, Maximus goes on to draw in material from
both Dionysius' third and fourth letters that functions as a controlling hermeneutic to he
applied to the paradoxical data generated by the Incarnation:
'The eternally transcendent one is not less overflowing with transcendent being,' for when
he became a human being, he was not subjected to nature. On the contrary, he rather
raised up nature to himself and made it another mystery. And while he himself remained
completely incomprehensible, and demonstrated his own Incarnation.., to be more
incomprehensible than any mystery, the more he has become comprehensible because of it, the more he
is known to be incomprehensible through it. Tor he is hidden even after his revelation,' the
teacher says, 'or, to speak more divinely, even in his revelation.'34
The movement towards knowing God as incomprehensible takes place not only after, but
in one's engagement with him in his corporeal, contingent self-manifestation. God is
known as hidden precisely where he is encountered as visible.
In order to show how this dynamic functions, Maximus moves on to introduce for
the first time into the apophatic/kataphatic dialectic the /ogos/tropos distinction he had used
131 See De div.nom. 5.4 (Coous Dionysiacum I, 183.5 - 10).
132 Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1060q.
133 Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1048B).
134 Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1048D — 1049A); DionAr.Ep.4 and Ep. 3.
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and explained in a trinitarian context in the first difficulty, Ambiguum 1. 135 Maximus'
connecting in the Incarnation of this distinction with that of apophatic/kataphatic is subtle
and profound: Christ's human nature is affirmed, since its logos (its 'what') remains
completely intact and natural. At the same time, it is transcended, since the tropos (mode —
the 'how') in which that nature, in unconfused communion with the divine nature, is freely
lived out and encountered at the level of the contingent and particular, is supernatural.
Here we are encountering themes that we find elsewhere in Maximus, most
memorably in his meditations on the Transfiguration. The Word's self-disclosure is
reciprocally proportionate to his concealment in a way that parallels the mysterious union
of and metaphysical distinction between the two natures. Yet, paradoxically, it is not the
bare natures themselves that we encounter in the concrete events of the Incarnation, but
their unified and unique new mode (tropos) of existence. As Madden observes with
reference to the respective natural activities, 'they can retain their natural identity and at the
same time enter into an exchange in his hypostasis, which entitles them to the epithet 'new'
and the theological status of being theandric.' 136 Simultaneously manifest and hidden in the
particular person Jesus are the intertwined activities of a fully divine nature and a fully
human nature, each with its constitutive features intact.
Two classic miracles used by the Areopagite and generally favoured by the Cyrilline
tradition — both Chalcedonian and Severan - function for Maximus as apt illustrations: the
virginal conception and Jesus' walking on the water.' Both involve the affirmation of what
are natural human activites: being conceived and born, and walking. But with Jesus these
135 Amb.Th. 1 (PG 91.1033D — 1036C).
136 Madden, 'Composite Hypostasis in Maximus Confessor', 194.
137 The two Gospel events are paired in Dion.Ar.Ep. 4 and in an important passage in De div.nom. 2.9, where
they substantiate the supernatural psiologia of Jesus, comprehensible only to faith. Maximus' interpretation
echoes that of Severus of Antioch who had appealed to the Gospel accounts (Mt 14:25; Mk 6:48; Jn 6:19) of
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activities are lived out in a supernatural manner, for 'the natural activity of his own flesh is
inseparable from the power of his divinity: 1 ' Thus the conception and birth are of a
virgin.'" The walking is on waterm Yet both miracles demonstrate not the suppression of
nature, but a renewed, transcendent manner of operation of what are natural human
activities. They are both physical manifestations of what Maximus understands to be an
overarching soteriological avdrai at work, so that 'having become what nature is in actual
fact, he has fulfilled without illusion the economy for our sake.'"
We can now move on to clarify the implications of Maximus' teaching on the
Incarnation for our enquiry regarding the constitutive function of the material and
contingent in the economy. First, it is only as anthropos that God has become recognisable
as the philanthropos. In the unique modality that is the particular historical life of Jesus the
incarnate Word, all that is inherent in human nature - in all its physical, material, passible
contingency - is drawn into a transcendent, supernatural manner of existence in and by
which the transcendent God, who in his condescension never ceases being transcendent,
becomes visibly accessible precisely as the transcendent lover of human kind. The efficacy
of Jesus' love for humanity is dependent upon its ontological ground in divine
transcendence.' Yet the union of divine and human activities at the level of the particular
changes nothing as far as the human nature is concerned. What is new is the supernatural
mode in which it is lived out.' And for Maximus, this qualitatively' new human existence
Jesus' walking on the water as demonstrating the insufficiency of the Chalcedonian conception of the two
natures. See (IT, 2.2, 138; Louth, Maximus the Confessor, 215 fn11.
138 Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1049C).
139 Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1049B).
14o Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1049B).
141 Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1049D).
142 Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1053C).
143 Tor the transcendent Logos, having truly assumed our being for our sake, joined to the affirmation of
nature the transcendent negation of what is natural to it, and became a human being — the supernatural tropos
of being (Tv UTTEp 4)1101V TO-1.1 TITZS s'ivat TpOTTOV) having been linked to the natural logos of being — so that
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is re-creative, eschatological, and universal in scope. Once again David Yeago's comments
are instructive:
The union of the natures and energies is not.., conceived in abstract or merely conceptual
terms. Christ himself, as a single subject, a single hupostasis, is the true union of the divine
and human energies, and their unity is displayed not in any abstract "godmanhood" which
could be described in general terms, but in the self-consistent, singular pattern of his
contingent actions, in a word, in the concrete Gospel narrative.... Thus redemption is not
a general state of affairs, something which could be described without mentioning the
particular person of the redeemer; redemption is what happens in the story of Jesus,
impossible to characterize without constitutive reference to "the things that have come to
pass" [TO( yivOlicva] [sic] in that particular narrative.145
Secondly, it is due to the double — theandric - character of Christ's acts - the
voluntary limitation of the operations of the divine nature to the human, fleshly mode, and
the lifting up of the operations of the human nature to the divine, transcendent mode, that
the mysterious character of the Incarnation is preserved and heightened. The exchange of
divine and human activities at the level of the modal and particular brings about its
redemptive, transformative effects in an at-once hidden and revealed way, so that while
Christ is said to have 'suffered' the miraculous wonders typically associated with the divine
nature, the sufferings associated with his human nature - since they are suffered 06K(.35 -
the nature, which does not admit any change in its logos, might be confirmed by the newness of the modes,
and that he might demonstrate the power that surpasses infinity as it is recognised in the genesis of opposites'
(PG 91.1053B).
144 'This newness is a matter of quality, not quantity' (PG 91.1057A).
145 'Jesus of Nazareth and Cosmic Redemption', 175, 177.
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become 'wonderful or, we could say, wonder-working.' This builds upon Maximus'
articulation of the mystery of God's passibility by affirming that while God truly suffers, he
does so actively, voluntarily, and salvifically, thereby transforming 'the sufferings of his
human nature into active works.'147
We find the same idea expressed at around the same time (ca. 634) in Maximus'
Letter 19 to Pyrrhus. It is noteworthy that Maximus seems here gently to be qualifying the
Psephos (633) of Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople, which had forbidden any talk of
either one or two ivipye ta i in Christ. Maximus, sympathetic to the Psephos' conciliatory
aims, yet eager to be faithful to the Chalcedonian confession of 'one and the same Christ...
acknowledged in two natures', presents the mystery of the union of the divine and human
natures by employing two verbs taken from the prologue to the fourth Gospel, each
denoting one or the other nature: 'what he was' (Orrep Tiv), that is, the pre-existent Word
On 1:1-2), and 'what he became' (OrrEp ygyove), that is, a human being On 1:14). When
these are combined, the result is predictably paradoxical:
So while he became what he was not, [God the Word] has remained what he was, for he is
without change. And while he remained what he was, he preserved what he became, for he
loves humankind. Through what he was and what he became, he acted divinely,
demonstrating what he became to be unaltered; and through them he suffered humanly,
proving what he was to be unchanged. For he performed the divine things carnally, because
natural activity is not excluded through flesh, and the human things divinely, because he
accepted human limitations — not as a matter of circumstance, but freely and willingly. For
neither were the divine things done divinely, since he was not bare God, nor were the
1443 Amb.M. 5 (PG 91.1056AB).
147 izlinb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1053C).
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human things done carnally, since he was not mere man. Hence the wonders were not
without suffering, nor were the sufferings without wonder, but the wonders were, if I may
venture to say, not impassible, and the sufferings were manifestly wonderful. Both were
paradoxical, because both divine and human come from one and the same God the Word
incarnate, who in his actions guaranteed by means of both the truth of those realities the
natures from which, and which, he was.148
While the controversial Dionysian term theandric does not occur in this particular
section of the letter, Maximus' explanation clearly parallels that which he gives in the fifth
Ambiguum. Thunberg is surely right when he defines the term theandric as Maximus' 'preferred
expression of the divine -human reciprocity in action." But reciprocity does not imply equilibrium.
The divine-human union is 'asymmetrical', to use a term first coined by Georges Florovsky.
The divine nature is still divine. The human nature is still human: created, and thus
naturally subordinate. Their respective activities in communion thus manifest themselves in
different ways: divine wonders are suffered; human sufferings are made wondegrul.
Holy Flesh, Wholly Deified
As the controversy over the number of natures, activities, and wills in Christ both widened
and deepened, Maximus' recognition of the correspondence between the metaphysical and
the soteriological in the Incarnation gained increasing prominence in his writings. To
detract from the integrity particularly of Christ's 'all-holy flesh', with all its attendant
characteristics such as activity and will, would be to 'condemn ourselves to inherit a portion
148 Ep. 19 (PG 91.593A - 593C).
149 Man and The Cosmos, 72.
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of an imperfect salvation or else to fall from the whole of salvation completely.' 150 On that
basis Maximus could only affirm his associate Thomas' own intuition regarding the need to
'safe-guard the movement of the soul which mediates between God the Word and the
flesh, the movement to which, according to the definition given by the inspired Gregory,
even the sufferings of the flesh are to be referred as natura12 151 Anything short of this is, in
Maximus' estimation, to charge the Godhead with deceit — as though, in a show of
conceited pretence, the divine essence either simulated human actions or else succumbed
unnaturally to the conditions of carnal humanity. To the extent that the true account is
threatened by perversion, 'one is compelled to join in the battle for it and to offer a clear
and ordered presentation of it, so that not only believing devoutly with our heart we may
be justified, but also everywhere confessing rightly with our mouth we may be saved (Rom
10:10).'1'
These are themes we find constantly repeated in the Opuscula, many of which were
written in the 640s. The 'wholeness' of Christ's human nature, since it is wholly deified,
corresponds to the 'wholeness' of human salvation. And the measure of the wholeness of
his nature is judged by its level of correspondence to human nature in general, sin alone
excepting. In two respects, his nature appears different: he is sinless, and was conceived by
an ordinance 'contrary to nature.'' But these do not amount to natural differences, but
modal ones. As far as its logos is concerned, Christ's humanity is identical to ours. His birth
from the Virgin and his sinless life, however, demonstrate a new mode of existence in
which his human nature operates in a manner entirely in keeping with its divinely-given
150
 Epistula secunda ad Thomam (Canart, 437.145-147).
1 51 
_Epirtula secunda ad Thomam (Canart, 441.188-191).
1 52 ,Epistula secunda ad Thomam (Canart, 445.250-253).
1 53 Amb.Io. 41 (PG 91.1313C).
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definition and vocation. 154
 Thus while his body is wholly deified, it does not become clivine
by nature, for that too would signal an alteration in its essential, created constitudon,155and
'nothing at all changes its nature by being deified.' 156 On the contrary, the redemption
effected by Christ involves the restoration of human nature to its fully natural mode of
existence in which alone it is capable of its supernatural vocation:
For he did not come to devalue (Trapaxapdai) the nature which he himself, as God and
Word, had made, but he came to deify wholly (Si aou Oec7aaat) that nature which, with
the Father's approval and the Spirit's co-operation, he willed to unite to himself in one and
the same hypostasis, with everything that naturally belongs to it, apart from sin.157
Maximus is repeatedly wary of admitting to Christ's economy any hint of delusion
or phantasy. In this he follows the typical anti-docetic strain of Johannine christology. But
his recognisably Athanasian reasoning demonstrates his especial appreciation of the
constitutive character of the external and empirical in Jesus' life: it is for the sake of our
senses, that is, our creaturely and corporeal condition according to which we can only
begin to apprehend divine realities through sensual perception.'" It is in this connection
that a proof drawn from Cyril becomes especially useful, so that Maximus can draw upon it
in a number of contexts. Repeating Dionysius, Christ's human acts are not Ka-ra
eivepcoirov, since he is not a mere human being. Nor are his divine acts KaTa ee6v, since
he is not bare God. 159 Instead, Christ demonstrates his natural energies 'to be thoroughly
184 OPUSC. 4 (PG 91.60C); DP (PG 91.297D).
185 Opusc. 7 (PG 91.77B).
156 Opusc. 7 (PG 91.81D).
157 Opusc. 7 (PG 91.77C).
188 Opusc. 7 (PG 91.76D; 91.80CD).
159 Op= 7 (PG 91.85C); Opusc. 9 (PG 91.120B).
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united by their mutual adhesion and interpenetration.' 1 ° Cyril supports this fact when in
commenting on the eucharistic significance of Jesus' words in John 6:53 - 'unless you eat
the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no life in you' - he speaks of the
Saviour using his holy flesh as a 'co-worker' (otivEpyd-rriv): he raises the dead and heals
the sick not simply by his 'almighty command' (TC? Travroupyo) TrpooTciypaTt), but also
by 'the touch of his holy flesh' (Tii: dcVn ciyias crapK65). 161 In so doing, says
Maximus, Cyril aims to show that 'it is this flesh, to which properly belong touch, voice and
the rest, that has the power to give life through its essential activity. )162 Just as a glowing
sword as a single instrument both cuts and bums, while each nature, that of fire and that of
iron, remains unchanged even 'in acquiring the property of its partner in union', 163 so too
does Christ effect a double activity in such a manner that his flesh, having acquired the
divine ability to give life, and at all times playing a constitutive role in the saving economy,
never loses its inherent 'fleshly' properties. As Balthasar goes so far as to assert,
The divinity of his actions has its ultimate guarantee in the uncurtailed and uninjured
authenticity of his humanity. Precisely [his] speech, breathing, walking, his hunger, eating,
thirst, drinking, sleeping, weeping, and anguish is the particularised place of the appearing
of the divine.... God appears to the extent that what is particularly human is lived out.164
It is also at this outermost extreme of human nature - its somatic and sarkic
dimension, that redemption needs to occur, for it was via this dimension that Adam first fell.
160 Opusc. 7 (PG 91.88A)
161 Opusc. 7 (PG 91.85D). The quotations from Cyril are from Cyrjoh. 4.2 (PG 73.577CD). Severus found in
the combination of Christ's voice and touch the model of how one energia is to be understood (CCT, 2.2,
163-164).
162 OpUJC. 7 (PG 91.85D). The same argument recurs in Opusc. 8 (PG 91.101A — 104A).
163 Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1060A).
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In a passage from Quaestiones ad Thalassium 61, Maximus focuses on the realm of sense and
passibility as simultaneously the locus of man's undoing and redemption, the former under
the dispensation of the old Adam, the latter under the dispensation of the new Adam.165
Nature's inherent passibility, blameless in itself, functions as a 'weapon' or 'instrument'
(cirrXov) capable of exacting either death on the one hand, or life on the other. 166 The
Word of God's coming in the flesh spells the dramatic reversal of the cursed Adamic cycle
of birth, corruption, and death. On account of his voluntag possession of the punishment
that resides in Adam's flesh, Christ 'reversed the use of death' (dv -rgo -rpOE -njv xpiptv
-mi.) Oavci -rou), so that his death in the flesh achieves not the death of nature, but the
death of sin. 167 But this is only the negative effect. The positive effect is suggested in a
mysterious phrase in which Maximus conjectures a 'more mysterious' interpretation of
Gregory's exhortation in his sermon on the Pascha for his hearers to 'ascend with Christ'
into heaven.' The Word's economy in the flesh is the means by which 'the world of the
flesh of the Word came to be with the Father.' 169 Christ's very flesh — crucified, risen and
ascended into heaven — contains in itself the whole ordered universe (O KOcrpos) which
already participates in the hidden, glorious trinitarian communion.
Perichoresis then is seen to extend beyond the respective activities of the united
divine and human natures into the realm of their soteriological efficacy. But either way, its
effective locus remains acopa -ro<C35 in strict correspondence with the Son's economy in
164 Kosmische Liturgic, 259.
165 Also Q. ThaL 21 (CCSG 7, 127.1 — 133.115).
166 .Q.ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 89.77-94).
167 2ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 93.155 — 95.164).
165 Amb.Io. 60 (PG 91.1384D— 1385C); Greg.Naz.Or. 45.25.
169 Aniblo. 60 (PG 91.1385B).
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the flesh 170 His flesh is not eliminated or overcome; rather its very frailty is rendered
potent."' There it is that che put death to death',
in order that he might show as a human being that what is natural is saved in himself, and
that he might demonstrate, as God, the Father's great and ineffable plan (Is 9:6) fulfilled
bodily. For it was not primarily to suffer, but to save, that he became a human being. 172
Just as Adam's death is separation from God, Christ's death is union with God.'"
Doubtless this is what was in Maximus' mind when we heard him referring earlier to
Christ's sufferings as 'wonderful. But once again, let us emphasise the constitutively
corporeal dimensions of this reversal, in this case strikingly rendered in the present tense:
[The Word] effects the overthrow of the tyranny of the evil one who obtained control over
us through deception, conquering the flesh which was overcome in Adam by brandishing it
as a weapon (OTrAov) against him. He does this to reveal his flesh, which formerly was
crushed by death, as that which captures its captor and by natural death destroys [the evil
one's] life. His flesh becomes on the one hand a poison for him to make him vomit up all
whom he had swallowed in his might, since he holds the power of death (Heb 2:14), and on the
other hand life for the human race, raising like dough all nature towards the resurrection of
life.174
170 Cf. DP (PG 91.344BC).
171 p.Thal 54 (CCSG 7, 465.376-378).
172 °pax 3 (PG 91.48BC). This sentence is found also in .Q.ThaL 63 (CCSG 22, 173.435-438), except there he
adds an important qualification which brings out the Adam-Christ relief more strongly: Tor God did not
become man primarily in order to suffer, but to save man through his sufferings under which man, who from
the beginning was impassible, has put himself by transgressing the divine commandment.'
173 Car. 2.93; 2.96.
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Returning to Ambiguum 5 to what may be regarded an anti-intellectualist swipe,
Maximus puts the recognition of this perichoretic exchange beyond vo-us as
'indemonstrable.' 'Faith alone' (pOvn Tria-ris) can comprehend the mystery of Christ, a
comprehension that is experienced and lived as worship."' Faith alone can discern anything
'wonderful' (eaupacr-rOv) hidden under the sufferings of Christ. Likewise, faith alone can
discern that divine wonders 'were fulfilled through the natural suffering power of the flesh
of the One who worked these wonders.' 176
 Maximus is here face to face with a paradoxical
reality he has expressed elsewhere:
In himself, in his essence, God is always hidden in mystery; and even when he emerges
from his essential hiddenness, he does so in such a manner that, by its very manifestation,
he makes it even more mysterious.177
Eventually this cannot but lead to a stance of wonder before the veritable newness of
redemption, in which the Confessor repeats what nearly a milleniurn later became the
catch-cry of the Reformation:
For who knows how God assumes flesh and yet remains God, how, remaining true God,
he is true man, showing himself truly both in his natural existence, and each through the
other, and yet changing neither? Faith alone can grasp these things, honouring in silence the
Word, to whose nature no logos from the realm of being corresponds.178
174 Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 36.165-174).
175 PG 91.1053D. Cf. Dion.Ar.De div.nom. 2.9.
176 PG 91.1056B.
177 PG 90.1181BC.
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But lest we assume too much common ground between Maximus and the
Reformers by collapsing their distance, we would do well to add some concluding
observations by reconsidering some of our major points within Maximus' own context and
that of the emerging Monenergism of the 630s. By recovering the Dionysian 'new
theandric activity' as a voice articulating the orthodox confession of two energies and two
natures, Maximus opens up a compelling way of conceiving deification.' Perhaps it is
unfair, even inaccurate to say of the Monenergist account of the Incarnation what
Florovsky once said of Monophysitism, namely, that it is a vision damaged by
'anthropological quietism?'" That was certainly not the intention of Severus of Antioch in
the sixth century nor of Sergius of Constantinople in the seventh. Yet logically and
theoretically, that is where the Monenergist account leads, and what the orthodox position
guards against. According to the Monophysite schema, the divinisation of Christ's 'flesh'
occurs only as far as its diminution.' A lengthy quote from Grillrneier highlights the
difficulties:
Severus distinguished various strengths in the controlling influence on the Logos on his
humanity. The highest degree is present in the miraculous healings. But what is the case in
the everyday life of the Incarnate One? ... Severus, in the tradition of Gregory of Nyssa
and Cyril of Alexandria, could not properly imagine such an everyday life. The hypostatic
union signified for the humanity of Christ the constant claim to participation in the divine
life. For this reason on each occasion it also needed permission on the side of the godhead
178 Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1057A). The meaning of this formula in Gregory of Nyssa is the subject of a study by
Martin Laird, "By Faith Alone": A Technical Term in Gregory of Nyssa', VC 54 (2000), 61-79.
179 'One might even say that the term "theandric" becomes his preferred expression of the divine-human reciprocig in
action.' Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos, 72.
180 Florovsky, The Byantine Fathers of the Sixth to Eighth Centug, 42.
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to hunger and suffer, even to die. Such a release of the flesh for the 'blameless passions',
however, was due really to a restraining of that power, on which the hypostatic union was
built. In warding off the teachings of Julian, Severus trapped himself here in an insoluble
dilemma. The henosis of Christ was not sought at the right leve1.182
By contrast, not only does the assertion of two distinct energies in Christ, one
divine and one human, and their monadic and paradoxical interpenetration in him, best
account for 'the great mystery of the psiologia of Jesus.' 183 It also furnishes the backbone
for an effective and robust soteriology by providing a structure for the reciprocally related
account of the mystery of deification, or `Christificadon', as Panayiotis Nellas dubbed it,'"
in which human nature achieves its full and perfect fulfilment through its supernatural
activation right at the level of the corporeal, particular, and mundane. In fact this forms the
chief goal and purpose of the Incarnation, 'for [the Son] lives out this [theandric] activity
not for himself but for our sake and renews nature so that we can transcend nature.' 185 And
while Christ alone cis his natures,' both divine and human, the latter is the common human
nature of all people and hence - in a way recalling Irenaeus' doctrine of recapitulatio (Eph
1:10) 186
 and Saint Paul's Adam-Christ typology (Rom 5:12-17; 1 Cor 15:45) —it is cosmically
181 Grillmeier makes this point in CCT, 2.2, 163. The evidence, however, is based on a Latin translation of
Severus: evidens est earn [carnem] non tenuirse sine defectu suam proprietatem ('it is evident that it has not retained its
natural quality without diminution').
182 CCT, 2.2, 171.
183 Amb.Th.5 (PG 91.1052B).
184 Deification in Christ, 121-140.
183 Amb.Th. 5 (PG 91.1057C). The goal of the Incarnation is precisely to make possible a communion
between energies, which alone can bring into being the divinization that is the final goal of human life.'
Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos, 72.
186 Iren.Haer. 3.16.6 — 3.21.9.
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and universally representative."' At least that is what is suggested in a summary passage
near the end of Ambiguum 5:
For by the whole active power of his own divinity, the incarnate Word, possessing
undissolved the whole passible potentiality of his humanity (combined in union), performs
as God, but in a human fashion, the miracles accomplished through the flesh that is
passible by nature, and undergoes as a man, yet in a divine fashion, the sufferings of nature,
making them peeet b) divine authority. Or rather in both [he acts] `theandrically', since, being at
the same time both God and man, by means of the wonders he gave us back to ourselves —
[us, that is] — who show that which we have become, and by means of the sufferings, he
gives us to himself — [us, that is] — who have become what he demonstrated. Through both
he confirms the truth of those natures 'from which' and 'in which' and 'which' he is, as the
only true and faithful one (Rev 3:14), who wishes to be confessed as such by us.188
Reading the passage just quoted in the context of the whole Ambigua ad Thomam,
and indeed, in the context of our whole discussion about divine (im)passibility, raises the
question as to whether it is possible to posit a flipside to this redemptive theandric energeia:
namely, theandric pathos. It was the late Dumitru Staniloae who suggested as much when he
noted with reference to the fifth Ambiguum that Tendurance des passions est-elle aussi
theandrique, comme l'est egalement l'accomplissement des miracles.' 1" The term
187 It is curious that Larchet ('Ancestral Guilt according to St Maximus the Confessor', 35) appears to play
down the notion of humanity's incorporation in Adam and Christ in Maximus' theology, reducing it to 'plain
rhetorical effect.' Yet incorporation is clearly presupposed in a number of important passages, such as Amb.lo.
42 (PG 91.1316D — 1317C; 1325AB); Q.ThaL 42 (CCSG 7, 285.7 — 289.76); .Q.Thal 61 (CCSG 22, 85-113),
and is crucial to Maximus' understanding of the universal scope of the Incarnation. See further Sherwood, St.
Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Isle, 63-70; Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos, 72.
188 Amb. Th. 5 (PG 91.1060B).
189 From his commentary on the Ambigua as appended to Ponsoye's translation, Saint Modme le Confesseur.
_Ambigua, 382.
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`theandric' obviates any reducdonistic, and eventually divisive predication of wonders or
sufferings, the miraculous or the mundane, to either one or the other nature of Christ, and
allows us to understand both in terms of a voluntary and salvific demonstration of the
communion of energies at the level of the modal, subjective, and particular. To be sure,
divine incarnation and human deification are both theophanic events in which the divine
and human natural activities — the latter of which is marked not least of all by increasing
passivity or receptivity to God' - are welded into a new theandric, deifying dynamic. In
Christ, insofar as he actually embodies the point at which the future fullness of human
deification is realised, pathos becomes 'supernatural' (tiTrip (0011.). 191 Deification is as much
'suffered' as it is 'achieved.' From the redemptive complex of evidence on display in the
Incarnation, Maximus brings to bear upon his readers the conviction of the catholic
patristic tradition that Christ's suffering, death, and holy flesh, and, implicit with these, the
inherent passibility of created human nature, are not obstacles to union with God, but the
fundamental loci of God's proleptic demonstration and historic realisation of humanity's
goal of union with him, 192 and indeed, the expansive media through which he turns
suffering and death on its head and brings the whole cosmos to its pre-planned perfection.
190 In his dispute with Phyrrus, Maximus countered the suy:estion that in contrast to divine activity, human
activity is pathos (PG 91.349CD). While we might describe the activity of human nature as passive — we
cannot define it as such. As Maximus argues (PG 91.349D), the Fathers only spoke of human movement as
passive 'on account of the creaturely principle inherent in it.' Commenting further on Maximus' point in this
passage, Keetje Rozemond notes: The human energy is a subordinate action: dependent and limited - in that
it is created; but even so, it is no less real.' La Chtirtologie de Saint Jean Damascene (Buch-Kunstverlag Ettal,
1959), 55.
1 9 1 Q Thai 22 (CCSG 7, 141.80).
192 So in defining 'the mystery of Christ' as the hypostatic union in .Q.ThaL 60, Maximus uses the term
TtpoErrivootipeuov Taos to refer to the recapitulation of all creation in God, a union proleptically realised in
the Incarnation (CCSG 22, 75.32 — 77.63).
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CHAPTER FOUR
Corporeality and the Church
This my defiled tabernacle, subject to corruption,
Has been united to your all-pure body
And my blood has been mixed with your blood.
I know that I have been united also to your Godhead
And have become your most pure body,
A member shining with kght, holy, glorious, tramparent....1
Not surprisingly, in no single work does Maximus present what we might recognise as a
systematic account of a doctrine of the Church. In this he is continuous with the whole
patristic tradition before him. Nevertheless, in the interests of our analysis we can and must
offer an account in which we examine under the rubric of ecclesiology Maximus' vision of
the status and function of that notably public and corporeal phenomenon he habitually
calls 'the holy Church of God.' For while a work such as the Mystagogia might be regarded
as less an ecclesiological treatise than an unfolding, symbolic application of the mysteries
unveiled in the eucharistic liturgy to the ascetic life, that application is grounded in the
experience of the concrete, housed enactment of the divine liturgy, an enactment that implies
a predetermined, given complex of concrete ritual, social and geographical arrangements.
This in itself already suggests how an examination of his ecclesiology is connected with our
I Symeon the New Theologian, Hymns II, 11-29, quoted by Kallistos Ware, 'My helper and my enemy', 103.
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overarching interest in the bodily since, as liturgiologist Mark Searle has pointed out, liturgy
is 'uniquely a matter of the body: both the individual body and the collective body.'2
Maximus' distinctly liturgico-centric ecclesiology has been reckoned by Thunberg
to be 'more a dimension than a specified theme of theology?' Yet it is, he adds, 'the supreme
dimension', one that 'contains the total vision of Maximus.° In this respect the learned
Swede concurs with Polycarp Sherwood who, writing some thirty years earlier in the
introduction to his English translation of Maximus' ascetic works, observes that while the
Confessor's ecclesiology is more implicit than explicit, more descriptive than definitive, the
Church is for him the primary realm in which there is experienced divine activity.' Earlier
still, Georges Florovsky spoke of the Church in Maximus' theology as the microcosm or
'macro-humanity' where `man's fate is decided?' More recently the Orthodox scholar Jean-
Claude Larchet has confirmed all these views in his affirmation that 'it is to the Church that
the mystery of human deification has been entrusted. For Maximus and his forebears, the
Church is the milieu where one attains union with God, the place where deification is
effected?'
But when Thunberg goes on to oppose this dynamic depiction of the Church to its
formal, externally-ordered existence as a social institution, he proposes an antithesis more
characteristic of the modern era that would, I suspect, appear to the Confessor as not
entirely true. In Maximus' mind, claims Thunberg, 'the Church is not an ecclesiastical
2 Mark Searle, 'Ritual', in Cheslyn Jones et ad (eds.), The Sturb, of the Litugy (London: SPCK; New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993), 56.
3 Man and the Cosmos, 113.
4 Ibid., 113.
5 St. Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Life, 73.
6 The 13Rantine Fathers of the Sixth to Eighth Century, 243.
7 La diviniration de Phomme, 400.
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institution distributing divine grace, but truly a Mystical Body that represents symbolically
the whole divine-human mystery.'8
Now it is a fact that, as Henri de Lubac demonstrated some time ago, the phrase
'mystical body' (calms mysticum) only came to be applied to the Church for the first time in
the twelfth century, before which time it designated the body of Christ received in the
Eucharist.' The phrase was, to be sure, used by some Fathers to refer to the Church of
heaven,10 and Maximus - without using the term a6pa puoTiK6v - does indeed think of
the Church on earth as a markedly heavenly, eschatological, mysterious reality. Its true
character or nature is not immediately apparent, but must be got at through contemplative
penetration of its outward, symbolic form. It remains the case however that what can be
gleaned as certain from Maximus' writings is that - whether expressed in his teaching on
the Incarnation and baptismal regeneration, his anagogical commentary on Scripture and
the liturgy, his appeals to the divine authority of Fathers and councils, his personal
exhortations to priests and bishops on the nature of their office, or his apparently lucid
confession of the pre-eminence of the Roman See - 'the holy Church of God' is neither an
invisible idea nor a utopic ideal, but an actualpoli g a substantive, identifiable communion of
faith whose inherent unity in Christ, orthodoxy of worship, and fulfilment of its
methatorial mission is strictly related to its hierarchical orders, its liturgical constitution, and
its faithfulness in doctrine.
Our reasons for investigating Maximus' understanding of the Church in connection
with our study on the place of the corporeal in his theology are therefore hopefully
obvious. Prominent in our analysis will of course feature those constitutively corporeal,
8 Man and the Cosmos, 113.
9 Corpus Mystictem. LEucharistie et Ltglice au Moyen Age (Paris: Aubier, 1949).
19 De Lubac draws particular attention to Theodoret (d. ca. 468) and Augustine (Corpus Mysticum, 16-17).
203
external marks of the Church's existence: liturgy, priesthood, sacraments." These are not
simply incidental, material components extrinsic to a more spiritual engagement with the
Church's intrinsic, transcendent life. It is precisely as a sacramental, hierarchical, liturgical
community that the Church is encountered as the true cosmos, as an ordered universe
penetrated by the presence of God - or to extend an originally eucharistic metaphor, as 'the
divine body.'' This affirmation does not simply set before us a mental image for rhetorical
application, but a profound truth that identifies that liturgically constituted phenomenon
which is the Church as the concrete locus whereby Christ is universally identifiable and
tangibly accessible in all his salvific splendour. Thus if we want to learn precisely what
Maximus regards as ultimately constitutive for the creation, preservation, and perfection of
all created and material bodies, we must sooner or later look to the Church. And since the
Church is Christ's own body, his deifying self-location, such an exercise will be
emphatically christocentric. As Saint Gregory of Nyssa has it, 'he who looks to the Church
looks directly to Christ.' n For at the centre of all Maximus' thinking about bodies —
whether cosmic, scriptural, human or ecclesial - is the transfigured, radiant body of Christ.
To risk repeating what is now in this study a well-worn theme: in the eschatologically-
charged account of the Transfiguration the human body of Christ becomes the medium of
divine glory: the created, visible, symbolic instrument for beholding the invisible light of
God. It is, to recall Richard Crashaw's poetic depiction of the Christ-child, 'all Wonders in
one sightl'14
11 The sacrament of holy baptism will be studied in more detail in the final chapter.
12 Amb.Io. 48 (PG 91.1364B).
13 Greg.Nyss.Cant. 13 (GNO VI, 382.2 - 383.3): (!) TrpOc rrjv iKKATIOIC0.1 PAETTCJV iTpOS. TO) XpicrrOv
aVTIKpUS PAgTTEI.
14 From his Christmas Ode, quoted by Avery Dulles, The Catholici0 of the Church (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1985), 36.
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In like manner 'the glorious and transcendently radiant magnificence of the holy
Church' is regarded by Maximus as a wholly pure, unadulterated object of contemplation —
utterly untarnished by material contingencies, persecution, or heresy. By grace she 'gives
saving strength to the entire disposition of those who devoutly contemplate her, for she
invites the ungodly, imparting to them the light of true understanding, and preserves those
who cherish the vision of the mysteries performed in her, guarding as unscathed and
without diminution the apple of their spiritual eye.'n
Our principal aim in this chapter then is not to attempt to provide a full account of
Maximus' ecclesiology per se, but to examine in what wcy this radiant ecclesial body functions
as the locus derficandi, the definitive place in which all creation reaches its divinely appointed
goal of union with God in Christ. In doing so we shall also highlight what Maximus
considers, explicitly or implicitly, the significance of the external, material aspects of the
Church's liturgical life, the conceptual terms with which he expresses that significance, and
the relation between these external aspects and the Church's mediatorial vocation. With the
designation `mediatorial vocation' we are already hinting at a connection requiring further
explication between Christ's priestly mediation between God and man, heaven and earth,
and the Church's fulfilment of the same as his deified body. What we shall argue is that for
Maximus the mediatorial veracity of this 'divine body' is inseparable from the ritual and
institutional dimensions of ecclesial life. Here again his thinking about the Church is
correlative to his christology, in which as we have seen the deification of the whole of
human nature through Christ's 'holy flesh' is the reciprocal and direct effect of the
mediatorial and hypostatic union in Christ of the divine and human natures. Let us recall
15 .Q.Thed 63 (CCSG 22, 145.13-14; 147.36-44).
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briefly Maximus' thinking on this matter in the first of his so-called christological letters,16
where in explicitly biblical language he paraphrases the Nicene Creed, 'the beautiful
inheritance of the faith,' as it has been taught by the Fathers:
His nature or essence is double, because as mediator between God and men (1 Tim 2:5), he must
fittingly restore the natural relationship to the mediated parties by his existence as both, so
that - in him and through him in very truth, having united the earthly realm with the
heavenly (Eph 1:10), 17 and having led back to his God and Father the material nature of
men that had been made hostile as a result of sin, but is now saved, reconciled and deified
(not by an identity of essence but by the ineffable power of his becoming human) - he may
through his holy flesh, taken from us as a first-fruit, perfectly make us sharers in the divine
nature (2 Pet 1:4). Hence he is known in fact and not in name alone to be at the same timels
both God and man.19
Let us now proceed by learning how this mediation of the incarnate Word, 'our great and
true High Priest of God,' 2' is made concretely accessible.
16 Ep. 12-19 (PG 91.460A — 597B).
17 In QD 63 (CCSG 10, 49.1-6) Maximus links Ephesians 1:10 with its talk of the recapitulation in Christ of
'things in heaven and things on earth' with Ephesians 2:14-15, in which Jews and Gentiles are united in Christ
to make 'one new man.'
la This emphasis on the simultaneity of Christ's existence as God and man and its cruciality for the efficacy of
his mediatorial vocation has its precedent in Cyril of Alexandria's understanding of Christ as High Priest. See
Frances M. Young, `Christological Ideas in the Greek Commentaries on the Epistle to the Hebrews', JTS NS
20 (1969), 152. Thus we may dismiss as unqualified the notion, voiced by the great Jesuit liturgical scholar
Josef A. Jungmann in The Place of Christ in Liturgical Payer, trans. A. Peeler (London: Geoffrey Chapman,
1989), 239-263, of a general trend in later Greek christology that sublimates Christ's high-priestly activity into
his divinity.
19 Ep. 12 (PG 91.468CD).
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The 'Priesthood of the Gospel': God Visible on Earth
In characteristically biblical terms, the holy flesh of Christ in the passage just quoted is the
very meeting point of God and humanity, 21 a reality prefigured in Israel's worship by the
priesthood, 22 the tabernacle,n the holy name,24 the altar,25 the holy of holies,26 and the
Temple.27 This emphasis on mediation through location - through the whole incarnate
divine Son rather than any single specific deed, was to become an important characteristic
of Byzantine liturgical theology, as we witness in Nicholas Cabasilas' Commentary on the
Divine Liturgy from the 1461 century:
[Christ] is mediator between God and man, not by his words or prayers, but in himself;
because he is both God and man, he has reunited the two, making himself the meeting-
ground of both.28
20 Myst. 23 (Sotiropoulos, 214. 10-11).
21 Jn 1:14, 18; 6:53-57; 7:37; 14:9; 20:28; 1 Jn 1:1-3; Rev 21:3.
22 Ex 29:42-46.
23 Ex 33:7-11; 40:34-35.
24 Ex 33:12-23; 34:5-7; Dt 12:5; 2 Chron 6:1-11.
25 Lev 9:1-24.
26 Ex 25:22; Num 7:89.
27 2 Chron 7:14-16.
28 Chapter 49 in J.M. Hussey and P.A. McNulty (trans.), Nicholas Cabasilas: A Commentary on the Divine Liturgy
(London: SPCK, 1960), 110. While it is safe to assert as a general trend in Byzantine theology this emphasis
upon the saving efficacy of the whole Incarnation rather than upon any specific deed of Christ, it ought not
be overstressed, or at least, not in Maximus' theology. Maximus is often led to focus on certain events in
Christ's life — his virginal conception and birth, his baptism, his temptation in the wilderness, the
transfiguration, his agony in the garden, his death, and finally his resurrection and ascension. Each possesses
in a varying respect a distinct and integral soteriological place and function in the overall redemptive
economy. Blowers offers some subtle reflections on and, I believe, a balanced appraisal of scholarly trends in
this connection in an article cited in the previous chapter, 'The Passion of Jesus Christ in Maximus the
Confessor: A Reconsideration.'
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Such an emphasis suggests an understanding of the liturgy — and of the eucharist in
particular - primarily as a performative oipbany of the transfigured Lord who, present as
high-priest, radiates through his body the light of his divine glory. 29 Our question is how,
concretely, does this happen? What does it look like? With this distinctly liturgical theme of
Christ as priest and mediator before us, it is appropriate to explore further Maximus'
remarks on what he knows as, in contrast to the Aaronic priesthood of the old
dispensation, 16 TO-11 EilayyEAiou iEpC0C511VT) - 'the priesthood of the gospel:3°
On numerous occasions in his role as spiritual father Maximus was presented with
opportunities to write to associates occupying a wide range of prominent political and
ecclesiastical positions. It is in his friendly exhortations to two bishops in particular that we
find four passages providing subtle indications of his high esteem for the priestly office and
of his understanding of its function to present God visibly on earth to the eyes of faith.
This distinctly christocentric character of the priesthood, or more specifically, of the
episcopate, is especially evident in his calling it TO As (ipxtEpcoativris puurriptov. 3 ' Of
the four passages, all of which predate 630, 3' three come from letters addressed to his close
friend John, Bishop of Cyzicus, whom he came to know when he lived at the monastery of
Saint George, and to whom he addressed the great earlier Ambigua." In the first, Maximus
offers counsel with respect to those under John's episcopal jurisdiction suffering some kind
29 On this point we would express agreement with Jungmann's estimation that central to this epiphanic
understanding of the Byzantine mass is the human-ward movement of the Logos sent by the Father. But we
would disagree quite strongly if this were taken to exclude a reciprocal human movement towards the Father
through the mediating Logos. What must be avoided is any simplistic (Nestorian or Monophysite) reduction
of 'divine service' to either a divine or a human activity. See The Place of Christ in Liturgical Prger, 239-263, and
esp. 252-255.
30 ,2D 7 (CCSG 10, 7.7-8).
31 Ep. 28 (PG 91.621A). In Maximus' works the terms lEpEtis and iEpcocruvri chiefly refer to the bishop and
the episcopal office, though without excluding the wider presbyterate.
32 Sherwood, Annotated Date-List.
33 We accept for the moment, though not without reservation, the authority of Combefis, as reported by
Sherwood (Annotated Date-List, 27), who supposes the `Kyrisilrios' addressed in Ep. 28 is in fact a corruption
of Ky#kenos, and is therefore the same Bishop John of Cyzicus.
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of dispersion — perhaps as a result of the Persian invasion. He reminds John that, 'in
accordance with the grace of the high-priesthood', it has fallen to him to be 'an imitator of
the divine goodness on earth,' and on that basis exhorts him to
strive to gather together the scattered children of God into one On 11:52), for this too is a mark
(xaparnip) of divine goodness. And since you are head (KukaVI) of the precious body of
the Church of God, join its members together with one another through the harmonious
design of the Spirit. Having been made herald of the divine teachings, call with a loud voice
those far and those near, and bind them to yourself with the indissoluble bond of the
Spirit's love....34
In the second passage, Maximus cites certain 'interpreters of the divine mysteries'35
who, using the adjective iXKT1K65, liken the priesthood to the attractive or drawing power
first of fire, then of God:
Physicists say that the force of fire draws up all the underlying material. In symbolically
comparing God to fire, the interpreters of the divine mysteries say that he also draws up all
who wish to obey his laws and who strive to live a pious life. And declaring the priesthood
to be a picture which in image-form suitably portrays what it represents (VI EIKOvt ypactrnv eU4)ue3s.
Tirjv pipriotv g)(oucrav irritipxetv AgyovTes Tip) iepcocnjvriv), they assert that it too, by
the equally gracious law of compassion, draws up to God all who are under the same
nature.36
34 Ep. 28 (PG 91.621A).
35 Maximus may well have Dionysius in mind. See a similar idea expressed in Dion.Ar.De ecc.hier. 1.1; 1.5; 2.3.3
(Cotpus Dionysiacum II, 63.10 —64.14; 67.16 — 68.4; 74.12 — 75.9).
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Maximus goes on to offer John specific injunctions on the basis of his appointment 'to
bear (gxEi V) the image of God on earth.'"
In the third passage, also to John, very similar language is used, with the additional
image of priest as pedagogue who leads a receptive person through sacramental initiation
to perfect deification with God. Thus the priest, as mediator, presents God to earthly man,
and offers deified man to God:
Just as the sun's rays suitably attract to it the healthy gaze which naturally delights in the
light and impart their own brightness, so also the true priesthood — being through all a visible
representation of the blessed Godhead to those on earth A(vaparrip &a« 5ta Trdvi-cov Tijs
paKapias OcOurros TOts — draws to itself (iclaKeTat TrpOç icarrijv) every
soul of devout and divine habit and imparts its own knowledge, peace and love, so that,
having borne each faculty of the soul to the final limit of its proper activity, it may present
to God as entirely deified those sacramentally initiated by it.38
And, he continues, this knowledge, peace, and love — the true telos of the soul's rational,
concupiscible and irascible faculties respectively, are the agents through which 'the true
priesthood' reaches its own telos, which is 'to be deified and to deify' (OEoITooOaI TE Kai
Nonotilv)." This last phrase echoes very clearly Gregory Nazianzen's summary of the
364. 30 (PG 91.624B).
37 Bp. 30 (PG 91.624B).
38 Bp. 31 (PG 91.624D — 625A).
39 Ep. 31 (PG 91.625A). VOlker cites this passage as evidence in Maximus that 'the ascent to deification is...
bound to the Church and its sacramental gifts as well as to the priesthood which distributes them.' Maximus
Confessor  alr Meister des geistlichen Lebens, 481.
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two-fold mediatorial goal of the priesthood, namely, 'to be God and to deify' (0EOv
icrOpEvov Kai 0Eo1roujoovTa).40
In the fourth passage, which again forms the theological basis for subsequent
paraenesis, Maximus is addressing an unnamed 'most holy Bishop of Cydonia.'' The monk's
high praise for him stems from the bishop's perfect imitation of the mystery of God's
saving economy in paradoxically uniting in himself 'sublimity' and 'humility'. This Christ-
like joining of transcendent divine qualities with bodily human nature — so that each
becomes visible through the other - is to Maximus' mind especially appropriate to the
incumbent bishop, 'since God ordained the priesthood to represent him on earth to ensure that he may
not cease being seen bodily and that his mysteries may not cease appearing to those with eyes to
see. )42
In summary of these four passages, the priest/bishop is seen by Maximus as head
of the body of people under his oversight. Their unity in him is established and preserved
through his proclamation of doctrine and his active exercise of divine love. As the
xaparnjp and EiKuiv of God' he communicates heavenly, divine realities on earth, bodily,
and more specifically, visibly. It is to the eyes more than to any other sense that the priest
presents God, for they are the physical organ by which the mind penetrates sensible
phenomena to apprehend exclusively intelligible realities. In turn, the priest draws to himself
40 Greg.Naz.Or. 2.73 (SC 247, 186.17-18); see also Greg.Naz.Or. 2.22 (SC 247, 120.14), where the goal of the
priest's art is OEOv Trotilcrat.
41 Ep. 21 (PG 91.604B — 605C). Cydonia is on the north coast of Crete.
42 Bp. 21 (PG 91.604D).
43 One cannot overlook the christological significance of the term xaparnip as it appears in Hebrews 1:3.
Yet its association with the priesthood in Maximus, as in Gregory Nazianzen, ought not be interpreted by
way of the later Tridentine notion of a priestly character indelibilis. See Andre de Halleux, 'Gregoire de
Nazianze, temoin du «caractere sacerdotalh?' in idem., Patrologie et CEcuminisme, &cued Dttudes (Leuven:
Leuven University Press, 1990), 693-709.
44 A fact also noted by Irenee-Henri Dalmais, Nystere Liturgique et Divinisation dans la Mystagogie de saint
Maxime le Confesseur', in Jacques Fontaine and Charles Kannengiesser (eds.), Epektasis: Mikinges Patristiques
Offirts au Cardinal Jean Dandlou (Beauchesne, 1972), 56.
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all those under his care and presents them, perfectly deified, to God. While the actual
person of the priest and his mediatorial function are in no way viewed as though
incumbent and office were separable, it is chiefly in his role as one who renders visible the
divine 'mysteries' that he is most truly the bodily image of God on earth.
There is also much more to this 'drawing' than may at first meet the eye. 45 The term
clearly echoes Jesus' words about his priestly activity in John 12:32: 'And when I am lifted
up from the earth I will draw (Doakiw) all people to myself.' But Maximus' immediate
source of inspiration for its use is more likely Dionysius the Areopagite. The word
comprehends the totality of the function of the Church's sacerdotal office in which the
hierarch - the bishop - serves as a mediating ray for the assimilation to God of all the orderly
ranks under him. This of course indicates that Dionysius and Maximus following him
understood the notion of hierarchy differently from how it is popularly understood today:'
Hierarchy is, to my mind, a sacred order, knowledge and activity, which is being assimilated
to likeness with God as much as possible and, in response to the illuminations that are
given it from God, is raised to the imitation of him in its own measure.... The purpose of
hierarchy, then, is to bring about assimilation to God and, as far as possible, union with
hhm
Andrew Louth comments on the meaning of this passage in the context of Dionysius'
[Denys] broader vision of ecclesial and celestial orders:
45 The verb XKEIV is translated in these contexts by VOlker with `sich anziehen' (Maximus Confessor air Meister
des geirachen Lebens, 140-141).
46 Dionysius is repeatedly slighted in many quarters for introducing to the medieval Church of the West,
through Aquinas, a hierarchical view of ministry in which 'service' is allegedly 'swallowed up by authority.'
See, for instance, Paul Philibert, 'Issues for a Theology of Priesthood: A Status Report', in Donald J. Goergen
and Ann Garrido (eds), The Theology ofPrksthood (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 2000), 17-19.
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[Hierarchy] is, certainly, a matter of order (-rd)s), but for Denys it is much more. The
hierarchy itself is knowledge (riarripri) and activity (ii4yeta), and has a purpose: that
of drawing into union with and assimilation to God all that belongs to it.... [H]ierarchy has
a healing purpose. Far from being a structure of ordered and repressive authority, hierarchy
for Denys is an expression of the love of God for everything that derives from him — that
is, everything — a love that seeks to draw everything back into union with the source of all
being. Hierarchy is the theophany of God's love that beings are.48
With this background in mind we can better appreciate the full, cosmic scope of Maximus'
understanding of the 'drawing' purpose of the priesthood. At the same time it may allow us
to make clearer sense of Maximus' conception of hierarchy when we come to consider it
more closely in the next section.
We move now to another passage which sheds further light on this central notion
of the priest as one in whose person, teaching, love and ritual actions God is presented
visibly and bodily on earth and all the members of the body are drawn together and united.
It appears in Anastasius' record of Maximus' first trial in 655. There we discover why it is
Maximus would have the Emperor, who in this case was bent on enforcing the notorious
Typos, excluded from the task of defining catholic doctrine. The text shows itself to be an
important part of our investigation when we see with Maximus that the unity and
mediatorial vocation of the Church are grounded in the orthodoxy of its public confession
of saving dogma, a confession which is itself defined and regulated exclusively by the
47 Dion.A.t.De codhier. 3.1-2 (Corpus Dionysiacum II, 17.3-11).
48 Andrew Louth, `Apophatic Theology: Denys the Areopagite', Hermathena 165 (1998), 78.
49 For details on authorship and dating, see Pauline Allen and Bronwen Neil (eds.), Scripta Saeculi VII, Vitam
Maximi Confessoth Illustrantia (CCSG 39, Turnhout: Brepols and Publishers, 1999), xv.
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Church's priests and bishops. Having asserted as much, the aged Confessor was asked
whether every Christian Emperor is not also a priest and therefore possesses the right to
determine dogma, to which he replied:
He is not, for neither does he stand at the altar nor after the consecration of the bread does
he elevate it saying, 'Holy things for the holy.' Nor does he baptise, or perform the rite of
chrismation, or ordain and make bishops and priests and deacons; nor does he anoint
churches, or wear the symbols of the priesthood, the omophorion 50 and the Gospel book,
in the way in which he wears, as symbols of kingship, the crown and purple robe.51
Appealing to the Church's lex orandi Maximus here indirectly affords us an insight
into elements he considers constitutive of the priestly office. It is with reference to the
opening words of this passage that Robert Taft speculates that Maximus 'obviously views
[the elevation] as a rite of some significance, even emblematic of the priestly ministry.'52 It
is apparently the theophanic moment of unveiling the eucharistic gifts at which the priest,
at least in the rite known to Germanus in the 8 th century, exhorts 'Look, see, behold God! ...
God is the holy one who abides with the saints!' ((AineTE, escopiiTE I Sot) O eE65.
0E65 icyriv 0 aytos iv dylois olvaTrau41Evos). 53 While in his Mystagogia Maximus
omits any mention of this particular moment in the eucharistic rite, which falls between the
`Our Father' and the congregational hymn 'One is Holy', it appears when his model
543 'The omophorion of the Greek Rite... corresponds to the Latin palliurn, with the difference that in the
Greek Rite its use is a privilege not only of archbishops, but of all bishops.' Joseph Braun, Tailium', The
Catholic Engclopedia 11 (London, 1913), 429.
51 RiVI (CCSG 39, 27.183-190).
52 Robert F. Taft, 'The Precommunion Elevation of the Byzantine Divine Liturgy', OCP 62 (1996), 31.
53 Chapter 43 in Paul Meyendorff, St Germanus of Constantinople on the Divine Liturgy (New York: St Vladimir's
Seminary Press, 1984), 104. While I have taken arms as the masculine plural, the expression invites being
understood as 'in the holy things', that is, in the sacramental elements, 'among the holy ones', that is, the
angelic beings, and 'in the sanctuary', as it is used sometimes in LXX (cf. Is 57:15; Ezek 44:11).
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mystagogue, Dionysius the Areopagite, makes at least three references to the elevation in
his Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, introducing it with formulaic regularity as the bishop's
performance of 'the most divine acts':
[Then] the hierarch performs the most divine acts and elevates the things praised through
the sacredly displayed symbols (6 lepdp)(ris. ... iepoupyiiTa 0£16TaTa Kai UTT' 0nIJIV
«yet Ta Upvrivp6va 51« Te;sv lEpGsn 1TpOKE11.1EV631) CUII36ÀCJI0.54
If all we had to go on was this passage from Dionysius and the statement from
Maximus' trial we could do no more than speculate with Father Taft about the
'emblematic' status of the elevation in Maximus' understanding of the priestly office. But
coupled with the testimony of Germanus, it cannot be insignificant that in the Mystagogia
itself, when he comes to praise the communion ( .6 pe-rd500ts-) as the telos of the whole
synaxis, Maximus writes how at that point — which immediately follows the elevation — the
worshippers themselves 'beholding the light of the invisible and ineffable glory become,
together with the powers above, vessels (5EKTIK0i) of the blessed purity. 55 Combined with
the material cited above from the Epistulae may we not plausibly suggest that the reason
Maximus cites this moment first in a series of episcopal functions is because he regards the
action of the priest, in the movement from standing before the altar to lifting before the
eyes of the saints Christ's holy body, as somehow constitutive of his mediatorial office
through which the worthy are united to God? Surely we are justified in affirming that
Maximus explicitly locates the significance of priesthood at the altar (OuataaTripica), in the
elevation, with the proclamation -re( Oira TOis ciyiots!, because there above all is the
54 Dion.Ar.De ecc.hier. (Copus Diogsiacum II, 81.6-7; 90.9-10; 92.17-18).
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priest most visibly and definitively what he is appointed to be: the mediating servant by
which worthy individuals attain a holy communion. There he most closely resembles Christ
the mediator between God and man (1 Tim 2:5), 'who through his flesh makes manifest to
human beings the incomprehensible Father, and through the Spirit leads those reconciled
in himself to the Father.' 56 There he most explicitly manifests the two principal tasks which,
according to Gregory Nazianzen, have been entrusted to him: 'the protection' of souls'
puxc3v TrpooTaaiav) and 'the mediation between God and man' (t.marreiav eEdilt Kai
civepo.irrcov).58
The Ranks of the Church: Ordained by the One Spirit
A second point arising from the statement made in Maximus' trial, and one most pertinent
to our topic, is the question of ecclesial ranks. In the scheme of ecclesiastical order the
Emperor stands alongside the laity. Maximus is further recorded as noting that in the
intercessory lists included in the eucharistic anaphora, the Emperor is remembered with the
laity after all the clerical ranks, implying therefore his subordination to that unifying
episcopal authority exercised most definitively in the bishops' defining doctrine and their
presiding at the eucharist:
During the holy anaphora at the holy altar, the emperors are remembered with the laity after
the bishops and priests and deacons and the whole priestly rank when the deacon says,
55 Myst. 21 (Sotiropoulos, 210.8-10).
56 Or.dont. (CCSG 23, 30.71-74).
57 The word TrpooTaala carries a range of meanings — oversight, care, leadership, patronage. A TipOCIT&TT'S'
in Graeco-Roman society was a patron. For Gregory, this essentially meant a protector of the weak. See the
comments of Jean Bernardi in Gregoire de Natian.ze. Discours 1-3 (SC 247, Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1978),
47-48.
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'And those laymen who have died in faith, Constantine, Constans,...' and the others. Thus
he makes remembrance of living emperors after all the clergy.59
We have already encountered the existence of ranks in connection with our study in
chapter one of 'proportionate revelation' and the ascent from praxis through theoria to
theologia in the Chapters on Theology. There we saw within a more consciously monastic milieu
how and why Maximus distinguishes between 'initiates' or 'beginners' (01 EicraycipEvot , ol
VTITT101) and 'the perfect' (oi TEXEIWOEVTES, 01 TEXEI00,6° or between the respective
spiritual ranks of TTIOT65, PaerITTiS, and e1T6oToAos. 61 In no way does this existence of
a hierarchy of different ranks within the Church contradict the fundamental baptismal unity
announced by Saint Paul in Galatians 3:28, a central text in Maxirnian theology: 'there is
neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ.' On
the contrary, it is precisely by way of differing ecclesial ranks, themselves xapiopa-ra of
the one Holy Spirit, that the unity of the Church is preserved. Maximus makes this clear
when he is asked by the priest Thalassius to reconcile an apparent biblical discrepancy in
which Saint Paul allegedly disobeys the Spirit.' How was the Apostle's journey to
Jerusalem justified when the Tyrian disciples, speaking by the Spirit, urged him not to go (cf.
Ac 21:4)?
Maximus begins his reply by referring to Isaiah 11:1-3 where the prophet lists seven
'spirits', by which Isaiah does not infer that there are seven spirits of God, but that the
'energies of one and the same Holy Spirit' are said to be 'spirits' since the same 'actuating
58 Greg.Naz.Or. 2 (SC 247, 208.17-18).
59 RAI (CCSG 39, 27.200-206).
60 Th.Oec. 1.97; 2.13; 2.28; ,Q.ThaL 10 (CCSG 7, 83.6-24). Cf. the contrast between vrjrnot and the dap
Tae toy
 in Ephesians 4:13-14.
81 Th.Oec. 1.33-34.
62 .Q. ThaL 29 (CCSG 7, 211.1 —215.72).
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Holy Spirit exists wholly and complete in each energy proportionately.' 63 These 'diverse
energies' also include the 'diverse gifts' mentioned in 1 Corinthians 12:4, again given by one
and the same Spirit. The Spirit distributes these gifts in proportion to each person's faith,
and by participating in the gift that person receives the corresponding energy or activity of
the Spirit, thus enabling him to fulfil particular commandments.
Returning to the problem in hand, Maximus first distinguishes between Paul's gift
of 'love for God' to the disciples' gift of 'love for Paul':
Paul disobeyed them because he regarded the love which is divine and beyond
understanding as incomparably superior to the spiritual love which the others had for him.
And in fact he did not go up disobeying them at all, but rather by his own example he drew
(AKr.A.w) them — who prophesied through the energy of the Spirit which was in due
proportion given to them according to the gift of grace — towards that yearning desire for
him who is beyond all."
This first distinction is based on the two-fold divine command of love for God and love
for neighbour, which in no way admits any division or separation. Still, the one is
subordinate to the other. Maximus then introduces a second distinction — that between 'the
prophetic gift' (TO irpotl)nTiKOv Xdplapa) and 'the apostolic gift' (TO eurooToXtKOv
xdp(apa). The latter is superior to the former, since it has in mind the whole divine skopos:
Since the prophetic gift is inferior to the apostolic gift, it was not appropriate to the Word
who governs the universe (TO ITEM and assigns each one his due office (Ti=1.,v iKnioTou
63 Q.ThaL 29 (CCSG 7,211.9-12).
64 2ThaZ 29 (CCSG 7, 213.43-49).
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Stop(Cov-ros- Tgtv) for the superior to submit to the inferior, but rather for the inferior
to follow after the superior. For those who prophesied through the prophetic spirit in
them — not the apostolic spirit — revealed the way in which Saint Paul would suffer for the
Lord. But he, looking only towards the divine purpose (npOs pOvov «ckop(3v TOv Oelov
aKoTrOv), regarded as nothing all that would intervene. He was concerned not to survive
that which would befall him, but to become another Christ through the imitation of Christ
and through accomplishing all that for the sake of which Christ in his love for humankind
chose life in the flesh in his economy.65
Any question of opposition between various ranks is therefore done away with, since they
are seen to be arranged by divine reason (the Logos) and are related to the entire economies
of cosmic and salvific order. Consequently the alleged 'disobedience' of the Apostle,
condudes Maximus, is in fact
a guardian of the good order (ctiTaias- cj)UdtaKij) which arranges and governs all sacred
matters, and which keeps each person from falling away from his own abode and
foundation (poviis Kai iSpjaEc)s). It also teaches clearly that the ranks of the Church
which the Spirit has fittingly assigned (Toils KaAC35 inTO Tdil nvElipaTos. &cop I apbous
Tiis EKKX11Cri as Paepoijs) are not to be confused with one another.66
From here I do not think it too great a leap to move to the contended question in
Maximus' theology of the status of the Church of Rome. On this point we must ask
whether the external, charismatic hierarchy which as we have seen guards and preserves the
Church's ordered harmony extends to a ranking of different episcopal sees. If for Maximus
65 .Q.Thal 29 (CCSG 7, 213.54 — 215.66).
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such an order is essential to each member's harmonious preservation in the whole body - if
there is no opposition, but rather a necessary correlation between ordered ranks in the
Church and the Church's fundamental unity - then we might expect to find that he reckons
entirely acceptable the extension to one particular church of a divinely-given rank of pre-
eminence over the others. This whole subject has been studied extensively by Larchet,'
who refutes and clarifies some of the lofty claims made by Dominicans Alain Riou" and
Juan-Miguel Garrigues.' Larchet rightly rejects any appraisal of Maximus as a virtual proto-
champion of a fully developed medieval version of papal primacy. He argues that Maximus'
defence of Popes Honorius (625-638) 7° and Theodore I (642-649) 71 stems primarily from
his conviction that their language was capable of admitting an orthodox interpretation and
indeed, we might add, despite weaknesses in their choice of words, was intended to do so.
But what of the unambiguous exaltation extended to the Roman See in the two incomplete
texts that survive as Opuscu/a 11 and 12? Larchet has pointed out that the second of these
texts,n both of which are no more than extracts preserved by the 9th century librarian and
member of the papal curia Anastasius (d. ca. 878), extant only in Latin and of
potentially dubious authenticity. Even so, Is]etting aside questions of textual authenticity
and accuracy of translation from the Greek original,' he writes,
66 .Q.ThaZ 29 (CCSG 7, 215.67-72).
67 We shall draw in large part from the briefer comments in his Introduction to Emmanuel Ponsoye's‘French
translation of the Opuscula in Saint McDdme k Confesseur. Opuscules Thiologiques et Polimiques (Paris: Les Editions
du Cerf, 1998), 7-108. For a full treatment of each relevant text with the necessary historical background, see
Larchet's Maxime le Confesseur, midiateur entre l'Orient et l'Occident (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1998), 125 — 201.
68 Le Monde et Lglise se/on Maxime k Confesseur.
69 'Le sens de la primaute romaine selon Modme le Confesseur', Istina 21 (1976), 6-24.
70 Opusc. 20 (PG 91.237C — 245D).
71 Opusc. 10 (PG 91.133D — 136C).
72 PG 91.144A-D.
73 For a brief precis of Anastasius Bibliothecarius' life and work, see Allen and Neil (CCSG 39), xxvi — mot.
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one notes first of all that Maximus does not establish strictly speaking an equivalence
between the Catholic Church and the See of Rome, but... affirms the recognition that the
Church of Rome, engaged in the controversy to defend the orthodox faith, represents that
faith in a way the Church of Constantinople, fallen in heresy, does not. And it is only to the
degree that the Church of Rome confesses the orthodox faith that she may be considered
the universal Church.74
The authenticity of the second text, Opusada 11, while more commonly accepted,
can neither be regarded as entirely free from doubt. It is generally thought to have been
penned by Maximus in Rome soon after the Lateran synod in 649. Before we hear from
Larchet, let us place before our eyes the whole of the disputed passage:
For the very ends of the earth and those in every part of the world who purely and rightly
confess the Lord look directly to the most holy Church of the Romans and its confession
and faith as though it were a sun of unfailing light, expecting from it the illuminating
splendour of the Fathers and the sacred dogmas, just as the divinely-inspired and sacred six
synods («rat 4 aLivoSot) have purely and piously decreed, declaring most expressly the
symbol of faith. For ever since the incarnate Word of God came down to us, all the
churches of Christians everywhere have held that greatest Church there (atIT600 to be
their sole base and foundation (pOvriv Kpri ii6a Kai eepiXtov), since on the one hand, it is
in no way overcome by the gates of Hades, according to the very promise of the Saviour
(Mt 16:18-19), but holds the keys of the orthodox confession and faith in him and opens
the only true and real religion to those who approach with godliness, and on the other
hand, it shuts up and locks every heretical mouth that speaks unrighteousness against
74 Larchet, Introduction to Ponsoye, Saint Maxim k Confesseur. Opuscuks Theologiques et Polimiques, 74.
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the Most High. For that which was founded and built by the creator and master of the
universe himself, our Lord Jesus Christ, and his disciples and apostles, and following them
the holy fathers and teachers and martyrs consecrated by their own words and deeds, and
by their agony and sweat, suffering and bloodshed, and finally by their violent death for the
catholic and apostolic Church of us who believe in him, they strive to destroy through two
words (St ci St:10 pripC(TWV) [uttered] without effort and without death — 0 the patience
and forbearance of God! — and to annul the great ever-radiant and ever-lauded mystery of
the orthodox worship of Christians.75
According to Larchet, who provisionally accepts Maxirnian authorship, what the
Confessor has to say in this text `s'explique cependant en grande partie par les
circonstances historiques et celles de sa propre vie. ... '76 In other words, Maximus'
`enthousiasme' here is coloured by the fact that as a political refugee he had found
protection and support in the western empire generally and in the Church of Rome in
particular when she alone was confessing the true faith against the Monotheletist policy
endorsed by the Imperium. In Larchet's words, the eminence with which the Confessor
regards the Roman See 'chiefly relies on the fact that she has confessed the orthodox faith
and defended it against heresies.'77
A closer reading of the text however reveals that according to its author's own
explicitly theological reasoning, the eminence of the Church of Rome for its confession of
faith is not independent of its pre-eminence on the basis of the promise of Christ - of
which Rome is the primary and representative recipient. The locative adverb `airrOei' (here;
there; in this or that specific place) indicating Rome is immediately linked to Christ's promise of
75 PG 91.137C — 140B.
76 Introduction to Ponsoye, Saint Maxim k Confesseur. Opuscuks Thiokgiques et Pokiniques, 107.
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the inviolability of the Church against the gates of Hades and the conferral of the keys to
Peter (Mt 16:18-19). We can only presume that in the author's way of thinking, the Church
in Rome holds these keys for no other reason than what was accepted universally as the
Petrine connection to Rome, a connection first made explicit by Irenaeus,Th referred to at
the Council of Sardica (ca. 343),79 by Leo I (440-461),80 and exploited from very
early on81
 through the establishment of a shrine at the Apostle's tomb and its promotion as
a holy place for pilgrimage." Upon his concession to Maximus in the dispute in Carthage in
July of 645, Pyrrhus drew precisely that connection when he expressed his desire 'to be
deemed worthy first of venerating the shrines of the Apostles - or rather those of the chiefs
77 Introduction to Ponsoye, Saint Maxim k Confesseur. Opuscules Thiologiques et Pole'miques, 107.
78 Iren.Haer. 3.3.2 (SC 211, 32.15-29): 'Although it would be overly long in this kind of book to enumerate the
[episcopal] successions of all the churches, yet by drawing attention to the tradition from the Apostles and the
faith confessed to mankind which have come down to us through the succession of bishops in the greatest,
most ancient and well-known Church founded and constituted by the two most glorious Apostles Peter and
Paul at Rome, we may confound all those who in any other way, either through self-satisfaction or vainglory
or through blindness and wicked intent, assemble improperly. For with this Church, on account of its more
authoritative origin (propter potentiorem pnncipaktatem), all churches must agree, that is, the faithful in all places,
because in it has always been preserved by the [faithful] of all places the tradition from the Apostles.'
I take the two celebrated phrases in Ign.Rom. (one in the salutation in which he addresses the
Church that 71-p0KdeT1Tal EV TOM? xoapiou 'Pczpaiczu, and the other in Ign.Rom. 4.3: ot:tX ()Ls 1TETp05
Kai TTaiiAos. StaTaaaopat as evidence of an earlier (ca. 110), but implicit recognition of the
connection.
79 Canon 3: But if perchance sentence be given against a bishop in any matter and he supposes his case to be
not unsound but good, in order that the question may be reopened, let us, if it seem good to your charity,
honour the memory of Peter the Apostle, and let those who gave judgement write to Julius, the bishop of
Rome, so that, if necessary, the case may be retried by the bishops of the neighbouring provinces and let him
appoint arbiters.' Trans. in Henry IL Percival (ed.), The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church (NPNF
14, Edinburgh: T&T Clark / Grand Rapids, Michigan: WM. B. Eerdrnans Publishing Company, 1900), 417.
Before this time it appears there may have been claims made by individual Roman bishops to a Petrine
succession for their office. The famous though not undisputed cases are that of Pope Calixtus I (d. 223) in
connection with Tertullian's polemic to a nameless bishop in De pudicitia 21, and that of Pope Stephen I (d.
257), who, in an extract preserved by Cyprian of Carthage (Cyp.Ep. 74.17), was accused by Firmilian of
Caesarea of claiming to possess the chair of Saint Peter 'through succession.'
89 See Walter Ullmann, 'Leo I and the Theme of Papal Primacy', in Everett Ferguson et aL (eds.), Studies in
Earry Christianity: A Collection of Scho&rry Esscrys (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1993), 359-385.
81 In a recent article Brian Daley notes that 'excavations carried out under the Vatican basilica in the 1940s
confirm that Christians were venerating Peter's remains there, with great devotion, from at least the 160s.' See
The Ministry of Primacy and the Communion of Churches', in Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (eds.),
Church Unity and the Papal Office (Grand Rapids, Michigan / Cambridge, UK William B. Eerdrnans Publishing
Company, 2001), 37.
82 In The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981),
87-88, Peter Brown records how the young prince Justinian's request for a fragment of Peter's remains was
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(Kopucip aic.ov) of the Apostles themselves [Peter and Paul], and then of seeing the face of
the most-holy Pope.'" According to Opusculum 11 then, Rome's pre-eminence is not seen
exclusively to be conditional upon the orthodoxy of its confession, but is also bound up
with the promise of Christ, his bestowal of the keys to the Church in the person of Peter,
and the succession of Peter's episcopacy located in Rome.
Thus there can be no question about the essential meaning of the text, nor does its
ecclesiology necessarily furnish any real doubts about Maxirnian authorship. For Maximus,
Peter is 'the all-holy, the great foundation (Kprirris) of the Church.'" His is the 'reverent
confession, against which the wicked mouths of the heretics, gaping like the gates of hell,
never prevail.'" It appears that Maximus also accepts communion with the Roman See as a
critical factor, properly inseparable from 'the right confession of the faith', in the realisation
of the unity of the Church. When, according to the record of the debate which took place
in August 656 while Maximus was in exile in Bizya," Bishop Theodosius, imperial and
patriarchal legate, proffers superficial acceptance of Maximus' position and offers to
confirm it in writing, Maximus directs him and his associates — 'that is, the Emperor and
Patriarch and the synod convoked by him' - instead to 'send a written account to this effect
to Rome as the canon stipulates.'" His summary recommendation is that the Emperor and
the Patriarch themselves forward to the Pope of Rome 'an exhortatory dispatch' and 'a
flatly denied. Instead, he received a handkerchief that had been lowered into the crypt and brought out 'heavy
with the blessing of St Peter.'
83 DP (PG 91.352D — 353A).
2.ThaZ 27 (CCSG 7, 197.114-115). In specifically identifying Peter as the emp6TaTos and K0pu4)caos of
the Apostles CQ.Thal59 [CCSG 22, 55.171-172]; 61 [CCSG 22, 101.272]) Maximus expresses the common
mind of the Byzantine tradition both before and for a good while after him. See John Meyendorff, 'St. Peter
in Byzantine Theology', in idem. et al (eds.), The Primag of Peter (London: The Faith Press, 1963), 7-29.
85 Ep. 13 (PG 91.512B).
86 Allen and Neil (CCSG 39), XV.
87 DB (CCSG 39, 113.432-434). The canon to which Maximus here refers is presumably canon 5 of the First
Ecumenical Council (see Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Council'', vol. 1, 8). The (earlier?) Apostolic canon 32
(Percival, The Seven Ecumenical Councils, 595-596) is like it: 'if any presbyter or deacon has been
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conciliar petition' respectively so that, 'if indeed you are found to be turning to the way of
the Church on account of your right confession of the faith, you may be reconciled....'m
Nevertheless, notwithstanding Maximus' continuity with the tradition's acceptance
of communion with the Roman See and its Bishop as a necessary condition of Church
unity, Opusculum 11 does present one peculiar and unaccountable phrase that raises
unavoidable questions of textual authenticity. We are referring to the expression, 'the
sacred six synods' or `councils'. 89 According to the 17 th century Dominican patrologist
Francois Combefis, the 'six synods' mentioned in the text include the Lateran synod of 649
in Rome, which he assumes Maximus must have regarded as on par with the five councils
by that time generally ragarded as 'ecumenical': Nicaea (325), Constantinople (381),
Ephesus (431), Chalcedon (451), and Chalcedon 11 (553). This assumption has acquired
nearly universal acceptance.
There is in principle no reason why Maximus might not have thought of the
Lateran synod as a truly 'ecumenical' synod. It was convoked by the Pope himself, brought
together bishops from around the inhabited world, confessed the faith and rejected error in
accordance with the dogmatic tradition enshrined in the great councils of the past. But
does Maximus anywhere else give any indication that he thought of the Lateran synod as a
universal synodical gathering on par with the five synods generally accepted as ecumenical?
We should first ask whether he could have gained that impression from the synod itself -
though it seems those councils subsequently called 'ecumenical' never actually set out with
a self-conscious view of their status as such." The Acta of the Lateran synod of 649 are
excommunicated by a bishop, he may not be received into communion again by any other than by him who
excommunicated him....'
88 DB (CCSG 39, 115.445-450).
89 The words 'synod' and 'council' translate the same Greek word.
90 This of course raises the much-disputed question as to what constitutes an 'ecumenical' council or synod.
There is one passage in Maximus' trial that perhaps indicates a prevailing belief that a synod's validity
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recorded simply as 'the proceedings of the holy and apostolic synod conducted in this
illustrious and venerable [city] Rome.'" That is, they appear to regard the synod as 'one of
the normal bi-annual provincial synods as visualized by Nicaea 1 (canon 5)• 92 Riedinger
grants it a more modest status yet, going so far as to suggest that it was little more than a
meeting convoked to approve the Latin translation of already existing Greek documents.
Flis basis for such a view rests on the fact that there was no actual debate or discussion."
When later the validity of this 'synod of Rome' is questioned by several of
Maximus' interrogators, he gives no indication that he thinks of it at that stage as bearing
the illustrious title `ecumenical'." Yet his mention of 'four synods' in his trial is qualified by
the adjective oiKoupeviKal,95 as we find in an earlier treatise where he speaks of 'the holy
five ecumenical synods.' 96 And in a work written after his death by followers dearly
dedicated to the primacy of the Roman See, we find no signs of their exploiting Maximus'
alleged recognition of the Lateran synod as on par with the first Five Ecumenical Councils,
but instead find distinguished 'the five holy and ecumenical synods' and 'the holy and most
pious apostolic synod convoked in Rome.'97
depended on its being convoked or authorised by the Pope, given, that is, that he was legitimately in
possession of his office. When mention is made of the doctrinal authority of the Lateran synod in Rome, one
of Maximus' accusers, Demosthenes, with reference to Pope Martin I's shameful arrest, trial, and exile at the
hands of the Imperium, counters with the cry, 'The synod has not been ratified since the one who summoned
it has been deposed.' To which Maximus calmly replies, 'He was not deposed, but banished. What synodal
and canonical act is there among the things accomplished that firmly attests his deposition?' RM (CCSG 39,
47.457 — 49.463).
91 Riedinger, ACO ser. 11.1, 2.3-4. This titular form also occurs in Anastasius' DB (CCSG 39, 111.416-417)
where Maximus is recorded as ,pointing out patristic citations from Tiiv (3i(3Xov Trerrpayp g vcov Tris
«yias K a t arroa-roAtKiic auvo5ou Pczuris.
92 J.M. Hussey, The Orthodox Church in the Byantine Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 20.
93 Rudolph Riedinger, `Griechische Konzilsakten auf dem Wege ins lateinische Mittelalter', Annuarium
Historiae Conaorum 9 (1977), 255-257; cited by Bronwen Neil, 'The Monothelite Controversy and Its
Christology' (MATR dissertation, University of Durham, 1998), 19.
94 EM (CCSG 39, 31.250 — 33.263; 45.428 — 49.468); DB (CCSG 39, 95.234 — 97.260).
95 RM (CCSG 39, 31.253).
96 Opusc. 9 (PG 91. 128B).
97 Hypom. (CCSG 39, 213.225-232).
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Combefis may well be right. Yet it is not entirely impossible that a later writer with
certain sympathies towards the Roman See - perhaps even Anastasius Bibliothecarius
himself - composed and inserted the fragment we have come to know as Opusculum 11 in
the Maximian corpus. Interestingly enough, after his own attempt to install himself to the
papal office by unlawful means and his subsequent deposition, Anastasius became
'unofficial secretary and private advisee" to Pope Nicholas I (858-867) who, in the
polemical context generated by his debate with Photius and questions of a more juridical
nature, asserted the traditionally accepted eminence of Rome with no uncertain rigour in
language remarkably similar to our own Opusculum 11. It is also interesting to note that at
this stage — well after the Second Council of Nicea (787) — it would apparently have been
entirely normal for the those allied with the Church of Rome to refer with Pope Nicholas
to the authority of 'sex universalium conciliorum'."
None of these speculations pretends to prove anything positive, nor do I possess
either the evidence or competence to offer a firm verdict on text-critical questions at this
stage. What can be said is that any conclusions regarding the authenticity of Opusculum 11
will have to settle the question of the 'six synods', a task that might also be helped by a
certain identification of the 'two words' referred to towards the end of the text, a reference
no commentator to my knowledge has yet addressed.'
In the final analysis, furthermore, one's interpretation of Opusculum 11 must be
qualified by what we come across later in Maximus' life in two sets of statements which
could be said definitively to represent his mature ecclesiology. In the first, from the
98 Allen and Neil (CCSG 39), xxvii.
99 See Nicolai I. papae epistolae 91; 92; 98 (E. PereIs [ed.], Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistobrum Tomus VI,
vol. 4: Epistolae Kambni Aeui [Berlin, 1925], 520.17; 539.34-35; 558.18).
100 My hunch would be to suggest that, supposing Opusc. 11 to be at least contemporary with Maximus, the
phrase refers to the Imperial Ekthesis and the Typos, both of which were condemned at the Lateran synod; in
which case the Greek would better be translated as 'two statements.'
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Diiputatio Bi vae, Bishop Theodosius is found to be trying amicably but unsuccessfully to
persuade Maximus to submit to the Typos and return to fellowship with the Church (of
Constantinople). It becomes evident that Maximus' resistance is rooted not in a pedantic
dogmatism' but in an understanding of a divinely instituted order of ecclesial and
doctrinal authority in which the teaching of the Apostles and Prophets, recorded in
Scripture and mediated through the Church's Bishops and Councils, itself conveys what is
constitutive for the reception of divine life. To receive their teaching is to receive them, and
to receive them is to receive Christ. To receive anything contrary to their teaching, such as
the Typos, no matter what its source or medium, is to reject them and receive instead the
devil. Maximus explains this at length to Theodosius in words that could scarcely be
stronger:
What kind of believer accepts a dispensation silencing the very wordss which the God of
all ordained to be spoken by the apostles and prophets and teachers? Let us investigate,
reverend master, what kind of evil this summary blindly arrives at. For if God appointed in the
Church first apostles, then prophets, and third teachers (1 Cor 12:28) for the perfecting of the saints (Eph
4:12), having said in the Gospel to the apostles and through them to those after them,
What I say to you, I sty to all (Mk 13:37), and again, He who receives you receives me, and he who
rejects you rejects me (Lk 10:16), it is clearly manifest that whoever does not receive the
apostles and prophets and teachers, but rejects their words, rejects Christ himself.
Let us also investigate the other passage. God chose to raise up apostles and
prophets and teachers for the perfection of the saints. But to oppose godly religion the devil
chose to raise up false apostles and false prophets and false teachers, so that the old law
101 Pace Greek historian A.N. Stratos, who, charging Maximus with 'resolute obstinacy', derives his resistance
from 'his aristocratic background, combined with a monastic and senile stubbornness....' Quoted by George
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was opposed, as was also the evangelical law. And as far as I understand it the false
apostles and false prophets and false teachers are the heretics alone, whose words and train
of thought are distorted. Consequently, just as the one who receives the true apostles and
prophets and teachers receives God, likewise the one who receives false apostles and false
prophets and false teachers receives the devil. So the one who throws out the saints along
with the cursed and impure heretics - mark my words! - manifestly condemns God along
with the devil.
If, in that case, in racking our brains to come up with new terms in our own times
we find those terms to have descended to this extreme evil, watch out lest we - whilst
alleging and proclaiming 'peace' - be found to be struck ill with the apostasy which the
divine Apostle said beforehand would accompany the coming of the Antichrist (2 Thess
2:3-4).
I have spoken this to you, my lords, without holding back.... With these things
inscribed on the tablet of my heart, are you telling me to enter into fellowship with a
church in which these [other] things are proclaimed, and to have communion with those
who actually expel God and, I imagine, the devil with God? May God — who for my sake
was made like me — sin excepted - never let this happen to mel102
Then on April 19, 658, 1' in a letter written from exile in Perberis to Anastasius - his
faithful disciple of forty years - Maximus recounts his interrogation by legates of the
Constantinopolitan Patriarch Peter sent to persuade him to give in to Peter's own
compromise Monotheletist/Monophysite formula. While up until this time it seems that
subsequent Roman bishops at best stood only loosely by Pope Martin I's rejection of
C. Berthold, 'The Church as Mysterion: Diversity and Unity According to Maximus the Confessor', Patristic
and Byantine Review 6 (1987), 20.
102 DB (CCSG 39, 89.181 — 93.218).
103 Following the dating proposed by Allen and Neil (CCSG 39), xvi-xvii.
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Monotheletism at the Lateran synod, the interrogators applied new pressure to Maximus by
announcing that all five Patriarchates, including Rome, had become united under the
compromise formula:
Of what Church are you? Byzantium? Rome? Antioch? Alexandria? Jerusalem? Look here -
all have been united along with the regions under them! So if you belong to the catholic
Church, be united, lest forging a novel and alien path by your way of life, you suffer what
you least expect.104
Faced with such dire circumstances Maxitnus is forced to offer in reply what is
surely his narrowest, most precise ecclesiological definition (and not simply a description!)
in which the catholic Church is specifically equated with the orthodox confession of faith:
The God of all, having blessed (paKapicras .) Peter on account of the fact that he
confessed him rightly, declared (ecrrecHva-ro) the right and saving confession of faith in
him to constitute the catholic Church.105
The interpretation one gives to this definition depends largely on whether one takes the
verbs paKapicras and OITTECPTiVaTO as sequential or simultaneous. Either way, Peter here is
no less yet no more than the archetypal and paradigmatic confessor of true faith in Christ.
It is eo ipso 'the right and saving confession of faith in Christ/God' that constitutes the
Church in its catholicity. Not even the Councils stand above this rule, since, as Theodosius
104 Ep. Max. (CCSG 39, 161.4-8).
105 Ka80Xidw iKaticrimi, TTIV OpOiiv Kai croyrijpiov Tijs- Els- airrOv TrIGTEWS" OPOÄOylaV, TriTpov
paKaplaas iit,' chs ati-rOv KaAc 5. G;pioAciyncrEv, 6 TC2/1.1 OAc.ov ilvat ®605 eumpriva-ro. See Ep. Max.
(CCSG 39, 161.9-11).
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at one point has to admit, cit is as you say: the rightness of the dogmas judges the
synods.'"
In following an apparent digression we have not lost sight of our primary point. To
separate this definitive principle of ecclesial existence from the fully-rounded (catholic)
contours of its corporeal life would not be far removed from envisaging the life of the soul
apart from its body. The universality of the Church's mediating vocation, constituted by its
orthodox confession of faith in Christ, is properly inseparable from the specificity of its
particular divinely-given orders, ranks, and sacramental worship. There are signs here of
what Peter Brown has described primarily with reference to the Latin west as the
localisation of the holy,' though in our case it is as much structural as it is spatial.
Regarding the external criteria of the Church's catholicity, Maximus clearly accepts the
headship of Peter among the Apostles, the pre-eminence of the Church of Rome on
account of its living Pettine office, and communion with its bishop as an essential factor
for the realisation of catholicity. He also accepts a temporal hierarchy in which Christ is
mediated through the apostles and prophets and teachers (the Church's bishops)," and a
local hierarchy of bishops, priests, deacons, monks and other lay orders, and initiates.
There is no doubt that apart from its reference to the one Word and Spirit of God, such
external specificity can only lend itself to diffusion and dissolution. As Blaise Pascal was to
write in another era, 'La multitude qui ne se reduit pas l'unite est confusion; l'unite qui ne
depend pas de la multitude est tyrannie." ®
 So we find Maximus invoking the Apostle Paul
'through whom the Holy Spirit condemns even angels who institute anything contrary to
106 DB (CCSG 39, 97.261-262).
107 Cult of the Saints, 86.
108 Sherwood, St. Maximus the Confessor The Ascetic Life, 75; also Pelikan, 'Council or Father or Scripture', 277-
288.
109 Pensees stir la Religion et stir quelques autres sujets (Club des Libraires de France, 1961), 370 [= Brunschvicg, 36].
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the kerygma.' 11° Yet through the harmony created by right faith active in love, the Church's
hierarchical ordo is the means by which each individual component in the whole structure is
able to participate in its unique, unchanging centre (Kkrrpov)."' It is the means by which
the whole Church with each of its members rightly confesses the true faith. It is the means
by which God is manifest bodily on earth. And so it is the means also to true ecclesial
communion and personal deification. In the inspired vision of Dionysius who himself
coined the term, 'sacred order' (hierarchia) is seen to be a gift bestowed upon the Church by
the divine goodness itself 'to ensure the salvation and deification of every rational and
intelligent being. )112
Spiritual Topography and the Body of Christ
With our interest in the Church as the locus deificandi and our reference just now to the
'localisation of the holy', we are well-situated to undertake a closer investigation of
Maximus' conception of TOiros- and its relationship to somatic and ecclesiological
concerns. In our study of Ambiguum 7 in chapter two we saw how Maximus speaks of the
final state or position of the saved as being 'in God', their 'abode and foundation.' In the
age to come, neither space nor time — both of which are created realities - are obliterated,
but come to transcend their finite boundaries by their participation in the infinite God.
'Inspired by Gregory of Nyssa,' Blowers remarks, 'Maximus projects a zone of eternal
sabbatical motion or 'moving rest' in which the features of spatio-temporal extension
110 EM (CCSG 39, 35.293-4).
111 Myst. 1 (Sotiropoulos, 154.4).
112 De ecc.hkr. 1.4 (Corpus Diogsiacum II, 66.21 —67.1).
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[ötdarripa] are gradmlly collapsed.... " 3 In this section we shall seek to demonstrate how
it is through his use of the term topos that Maximus extends this vision to the ecclesial
sphere.
In the biblical, philosophical and patristic traditions, topos implies far more than the
English words 'place' or 'space'. In the LXX topos translates the Hebrew mdqdm, a term
often used to evoke or designate a specific cultic locus at which people have been granted
access to God's gracious presence. Thus Abraham prepares his son Isaac as a burnt
offering at the 'place' indicated by the Lord (Gen 22:4), a mountain he eventually names,
'The Lord has seen' (Gen 22:14). Upon waking from his dream at Bethel ('house of God')
Jacob exclaims, 'How awesome is this place! This is none other than the house of God; this
is the gate of heaven' (Gen 28:17). In Exodus 'the place of God' is the mountain of
theophany and heavenly communion (Ex 24:9-11). The Jerusalem Temple is the 'place'
where God has put his name and where alone Israel is to worship (Dt 12:5-9). After its
destruction in 70 AD (cf. Jn 11:48), the early Church recognised Jesus himself — through
his own name (Mt 18:20) and body On 2:19-22) — to be their 'place.' Saint John underscores
the eschatological and trinitarian character of this new sanctuary when, evoking the image
of a bridegroom anticipating union with his bride, he records Jesus speaking of going to
prepare a 'place' for his disciples in his Father's house On 14:2-3; cf. 1 Clem 5.4-7).
In his brief study on topos in late Neoplatonism, 114 Shmuel Sambursky has shown
that such cultic and sacral inferences are not confined to the biblical sources. Remarking
upon the effect of their tranquil, paradisiacal surrounds on their conversation Socrates tells
113 'Realized Eschatology in Maximus the Confessor, Ad Thalassium 22', SP 32 (1997), 260. See also Plass,
'Transcendent Time in Maximus the Confessor', 263.
114 The Concot of Place in Late Neoplatonirm Gerusalern: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1982).
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Phaecirus, 'this place seems to be a holy place.' 115 In commenting on the episode of Jacob's
dream at Bethel, Philo gives three meanings for the term topos: it is the space (xc6pa) filled
up by a body, the divine logos, or God himself, since he encompasses all things but is not
encompassed by anything. 116 Later in the Neoplatonic tradition, writes Samburslcy, `Nile
central conception ... was that the encompassed is supported by the encompassing, that
secondary entities are always contained in primary ones and have their place in them!'"
Topos is that space filled up by body, 118
 yet 'the forces acting in space do not merely
encompass bodies, but totally penetrate them.'119
In Maximus these sources converge to reveal an understanding of topos that is at
once deeply rooted in cosmology, ecclesiology, and eschatology. For a start we should be
reminded that the Confessor always considers spatial extension sub Jpecie aeternitatis, that is,
from that eschatological perspective in which `God will be all in all' (1 Cor 15:28). In other
words, topos is ultimately equated with God himself since it refers to that space filled in the
age to come by God's own incarnate self-extension, the Church, a body he penetrates
entirely. On the other hand, topos denotes a category inapplicable to God. He is not
`somewhere', but is beyond every cwhere.' 1 ' And yet since the psalmist knows God to be 'a
strong place' (Ps 70:3), Maximus affirms — as an economic, teleological reality — that God
will be the abode (povrb and foundation (puots) of those being saved — their `place' —
`uncircumscribed, immeasurable and infinite' — 'becoming all to all' (1 Cor 9:22; cf 1 Cor
15:28). 121 Maximus cites as illustrative of this state the way the soul `manifests itself in the
limbs of a body as a subjective power at work in each limb, and through itself holds the
115 Phaedrus 238c.
116 De somniis I. 61-63.
117 The Concept ofPlace, 16.
115 The Concept ofNice, 25.
119 The Concept of Place, 16.
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limbs united for life together towards being." In Ambiguum 7 we came across the same
idea in connection with his anti-Origenist argument that while the Sabbath rest remains a
yet-to-be-realised reality, it is already anticipated in this life by the virtuous. When such a
person comes to be 'in God',
he will no longer be moved away from his own place, since it is a state surrounded by
stillness and calm. Hence God himself is the 'place' of all those deemed worthy of such
blessedness, as it is written, be my God and protection, a strong place to save me (Ps 70:3).123
Elsewhere we gain further indication that this anticipated bliss is already realised in
this age as a simultaneously personal and ecclesial experience. Hinting at John 12:32 in the
Chapters on Theology and the Economy, Maximus tells how, 'when the Word of God is exalted
in us through praxis and theoria, he draws (Aut) all people to himself.' 'Therefore,' he goes
on,
let him who beholds divine things ascend with zeal, following the Word until he attains the
'place' where he is. For there he 'draws' him, as Ecclesiastes says: he draws towards his place
(Ecc 1:5), clearly referring to those who follow him as the great high priest who leads them
into the holy of holies where, as one of us (TO Ka6' ;was), he himself entered on our behalf as
a forerunner (Heb 6:20).124
120 2ThaZ 61 (CCSG 22, 103.320-325); Th.Oec. 1.68.
1212. Thai 61 (CCSG 22, 105.328-330)
122 ,Q.ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 105.333-336). Origen uses the same analogy with explicit reference to the
relationship between the Logos and his body the Church (Or.Ceir. 6.48).
123 Amblo. 7 (PG 91.1081A).
124 Th.Oec. 2.32.
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We may note how Maximus here weaves together the 'drawing' function of Christ's
priesthood on our behalf and the notion of 'place' as the final destiny of such movement.
Later he designates this same 'place' as the 'inheritance' (KAripovopiav) and 'abode'
(povijv) of those being saved, equating all three terms with 'the pure kingdom of God', 'the
goal of those being moved through longing for the ultimate object of desire.' 125 Yet it is
especially in a brief passage from one of the ,Quaestiones et Dubia126 that we see in continuity
with Neoplatonic thought how topos indicates God as the 'space' filled by the body of
Christ, which in turn is itself entirely penetrated by that space. The question seeks the
meaning of the Pauline phrase, 'the fullness (TO TrAripcopa) of him who is filled all in all'
(Eph 1:23). Pleroma is a pregnant word whose meaning 'totality', 'content', or 'unity' as
distinct from multiplicity or partiality lends itself as a metaphoricall ' cosmo-spatial term to
convey the 'totality' of divine life in Christ (Col 1:19; 2:9), and of christic life in the cosmic
Church (Eph 3:19; 4:10). 1  For the Stoics it functioned as an anti-dualist term signifying
the mutual compenetration of the divine soul and the whole material cosmos. 129 Here in
Ephesians 1:23 it appears in immediate apposition to TO aCapa of Christ and, indirectly, to
the Church. Presumably it is the passive form (TrXripoup gvou) of the verb TrXrpciiiv which
poses the interpretative problem."' It is remarkable enough that the Church, as Christ's
body, is God's 'fullness', but how can it be said that God is filled 'all in all'?
125 Th.Oec. 2.86.
126 ,QD 173 (CCSG 10, 120.1-16).
127 I use this word qualifiedly in the positive sense defended by Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious
Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
128 See G. Delling, ‘TrXripcolice, in TDNT VI, 298-305. See also the excellent study by Pierre Benoit, 'Body,
Head and Pleroma in the Epistles of the Captivity', in idem., Jesus and the Gospel, volume 2, trans. Benet
Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51-92.
129 Benoit, 'Body, Head and Pleroma', 83.
130 Benoit notes that the passive sense rather than the middle is supported by philology and the Fathers
(Body, Head and Pkmma', 90).
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Maximus' answer is divided into two parts. The first is an exercise in apophatic
theology in which he excludes God from all definition or perception or participation by
created beings. But then kataphadcally speaking, that is, 'according to the providential
procession, being participated in by many, he is also filled by them.' Every creature
therefore, according to its logos in God, 'is said to be a member (p gX05) of God and to have
a place in God.' At first glance it appears that Maximus is here speaking primarily of a
cosmic rather than an ecc.lesial reality. But in what follows it becomes clear that the
fulfilment of this participated cosmic reality occurs only in, or as, the body of Christ. Christ
is the concrete meeting point at which the fullness of God and the totality of the new
creation compenetrate, each filling and being filled by the other. For if, as he says, the
creature moves in harmony with its logos, it will come to be 'in God, filling its own place and
achieving its proper dignity as a useful member of the body of Christ.' The only alternative
is non-being, or being 'no-where.' To borrow Pen's apt phrase, 'Mlle world is only as the
body of Christ.'131
In these passages we have witnessed a close correspondence in the spiritual
topographies of the individual soul, the cosmos, and the Church. Maximus knows of no
opposition between the individual, communal, and cosmic. As Ephraim the Syrian has it,
'He who celebrates alone in the heart of the wilderness / He is a great assembly.' 132 The
soul as microcosm is the Church, and the Church - as the Lebensraum of divine theophany,
the fullness of Christ, the new creation - is the cosmos, or in Origen's words, KOCIPOS Tdil
KOopoti. 133 Yet while neither displaces the other, the Church occupies a kind of centre since
131 Per!, `Methexis', 305.
132 Quoted by Andre Louf, Teach us to Prig: Learning a Little About God, trans. Hubert Hoskins (np: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1974), 97.
133 Or.Joh. 6.301 (SC 157, 360.9); Or.Joh. 6.304 (SC 157, 364.42-43): 'Let the Church, therefore, be said to be
the cosmos when it is enlightened by the Saviour.' With Origen early Christianity apparently embraced the
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it is the place where the new life of the soul begins and where the life of the cosmos
reaches its goal. It is 'in the Church of God' that Christ the Word of the Father 'is
proclaimed according to the pious faith, exalted by the life made virtuous through keeping
the commandments, and manifested among the nations....
person — bearing in himself the extremities of the cosmos - attain his proper place 'in God'
is in fact fulfilled by participation in the body of Christ, so that it can be said both
collectively and individually that 'in us the fullness (TO TrAripc.opa) of the Godhead dwells
bodily by grace', just as 'in Christ the Word of the Father all the fullness (aov TO ITATipcopa)
of the Godhead dwells bodily bji essenc e' . 1' Such correspondence and bodily (acopatimis-)
indwelling of the divine 'fullness' do not amount to the elimination of personal distinctions
or the conflagration of all bodily particularity with the hypostasis of God the incarnate Word.
Maximus insists on as much when in another striking passage from the Chapters on Theology
he comments on the phrase, We [you] are the body of Christ and members of it each in
particular' (1 Cot 12:27). 13 ' The thrust of the passage can be more fully appreciated when it
is examined in the light of the paragraph preceding it, 137
 with which it forms a precise
structural and thematic parallel. There the scriptural text up for consideration is Saint Paul's
similarly outstanding claim, 'we have the mind (vOiiv) of Christ' (1 Cor 2:16). According to
Maximus, the saints receive this mind
not by a negation (06 KaTa crT gRaw) of our own intellective faculty, nor as a
supplementary mind to ours, nor by its essential and hypostatic transferal into our mind,
theology of Second-Temple Jewish sources — especially Philo - in which the Temple was likened to the
cosmos and the Temple service seen to ensure continuing cosmic stability. See further C.T.R. Hayward, The
Jewish Temple: a non-biblical sourcebook (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 6-9, 108-141.
134 Q. Thai 63 (CCSG 22, 147.52-54).
135 Th.Oec. 2.21. Cf. Col 2:9.
136 Th.Oec. 2.84.
' 1" The divine plan that each
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but by its illuminating the faculty of our mind through its own inherent quality and by its
bringing (4pcov) our mind to the same activity.
The saints thereby are said to possess Christ's mind not by the elimination of their own
mind or intellective faculty but by the harmonious activity of Christ's mind and theirs
brought about by an illuminating qualification of the activity of their mind by his.
In a similar way, participation in Christ's body by a multiplicity of bodies does not
threaten the integrity and unity of his body, nor does it entail the elimination of the
plurality of the various members' bodies. Rather it implies the purging from individual
bodies of the divisive character they have accrued through sin:
We are said to be the body of Christ... not by a negation (oti KaT« crdpriatv) of our own
bodies in our becoming his body, nor again by his hypostatic transferal into us - or by his
being sundered limb from limb, but - in the likeness of our Lord's flesh - by the
repudiation from oneself of sin's corruption.138
The same idea is expressed more subtly in the so-called 'nourishment texts"
which often contain strongly eucharistic and ecclesiological undercurrents.'° In them
Maximus basically shows how the divine Word adapts himself to become edible and thus
pardcipatable in a manner commensurate with the multi-dimensional levels of common
human existence and individual spiritual capacity. In this way, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer
137 Th.Oec. 2.83.
138 Th.Oec. 2.84.
139 Sherwood, St. Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic 14, 80.
140 Th.Oec. 1.100; 2.56, 66, 88; Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 34.128-134; 59.560 — 60.571);.Q.ThaZ 36 (CCSG 7,243.1 —
245.47); Amb./0. 48 (PG 91.1361A— 1365C).
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perceived in another context, 'the body of Jesus Christ takes up space on earth!'"
Commenting on Gregory Nazianzen's paschal homily in which various bodily parts and
organs of the paschal lamb are spoken of as being 'consumed and distributed for spiritual
digestion," Maximus explains that by such eating the Lord `transforms into himself those who
participate by the Spirit, initiating and repositioning each of them according to their state of
bodily harmony into the place (TOTrov) of the component which is spiritually consumed by
that person....
actually a means of total, yet proportionate self-assimilation to a place in the body of the
Word, a notion equally familiar to the mysticism of an Origen or a Gregory of Nyssa, 1" or
to the eucharistic ecclesiology of a Cyril of Alexandria.
So far in our exposition of the Church's spiritual topography we have postponed
closer analysis of the Mystagogia, but in turning to it now shall attempt to demonstrate how
it is only through the Church, insofar as it is the place of divine 'fullness', and specifically
through its liturgy — 'the sacred arrangement of the divine symbols" - that God ultimately
becomes 'all in all.' For while in his economic dispensation God is equally present to soul
or cosmos, it is in the concrete, corporeal actions of the Church's eucharistic synaxis that
the grace of the Holy Spirit is present 'most distinctively' (i5lo-rp6nc.os Si pc(Alcr-ra) to
'transmute, transform and transfigure' each one.H6
141 Der Leib Jesu Christi nimmt Raum em n auf Erden.' Martin Kuske and use TOdt (eds.), Dietrich Bonhoeffer:
Nachfolge (Munich: Kaiser Verlag, 1994), 241.
142 Greg.Naz.Or. 45.16.
i 43,4mb./o. 48 (PG 91.1365BC).
1 44 Greg.Nyss.Or.cat. 37.
1 45 Myst. 24 (Sotiropoulos, 234.12).
146 Myst. 24 (Sotiropoulos, 222.12-13).
'143 Thus spiritual eating — whether ethical, contemplative, or eucharistic - is
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Liturgical Metaphysics .'47and Ritual Action
Having devoted a whole section to an analysis of Maximus' ecclesiocentric use of the
spatial term top os, we may now justifiably cite as instructive Robert Taft's remarks on the
sense of space as characterised in the Byzantine liturgical tradition in general and in Justinian's
great basilica, the Hagia Sophia, in particular. 'What was most new about this building, far
more so than its startling architecture, was the vision created by its marvelous interior. .. . )148
Taft describes it as a vision of 'awesome splendour', one which 'led observers of every
epoch to exclaim with remarkable consistency that here, indeed, was heaven on earth, the
heavenly sanctuary, a second firmament, image of the cosmos, throne of the very glory of
God." He adds the important observation that it was 'the space itself, not its decoration'
which created this impression.'
Perhaps on account of his almost certain participation in the synods of the capital's
cathedral, and therefore his first-hand experience of this same dramatic sense of space, it
may be said that Maximus, in a way not dissimilar to Dionysius, 151 generally pays greater
attention in his Mystagogia to the symbolic value of ritual action and movement rather than to
the significance of particular sacramental objects. 152 For him the Church's liturgy
147 The term comes from Pen, `Methexis', 311.
148 Robert F. Taft, 'The Liturgy of the Great Church: An Initial Synthesis of Structure and Interpretation on
the Eve of Iconoclasm', Dumbarton Oaks Papers 34-35 (1980-1981), 47.
149 'The Liturgy of the Great Church', 48.
150 Ibid., 48.
151 Rorern, Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and Introduction to their Influence (New York / Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993), 116-117.
152 The Church building itself - as symbol of the cosmos, the whole human being (mind, soul, body), and the
soul considered in itself - is perhaps the only exception. Otherwise the word gmbolon in the Mystagogia is
reserved for ritual actions such as the entrance, the chants, the readings, the closing of the doors, the kiss of
peace, the confession of 'the symbol of faith', and the invocation of God the Father in the Lord's prayer.
Precisely what we mean by the terms 'symbol', 'symbolic', and 'symbolism' and what Maximus intends by
using the terms 'type and image' may be summed up in the following words: 'Along with the whole platonic
tradition, Maximus sees in the image not so much the sign of an absent reality than the reality itself somehow
rendered present by the sign. The image is in a certain manner that which it represents and, in turn, the thing
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constitutes a progressive series of unfolding symbolic, theandric activities through which
the hidden, eschatological union of the cosmos in and with God is manifested and realised
in historic time. His experiences in the Great Church may also account for his uniqueness
among Greek mystagogues in the particular symbolic prominence he accords to the
church's architectural topography in the traditional two-fold division of the church building
into two topoi — the nave (va6s), accessible to all the lay faithful, and the sanctuary
(1EpaTElov), accessible exclusively to priests and deacons. This topography speaks for
Maximus of the inherent unity and diversity of the Church, the human being, and the entire
cosmos. While each remains a distinct space whose boundary is governed by the
hierarchical orders and the kind of liturgical action performed in it, the church 'being by
construction a single building.., is one in its concrete reality (pia crrI Ka-ra
irrrOaracr(v) without being divided with its parts on account of their difference from one
another.'m
In going on to explain how it is that this fundamental unity of the church building
as a single, particular reality (hypostasis) is not damaged by the difference admitted through
its division into two distinct spaces, Maximus uses a term which we encountered in our
analysis of Ambiguum 7 where he explains how the many logoi are in fact one Logos 'by
means of the reference (it dvackopa) of all things to it, since it exists without confusion by
virtue of itself.' imIn our present context he writes:
signified exists in its sensible representation. This close relationship between the image and the reality it
signifies forms the basis of St Maximus' sacramental and liturgical symbolism.' R. Bornert, 'Les cornmentaires
byzantins de la divine liturgie du VIP au XI' siècle', Archives de l' Orient chtitien 9 (Paris, 1966), 113-114, quoted
by Larchet, La divinisation de P homme, 405 fn37.
153 Myst. 2 (Sotiropoulos, 156.11-13).
154 Amb.Io. 7 (PG 91.1077C).
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by means of the reference [of the parts] to [the building's] unity, the church releases
(euroAtjouon) these parts from their difference in name, reveals (Smut:lc:m(3a) both to be
identical with one another, and shows (ecrrockaivouna) one to be to the other reciprocally
(Ka-C iTraXXayilv) what each one is in itself: the nave, being sanctified as a priestly
offering by the reference of the sacred rite to its destination (it TrpOs TO Tr6pas Ocvactopa
TflS pucyraycoy(ac lepoupyoliinvov), is the sanctuary in potential, and in turn the
sanctuary, since it has the nave as the starting point (dpxriv) of its own sacred rite, is the
nave in actuality. The church remains one and the same through both.155
It is worth underscoring that Maximus is here speaking about a decidedly concrete, material
object: the church as a building, and the actual rite of the synaxis which begins in the nave
and proceeds to the sanctuary. The sanctuary, towards which the focus of the people in the
nave is drawn and to which they finally come for communion, constitutes the final
destination (TO Trgpas) of the whole rite. From the beginning of the service then, the nave
is already the sanctuary in potential, since the progressive movement of 'the sacred rite'
(puaTaycoyia) orients its lay occupants towards it. 156 But this rite which properly
culminates in the sanctuary actually begins in the nave as the first processional entrance of
the people with the bishop.'"
Maximus' meditations on the two-fold division of the church space are therefore
bound to his observation of the way those different parts (p g pr) function in the ritual
actions and movement of the liturgy. In no way does his insistence on their fundamental
155 Myst. 2 (Sotiropoulos, 156.13-19).
156 In The Earb, Churches of Constantinople: Architecture and Litugy (University Park and London: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971), 162-169, Thomas F. Mathews argues on the basis of textual and
archaeological evidence that in non-Syrian churches of this time there existed no visual barrier (such as a
curtain or iconostasis screen) between the nave and sanctuary. The cloth-covered altar was apparently clearly
visible to the lay participants throughout the rite.
167 Myst. 8-9 (Sotiropoulos, 192.1 — 194.21).
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unity imply that the division is arbitrary or clispensible. The two spaces in the church
building are distinct elements in a single reality whose primary, final, subjective singularity
is brought about by the ordered, reciprocal penetration of its parts and their ritually determined
orientation to their final state. Suggested in Maximus' use of the Aristotelian term 'reference' is,
in contrast to Dionysius, an eschatological perspective that views the different parts in
terms of what they will become (and thus are) as a single subject.' It cannot be accidental
that he finds this term especially applicable to a relationship centred upon and realised in
association with the unfolding movement of the eucharistic synaxis, whose central prayer is
also called the anaphora. It is chiefly by means of their ritually achieved 'reference' or upward
orientation to the final unity realised through communion in the earthly-heavenly sanctuary
that the distinct parts of the church building — and, by extension, the members who occupy
those parts - compose a single hypostatic reality.'
What we are emphasising is that the metaphysical 'reference' of the parts to their
whole is seen to be ritually achieved. The ordered divisions of the church building and the
two-tiered structure of the liturgy are presented by Maximus, at least in this instance, as the
means of ritually effecting — bi disclosing - the unity of 'another sort of church not made
with human hands,' that is, the cosmos — likewise undivided with its division into
intelligible and sensible reality. The 'reference' of the distinct parts to their indivisibly
single, concrete, hypostatic reality — whether church building or cosmos - allows them to be
seen at the same time as identical both to that single reality and to each other crau-rOv
iau-rez: TE Kai dOariXot 5). The whole wholly fills all its parts, and in and through each
155 According to Rorem, Pseudo-Diogsius: A Commentary, 122, Dionysius' Ecclesiastical Hierardry contains 'not a
hint of such eschatological typology or correlation of the events of the liturgy with the future glory of
heaven.'
159 Maximus makes use of a parallel metaphor to depict the same reality. Scripture speaks of Christ as 'the
head of the corner' (Ps 117:22). Thus 'corner', the union of two walls, is for Maximus the Church which joins
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distinct part there is made manifest entire both the other part and the whole. Taking this
section further not simply as a commentary on church architecture but as a demonstrative
parable of 'the holy Church of God' as image of the cosmos, the Church's fundamental
unity can be seen to be an eschatological reality whose present, potential subjectivity is
realised in hypostatic actuality via the inductive movement enacted in 'the sacred rite.'
Maximus describes the same ritually achieved reality with even greater metaphysical
precision in the first chapter of the Mystagogia when, in defining how the Church 'bears the
type and image of God', he states that it shares `by imitation and type' God's activity by
which he draws diverse beings together into unconfused union with one another in
himself. Here again we find the term 'reference' playing a pivotal role. Its meaning is
further elucidated by its being paired with ativaetiois (gathering) and 'g yawns (union),
and by its association with the term oxiatc (relation). But before we examine the
particulars, let us first view the chapter as a whole.
In the first half Maximus outlines the entire economy of God's activity in creation
as it can be summarised by the biblical and Neoplatonic formula that knows God to be 'all
in all (Trdv-ra iv Tram)? Having created all intelligible and sensible beings
God contains, gathers, circumscribes, and providentially binds them to himself and to one
another. Maintaining around himself as cause, beginning and end all beings that are
naturally set apart from one another, he makes them converge with one another by virtue
of the singular power of their relation to him as beginning (Ka-ra piav TflV Trpoc airrOv
oSs. «pvjv 0x4aEcos Stivaptv CDATiX015 OUVVEVEUKOTa TT0161).160
Gentiles and Jews in one faith. It is a union of universals and particulars, of intelligible and sensible, of
heaven and earth, of the Logos and creation. See 2.Thal 48 (CCSG 7,341.178-193); 53 (CCSG 7,431.6-16).
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It is this indissoluble 'relation' (Gx gais) that proves to be the critical factor in the
simultaneous unity and identity of diverse beings with one another and with God. So much
so that it is said by Maximus to
render impotent and obscure (KaTapydiraav TE Kai intKaAtiwrouaav) all the particular
relations (iStKac ax gaEtc) considered according to each being's nature, not by dissolving
or destroying them or making them cease to exist, but by overcoming and transcendendy
revealing them in the way of a whole with its parts.... For just as parts naturally come from
the whole, so also do effects properly proceed and come to be recognised from their cause
and suspend their particularity in a state of rest at which point, having acquired their
reference to the cause (iiviKa TflS TrpOs rip, ai-riav avacimpas irEpiXri(i)UvTa), they are
wholly qualified in accordance with the singular power of their relation (axgoecas) to the
cause. 161
In the same way, as an image reflecting its archetype, the Church effects with
human beings the very same activity God performs in creation. But the two activities —
ecclesial and divine - are not simply parallels. They are the same — in that their effects are
indistinguishable. Mirroring the vast diversity in creation, almost infinite is the multiplicity
of men, women and children differing from one another by race and class, nationality and
language, custom and age, opinions and skills, manners and habits, pursuits and studies,
reputation, fortune, characteristics and connections. Yet distinct and different as they are,
'those who are brought into being in the Church (T—r7w Etc airrnv yiyvopgvcav) are by her
160 Myst. 1 (Sotiropoulos, 150.6-11).
161 Myst. 1 (Sotiropoulos, 150.16 — 152.2).
246
reborn and recreated in the Spirit." 62
 The language here is at once metaphysical and
baptismal, since holy baptism is the primary means by which the Church as active subject
brings about in these disparate people an existence which, from the perspective of fallen
creation, appears as utterly new. It is in connection with this baptismal, ritual activity of the
Church that we find Maximus once again using the terms 'relation' and 'reference':
The Church confers on and gives to all equally a single divine form and designation,
namely, both to belong to Christ and to be named from him. And she confers on and gives
to all in proportion to faith a simple, whole, and indivisible relation (oxiatv) which, on
account of the universal reference and gathering of all things into her, hides from recognition
the existence of the many and innumerable differences among them (T1)11 TS noVvis
Kai cipueriTous TrEpi EKaOTOV c0c3a • Stackopois, oiN5' On Kai, Eiat cruyxcopoinav
yvcopieaeat, Sui TI)V TC:31/ TrdVTWV EIS aljTTIV Ka e0À1 Krjv dvaci)opav Kai
auvgAEucstv).163
'Relation' therefore, as the necessary result of the universal, eschatological 'reference and
gathering' of all creation into the Church, and as a condition commensurate to faith, is
brought about ritually through baptism. On account of it `no one at all is separated from
what is common to him.' Rather 'all converge and join with one another by virtue of the
one, simple, indivisible grace and power of faith, for all, he says, had but one heart and soul
(Acts 4:32), since to be and to appear as one body of different members is actually worthy
of Christ himself, our true head.' This according to Maximus is none other than the
fulfilment of the Apostle's words in the great baptismal text of Galatians 3:28, and of
162 Myst. 1 (Sotiropoulos, 152. 16-17).
163 Myst. 1 (Sotiropoulos, 152.17-21).
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Colossians 3:11 in which Christ himself is said to be 'all and in all (Trdv-ra Kai iv Traolvy
To be one is to be the Church, and to be the Church is to be Christ. Separation from this
reality amounts to dissolution into non-being. The soul's activity as a member of the body,
the Church's activity as the body of Christ, Christ's activity as Saviour and head, and God
the Trinity's activity as creator are, at the level of effect, one and the same. Maximus
predicates to God an activity among created beings of identical character and means to that
of the Church: 'he softens the differences surrounding them and creates an identity by their
reference and union to himself Cit -rrpOs iauTOv ... dva4)opi3c TE Kai ivctioEt). ,164 The
Church images God because the union of the faithful with God it effects is the union of
the whole universe with God achieved by him without confusion.
To conclude this chapter, we may summarise our findings against the broader
background of patristic ecclesiology. From very early on in the development of Christian
thought there was expressed the intuition that the Church is somehow the very pinnacle of
all creation, indeed, of the whole divine economy of creation and redemption. According
to the Shepherd of Hermas she was created first before all things: it is for her sake that the
world was created.' Earlier still in Second Clement the Church is said to precede all
creation: she is 'spiritual' and 'from above' (eivcoeev). But in the last days she was made
manifest in Christ's flesh, itself a 'type' (dVTiTUTTOS) of the spiritual. 166 For Origen too, the
body of Jesus which was crucified and raised from the dead is considered to be a type of
the Church, not the other way around.' And for his Alexandrian predecessor Clement,
just as the cosmos is the fulfilment of God's creative will, so the Church is the fulfilment of
164 Myst. 1 (Sotiropoulos, 154.19-20).
165 Herrn. Vis. 2.4.1.
166 2 am. 14.
167 Or.Joh. 10.228.
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his universal saving plan. 168
 In short the Church is, as it were, the final, ultimate created
reality to which the cosmos and the flesh of Christ testify. She is
... the pure height,
Clear, lofty and fair;
Scripture named it Eden,
The summit of all blessings.169
Alongside these convictions goes the understanding of the mutual interpenetration of God
the Logos and his own incarnate body, and the identification by grace of this body with the
Church and, ultimately, the cosmos. In Origen's words, 'just as a soul animates and moves
the body which is unable to live or move by itself, so the Word, moving and activating the
whole body as required, moves the Church and each of her members which do nothing
ipart from the Word?"'
We have found Maximus at once faithful to these traditions and yet developing
them by anchoring them firmly in the Church's actual hierarchical and liturgical structures.
For him the Church is a kind of synthesis of all creation as it is summed up in the three
laws of nature (cosmos), law (Scripture) and the Spirit (Christ). In them, he says, 'is
encompassed the entire orderly arrangement (StdKocrpos) of the Church?"' Through its
thoroughly corporeal hierarchical, doctrinal, and liturgical constitution, it brings into being
the new creation prefigured in the old. Or as it has been remarked, 'The body of Christ
confers a redeemed significance on the cosmos and marks out a sacred space in which this
iss Clem.Paed 1.27.2.
169 Ephraim the Syrian, Hymns on Paradise 5.5, in Sebastian Brock (trans.), The Hal) of the Spirit: Eighteen Poems of
Saint Ephrem (np: Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius, 1983), 23.
170 Or.Ce/s. 6.48 (SC 147, 300.17-21).
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redemption is celebrated and effected." 72 The ritually achieved, ecclesial union Maximus
envisages between God and the soul/cosmos is nothing short of that future nuptial
mystery heralded by Moses (Gen 2:23), marvelled at by Saint Paul (Eph 5:29-32), and
unveiled in all its splendour in Saint John's Apocalypse (Rev 21:1-4). Drawing upon
language familiar to the tradition of contemplative exegesis of Solomon's Song of Songs,
Maximus calls it 'the blessed and most holy intercourse by virtue of which there is
accomplished that awesome mystery of the union surpassing mind and reason, a mystery
through which God becomes one flesh and one spirit with the Church, and thus with the
soul, and the soul with God.' 173 Indeed, in the ritual expulsion of the catechumens and the
closing of the doors in the liturgy is anticipated the future passing away of the material
world, the perfect abolition of deceitful activity in the senses, and the entry of the worthy
into the intelligible world, that is, into 'the bridal chamber of Christ.' 174 No wonder then
that near the end of the Mystagogia Maximus follows both 'the blessed old man' and the
writer of the epistle to the Hebrews (Heb 10:25) in exhorting his readers not to abandon
the holy assembly at which the mysteries of their salvation are performatively
demonstrated. There (iv-raVea) through corporeal, sensible symbols — the ritual actions of
the eucharistic liturgy culminating in holy communion - are exhibited proleptically 'the
archetypal mysteries': gifts of the Holy Spirit in which the baptised in this life already
participate St« Tijs iv 1TiOTEI xdprros and in which they shall in the age to come
participate 'in actual, concrete fact' (EVUTTOOTdTG3S aUTC..7 .? Ti..5 TrpdypaTt), that is, when
they pass from 'grace by faith' to 'grace by sight'.175
171 ,Q.ThaL 64 (CCSG 22, 239.809-810).
172 Louth, 'The body in Western Catholic Christianity', 121.
173 Myst. 5 (Sotiropoulos, 176.15-19).
174 myst. 15 (Sotiropoulos, 204.7).
175 Myst. 24 (Sotiropoulos, 224.24 — 226.4).
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CHAPTER FIVE
Corporeality and the Christian
Frail creatures are we all! To be the best,
Is but the fewestfaults to have:-
Look thou then to thyself, and leave the rest
To God, thy conscience, and the grave.'
'What is a monk? ...A monk is toil. The monk toils at all he does. That is what a monk is.'2
If any saying encapsulates Maximus' vision of the practical aspect of monastic discipleship
in which the Christian embodies participation with the one who 'had to suffer,' then this
sentence from Abba John the Dwarf of the desert may well be it. Here in this final chapter
all the relevant findings of our previous inquiries come together at the level of the concrete
personal spiritual quest for perfection. Here we shall attempt to offer the most explicit
answer to our original question: what happens to the body when it is deified?
From a purely biological perspective, individual human existence begins at
conception and ends at death. Birth and death universally constitute the inescapable
parameters within which the human struggle for existence is contrived. Like his spiritual
predecessors, Maximus is a realist when it comes to recognising death as the inevitable
terminus of our present bodily existence, and when he seeks to live out the ancient
1 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Humility the Mother of Charity, in Ernest Hartley Coleridge (ed.), The Complete Poetical
Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912), 486.
2 Quoted in Benedicta Ward, The Scryings of the Desert Fathers: The AOhabetical Collection (CS 59, Kalamazoo:
Cistercian Publications, 1975), 93.
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philosophical ideal of making this life a preparation for death.' That means, among other
things, not simply thinking about one's own mortality, but actually putting into present
practice the impending separation between soul and body `by cutting the soul off from
worrying about bodily concerns' even before death comes.'
But the Platonic ideal of making this life a preparation for death is deepened and
given even broader corporeal contours in the theology of the Christian Fathers. Maximus
acknowledges with Saint Paul that through the waters of holy baptism the Christian has in
fact already entered into the path that leads through the shadow of death. In this chapter
we shall see how for Maximus baptism forms the connecting point by which the universally
significant events of Christ's own birth, baptism, death, and resurrection in the flesh
become applicable at the level of the individual and particular. And if the sacrament of
baptism plunges the baptised into Christ's death, then it also establishes and pre-empts in
them at a corporeal, historical level the pattern of Christ's resurrection. It is only by virtue
of Christ's bodily resurrection that 'the material cosmos can follow the soul into the
kingdom of heaven when it is translated into the world of God....' s Ultimately baptism is
made complete at the final day when our own bodies are raised from the dead.
We shall see too how Maximus views the purification wrought in baptism as
encompassing both the moral and spiritual spheres. At one point he is asked to comment
on the difference between being born 'of water and the Spirit' (Jn 3:5) and being baptised
'with the Holy Spirit and with fire' (Mt 3:11; Lk 3:16). When these two passages from the
Gospels are placed alongside one another, he discerns a parallelism indicating the dual
level, corporeal and spiritual, at which the Spirit is operative:
3 Plato Phaedo 81a; Greg.Naz.Or. 27.7, 15; Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 61.599-600).
4 Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 61.601-602).
5 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Preger, trans. A.V. Littledale (London: SPCK, 1961), 210.
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The Holy Spirit is active in each: as water he purifies the defilement of the flesh and as the
Spirit cleanses the stain of the soul. And as the Holy Spirit he establishes as preliminary the
way of the virtues and as fire makes a person God by grace, shining on him the divine
characteristics of virtue.6
In this connection we shall witness Maximus' understanding that the faith given in
baptism is a potential which must be willingly brought to actuality through the exercise of
virtue. This activated faith is love, by which the believer re-created in the image of God
comes perfectly to be likened to him. Only through love does the Christian possess in toto
the concrete reality towards which faith impels him. Maximus' way of conceiving the
relationship between faith and love leads us to discover the intrinsically social, ecclesial
character of divine love, and thus perhaps to be able to answer the question raised by
Georges Bemanos' priest when, speaking approvingly of 'old monks, wise, shrewd,
unerring in judgement, and yet aglow with passionate insight, so very tender in their
humanity', he immediately asks, 'What miracle enables these semi-lunatics, these prisoners
of their own dreams, these sleepwalkers, apparently to enter more deeply each day into the
pain of others?'' Drawing on a pair of sayings from the wisdom tradition of Ecclesiasdcus
(6:14-15), the Confessor shows in a series of sentences what it takes to make a faithful
friend (4) iAos 1rioTos). 8 All the effort expended in the acquisition of the virtues that
renders a monk unperturbed in the midst of demonic attack and infinite distraction is
intended to lead to his faithful participation in the sufferings of another. Present, suffering
love for the godforsaken, the summit of all the corporeal works of asceticism, is the
6 .,QD 4 (CCSG 10, 4.5 — 5.2).
7 Georges Bernanos, Diary of a Country Priest, trans. Pamela Morris (London: Boriswood, 1937), 115.
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touchstone by which true spiritual progress is tested and proved.' Consequently deification
is manifested bodily most poignantly under the form of suffering love. And only in the
Church, among Christ's disciples, is this love to be found, 'for only they have the true love,
the teacher of love.... Therefore the one who possesses love possesses God himself, since
God is love (1 Jn 4:8).'w
These then in brief are the themes of our final chapter. Let us now examine them
in closer detail.
Bodily Birth and Death
It is almost inevitable that in attempting to describe the place of the body in Maximus'
theological vision we must eventually treat two items which heavily occupy contemporary
body theologies, namely sex and death. At the heart of Maximus' five-fold division of
created being lies the division between male and female, and not surprisingly it is here that
Christ's renovative work of reconciling the various divisions in the universe must start. The
recapitulation of the universe in Christ begins by his overcoming the fundamental division
between the sexes, 'for in Christ Jesus', as we have found Maximus repeatedly pointing out,
'there is neither male nor female' (Gal 3:28). It forms the essential first stage of unification
from which Christ ascends through the intermediate steps of reconciliation in proper order
and rank, ending at last with the division between created and uncreated."
But why is it so, we may ask? Why is this particular bifurcation found to be so
divisive? How did it arise? Moreover, how is it healed in the particular history of the
8 Car. 4.93-99.
9 Cf. LA 36 (CCSG 40, 81.698-700).
10 Car. 4.100.
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incarnate Word, and thus in his incarnate life in the virtuous Christian, and what
implications does that healing bear for the way in which redeemed women and men are to
relate to one another? And what is its relation to marriage and virginity, to the 'natural'
cycle of bodily birth, aging, suffering and death, and so to the deification of bodily beings
whose concrete existence in this world is necessarily characterised by such 'marks of
corruption'? What we offer here is hardly the 'detailed study' of this theme in Maximus
called for by Verna Harrison over a decade ago, 12 but it will hopefully open up avenues for
further reflection, research, and action.
We may begin attending to these questions by returning to examine more closely
Maximus' understanding of the causes of humanity's fall and of the character and function
of its gendered condition. It shall be emphasised that the problem presented by sexual
differentiation in bodily human nature, a differentiation created by God, can only properly
be understood within a context in which sexual reproduction is seen to carry a double
significance: it provisionally ensures the overall continuation of the whole human species,
but also perpetuates the cycle of individual human mortality. Thus sexual reproduction,
whose condition is sexual differentiation, is an aspect of God's providential but at the same
time punitive provision on account of human sin. According to Maximus, 'it is in bodily
birth,' a pathos issuing from a deviant carnal pleasure, 'that the power of our condemnation
resides.'n
Scholars have recognised Maximus' reception and development of a long tradition
most characteristically expressed in Gregory of Nyssa's speculations regarding the
11 Amb.Io. 41 (PG 91.1305BC; 1309A).
12 Verna E.F. Harrison, 'Male and Female in Cappadocian Theology', JTS NS 41 (1990), 469, fn93.
13 Amb.Io. 42 (1348C).
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essentially asexual character of the primal human being(s) made in the image of God." For
Gregory, God adds gender to human beings in preview of their impending fall toward the
material world. The Bishop of Nyssa's readiness - on the basis of the fact that the sacred
text only mentions Adam and Eve's sexual intercourse after their expulsion from Paradise
(Gen 4:1) — to link genital procreation with the curse of death resulting from sin, may at
first blush appear to represent an almost Encratist view of marriage and sex. Only when we
recognise it as the fruit of considered reflection on what is regarded as clear scriptural
warrant for asserting the primacy of both virginity and the primal couple's eschatologically
oriented, angelic mode of existence can we appreciate its subtlety and apologetic value.'
Marriage is for Gregory, as van Eijk and others have rightly argued, an 'ambiguous' reality
whose positive value and purpose is contingent upon its proper ordering and use. 16 While
the soul, the ontological seat of human nature, is essentially asexual, it is according to
Rowan Williams' astute analysis 'always implicated in contingent matter, and even its final
liberation for pilgrimage into God depends... upon the deployment and integration of
bodiliness and anirnality. That is to say, the ungenderedness of the soul is never the actual
state of a real subject.'"
Maximus is clearly following in Gregory's footsteps when he views marital
procreation, a function that depends on sexual differentiation for its existence, as a
provisional gift added to human nature on account of Adam's sin. In one crucial and
14 Secondary commentators include Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, 202; Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 373-
376; Larchet, 'Ancestral Guilt according to St Maximus the Confessor', 27. On this aspect of Gregory's
anthropology see Greg.Nyss.Opif 16-18; Danielou, Platonisme et thiologie mystique, 48-71; Harrison, 'Male and
Female in Cappadocian Theology', 465-471.
15 Cf. Lk 20:35-36; 1 Cor 7:1-40. See the insightful article by Ton H.C. van Eijk in which he traces precisely
these themes in the Greek philosophical and patristic traditions: 'Marriage and Virginity, Death and
Immortality', in Fontaine and Kannengiesser, Epektasir, 209-235, esp. 230-234.
16 'Marriage and Virginity', 231.
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unambiguous phrase, Adam's transgression itself is identified as the instrumental cause by
which marriage is introduced: i s] Si rraprjRracts- TitsEVTOXflç -r(?)v ycii.tov Eicniyayiv
Ste( TO (ivopijoat -r(?)v 'ASdp, TOUTLYTIV des-rijoat -r(?)v iK 0E0-11 1506iVTa
v4iov. 18 Yet in citing this we would want immediately to add the observation that sexual
differentiation, like the four other divisions detailed in Ambiguum 41 between created and
uncreated, sensible and intelligible, earth and heaven, the inhabited world and paradise,
only becomes a problem when, through ignorance of their fundamental connectedness,
human beings fail to unite each aspect of these respective divisions within their own lives.
This ignorance can properly be said to amount to a genuine 'failure' because by virtue of its
genesis from God human nature possesses a natural capacity to unite the disparate parts of
each division in itself." As the Confessor asserts in connection with the first division, that
between created and uncreated, 'although God has created the radiant orderly arrangement
of all beings in his goodness, what and how it came to be is not immediately apparent in it.
[Thus] the saints call this division, which divides creation and God, ignorance.'2°
Conversely, the reunion or reconciliation of the divided entities by no means involves the
elimination of their distinct characteristics, but, being a matter of - riAiia yvc.Licts,21
involves the recognition of an overarching divine logos in whose universality even the most
particular extremities are united without being reduced to a solitary metaphysical unit by
their specific differences collapsing in confusion or dissolving into non-existence.
Thus I think it is fair to say that it is unlikely Maximus is referring specifically to
sexual genitalia when he speaks here and there in somewhat circumlocutary fashion of -re(
17 Rowan Williams, `Macrina's Deathbed Revisited: Gregory of Nyssa on Mind and Passion', in Lionel R.
Wickham and Caroline P. Bammel (eds.), Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy in Late Antiquity: Essay in Tablas
to George Christopher Stead (Leiden / NY / Köln: E.J. Brill, 1993), 244.
18 ,QD 1,3 (CCSG 10 138.4-6).
19 Amb.Io. 41 (PG 91.1308C; 1309D).
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yvcopiapaTa of Adam, explained further as 'the characteristic features of those subject to
generation and corruption,'22 even though certain occurrences certainly suggest a
connection. Whatever these distinguishing marks are in concrete, corporeal fact, they
apparently function as the external indicators of the punishment (TO int Tipiov) residing in
human flesh by which human beings receive their life through birth from seed and blood
(like the plants and animals), keep their life through pain and toil, and eventually lose their
life through corruption and death.' If they are not the genitalia themselves, then they are
the characteristic marks of animal life generated by genital reproduction: birth, aging,
suffering, and death. These things will indeed be done away with.
We have seen that in Maximus' mind sexual differentiation, which 'in no way
depends on the primordial reason behind the divine purpose concerning human
generation,'" is provisionally linked to Adam's fall. Next we must ask how. Maximus
implicitly locates the answer within his discussions on the complex relationship between
pleasure (ip5ovri) and pain (OSlivr). While Christoph von SchOnborn is surely right to
highlight the remarkable cfraicheue and 'plausibilite culturelle' Maximus' analysis retains for
our own contemporary situation,' the discussions themselves most often arise in
connection with and, as Larchet notes, are 'for the most part justified by the special
conception of the modalities of the saving economy of Christ!' In other words, what
Maximus has to say on pleasure and pain does not arise out of any kind of personal
Amb.h. 41 (PG 91.1304D — 1305A).
21 Amb..To. 41 (PG 91.1305D).
22 ,Q. ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 87.60; 93.150-155).
23 See Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 50.400-402); Amb.10.41 (PG 91.1312A). It is likely Maximus would have been aware
of Gregory Nazianzen's reference (Greg.Naz.Or. 7.23 [SC 405, 240.22]) to all the divisions listed in Galatians
3:28 as Tarrç aapK65 yvcapiapa-ra.
24 ,Q.ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 93.148 — 95.164).
25 Amb.Io. 41 (PG 91.1305C).
26 Christoph von SchOnbom, Plaisir et Douleur dans L'Analyse de S. Maxime, d'apres Les Quaestiones ad
Thalassium', in Heinzer and SchOnborn, Maximus Confessor, Actes du Symposium, 274-275.
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psychological angst any more than his position on sexual differentiation and marriage arises
out of any kind of personal sexual phobia. Rather both arise out of an attempt to connect
christology concretely to the Adamic state within a teleological view of perfection. The locus
classicus for this topic is found at the beginning of Quaestiones ad Thalassium 61:
When God created human nature, he did not create along with it sensual pleasure or
sensual pain, but built into it a certain spiritual capacity for pleasure, according to which it
would be able ineffably to enjoy him. But at the very moment he came into being, the first
man surrendered this capacity — I mean the natural desire of the intellect for God — to the
senses, and so according to this initial movement toward sensible objects by means of
sense perception he experienced the kind of pleasure which is activated in a manner
contrary to nature. To this pleasure the one who tends to our salvation providentially
attached pain as a sort of assisting punitive power. By virtue of this power the law of death
was wisely implanted in bodily nature, in this way putting a fence around the unnatural
desire of the mind's madness — the desire which is moved towards sensible objects.28
The law of death, operative in all human nature, is here seen to follow as the direct
result of Adam's surrender to his sensual appetite. But to this 'initial movement' away
from God towards the experience of sensual pleasure, God has, in the interests of man's
immediate correction and eventual restoration, attached pain, hardship and suffering, upon
which follows death (cf. Gen 3:16-19). Such pain tempers man's appetite for unnatural
27 Larchet, 'Ancestral Guilt according to St. Maximus the Confessor', 44.
28 Q.ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 85.8-21).
29 Or as Thunberg summarises, `Man's fall was due to bodily desire and search for sensual lust. That is
Maximus' basic conviction, and it is confirmed through his definition of self-love as love for the body, which
he considers to be the root of all sins and passions and the primitive sin which caused the fall.' Microcosm and
Mediator, 377.
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pleasure and limits its spread,' but remains powerless to negate it entirely. Fallen man
henceforth 'gains his generative origin from corruption through pleasure unto corruption
through death.'" In a poignant metaphor in which he exploits the ancient association of
human mortality with a birth arising out of pleasure (N.Vis 7:1-2), Maximus calls pleasure
'the mother of death', for the sexual desire that leads to intercourse and conception gives
birth to a life subject to pain and suffering and bordered by corruption and death.' In fact
'the more human nature strives to perpetuate its existence through birth, the more it binds
itself to the law of sin, since its passibility" continues to activate transgression.' 34 'By his
fear of death man remains enslaved to pleasure.'" Human existence between the
extremities of pleasure and pain involves its members therefore in a torturous dialectic:
For while wanting to flee from the painful sensation associated with pain we seek refuge in
pleasure, endeavouring to appease the nature that is hard pressed by the torment of pain.
And striving through pleasure to dull the disturbances of pain, we fully confirm its written
charge against us (Col 2:14) and are unable to have pleasure without pain and hardships.36
Maximus has certainly put his finger on a universal existential affliction, something
like that recognised in our own time by Bernanos when his country priest asks: 'how is it
we fail to realize that the mask of pleasure, stripped of all hypocrisy, is that of anguish?'37
30 Larchet ('Ancestral Guilt according to St. Maximus the Confessor', 35) wisely notes that Maximus 'does not
seem to ascribe an expansion to evil to the development of human nature [per se], but rather to the fact that
men have, each one through choice and through his own sins, persevered in the way of evil opened by
Adam.'
31 .Q. Thai 61 (CCSG 22, 87.46-49).
32 .Q. ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 93.138-139).
33 That is, its tendency to sin.
34 2. ThaL 21 (CCSG 7, 127.24-27).
35 ,Q. Thai 21 (CCSG 7, 131.70-71).
36 .Q. ThaZ 61 (CCSG 22, 89.92— 91.100).
37 Diary of a Country Priest, 136.
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What is more, there seems no hope of disillusionment from this lie. By its very fallen
existence human nature is 'bound indissolubly in a treacherous bond.' 38 At the heart of this
dialectic lies the disordered and thus 'deliberative' will (gnome) and the corrupted faculty of
choice (proairesis) of each individual:
Having a deliberative will that shrinks from pain out of cowardice, man, who is thoroughly
dominated by the fear of death, even against his will, in an effort to prolong life, stays
locked in slavery to pleasure.39
In a related passage cited earlier Maximus is prompted to comment on the well-
known verse from Psalm 50: 'I was conceived in iniquity and in sin did my mother pine for
,(a:tom-IGO me.'4° He first affirms that birth involving marriage and corruption was not part
of God's original purpose (skopos). Marriage was introduced by Adam's transgression, that
is, 'his disregard for the law given to him by God.' At this point the Confessor makes an
strikingly original distinction based on the literal meaning of the rare verb KIOGO(CO, a hapax
in LXX, in the sense used to describe the pleasurable pining of a pregnant woman for her
child, and further suggested by the syntactic division of the verse into two clauses:
Consequently all those born from Adam are conceived in iniquity, thereby falling under the
condemnation of the forefather. And the phrase and in sin did my mother pine for me indicates
that Eve — the first mother of us all — pined for sin OKICCITICE T161/ cipapTiav), in that she
38 ,Q. ThaL 21 (CCSG 7, 127.23-24).
39 Q.Thai 21 (CCSG 7, 131.82-85).
4° .QD I, 3 (CCSG 10, 138.1 — 139.13).
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desired sexual pleasure. This is why we also fall under the condemnation of our mother,
and so say that we were craved for (Ktooemeni) in sin.41
By its association with the unnatural desire for carnal pleasure, genital procreation
is seen by Maximus to be the result of a fall from a more superior form of reproduction
common to created intelligible beings.' Yet having asked whether this does not imply that
'the joining of man to woman is always something sinful', Sherwood - rightly I believe - can
supply a negative answer.' Marriage, since it has been instituted providentially by God, is
not sinful. The law of nature that dictates the use of carnal pleasure as a necessary means of
propagation is in itself 'blameless' (dvailloc)," even though it is a law that amounts to the
`bestializing'" of human nature so that in this act man resembles the irrational plants and
animals. For Maximus as for Gregory of Nyssa, sexual instinct is 'neutral' and 'acquires
moral colouring only in relation to the goals and activity of mind.'"
The trouble therefore is not with sexual intercourse itself, but with the fact that
human existence is dependent upon a law that arose out of and perpetuates an unnatural
desire for carnal pleasure, a desire whose ultimate root is 'self-love' (4)1Xatrria). From as
far back as Clement of Alexandria the tradition knew of self-love as 'the cause of all
sinning' (11-dVTCOV dpaprrip«Tcov aitia). 47 Maximus defines it as 'the first sin, the first
progeny of the devil and the mother of the passions.'" Even more specifically it is 'the
41 ,QD I, 3 (CCSG 10, 138.7 — 139.13).
42 See Aurb.Io. 41 (PG 91.1309A) where Maximus mentions 'another way, foreknown by God, for human
beings to increase, if the first human being had kept the commandment and not cast himself down to an
animal state by abusing his own proper powers.'
43 St. Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic life, 67-70.
44 Q.ThaZ 61 (CCSG 22, 87.33).
45 Sherwood, St. Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Life, 68.
46 Rowan Williams, `Macrina's Deathbed Revisited', 235.
47 Clem.Str. 5.56.2. Cf. Car. 3.57.
48 Ep. 2 (PG 91.397C).
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passionate attachment to the body' (TO TrpOs	 TO oc3pa Traos), 49 or 'the irrational love
for the body' Crj TO1J ocApaTos- aoyos 4:0n 1a). 5° Self-love therefore is not only the
fundamental egoistic orientation of fallen man, but his bodily egoism, his state of being
incurvatus in se, whose form and focus is chiefly carnal. As Thunberg has demonstrated, self-
love 'manifests itself primarily in an inner affection for bodily sensations and the sensible
world....'m Human beings generated under this regime nevertheless do not share in Adam's
guilt so much as in its consequences, namely passibility (susceptibility to unnatural
passionate attachments), corruption, and death.' Notice that these are effects specifically
brought about and experienced at a bodily level. They are what Maximus at one point calls
the 'operations' of the evil powers 'embedded in the provisional law of nature.'53
In studying this dialectic between pleasure and pain we are led to analyse more
precisely the character of bodily birth, for in Maximus' mind the latter forms a End of
connecting point by which all human beings become united to Adam and heirs of the
consequences of his fall. In this context 'bodily birth' entails much more than the simple
passage of a mature foetus from the womb into the light of day. It is, to be sure, something
that comes to fecundic completion in the pain of labour but, as seen above in the
commentary on Psalm 50:7, is essentially constituted by conception. On the basis of the
traditional double-creation doctrine, Maximus posits and plays upon a distinction we have
49 Car. 2.8.
59 Car. 2.59; also 3.8; 3.56-57.
51 Microcosm and Mediator, 244. For the whole of his outstanding analysis, see Microcosm and Mediator, 231-248.
Also Irenee Hausherr, Philautk: de la tendresse pour soi ci la chatite se/on Maxime k Confesseur (Rome: Pont.
Instituturn Orientalium Studiorum, 1952). One of the most important texts in Maximus on this theme is the
lengthy prologue to the Quaestiones ad Thalassium (CCSG 7, 17.1 — 43.432).
52 We may once again profitably cite Larchet ('Ancestral Guilt according to St. Maximus the Confessor', 35-
36) in this connection: 'If all men necessarily suffer the effects of Adam's sin, they sin themselves (and are
consequently guilty) not because they have inherited Adam's personal sin in their nature, but because they
imitate Adam.... Such [a] conception has nonetheless to be expressed with many precautions, because the
idea that sin is transmitted only by imitation was one of the first and main arguments of [the] Pelagians.'
53 .Q.ThaZ 21 (CCSG 7, 129.45).
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encountered in an earlier chapter between genesis (generation) and gennesis (birth). Genesis is
related to the creation of the soul and the gift of the divine image by insufflation at the
moment of conception. Gennesis is related to the formation of the body from already
existing blood and semen, also at the moment of conception. The two events are
simultaneous, with genesis being associated with the logos of birth and gennesis being
associated with the tropos of birth.' At the same time, each possesses its own integral logos
and tropos corresponding to the ontological difference between the two entities: soul and
body."
All this becomes particularly important when Maximus identifies gennesis, the
second in our scheme, as the precise point as it were by which human beings come to share
concretely in 'the likeness to the man of corruption.'" The law by which genesis comes to
pass was a law established before Adam's transgression, and thus was prior to sin. The law of
gennesis, however, was established 'after the transgression as a result of judgement' s' It is by
means of this second 'ignoble' (a-rums) birth," brought about as it is by the sensual
passion invariably involved in sexual intercourse, that everyone who experiences it
becomes necessarily subject to the passibility and corruption of human nature resulting
from Adam's transgression. Thus the initial order has been reversed. Out of sheer necessity
man now receives his blameless genesis from ignoble gennesis.
Let us now see how Maximus brings these distinctions together in a single passage.
Once again it is significant that the discussion takes place in a christological context in
which we find him using the Adam/Christ typology to explain the significance of Christ's
54 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1320A).
55 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1321CD).
56 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1316D).
57 Amblo. 42 (PG 91.1317A).
58 Amblo. 42 (PG 91.1317B).
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'stripping the principalities and powers' (Col 2:15). It is through the lens supplied by the
Word's own incarnation as Christ that Maximus contemplates what is basically the
presupposition of empirical human existence:
When without any change in himself the divine Word clothed himself with our nature and
became a perfect human being... he brought the first Adam to light by the way in which he
was generated and born. The first man, who received being from God and was made
according to the same genesis of being, was free from corruption and sin, for they were not
created along with him. But when he sinned by transgressing the commandment he
condemned himself to a birth (gennesis) contracted through passion and sin. Because of this
all subsequent natural generation (genesis) is held in the passibility of sin, as in a kind of law.
According to this law, no one is free from the effects of sin, since each of us is subject by
nature to the law of being born, a law introduced alongside generation because of 5in.59
In this scheme human genesis, that is, human nature's very coming into being from God, is
governed by and coincides with a birth 'contracted through passion and sin.' Hence its
ontological foundation, originating as it does in a morally questionable source, is unstable.
Having preferred what is pleasant and manifest to the senses in place of the intelligible and
as yet invisible good,
the first man abandoned this deifying and divine and incorporeal birth and was condemned
as is appropriate to be subject to a bodily birth which is involuntary, material and
perishable. God determined by worthy judgement that he who deliberately chose the
inferior instead of the superior should exchange his free, impassible, autonomous and holy
59 2.ThaL 21 (CCSG 7, 127.5-18).
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birth for one which is passible, servile, and subject to necessity like the irrational and
unintelligent animals, and that he should swap the divine and ineffable honour with God
for the life of dishonour on the same material level as the dumb beasts.60
We have I think sufficiently captured the sense of the Adamic dilemma as Maximus
portrays it. The law of being born from the union of male and female plunges its offspring
into a downward spiral towards non-existence: 'onward to darkness and to death we
tend.' 61 Human genesis moves inexorably EK (hyeopas. Kai Cis 1)eopav - 'taking its beginning
from corruption and meeting its end in corruption.'' Adam's brief course on earth is
marked by the constant vacillation between pleasure and pain, a vacillation itself
engendered by his own somatocentric self-love and failure to love the good. But Adam is
no distant figure of the shady past. He is, as Blowers aptly remarks, 'a prototype of the
monk in his or her ascetic struggles, and his humanity is an antitype of the new
eschatological humanity of the Second Adam.'' It remains now for us to explore the
redemptive ffip-side to this equation.
Baptismal Rebirth and Spiritual Renovation
Having referred obliquely just now to baptism as the redemptive 'flip-side' to the cycle of
birth and death propagated by sexual reproduction, we may go on to qualify Our meaning
by citing Maximus' observation that by virtue of its immediate relation to the incarnation,
baptism brings about 'the annulment and dissolution of bodily birth' (Cis ci06-rnatv Kai
60 Amb../o. 42 (PG 91.1348A).
61 Christopher Wordsworth.
62 Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 51.406).
63 'Gentiles of the Soul', 66.
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AliCil V TT'S EK CICOpeCTCOV yEVVTiOECO5). 64 But what is the connection between the
Incarnation, baptism, and the dissolution of bodily birth?
At one point at least the connection is suggested to him by a passage in Gregory
Nazianzen's Oration on Holy Baptism,' preached in Constantinople on Epiphany - the feast
commemorating the baptism of our Lord. In it Gregory says that 'the Word knows three
births for us: one from the body, one by baptism, and one by resurrection.' 66 But when he
goes on to explain these three births, Gregory apparently adds a fourth, or at least, he splits
the first - the birth from the body - into two aspects: 'the initial and life-giving insufflation',
and 'his incarnation.'67
It is in dealing with this question of three or four births that Maximus provides
some of his most remarkable reflections on the connection between Christ's own birth,
Christian baptism, and the dissolution of bodily birth inherited from Adam." The two
aspects of the birth from the body represent to Maximus the dual nature of human birth,
consisting as it does on the one hand in genesis - linked as we have seen with the divine
insufflation as the creation of the soul in the image of God, and on the other hand in
gennesis - linked with the formation (plash.) of the body from already existing matter. These
two aspects are in turn seen to constitute the two dimensions of the divine Word's
becoming a human being through condescension (Digkatabasis - genesis) and self-emptying
(kenosis - gennesis). But since the Word's genesis springs not from the corruption inherently
resulting from sexual union, but rather from a supernatural conception wrought without
seed, the second part of his birth - the gennesis, is transformed. In this way Christ becomes
64 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1348C).
65 Greg.Naz.Or. 40.
66 Greg.Naz.Or. 40.2.
67 Greg.Naz.Or. 40.2.
68 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1316A — 1349B).
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'the new Adam' who by 'causing the second and dishonourable birth [gennesis] to become
salvific and restorative of the first and honourable [genesis], also established the first [genesis]
as constitutive and preservative of the second [gennesis].'69
In 'honouring bodily birth' 7° for us like this, the Word willingly suffered to be
subject to the natural passions inseparable from this kind of birth. But he did so freely:
without necessity, and without sin. So while in his genesis he received through insufflation
the sinlessness natural to a created soul, he did not assume incorruptibility (TO ac)eapTov
ot; rrpooaa(3E). And while in his gennesis he received the passibility natural to bodily birth
as a result of judgement, he has not assumed its sinful aspect (TO dpapiTIT(KOv
rrpocniXr4E), that is, its tendency to sin?' Thus he 'powerfully healed both births' —genesis
and gennesis:
On the one hand he made his gennesis the means by which genesis is saved, paradoxically
restoring by the passibility associated with it the incorruptibility of genesis. And moreover,
on the other hand, he established his genesis as the means of preserving gennesis, sanctifying
its passible dimension by the sinlessness of genesis. His purpose was to recover genesis
completely, confirming nature by the divinely perfect logos of his genesis, and to liberate
completely the nature of gennesis that had fallen by birth because of sin - by means of the
fact that his gennesis was not governed by the eruptive mode of seed, as is the case with all
the rest who live on earth.72
In the light of this train of thought, the constitutive place of Jesus' conception and
birth from a virgin, and their function in the redemptive task of reconciling male and
69 JJj,jI0 42 (PG 91.1317AB).
70 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1320C).
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female in Christ, becomes patently dear. In the body of the Virgin Mary is contracted a
new mode of human generation and birth that restores fallen human generation and birth
to its properly natural, created logos. Mary's fiat is the 'word of faith by which everything
that is beyond nature and knowledge is naturally achieved.'73 Since no sexual pleasure
precedes the Lord's conception and birth, Maximus sees in the virgin birth the dissolution
of those provisional laws of nature that from Adam's fall have bound humanity to a mode
of generation contracted through sexual intercourse and thus 'from corruption, to
corruption:74
For God's conception was entirely without seed, and his birth untouched by corruption.
That is why even after the birth of the one born from her Mary remained a virgin, or rather
throughout the birth remained unharmed — a paradox departing from every law and
principle of nature. In fact through his birth, God — who deemed it worthy to be born in
flesh taken from her — actually tightened the bonds of virginity in her, though she was a
mother.... For it was absolutely essential for the creator of nature to correct that nature
through himself by dissolving those primary laws of nature by means of which sin, through
disobedience, had condemned human beings to receive their succession from one another
in precisely the same way as the irrational animals.75
Virginal birth, that is, the paradoxical coming into existence of a sinless and
naturally passible human being whose natural orientation is toward being, well-being, and
eternal well-being, has in Christ been constituted as the definitive and exclusive means by
71 Amb.b. 42 (PG 91.1317A).
72 Amb.M. 42 (PG 91.1317BC).
73 Amb.Io. 41 (PG 91.1313D).
74 Amb.Io. 31 (PG 91.1276A).
75 Amb.lo. 31 (PG 91.1276AB).
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which man and the cosmos are to be redeemed and 'the upper world ftlled.' 76
 Here then lies
the connection between the incarnation and Christian baptism. Baptism effects the
dissolution of the 'involuntary, material, and perishable' birth of the body, and incorporates
the subject into Christ's own 'deifying, divine, and incorporeal birth:'77
He who is good and the lover of humankind willingly entered as a human being into our
transgression, and voluntarily condemned himself along with us — he who alone is free and
sinless. And consenting to be born by bodily birth, wherein lay the power of our
condemnation, he mystically corrected it by the Spirit, and having loosed the bonds of
bodily birth in himself on our behalf, he has through the birth of the Spirit and according to
his will given to those who believe in his name - to us —power to become the children of God (Jn 1:12)
instead of children of flesh and blood.78
The Lord's own bodily birth bestows on the baptised the birth that their fallen human state
failed to provide — one brought about not by the carnal desire of a woman for a man (cf.
Gen 3:16), but 'the birth through baptism in the Spirit for my salvation and restoration by
grace.' Baptism brings about human nature's 're-formation' (dvcirrAacris),79 and thus
provides the firm ontological foundation for the moral quest.
It is from this perspective that we can now return to the problem of sexual
differentiation and the dialectic of pleasure and pain. By his bodily birth Christ restores to
human nature that 'other way' for human beings to increase, thereby 'expelling
76 Amb.Io. 31 (PG 91.1276B — 1276D).
77 Amb.Io.42 (PG 91.1348A).
78 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1348C).
79 Amb.Io. 42 (PG 91.1348D).
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(c.000LipEvos) the difference and division of nature into male and female.'' The existence
of the baptised is thus governed and defined not by a principle of male and female, a
principle marked by division and opposition, but by the principle of anthropos: simple
human being." Yet as we have been eager to prove, the negative and provisional character
of sexual differentiation seems to lie not in the fact of genital distinction per se, but in the
physical necessity of receiving an ontologically unstable existence on account of carnal
reproduction, and the egocentric sexual opposition — concretely experienced in the
existential dialectic between pleasure and pain — such reproduction propagates. This
reminds us of what we pointed out earlier, that the reconciliation or union between male
and female does not require the abolition of physical distinctions but is primarily a matter
of knowledge; it is a matter of recognising the single human nature common to all, male and
female, and of practising the dispassionate relating to one another such recognition entails:
Whoever is perfect in love and has come to the summit of imperturbability knows no
difference (06K ETT(aTaTal Stal)opecv) between what it is his own or what is another's,
between believer or unbeliever, slave or free, or indeed between male or female. Rather,
having risen above the tyranny of the passions and attending only to the one nature
common to all people, he regards all people equally, and is equally disposed toward all. For
there is in him neither Greek nor Jew, male nor female, slave nor free, but Christ is all and is in all
(Gal 3:28; Col 3:11).82
813 Amb../o.41 (PG 91.1309A). Maximus uses both 6 4)op a (distinction) and 5 t aipeais. (division) in reference
to sexual differentiation, and in this particular sentence speaks of -fly KTa TO «ppm Kat OnAuSial)opav
TE Kai Staipcatv. Thus it is unclear to me how in this context at least we can maintain Thunberg's insistence
that the two terms for Maximus signify 'two completely different concepts.' See Microcosm and Mediator, 57.
81 Amb.Io. 41 (PG 91.1305D; 1309D - 1312A).
82 Car. 2.30.
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Our comments so far may be illuminated further by examining a number of
important passages in which Maximus likens the male/female dichotomy to that of the
passions associated with the soul's so-called irascible and concupiscible faculties
respectively. Aggression (Oupos) and desire Prieup(a) stand in an analogous relationship
with male and female not least of all because, like sexual differentiation, they and the other
passions 'were not originally created together with human nature, or else they would
contribute to the definition of that nature.'" On this score Maximus explicitly defers to the
authority of the Nyssene," admitting with him that the passions were 'introduced on
account of the fall from perfection, being attached to the more irrational part of human
nature.'" In the carnally generated, these passions manifest themselves as a penchant for
deviance." Aggression typically destroys the exercise of reason, whereas desire 'sets up
flesh as more desirable than spirit and renders the enjoyment of visible phenomena more
delightful than the glory and brightness of intelligible realides.' 87 Again, there is no trouble
with the actual faculties or the natural passions. The tendencies of the natural and
blameless passions for which we are not responsible (06K if - the passionate drives,
the natural appetites and pleasures — in themselves these do not bring guilt upon those who
experience them. They are a 'necessary consequence' (civarcitov TrapaKoAotieripa) of
our created condition." Indeed, they can even 'become good in the earnest - once they
have wisely severed them from corporeal objects and used them to gain possession of
heavenly things.'" But under the influence of the liability which Maximus dubs 'generic sin'
83 ,Q. Tha 1 (CCSG 7,47.5-7).
Greg.Nyss. Vbs. 12.2 (SC 119, 398.1 —410.70).
85 ,Q. ThaL 1 (CCSG 7,47.7-10).
86 See ,QD 93 (CCSG 10, 72.1-10).
Ondom. (CCSG 23, 47.343-350).
88 .Q.ThaL 55 (CCSG 7, 487.123-127).
89 Q.ThaL 1 (CCSG 7,47.18-20).
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(yEvudi dpap-ria) 9° these natural passions have become the means by which the will, on
account of nature's passibility, is impelled towards the corruption associated with the
unnatural passions.' Hence in the opposition between aggression and desire brought about
by the disordered relation of the soul's faculties both to reason (above) and to the material
world (below) the soul itself becomes involved in conflicting and contrary dispositions.
This is fallen humanity's normal experience. This, like the dichotomy between male and
female, is 'second nature.'92
But just as baptism is the point at which the opposition between male and female is
reconciled under the single logos of anthropos, so is it the means by which the distinct
activities of the irascible and concupiscible faculties become subordinated to the hegemony
of reason and so, under that single logos, function harmoniously without opposition. Elijah's
successful advance toward God supplies an exemplary type of this at-once ascetic and
sacramental self-configuration to Christ:
When he reached the point of having life, movement, and being in Christ, he put far from
him the monstrous genesis from inequalities, no longer bearing in himself the contrary
dispositions of these passions in the way of male and female, lest his reason, changed along
with their unstable fluctuations, be enslaved to them.93
With clear baptismal overtones, the rational soul, empowered with divine knowledge, is
then said to discard the weaker genesis and replace it with the superior by guarding in itself
its graced equality with God along with the concrete realisation (lil y tirrOaraatv) of the
90 .Q.ThaL 21 (CCSG 7, 127.30).
91Q Thai 21 (CCSG 7, 127.30 — 129.35).
92 Blowers, 'Gentiles of the Soul', 69.
93 Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 381-387).
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gifts it has received. It is at the level of this concrete realisation that, in an expression
echoing that most centripetal Maximian motif,
Christ wills always mystically to be born and to become incarnate through those being
saved, thereby turning the soul that gives him birth into a virgin mother who, putting it
concisely, is without the marks of nature subject to generation and corruption as in the
relation of male and female.94
It is no surprise that we recognise here also a theme dear to Gregory of Nyssa. In
his treatise On Virginity, Gregory says:
What happened corporeally in the case of the immaculate Mary, when the fullness of the
godhead (Col 2:9) shone forth in Christ through her virginity, takes place also in every soul
when it gives birth to Christ spiritually, although the Lord no longer effects a bodily
presence. For, Scripture says, we know Christ no longer according to the flesh (2 Cor 5:16), but, as
the Gospel says somewhere (cf. Jn 14:23), he dwells with us and the Father along with
hirn.95
Each Christian, by virtue of baptism, is called to a new kind of procreation in which the
soul as both virgin and mother gives birth to Christ 'spiritually' (Ka-rci A6yov). For
Maximus, we notice however, the Christ who is born of the virgin soul is made flesh in the
fully corporeal practice of the virtues. While this is a vocation by no means exclusive to the
physically virginal, physical celibacy more closely typifies and prophetically embodies the
94 Ordom. (CCSG 23, 397-402).
95 Greg.Nyss. Vbs. 2.2 (SC 119, 268.18-25).
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pregnant virginity of the soul. What is achieved by baptism is not the elimination of a
person's gender or sexual, bodily identity, but the dissolution of his or her subjection to a
genesis 'from corruption, to corruption.' Baptism liberates nature not from its given bodily
characteristics - though eventually these are 'overwhelmed by the transcendence of glory',"
but from 'the symptomatic passions' (-ra arpawriKa Tian) — aggression and lust — that
are indicative of carnal genesis, for these are passions which
do not belong to the life of Christ and the logic according to Christ - if that is we can
believe him who said, for in Christ Jesus there is no male or female (Gal 3:28; Col 3:11). By these
words he clearly indicates the signs and passions (r& arip.... a Kai T....r'i Trden).,, of that nature
subject to corruption and generation. Instead there is only a single deiform principle
created by divine knowledge, and a single movement of will that chooses virtue alone.97
Let us at this point now turn to see what particular aspects of the Incarnation
Maximus envisages as overcoming the related dialectic of pleasure and pain. We recall that
under Adam deviant physical pleasure is the means by which sin has fastened itself to the
root of human nature." In just response God has providentially and punitively attached
pain (and with it, death) to pleasure to bring an end to nature and so limit the escalation of
evil. Unlawful pleasure has its necessary end in lawful death," for pleasure is, we remember,
'the mother of death.' Both pleasure and pain gain their actual, operative force through
nature's corporeal passibility, so that in the hands of sin and death passibility functions as a
96 Th.Oec. 2.88.
97 Onclom. (CCSG 23, 51.406-414).
98 QThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 95.165-171).
99 ,Q.ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 87.36 — 89.76).
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weapon against nature. 10° Yet it is this very threat of death which again drives nature again
to find solace in pleasure. In a kind of macabre, tragic twist, humanity is slave to a sorry
plot.
Christ's own birth, life, and death bring about an almost exact symmetrical reversal
of the above pattern. This reversal begins as we have seen with his birth from a virgin.
Because his beginning does not issue from unlawful pleasure, sin and death cannot 'use' his
natural passibility - a state he voluntarily assumes - as a 'weapon' to effect death. Instead
the Word takes up passibility as his own weapon to be wielded for the removal of sin and
death from nature. im Just as Adam introduced to all humanity a source of generation
issuing from pleasure and ending in death, so Christ by his birth introduces another, more
original source of generation by the Holy Spirit, in which 'all those who are mystically
regenerated from him by the Spirit' are liberated from the liabilities incurred through
Adam's generation. These then 'no longer have Adam's pleasure of generation, but only the
pain from Adam that effects death in them, yet not as a penalty for sin, but as a
dispensation against sin....
(birth) and pain (death) instigated by Adam by separating their relation as cause to effect
through his virginal, impassible birth and his freely chosen death. With these words we are
already anticipating a theme we shall address in the final section of this chapter. At this
stage we should like simply to point out how it is a distinctly baptismal theme that arises
from the dramatic reversal of the Adamic dispensation wrought through the life and death
of the incarnate Word.
I ® ,Q.ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 89.90).
101 .Q. ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 89.77 — 89.90).
102 Q.ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 91.109 — 93.141).
'102 Christ breaks the inevitable, destructive cycle of pleasure
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The temptations of Jesus also feature centrally as salvifically-charged, redemptive
moments whose significance chiefly lies in the way they undo Adam's surrender to
diabolical seduction. In the incarnate Word's passibility, a corollary of his existence as a
flesh and blood human being, there is presented to 'the principalities and powers' (Col
2:15) an apparently easy target for their deceitful schemes.' Their first wave of assault
comes to the Lord in the wilderness through his experience of pleasure. Maximus does not
indicate precisely what such pleasure involved, but it is likely he means the pleasure Christ
enjoyed in living 'by every word that comes from the mouth of God.' The tempter tries to
pervert this pleasure by tempting Christ to appease his carnal appetite. It is to this
temptation, it seems, that Maximus has Christ proving 'impregnable and untouchable.'1"
Through this victory he 'brings the evil powers to nought'' and
presents to us all he corrected as good. For he himself was not prevented from
experiencing temptations relating to pleasure.... But he summoned to himself the evil
power present in our temptations that he might absorb the attack himself, putting to death
the power that thought it could seize him as it had Adam at the beginning.106
Having defeated the adversaries in his first experience of temptation, the Lord in
his passion allows them to advance a second wave of attack in the form of pain and
suffering. We are struck in the following explanation by the significance Maximus thrice
103 2. Thal 21 (CCSG 7, 129.45-52).
104 .Q. ThaL 21 (CCSG 7, 129.55).
105 ,Q. Thai 21 (CCSG 7, 131.70-72).
106 2.ThaL 21 (CCSG 7, 129.56-62).
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attributes to 'the moment of his death' 107
 at which point the public 'stripping' of the
principalities and powers (Col 2:15) is definitively enacted:
He did this in order that, having completely destroyed in himself the corrupting arrow of
their evil, he might, like a fire, consume it, completely abolishing it from nature, stripping the
principalities and powers by his timely death on the cross, while remaining impregnable to
sufferings, or rather showing himself formidable in death, detaching from nature the
passibility of pain.... Hence on the one hand the Lord escaped from the principalities and
powers by his first experience of temptation in the wilderness, healing in its entirety
nature's susceptibility to pleasure. And on the other hand, he stripped them at the moment of
this death, similarly detaching from nature its susceptibility to pain. Out of his love for
humankind he made nature's correction, which is our responsibility, his own; or rather in
his goodness he reckoned to us the record of his own good deeds.108
The Lord's escalating agony from Gethsemane to Golgotha not only fails to yield
an opening for the demons to spawn their evil domination, but actually functions as 'his
means for consuming our culpable passions in his refining fire, the new Adam pioneering
his eschatological humanity....
Only in baptism is this grace-filled 'opportunity' (kairos) that the Word exploited in
time to condemn sin in the flesh 'in general' (yEviK(35) made accessible at the level of the
particular (iSIKi3s). 110 We are reminded that as long as we are in this body baptism is as
much about death as it is about resurrection; or rather, baptism initiates bodily human
107 KaTa TOV Tot) eavci-rou KaipOv (Q.ThaL 21 [CCSG 7, 131.79]); KaTet TOv KaipOtr T01.1 Ocarch-ou
(2Thal 21 [CCSG 7, 131.89-90]); iv Tc:? Kalpc;a: Toi.) eatich-ou (Q.ThaL 21 [CCSG 7, 131.96]).
1082Thed 21 (CCSG 7, 131.76-93).
109 Blowers, 'The Passion of Jesus Christ in Maximus the Confessor', 371.
no p.Thal 61 (CCSG 22, 99.236-241).
)109
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beings into a divine mode of life whose corporeal contours are experienced primarily under
the form of suffering, hardship, trial and death. But just as the experience of Adatnic
pleasure is the mother of death, so is this experience of baptismal suffering and death,
which is actually nothing else than real participation in the death of the Lord and
anticipation of his resurrection, 'the father of everlasting life."
Faith, Love and the Use of the Passions
At this point we temporarily suspend discussion on baptismal participation in the death of
Christ until our final section. In the intervening comments however in which we examine
the relation between faith, love, and the use of the passions, our focus on baptism and the
bodily dimensions of the deified life will be no less pronounced.
We may start by citing Sherwood who declares that the benefits bestowed in
baptism, summarised by Larchet as purification, illumination, and filial, deifying
adoption,112 possess in Maximus' view a provisional, conditional character."' Baptism
grants adoption as a potentiality - a 'seed' (orr g ppa); its concrete fertilisation and flowering
depend on the will and actions of the believing subject."' Restored freewill (proairesis) acts
as 'the guardian and keeper of adoption, the gracious divine birth given from above by the
Spirit', and which 'by the careful observance of the commandments adorns the beauty
given by grace." Insofar as we remain subject to the passions, 'we have not perfectly
attained forgiveness of sins. For we were freed through holy baptism from ancestral sin;
1112. ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 93.137-141).
112 La divinisation de Phomme se/on Saint Maoanu k Confesseur, 415-417.
113 Sherwood, St. Maximus the Confessor.. The Ascetic Life, 78.
114 2.ThaL6 (CCSG 7, 69.1 —71.51).
115 Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 32.97-102).
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but from the sin we had the effrontery to commit after baptism we are freed through
repentance?"' In Maximus' theology this relationship between the potential and actual,
between the reception of baptismal grace and the keeping of the commands, corresponds
to the relationship between faith and love. It is therefore our purpose in this section to
tease out further the implications of this relationship for the bodily life and for the re-
orientation and right use of the natural passions.
In classical philosophy pistis represents a vastly inferior means of knowing.
According to E.R. Dodds, 'No any one brought up on classical Greek philosophy, pistis
meant the lowest grade of cognition: it was the state of mind of the uneducated, who
believe things on hearsay without being able to give reasons for their belief?"' That was the
early picture. But as Dodds goes on to point out, from the time of Porphyry on in
Neoplatonic circles, pistis became 'a basic requirement, ... the first condition of the soul's
approach to God?"' We have already seen in this study also that for Maximus as for other
Christian thinkers, pistis constitutes a direct form of knowledge superior even to that of the
intellect. Indeed, it is a divinely-bestowed way of knowing that is 'beyond mind.' Directly
echoing Hebrews 11:1 Maximus says, 'Faith alone embraces the [divine] mysteries since it is
the concrete realisation (irrrOaraats) of things beyond mind and reason?'" Faith 'induces
the mind to accede to God CrtsieEi Tr.:? Trpooxuapeiv TOv voin.o.' 12° Elsewhere
Maximus equates faith with Christ: The word of faith (Rom 10:8) that we seek is Christ
himself.' 121 He is 1 ivurRicyra-ros TriaTts: in him we see in concrete actuality what faith
116 LA 44 (CCSG 40, 119.1013-1017).
117 Pagan and Christian in an Age ofAmde, 121.
118 Ibid, 122.
119 Cap. XV (PG 90.1184CD). See also Th.Oec. 1.9.
120 2712L 49 (CCSG 7, 351.28).
121 Th.Oec. 2.35.
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really is.' At the same time faith is also 'the first premise in matters of religion, assuring
the one with it of the existence of God and of divine realities, and that much more surely
than the eye that, by looking on the appearances of sensible things, forms an opinion
(58av) about them for those who see.' 123 In other words, while faith grants union with
God in all its consummative fullness, it is also the first step on the way to such a union.
But while Maximus accords remarkable status and power to 'faith alone' (Tria-ris
pOvr), he is equally adamant that 'mere faith' - i1 klAn Trio	 - is inadequate for salvation:
Do not say, says divine Jeremiah, that you are the Lord's temple (Jer 7:4). Nor then ought you to
say, 'mere faith in our Lord Jesus Christ can save me.' For this is impossible unless you
acquire love for him through works. For in what concerns mere believing, even the demons
believe and tremble (Jam 2:19).124
Again in the words of the monastic master he speaks largely to the same effect, though
adds some detail as to what right believing might entail:
Now perhaps someone will say, 'I have faith, and faith in him is enough for salvation.' But
James contradicts him, saying even the demons believe and tremble (ram 2:19), and again, faith by
itself without works is dead (Jam 2:26), as are works without faith. 125 In what manner then do
we believe in him? Is it that we believe him about future things, but about transient and
present things do not believe him, and are therefore immersed in material things, living by
the flesh and warring against the Spirit? But those who truly believed Christ and, through
the commandments, made him to dwell wholly within themselves spoke in this way: I live,
122 2. ThaZ 25 (CCSG 7, 159.30-31).
123 E.p. 2 (PG 91.393CD).
124 Car. 1.39; cf. 1.31.
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yet not I, but Christ lives in me. And the life I live now in the flesh, I live Ig faith in the Son of God, who
loved me and gave himself for me (Gal 2:20). That is why they suffered for his sake for the
salvation of all.... By their words and deeds Christ, who works in them, was made
manifest.126
This distinction between fides nuda or faith 'by itself' (KaEr iauTijv), and what
Maximus' later scholiasts would call fides subsistens or '6 iVUTTOCTTaT05 1TIOTIS, 127 may be
illumined further by returning to a passage we discussed in an earlier chapter in which we
examined the distinction Maximus draws between image and likeness. There we saw that
Maximus envisages two ways of being born from God, or at least speaks of the one birth
from God under two aspects. In the first God gives the whole grace of adoption, but only
as a potentiality (Suvcipsi). In the second this same virtual grace of adoption becomes an
actuality (Kal2 EVEpyElav). The first mode of birth grants grace 'potentially present as faith
alone.' The second 'brings about in addition to faith the most divine likening' to God.128
The all-important and necessary addition of actual likening to God turns upon the
subjective orientation of the human will, or, if you will, upon the exercise of faith. As long
as the human will is bound up in carnal attachments, as long as it retains even an occasional
inclination to sin, grace remains unrealised at the level of potentiality, 'for the Holy Spirit
does not give birth to an unwilling will (yvckiirry 06Xothaav), but reshapes a willing will
to bring it to deification.' 129
 This 'willing will' (ymivtiv POUXOpEV1110 is the product of an
often long and arduous journey through ascetic practice in which the Christian learns in
imitation of Christ to subject himself to the reformative work of the Spirit. Maximus'
125 The addition 'as are works without faith' may come from Greg.Naz.Or. 40.45.
126 LA 34 (CCSG 40, 73.639 — 77.660).
127 See Scholium 3, .Q.Thai 25 (CCSG 7, 167.8-11).
128
.Q. Thai 6 (CCSG 7, 69.8-16).
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conclusion reinforces the distinction between 'faith alone' and that fully-adorned faith by
which grace has been realised in its total actuality:
Hence we may possess the Spirit of adoption, which is the seed intended to endue the
begotten with the likeness of him who sowed it, but [at the same time] not possess
alongside it a will that has been purified from deviating towards other things. This is why —
even after the birth from water and the Spirit — we willingly sin. But if through knowledge
we were to equip the will to receive the activity of water and the Spirit, then through ascetic
struggle the mystical water would continually cleanse the conscience, and the life-giving
Spirit would effect the immutable perfecting of the good in us through experiential
knowledge. Therefore it most assuredly remains for each of us, who are still able to sin, to
will purely in accordance with our will to surrender our whole lives to the Spirit.130
We find a similar kind of distinction being made again in Quaestiones ad Thalassium
33, although this time the actuality/potentiality distinction is coupled with an inner/outer,
invisible/visible distinction. Here Maximus identifies the kingdom of God, said by Jesus to
be 'within you' (Lk 17:21), with faith. But the 'within you' suggests to the Confessor an
important conceptual distinction. Strictly conceived, faith is the 'invisible kingdom of God',
whereas the kingdom of God is 'faith divinely endued with visible form.' Faith only
becomes visible and 'external to us' when it is activated through works, that is, through the
129 .Q. ThaL 6 (CCSG 7, 69.21-23).
130 Q ThaL 6 (CCSG 7, 71.38-51).
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keeping of the ten commandments 131 Until then it remains an invisible, latent, virtual
reality. 132 This leads Maximus to conclude:
Now if the kingdom of God is this activated faith (ivEpyou16vri TTIOTIS), and the
kingdom of God creates the immediate union of the rulers of that kingdom with God, then
faith has been shown clearly to be the relational potential for or the effectual condition of
(81;vapiS GXETIKli ii CIXECIC SpaciT(Kii) that perfect, immediate, supernatural union that
the believer has with God in whom he trusts.133
There is yet another passage that deserves consultation since it serves to connect
what we have been saying about 'mere' or virtual faith to Maximus' understanding of faith's
relation to love and the concrete shape the transition from possessing potential grace to
possessing actual grace takes in the Christian life. Commenting on Zorubbabel's song of
praise facing Jerusalem in 1 Esd_ras 4:58-60, Maximus turns for further elucidation to the
prophecy in Zechariah 4:7-10 concerning Zorubbabel's work of restoring the Temple after
Israel's Babylonian exile. Having identified Zorubbabel as 'our Lord and God Jesus Christ',
Maximus goes on to uncover the multiple layers of application — both christological and
ascetico-practical — imbedded in the various features of the prophecy:
The stone (Zech 4:7) is faith in him [Christ]. And it is in the hand, because Christ's faith
manifests itself by the practice of the commandments. For faith without works is dead Gam
2:26), as are works without faith. The hand is clearly the symbol for ascetic practice.
131 Q.Thal 33 (CCSG 7, 229.12-19).
132 One of the later scholia on this passage confirms the identification of this virtual faith / invisible kingdom
with what Maximus calls ij q)ikij Tricrrts. , 'since it does not possess the divine likeness that comes from the
virtues.' See Scholium 1 to ,Q.ThaL 33 (CCSG 7, 231.1-4).
133 ,Q. Thal 33 (CCSG 7, 229.19-25).
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Consequently by carrying the stone in his hand the Lord teaches us by example to have
active faith in him adorned with the seven eyes of the Lord (Zech 4:10), that is, with the seven
activities of the Holy Spirit.134
It is important to note the connection Maximus makes here between the 'works' of
faith and the seven 'activities' (ivipyEtat) of the Spirit. Without them as 'eyes', faith
remains blind and inoperative. The seven activities, which Maximus identifies in order as
fear, strength, counsel, understanding, knowledge, intelligence, and wisdom (cf. Is 11:2), are
not seven different actions of the one Spirit, but are the graduated, varying effects
produced by the Spirit's one, uniform divine activity in the life of the believer. There is in
reality no intrinsic difference between the seven activities. Their apparent differences rather
reflect the developing faith and growing state of receptivity of the believing subject, whose
'works' actualise, embody and externalise the hidden, latent faith within him. They are the
effects produced by his increasing voluntary activation - in co-operation with the singular
work of the Spirit - of the virtual faith planted in him through baptism.
All this has been pointed out extensively in a pair of early and little-known articles
on this passage by Carmelite Joseph a Spiritu Sancto. 1 ' In them he artfully spells out the
precise relationship between faith and the seven iv g pye tat of the Spirit, which he calls 'the
effects of the Holy Ghost's continuous operation upon the soul... the vibrations of the
strings of the soul at the touch of the Holy Ghost.' Each effect represents a progressively
more advanced stage of spiritual maturity, and is related to faith in terms of the soul's
increasing detachment from created things and its subsequent voluntary actuation of faith
134 Q ThaL 54 (CCSG 7,461.300-308).
135 Joseph a Spiritu Sancto, The Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost in Early Greek Theology', The Homiletic and
Pastoral Review 26.8 (May, 1926), 820-827 and 26.9 (June, 1926), 930-938.
136 'The Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost', 822.
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through works of virtue. The first effect of faith is fear — fear of God's threats and
punishments, a fear that compels the believer to exert himself to avoid sin. And, since the
fear of God is the beginning of wisdom (Prov 1:7), at the very pinnacle of faith's effects is
wisdom. Wisdom is simply fully-actuated faith, and therefore equates to a union with God
'beyond mind.' 137 Wisdom is where faith leads to and serves as a sign of its complete
adornment with virtue. Only as wisdom does faith eventually become what it in fact is:
Ascending via these 'eyes' or, as it were, illuminations of faith therefore, we are drawn
together into the divine monad of wisdom. By our gradual ascent through the different
virtues we reconcile the differences between the gifts — differences that occurred for our
sake — uniting them with their very origin.138
If we call these works of faith the charismatic virtues, recognising them
simultaneously both as the effects of the Spirit's one divine operation upon the soul and as
the good works manifesting the soul's voluntary actualisation of baptismal faith, what can
we say about the relationship between faith and the two remaining theological virtues, hope
and love?
One of Maximus' most lucid reflections regarding the relationship between the
three theological virtues is undoubtedly in his letter on love to John the Cubicularius, the
Constantinopolitan courtier. 'Nothing', Maximus is convinced, 'is more truly Godlike than
divine love, nothing more mysterious, nothing more apt to raise up human beings to
deification.' 139 But 'divine love' as far as he is concerned is not exclusively a divine act
toward man. While its source and power are truly divine, it is a fully theanclric reality; or
137 'The Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost', 933.
138 2 Thed 54 (CCSG 7,463.347-351).
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rather, the love the Christian has for God and his neighbour is none other than God's own
love: they are 'one and the same and universal." In 'suffering' it the human soul becomes
an active agent of its all-embracing, deifying force. Whereas faith and hope are directed
towards the attainment of the good as means to an end, and thus have a limited function,
love possesses the good tonte entiere.' Love is the supreme union in which faith and hope
find their true goal:
For faith is the foundation of everything that comes after it, I mean hope and love, and
firmly establishes what is true. Hope is the strength of the extremes, I mean faith and
love.... But love is the fulfilment of these, wholly embracing the whole of the final object
of desire, giving them rest from their movement towards i.t — from lotVieving t1.k ii  to
be and hoping that something will be — and bringing instead, by means of itself, the
enjoyment of what is present.142
At the heart of love - and this is why bare faith without works is 'dead' - is the
incarnation of the Word. Love is the actuated, embodied fullness of what faith tends
towards; it is the outward adornment of faith, for in love, 'the most generic' of all the
virtues,143 God is incarnate and man is deified:
For it is the most perfect work of love and the summit of its activity to make the properties
and names of the things united to it fit each other by means of a reciprocal exchange. So
the human being is made God and God is called and appears as human.... Love is
139 Bp. 2 (PG 91.393B).
1 40 5p. 2 (PG 91.401D).
141 5p. 2 (PG 91.405B).
142 .E.P. 2 (PG 91.396BC). Cf. Car. 3.100.
1 43 Amblo. 21 (PG 91.1249B).
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therefore a great good, and of goods the first and most excellent good, since through it
God and men are drawn together in the one who has love, and the creator of humankind
appears as human through the undeviating likeness of the deified to God in the good so far
as is possible to humankind.144
Good works, consequently, on account of their being the faithful embodiment of divine
love, and without any hint of objectifying what some Reformers much later reacted to as
'works-righteousness', can be said to 'draw down the mercy of God.' 1 ' Good works are
nothing other than God's mercy at work in the flesh. As such they actually function as a
means of grace both for those who perform them and for those to whom they are directed.
Indeed as Maximus has it, 'the Lord's mercy is hidden in the mercy we show to our
neighbour' (TO E?\EOS TO6 Ku p ou iv Tri iXErpoot; vri TOU rrAnoiov iyKiKpurrTa 0,146
meaning not simply that God has mercy on others through our having mercy on them, but
that through our having mercy on others God has mercy on us? The relation between the
two is not one of cause and effect: God does not have mercy on us just because we have
mercy on others. It is rather one of identification: our acts of mercy are our experience of
divine mercy. Through them we become paradigms of and for God: flesh and blood
examples according to which we actually call on God to act when we pray, 'forgive, as we
forgive....
commandments, are therefore simply two aspects of the singular subjective experience of
the universal divine love in one's own particular, bodily existence.
144 Ep. 2 (PG 91.401BC).
1 45 Ep. 2 (PG 91.408A).
146 LA 42 (CCSG 40, 115.973-974).
147 Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 64.651-656): Kai TO 0E6: KaeiaTflaiv iauTOv dpErfis igeprAcipiov, El TOUT°
EITTE1V, trpOs 'Arnow iauToV, TOIP «pipriTov AOeiv EyKEXEU01.1EVOC.
'147 Love for God and love for neighbour, the sum total of all the
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The opening chapters of Maximus' Centuries on Love confirm our present claim that
charity is the necessary 'outward vesture' of faith and therefore is faith in its subsistent
actuality. There in what is not an altogether infrequent use of a deliberate structural strategy
by Maximus we find faith at the centre of a chiastic arrangement of which love forms the
outer frame.' While Sherwood has noted the inverse symmetrical structure of these
verses,149 in no study to my knowledge have they been set out diagramatically to highlight
their form:
A	 TiKTEI 611-0(081a,
clirciestav 	 j sic OsOv iXTT(C 
TTIV Si DariSa, in-ropovn Kai paKpoOupia
Tas S g , 1 TrEplEKTIKT) iyKpartsta 
gyKpaTstav Si, 6 T01.1 0E66 (popoc 
TOv Si 46130V, Ti Etc TOv Ktiptov TrfOTIC.
F'	 6 ITIOTEUCOV TC KUpICJ, 4O3E-1TM T11V KOXaGIV
E'	 6 Si ckoPotipivoc TT1V KOXacitv, gyKpaTaisTat arro .1-6)v rra0c3v
D'	 6 Si iyKpaTettOpsvos chro Liv Trak:iv irtropgvst Ta 07\43613a
6 Si t'1rop6vcov Ta exipEp« 4E1 EIS' 0E0V DoriSa 
B'	 Si sic esOv ikrric xcopiCst Ti-aoric yfivric Trpoonaecias -rew win/
A'	 TaljTTIC Si 6 volis xcopicreEis El TflV EIS' 0E0V ciyamy.
Here in an elaborate literary construct the formal relationship between the three
primary theological virtues is vividly illustrated. In comparing this arrangement to what we
have called the charismatic virtues we notice again how fear of God's punishment
148 Car. 1.2-3.
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immediately follows upon faith. Such fear however spurs the believer on to master the
passions, from which point he progresses through patient, hope-filled endurance in
tribulations and separation from earthly attachments towards the fullness of love for God.
Divine love and wisdom are thus seen to be the same: they are fully clothed, effectual faith;
perfect union with God; actual deification. Joseph a Spiritu Sancto's summary comments
are especially pertinent in this connection:
Thus, the three theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, mark three stages by which
man apprehends God in a closer and closer immediate contact with Him, whereas the
seven gifts of the Holy Ghost accentuate man's gradual approach to the union with God
from the more human side of this mysterious process, in so far as they make us see how, in
a soul that is responsive to the energies of the Holy Ghost, the practice of moral virtue in
daily life becomes more perfect, more connatural, more divine, so that finally every
virtuous act becomes a reflex of a divine perfection. Both the seven gifts of the Holy
Ghost and the three theological virtues are the result in man's soul of the continuous,
uniform activity of the Spirit of God. The beginning of this activity is faith, and its apex is
love or wisdom.150
It is but a small step to move on from here to consider how the soul's various
passible faculties and the passions to which it is naturally subject are involved in this fully
incarnate exercise and experience of divine love. In his Centuries on Love Maximus famously
speaks of the need for 'the blessed passion of holy love' (Tot") paKapiou Traous Tijs
dyias dy«Trqs) that binds the intellect to spiritual realities, at the same time persuading it
149 Sherwood, St. Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Life, 248 fn2.
159 'The Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost', 937-938.
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to prefer immaterial, intelligible and divine realities to those of matter and sense. 151 There
also we find a distinction between 'the blameworthy (tPEKTOv) passion of love' that
engrosses the mind in material things and 'the praiseworthy (irraivETOv) passion of love'
that binds it to divine things. 152 It is called a passion because as we have pointed out divine
love is as much 'suffered' as it is enacted: in the enactment of it, we suffer it. Yet it is also
an all-encompassing passion that by nature excludes any other competing or opposing
'love'. This radical, single-minded and exclusive devotion constitutes the very definition of
what it means to love God. He who has his mind fixed (lit. 'nailed') on love for God
'disdains all visible things as alien, even his own body.'m
It would be wrong to conclude from such a strong statement however that the
body is thereby excluded from participating in the fully integral union concretely realised in
love for God and neighbour. As Thunberg has observed, the good use of the concupiscible
and irascible faculties of the soul, typically associated with love for God and love for
neighbour respectively, features as a primary component in the bodily manifestation of
God as love.' To risk being repetitive: in being deified, man does not leave his passible
faculties behind. On the contrary, 'charity implies that this "passibility" be restored from its
perversion and transformed, and that it thus accompany man through all his life as a
human being.' Even those passions that only on account of the fall were grafted into the
more irrational part of nature such as pleasure, pain, desire, grief and the like, are through
the reorienting and purifying work of ascetic struggle and contemplation able to be brought
under the mediating hegemony of divinely-informed reason and so transformed in
151 Car. 3.67.
152 Car. 3.71.
153 Car. 1.6.
154 Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos, 102-103.
155 Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos, 104.
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character. Maximus explains this shift in the moral status of the passions in terms of the
proper 'use' (Xpilms) of the passible faculties, by this time a well-worn Platonic moral
code." The passions are transformed because the manner in which the soul uses its natural
faculties has altered at the most fundamental level. We can follow Maximus' essentially
christocentric thinking on this matter by looking at his answer to Thalassius' perplexing
question as to whether such passions are inherently evil, or whether their moral status is
capable of changing with their use. We notice in this discussion that the moral status of the
passions is contingent above all upon the moral status of the soul using them:
Obviously the passions become good in the zealous (811 TOIS CT1TOU5a iot s) once they have
wisely severed them from corporeal objects and put them to work to acquire heavenly
things. For example, they turn desire (irrieupiav) into an appetitive movement of the
intellectual desire for divine things, pleasure (.650viiv) into a harmless joy over the activity
of the mind enchanted with the divine gifts, fear (4)6130v) into a preventative concern
about the retributive punishment to come, and grief (Vrmw) into a corrective repentance
in the face of evil in the present.... Thus the passions happen to be good when used by
those who take captive eveg thought for obedience to Christ (2 Cor 10:5).157
Paul Blowers has made this transformation of the passions the object of a special
study in which he concludes that the created passions, which for Maximus are 'gentiles' in
the native territory of the soul, retain a 'contingent presence' in the lived story of human
nature. Nevertheless, 'despite their deviance in connection with the abuse of free will, they
still constitute a crucial vehicle by which incarnational grace is embodied in the farthest
156 Danielou, Platonirme et Theobsk Mystique, 63.
157 2.Thed 1 (CCSG 7, 47.18 — 49.33).
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reaches of the cosmic order. ..2158 The Christian struggle to embody divine love does not
exclude the passions from the union of the soul with God but rather relies on them as a
'crucial vehicle' through which this union is attained in its created, incarnate integrity. The
good use of the soul's faculties eventually leads to that future reversal of the corrupt state
when flesh will be 'swallowed up by the soul in Spirit, and the soul swallowed up by God
who is the true life so that the soul will possess the whole of God and radiate him alone
throughout its entire being.'159
The passible faculties, whose means of operation depend on the bodily senses, are
therefore morally neutral, depending on their use. Their right use is determined not only by
the subjective moral intent of the particular soul using them, but also by the harmony of
that intent and use with the divinely ordained nature of the faculties themselves. This
principle extends beyond the soul's faculties to include all created things. Scripture takes
away nothing given by God for our use: it forbids neither eating, having children, nor the
possession and right management of goods. Rather it restrains immoderation and corrects
their irrational use — such as gluttony, fornication, and greed - vices that arise out of an
empassioned (ipTraec35) relationship with created things.m
The vices, whether of the concupiscible, irascible, or rational faculties, come upon us
through the misuse (Ka-ra Trapdxpriatv) of the soul's faculties. Misuse of the rational
faculty is ignorance and folly; misuse of the irascible and concupiscible faculties is hatred
and intemperance. But the right use of these faculties is knowledge and prudence, love and
moderation. And if this is the case, then nothing created and brought into being by God is
evil. It is not food that is evil, but gluttony. It is not having children that is evil, but
Iss Blowers, 'Gentiles of the Soul', 57.
159 Amb.M. 22 (PG 91.1252A).
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fornication; not possessions, but greed; not reputation, but vainglory. And if this is the
case, then there is nothing evil in created beings except their misuse, which itself stems
from the intellect's neglect of its own natural cultivation.161
Even the human being's most basic bodily appetite for food, the crux in man's fall, is
capable of a fully 'spiritual' use that does not imply bodily starvation and abuse. As
Maximus comments in relation to the petition, 'give us today our daily/supersubstantial
bread,' it is
on account of the life in the Spirit that we are content to use the present life in such a way
as not to refrain from sustaining it with bread alone or from keeping up its good physical
health, so far as it is within our power, not in order to live but rather in order to live for
God. This way we establish the body - rendered rational by the virtues - as a messenger of
the soul, and by its steadfastness in the good we make the soul a herald of God.162
If to use something correctly is to use it according to its true nature or logos — a fact
determined by its divinely-given, teleologically directed skopos, then the skopos of all things is
itself determined by 'perfect love.' Maximus makes this clear by means of a striking
juxtaposition of 'purpose' and 'use' in the following two paragraphs:
God alone is good by nature, and only the one who imitates God is good by will. For it is
God's purpose (oKurrOs) to unite evildoers to himself who is good by nature that they may
become good. That is why when reviled by them, he blesses; when persecuted, he endures;
160 Car. 4.66.
161 Car. 3.3-4.
162 Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 62.619 — 63.625).
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when blasphemed, he entreats, when murdered, he intercedes. He does all things in order
not to fall away from the purpose of love, which is God himself.
The Lord's commandments teach us to use indifferent things in a correct way. The
appropriate use (-6 Ei:iXoyos- xpfic( s) of indifferent things purifies the state of the soul; the
pure state of the soul gives rise to discernment, which gives rise to imperturbability, from
which is begotten perfect love (6 TEXE a ecyciarri).163
There is a certain paradox here that conveniently leads us into our final section on
deification as suffering and death. The right use of the soul's passible faculties or of created
realities requires a discernment of and living openness to the divine skopos hidden deep
down in the structure of the universe, unveiled in its most naked form as suffering love in
the Lord's passion and death, and incarnately filled out through the Christian's own
fulfilment of the two-fold command of love. Such 'filling out' involves a mysterious
reciprocity between the activity and passivity on the part of the human person. Our proper
(active) use of created realities and of our own affective drives is inextricably bound up
with our (passive) submission to and experience of the divinely-willed purpose for the
whole human microcosm with all its constituent, and even morally marginal, components.
We can do no better than to draw on Blowers yet again in support of our concluding
remarks:
If passion (n-cieoc) bespeaks the primal Adamic and historic experience, the tragic loss of
integrity suffered within the differentiated levels and aspects of human nature, so ultimately
will passion bespeak the profound experience in which that nature regains its wholeness in
Christ and receives its full share in the divine life. Not surprisingly, Maximus describes
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"deification" in terms not only of perfected spiritual knowledge and virtue, or as the
christlike exercise of free choice by the saints in the eschaton, but also, dramatically, as a
sublime experience (Triipc), a pleasurable suffering (Treicis), a "supernatural passion"
(in-ip cl)tiotv TO Tro'cOos.) wherein the creature's utter passivity to divine grace is but a
consummation of the active powers in human nature.164
Deification as Suffering and Death
George Berthold once suggestively referred in a footnote to suffering as 'the tropos of
deificadon,'165 but did not go on to elaborate upon this theme. Yet as far as I can see it is
the nearest one can come to answering the question at the heart of our study as to what
happens to the body when it is deified. The short answer is: it suffers. Hidden beneath the
outward bodily suffering of the saints, be it imposed voluntarily as askesis or involuntarily as
tribulation, lies their deifying passage 'from glory to glory.' And, not unlike the universal
human pathos that in Balthasar's words 'runs through all gestures of existence', this deifying
suffering also 'reaches a peak in the riddle of death.'166
Death, as we have seen for Maximus, can only properly be understood and
interpreted christologically. The 'living death' that the first Adam 'fashioned for himself'
and, in him, for the whole of human nature through his eating of the forbidden fruit is
nothing more than the inevitable consequence of his rejection of the true bread of heaven,
associated with the tree of life, that alone 'gives life to the world' On 6:33). 167 Death is not
163 Car. 4.90-91.
164 Blowers, 'Gentiles of the Soul', 81-82.
165 Maximus Confessor: Selected Wntings, 173 fn57.
166 Theo-Drama, volume 4, 117.
167 Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1156C — 1157A).
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simply a biological event. It is separation from God.'" It is a power that interrupts the very
genesis of human nature from the outset and corrupts its progress in such a way that true life
can never quite take hold. As Maximus explains:
For if death is the corruption of generation ((Papa ysv6oEcos), and if the body, generated
by a constant flow of nourishment, is naturally corrupted, being dissipated by flux, then
Adam preserved death in a flourishing condition by means of the elements that he thought
to be the source of life.169
This is by now a familiar topos for us in the Confessor's writings, yet each time he tells the
story there are new metaphors and unexpected shades of nuance. And this passage from
Ambiguum 10 is no exception. Through his fall from divine life, the first man accepted
death as 'father of another life' in exchange for the paternal, life-giving Word of God. But
as it turns out this surrogate is a cruel tyrant who devours the human nature begotten by
him, 'turning us into fodder' (fiwis 3pc3atv nototipevos). Thus 'we never actually come
to live [in this life] at all, since we are always being eaten up by him through corruption.'m
Suffering and death under this regime are anything but deifying. They are on the contrary
the 'most just' penalty of sin in human nature.171
As we might expect, Maximus follows this pitiful description of the Adamic state
with an equally vivid account of its reversal. But in this case Maximus considers not so
much the reversal achieved in the particular events of Christ's life and death, but that
consequentially learned, taught and practised by the saints as spiritual artisans. They
168 Car. 2.93: 
	
PEV EC7TI KUpICOC 0 Toil °soil xoaptopcis.
169 Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1156D).
170 Amb.M. 10 (PG 91.1157A).
1712. ThaZ 61 (CCSG 22, 87.36— 89.76).
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recognise that this futile existence of constant change 'is not the life originally given by
God', teaching instead that there is 'another, divine life' that can only be attained by putting
aside the present life. And 'since there is no putting aside of life without death,'
they devised (iTrevOncrav) the rejection of carnal affection to be its death, for through this
affection death has gained entry into life. Their aim was that, devising a death by means of
death, they might cease from living through death and die an honourable death before the
Lord, a death that is really the death of death - a death able to corrupt corruption and to
provide an entry way in the worthy for the blessed and incorruptible life.172
Is Maximus here advocating some kind of masochistic, morbid engagement in a mimedcs
of violence? Far from it. Bodily suffering has no merit in itself. Those who vainly exalt
bodily hardship as though it were an ultimate end 'turn the Word into flesh in themselves
in a blameworthy manner (4ierrc.:55).' 17' Suffering only glorifies God when endured 'for the
sake of virtue', 174 and virtue itself is subordinate to truth."' Even the Saviour became a
human being 'not to suffer, but to save.' 176 The ascetic life which, in all its intricate, finely-
tuned details — fasting, almsgiving, vigils, psalmody, prayer, not to mention the 'relentless
ascesis of social relations' 177 characteristic of a monasticism formed in the desert - amounts
to 'the rejection of carnal affection' (TO cirropoViv Tfis- Ka-ra acipKa crropyfis), is a
sagacious scheme carefully concocted and actively adopted by the saints to bring about the
death of death and to furnish a space in the Christian for the reception of real, divine life.
172 .Amb.Io. 10 (PG 91.1157C).
173 Th.Oec. 2.42.
174 Th.Oec. 2.72.
173 2ThaZ 30 (CCSG 7,219.14-23).
176 ()prise. 3 (PG 91.48C); .Q.ThaL 63 (CCSG 22, 173.435-438).
177 Brown, Body and Society, 227.
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Just as the sheepskins worn by the early Egyptian monks reminded them that through their
life of ascetic contest they were bearing about in their bodies the death of Jesus (2 Cor
4:10), the sacrificial lamb,' so does the Christian's voluntary adoption of suffering for
Christ's sake in the form of self-denial, rigorous spiritual discipline and love of one's
enemies fulfil that bodily mortification under which is anticipated and manifested the
divine life of the coming age. Future participation in the eschatological glory of Christ's
resurrection life presupposes that we have already (195n) become sharers in the likeness of
his death (atilicku-rot
	 Tc.;? Opolu)paTI TOCI eavdTOU diToG) through suffering.'"
Baptism, naturally enough, is the sacrament of initiation into this apparently
peculiar way of life-through-death. The very dramatic details of the rite — immersion in
water and re-emergence from its drowning depths - already mark out on the physical body
of the candidate the precise pattern (-nSTrov) of entombment and resurrection, each of
which corresponds to a particular stage in the overall divine economy and whose final
archetype is other-worldly.180 Thus 'he who through baptism fulfils the pattern of
entombment and resurrection here in the present (iv-ratiea) should expect at the proper
time (Katpois iSiots) actually to become the all-perfect resurrection." While those
baptised into Christ through the Spirit receive 'the first incorruptibility' at a bodily,
contingent level (Ka-ra adpKa), they only receive 'the final incorruptibility according to
Christ in the Spirit in guarding undefiled the first incorruptibility by augmenting it with
good works and the intentional death' of self-mortification.182
178 Evag.Prak.proL (SC 171, 488.37 — 490.41).
178 Amb.Io. 31 (PG 91.1281B). Cf. Romans 6:5.
180 .0 115 (CCSG 10, 84.3-7).
181 QD 115 (CCSG 10, 84.9-12).
182 Th.Oec. 1.87.
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At another level of interpretation, the Lord's own baptism in blood on the cross
prefigures the baptismal, voluntary and intentional (Ka-ra TrpO0Eotv) sufferings of the
Christian for the sake of virtue. 'Through these, washing away the stains of conscience, we
admit the voluntary death of our faculty of freewill in its preference for visible
phenomena. ... 1 " On behalf of virtue it puts to death our preference for the pleasures of
life?"' Maximus distinguishes this baptism from the 'cup' mentioned by Jesus in the same
passage of Scripture (Mk 10:38). The cup which Jesus drinks 'is a type of the involuntary
trials for the sake of truth that, contrary to our intent, arise against us out of circumstances.
Through these, preferring desire for God to nature itself, we readily submit to the
circumstantial death of nature?"'
With this distinction between voluntary and involuntary sufferings or trials we
arrive at an especially prominent aspect of Maximus' ascetic teaching whose roots lie in
Origen's Commentag on the Lord's Prayer. Maximus however makes subtle connections
between this and his other distinctions that more clearly allows for the conversion of the
evil one's temptations into the God-given instruments for the ascetic's spiritual
formation."'
There are, first of all, two kinds of temptation whose source is devilish and that
exploit our sense-based liability to the vicious dialectic of pleasure and pain. One is
pleasurable (iiSovtK65), chosen (Trpoat
183 The mortification of one's Trpoa pEat s. is a necessary adjunct to the mortification of sin. Both are actively
put to death by means of practising virtue. But the practice of virtue also contains a principle of resurrection
that, leaving sin dead, raises up a renewed TrpoatpEatc so that, 'completely dead and wholly separated from
anything dead, the faculty of freewill may be insensible to sin, and that, being fully alive in an inseparable
union it may become sensible to the totality of living virtue.' See ,,,Q.ThaL 59 (CCSG 22, 57.190-207).
184
.Q.ThaL 30 (CCSG 7, 219.5-8, 14-16).
183 QThaL 30 (CCSG 7,219.9-13).
188 One of the more comprehensive treatments of this subject is found in Q.Thal. 58 (CCSG 22, 27.1 —
37.180), in which Maximus responds to Thalassius' question as to how it is possible, in accordance with 1
Peter 1:6 and James 1:2, to rejoice in trials when they are the apparent source of grief.
prri K65), and voluntary (iKotio n 05); the other is
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painful (OStivrip6s), unwelcome (d TT p oa pETos), and involuntary (dKotiOlOV). The former
begets sin and is to be avoided; the latter constitutes a just penalty for sin, and trials of this
sort are to be endured as purificatory and 'as coming with God's consent:1"
The aim of the Christian, however, is to anticipate these physically painful,
involuntary trials - voluntarily. Self-judgement and self-humiliation are enacted signs that the
Christian recognises the salutary character of divine judgement by which he co-operates
with God's corrective, purgative economy. So we find Maximus saying in the Centuries on
Love:
Nearly every sin is committed for pleasure, and its removal comes about through distress
and grief (whether voluntary or involuntary), through repentance, or through any additional
dispensation introduced by providence. For it says if we were to judge ourselves, we should not be
judged But when we are jucged we are being chastened b) the Lord lest we be condemned with the world (1
Cor 11:31-32).
When a trial comes upon you unexpectedly, do not blame him through whom it
has come. Instead seek out why it has come, then you will find correction. For whether it
comes through one source or through another, you still have to take the bitter wormwood
of God's judgements.188
The voluntary subjection to trial through the active elimination of passionate
attachments to the material order, the relentless scrutiny of vain self-opinions of the soul,
and the unceasing elevation of one's neighbour and even one's enemies over oneself - all of
which from a human perspective look like death, actually spells passage into immortal
187 Or.dam. (CCSG 23, 72.800 — 73.827).
188 Car. 2.41-42. See also IA 22 (CCSG 40, 43.380 — 45.392).
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7e . 189 Those who adopt this way of life become insensitive to physical pain!' They are
ready 'dead' and 'judged in the flesh' (1 Pet 4:6), for 'in a hidden way they bear about in their
dy the death of Jesus (2 Cor 4:1O).191 Death no longer threatens the nature which through
iptism has been 'innovated afresh', but serves only to mortify and condemn sin in it. This
s what Maximus calls 'death's active use' (Tijv Tot) eavdTou Xpficnv ivepyou1ivriv) 192 —
the application at the individual level of what is accomplished universally in Christ - which
is initiated at baptism and finds fulfilment through suffering. The Christian who guards his
baptism through keeping the commands 'uses' death in participatory imitation of Christ as
a mysterious escort toward the divine and everlasting life.1"
From this kind of evidence Maximus can offer a theological verdict and conclude
that it is in fact wrong to call the natural termination (TO Tr g pas) of this present life 'death.'
It is rather
deliverance from death, separation from corruption, escape from violation, the cessation of
trouble, the removal of wars, the receding of darkness, rest from labours, the silencing of
confused hubbub, quiet from excitement, the veiling of shame, flight from the passions,
the disappearing of sin, and, in brief, the termination of all evils. Succeeding at all this
through voluntary mortification, the saints commended themselves as aliens and refugees in
this life (I-leb 11:13).194
189 Ondom. (CCSG 23, 66.694-700).
190 Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 64.646-647).
1912 ThaL 7 (CCSG 7, 73.28 — 75.41).
192 2 ThaL 61 (CCSG 22, 99.235-236).
193 2Tha2 61 (CCSG 22, 99.236-260).
194 Amb.b. 10 (PG 91.1157CD).
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The fact that the holy women and men of old are said already to have 'succeeded'
or achieved (Ka-ropeckiocarrEs) in this life what normally is only ushered in at bodily death
also suggests that there is a way in which this voluntary use of death may be considered the
actual visible, outward, physical experience of deification more than simply by hopeful yet
unrealised anticipation. Here we shall be led to regard once again Maximus' abiding
sensitivity to the essentially prophetic character of the monastic life, being as it is a liminal,
veiled, but nonetheless real embarkation upon the heavenly life. This heightened sense of
the liminality of the monk's bodily life is as much brought on by theological factors as by
existential. Perhaps the most exquisite example of Maxirnian thought in which this problem
is addressed is an exegetical meditation on the tension raised by an apparent biblical
discrepancy in two references to 'ages' (aicSvEs.). For if, Thalassius asks, 'in the coming
ages God will demonstrate his riches' (Eph 2:7), how then has 'the fulfihnent (Ta TO0-1) of
the ages already come for us' (1 Cor 10:11)?'"
In his answer Maximus first refers to the creator's plan, established before the
beginning of all creation, to become man and to make man God through the hypostatic
union. From here he takes the two biblical references to fulfilled and coming ages as an
indication that God wisely divided the ages into those intended for the activity of his
becoming man, and those intended for the activity of man's being made God.' 96
 The
former ages, 'intended for the activity of the mystery of his embodiment', were
accomplished through the events of the incarnation themselves (KaTa TT11) o«pKcootv Si'
airro)v To5v TrpaypciTcov). Consequently they have reached their proper conclusion (TO
oiKliov rr6pas). 197 The ages intended for 'the mystical and ineffable deification of
195 ,Q.ThaL 22 (CCSG 7, 137.1-3).
196 .Q.ThaL 22 (CCSG 7, 137.4-16).
"7 2.ThaL 22 (CCSG 7, 137.17-27).
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humanity', however, and in which God 'will demonstrate the immeasurable richness of his
kindness towards us' (Eph 2:7), still await their actual and total fulfilment.'"
This at least is how Maximus concludes his first meditation on the distinction
between the ages of God's incarnation and the ages of man's deification as suggested by
the apostle's deliberate distinction between 'fulfilled' and 'corning' ages. It is, he adds, not
unlike the distinction between deification by potentiality and deification in actuality.'" But
his point that it is merely a conceptual distinction Crfi irrivoic0' rather than an actual
chronological sequence tells us that he is far from simply putting deification into a future
chronological category accessible at the resurrection of the dead. Typically enough Blowers
has recognised exactly the same point in his cogent analysis of the text:
To ascribe such a state of being purely to a future glory beyond death... would be
inaccurate, for this is in fact a mystery that spans the whole 'natural' life of human
creatures. Ontologically speaking, the mystery of deification coincides with the full 'history'
of human nature, a nature which receives definition precisely by its ongoing openness to
gracious restoration and transformation.201
What allows us to draw this conclusion is Maximus' remaining meditation in which
he couples the distinction between the 'past' ages of God's incarnation and the 'future' ages
of man's deification with 'the principle of activity' or acting (O Toii Troisiv X6yos-) on the
one hand and 'the principle of passivity' or being acted upon (O TOCI Trdo)(Etv X6yos) on
198 2ThaL 22 (CCSG 7, 137.28 — 139.49).
199 2, ThaL 22 (CCSG 7, 139.60-65).
zoo 2ThaL 22 (CCSG 7, 139.50).
zot Blowers, 'Realized Eschatology in Maximus the Confessor, Ad Thakssium 22', 262-263.
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the other.202
 The ages of the flesh in which we now conduct our lives are characterised by
activity, whereas the future ages of the Spirit are characterised by passivity and its
transformation under the influence of divine activity. Whereas the potential available to us
in this life is only fulfilled by constant ascetic activity by which God is made flesh in the
virtues, entry into the coming age is marked by our ceasing from activity and our passive
experience of deification by grace, an experience whose bounds are as infinite as the divine
activity of the one who enacts them upon us. 203 But now we must quote in full:
For this reason we do not cease from being deified. For at that point passivity is
supernatural, and possesses no inherent factor that precludes those who suffer divine
activity from being infinitely deified. For we are active insofar as we possess both the
rational faculty which being activated naturally performs the virtues, as well as the
intellectual faculty which is capable of all knowledge and which at the level of potentiality
passes directly through every being we know and leaves all the ages behind it. And we are
passive when, completely traversing the inner principles of beings that come from non-
being, we come in a state of ignorance to the cause of those beings and bring our own
faculties to rest along with those things that are naturally finite, becoming that which our
own natural powers could in no way achieve, since nature has no power to grasp that
which transcends nature. For nothing created is by nature capable of deification, since it is
incapable of grasping God. For it is intrinsic and peculiar to divine grace alone to bestow
deification proportionately on beings, for only divine grace illuminates nature with
supernatural light and elevates nature beyond its proper limits in excess of glory.204
202 See Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua, 133 fn19, for the philosophical sources for this distinction.
203 p.ThaL 22 (CCSG 7, 139.66— 141.79).
204 2 Thai 22 (CCSG 7,79-98).
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The remarkable passage of nature from activity to passivity described here
hopefully clarifies our claim that deification is manifest bodily as suffering. Deification is
concealed and at the same time disclosed in the Christian life through the visible, external
marks of ascetic activity and voluntary suffering, both of which simply form the dual
modes of faith embodied in love. But of these two modes it is voluntary suffering reaching
its summit in bodily death that most poignantly bears witness to the actual presence of
God's deifying activity here in 'the shadow of death.'205 Nature's passivity, the full
conclusion of its natural activity, provides the raw material par excellence with which God's
infinite activity elevates that very nature and overwhelms it with his glory. In this sense
passivity paradoxically constitutes a superior ontological order that, chronologically
speaking, may co-exist with the active state characteristic of nature's progression to its goal
by the use of its natural powers. What appears under the outward form of 'dying daily' as
the curtailment or diminution of those natural powers is in fact their very fulfilment in
passivity, by which Maximus means total submission by grace to God in Christ.
With these comments we come to the end of this chapter. We have seen how the
ancient philosophical ideal of making this life a preparation for death is for Maximus
inseparable from baptismal participation in the death of Christ and the increasing
adornment of faith in him through works of virtue and suffering love. We are reminded of
the intensely social dimensions which Maximus' conception of this spiritual journey
presumes. Love of those who have only hatred is the first step to liberation from the very
things that stand as obstacles in the path toward imitating the God who loves all people
equally and 'wants them to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth' (1 Tim
205 Car. 2.96.
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2:4) . 206 It is on account of its social character - its presupposition of an object other than
oneself, that love must above all else be suffered. But in the ecstatic going out of oneself
that love demands one enters into actual union with love's object, and so into union with
God. Or as Maximus so beautifully has it,
For the sake of love the saints all resist sin to the very end, taking no account of this
present life and enduring many forms of death, in order that they may be gathered from
this world to themselves and to God, and unite in themselves the torn fragments of
nature.2°7
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Maximus' teaching on deification as suffering and
death is the fact that he embodied it in his own life, and most painfully in his trial, torture,
exile and death at the hands of his ecclesiastical enemies. Inspired by the biographer who
penned the events following his trial and leading to his first exile to Bizya (655), we can
perhaps only imagine the aged monk's joy in being called to fill up in his own body the
sufferings of Christ. We can only imagine his thanksgiving when crying aloud he exhorted,
Tray for the Lord's sake that with our humiliation God may perfect his mercy, and may
teach us that those who sail along with him experience a savage sea....' All his sufferings
and those of his companions he no doubt would have recognised as the gracious gift of
God and participation in the death of Christ, gifts offered to man that he might not trust in
himself but attribute his salvation to God alone.m Hunger, thirst, nakedness, chains and
prisons, exiles and scourges, cross, nails, vinegar and gall, spitting and slaps and blows and
mockings: all this bodily torment has for its end
206 Car. 1.61; cf. 1.62; 1.71-74.
207 Ep. 2 (PG 91.404D).
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a radiant resurrection, bringing peace with it to those who have been persecuted on his
account, and joy to those who were afflicted for him, and ascension into heaven and
accession at the Father's transcendent throne, and an appointed place above every principa101 and
authorzbi and power and dominion, and above every name that can be named - whether in this age or in the
age to come (Eph 1:21).209
208 RIVI (CCSG 39, 49.479 — 51.485).
209 RAI (CCSG 39, 51.498-504).
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CONCLUSION
Can it really be imagined that the patristic tradition, which is still the source of "spiritual
life" in a narrow sense of the expression, is no longer of any use in our intellectual
inquiries? Is it no longer fertile? Has everything it contained been completely assimilated,
digested, systematized, and "surpassed" by subsequent speculation, and is it now a waste of
time to turn to it?1
Having arrived at the conclusion of our essay, we may return to the question raised at the
beginning in the introduction: What is the mind of the patristic tradition with respect to the
contemporary call for a return to the primacy of the external, material, and bodily in
determining what is constitutive of catholic Christianity? I have maintained that Saint
Maximus, at once faithful to the primary lines of tradition in the Greek Fathers as well as
their creative interpreter, accords to the body - and thus to the historical, social, ecclesial
and material cosmic orders - a definitive, constitutive place in God's creative, saving, and
sanctifying economies. The chaotic element in material diversity is overcome not by the
elimination of matter, but by its incarnational, ascetic, sacramental and liturgical
incorporation in Christ. To the extent that in this life the body is adorned with the virtues,
in which God the Word takes on visible, fleshly contours, it - no less than the soul —
already 'suffers' deification, anticipating under the veil of humility its glorious participation
in the soul's future beatitude.
This does not, however, amount to an unqualified primacy of the bodily, external,
or particular. Maximus could never say 'I am my body' in the sense advocated by more
Henri de Lubac, The Discovery of God, trans. Alexander Dru (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 208.
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revisionist theologies of the body. 2
 As Lutheran Jeffrey C. Eaton has argued in a recent
essay on the philosophy of one-time Bishop of Cloyne, George Berkeley (d. 1753), it is
only by giving way to a primacy of spirit that we can restore the material world to its
rightful integrity without danger of usurpation. Berkeley's famous maxim, often
misunderstood, could well be asserted in support of the present thesis: 'Matter once
allow'd. I defy any man to prove that God is not matter: 3 Unlike the soul, the body is not
self-subsistent. Its existence comes from outside itself, via the rational soul, and apart from
its subordinate relationship to the soul the body drags human nature into the diffuse chaos
of material irrationality. We have agreed with Peter Brown that for Christian monks, in
contrast to pagan intellectualists, 'Mlle material conditions of the monk's life were held
capable of altering the consciousness itself.° But we have also seen that this capability was
thought to be conditioned by the principle of 'use', whose rightness is determined by
agreement with the divinely given order and purpose of created things according to their
respective inherent logoi.
All of this might suggest that Maximus' commitment to the primacy of spirit would
preclude any concession to the material order of an importance beyond its contingent,
secondary ontological status. Yet, on the basis of the mystery of the Incarnation, it is
exclusively in the harmony proper to this contingent, subordinate relation that all material
phenomena, including the body, exceed their finite boundaries and so become vehicles of
divine theophany. The bodily resurrection of Christ and his ascension into heaven
adumbrate the passage of the material order with the soul into a transcendent realm where
2 Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, I am my Body: A Theology of Embodiment (New York: Continuum, 1995).
3 Quoted by Jeffrey C. Eaton, The Primacy of Spirit', in Eric 0. Springsted (ed.), Spiritua0, and Theology:
Essvs in Honor of Diogenes Allen (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 87.
4 The Bocb, and Society, 237.
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the passible and corporeal become entirely transparent to divine glory. Thus the very
integrity of the material order lies in its being transcended.
Whatever ambivalence remains, then, is not in Maximus' attitude towards the body,
but in the body itself, its senses, and the physical realm. All depends on their being referred
to a reality beyond, but not apart from themselves. To enshrine the historical, contingent,
material and outward for its own sake draws us not only into qapperrant metaphysics' s but
into idolatry. The alternative is not `spiritualisation', if by that we mean reducing the
universe to abstraction and irrevocably disengaging from the material order. It is rather
'spiritual life,' or better, life in the Spirit, by which we mean bodily participation in the
divine life of the holy Trinity, a mysterious reality rendered accessible sacramentally in the
bodily, divine-human life of one of that same holy Trinity. There alone is flesh made holy
and human nature wholly deified. There alone is the mystery of deification actualised.
There alone is the purpose of the universe fulfilled, and `God is proclaimed to be truly a
Father by grace.'6
5 Eaton, 'The Primacy of Spirit', 95.
6 Or.dom. (CCSG 23, 71.791-792).
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